Socialism As It Is

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What were "the advantages for the struggle of the working class" that
Frank and his associates could obtain by voting for the Baden Budget of
1910--besides the extension of the suffrage? First importance was placed
upon school reforms. Several religious normal schools were abolished;
women were permitted to serve on municipal committees for school affairs
and charities; the wages of teachers were somewhat increased; school
girls were given an extra year; physicians were introduced into the
schools; and a law was passed by which, for the first time, children
were no longer forced to take religious instruction against the will of
their parents. Social-Democrats in the legislature were allowed for the
first time to write the reports for important committees, such as those
on the schools, factory inspection, and town or township taxation. Aside
from these considerable improvements in the schools and in the election
law, the only advantage of importance was a decrease of the income tax
for those who earn less than 1400 marks ($350). One might have expected
that a government which claims to be progressive, to say nothing of
being radical or Socialistic, would altogether have exempted from
taxation incomes as small as $350--modest even for Germany. Frank
mentions also that 100,000 marks ($20,000) was appropriated for
insurance against unemployment, but this sum is trifling for a State the
size of Baden.

It was not denied by the radical Socialists that such measures are
desirable, but they did not feel that it was worth while, on that
account, to lay aside their main business, that of building up a
movement to overthrow capitalist government. As I have shown, capitalist
governments may be expected continually to inaugurate programs of
reform which, while strengthening capitalism, are incidentally of more
or less benefit to the working class. This is neither any part of
Socialism, nor does it tend towards decreasing the economic disparity
between the classes.

"If small concessions and trifles have been referred to," said the
revolutionary Karl Liebknecht, "it must not be understood that by this
it is meant to undervalue the practical work of the Badenese, but that
what has been attained is considered to be small, when measured by the
greatness of our aims. The so-called radicals, these are the true
reformers, the realistic political reformers who do not overlook the
forest on account of the trees."

Bebel, in two long speeches delivered at this Congress, defined the
Socialist attitude to existing governments and existing political
parties in a way that no longer leaves it possible that any earnest
student of Socialism can misunderstand it. He was supported by the
overwhelming majority of the Congress when he said that the policy of
the Baden Social-Democrats meant practically the support of the National
Liberals; that is to say, of the conservative party of the large
capitalists. The Socialists of Germany all consider that the parties
nearest related to theirs are the Radical or small capitalist parties,
formerly called the "Freethinkers" and the "People's" parties
(Freisinnige and Volkspartei) and now united under the name Progressive
Party. But a tacit alliance with these alone could not have been brought
about in Baden, so that the Socialists there favored going so far as to
ally themselves for all practical purposes with the chief organization
representing the bankers, manufactures, and employers--with the object,
of course, of overcoming the conservatives, the Catholic and
aristocratic parties.

"Now all of a sudden we hear that our tactics are false, that we must
ally ourselves with the National Liberals," said Bebel. "_We even have
National Liberals in our party.... But if one is a National Liberal,
then one must get out._ The Badenese speak of the great results which
they have obtained with the help of the Great Alliance [_i.e._ an
alliance with both National Liberals and Radicals]. Now results which
are reached with the help of the National Liberals don't bring us very
far.

"If we combine with capitalistic parties, you can bet a thousand to one
that we are the losers by it. It is, so to speak, a law of nature, that
in a combination of the right and the left the right draws the profits.
Such a combination cripples criticism and places us under obligations."

"_The government can well conciliate the exploited classes in case of
necessity, but never with a fundamental social transformation in the
direction of the socialization of society._" The reader must here avoid
confusion. Bebel does not say that the ruling class cannot or will not
bring about great legislative and political reforms, such as large
governmental undertakings of more or less benefit to every class of the
community, like canals or railways, but that such measures as are
_conceded to the Socialist pressure_ and at _the same time actually work
in the direction of Socialism are few and insignificant_. Bebel's
meaning is clear if we remember that we do not move towards Socialism
unless the reforms when taken together are sufficient both _to
counteract governmental changes and the automatic movement of society in
the opposite direction_.

Frank tried to make out that his action and that of his companions in
allying themselves with a progressive capitalist government was similar
to that taken by the Socialists in other countries. He mentioned
Denmark, England, and Austria, and one of the governments of Switzerland
(Berne), and also claimed that the Belgians would probably support a
Liberal government in case they and the Liberals gained a majority. All
these statements except one (that concerning England) Bebel denied. We
do not need to take his interpretation of the Austrian situation,
however, any more than Frank's, for an Austrian delegate, Schrammel, was
present and explained the position of his party. "If we voted for the
immediate consideration of the budget, we voted only for taking up the
question and not for the budget itself.... I declare on this occasion
that the comrades can rest assured as to our conduct in the Austrian
Parliament, that we would under no circumstances vote for a budget
without having the consent of our comrades in the realm. We will not act
independently, but will always submit ourselves to the decisions of the
majority taken for that particular occasion." It would seem from this
that the Austrians are considering the possibility of voting for the
budget under certain circumstances. But the Germans would also do this
much, and it is uncertain whether the cases in which the Austrians would
take this action would be any more frequent.

As to the English attitude, Bebel said: "The English cannot serve us as
a model for all things, first because England has quite other
conditions, and secondly, because there is no great Social-Democratic
Party there at the present moment. Marx would no longer point to trade
unions there as the champions of the European proletariat. From 1871
Marx showed the German Social-Democracy that it was its duty to take the
lead. We have done this, and we will continue to do it, if we are
sensible." As to Denmark, Bebel said that he was assured by one of the
most prominent representatives of the Danish movement that even if the
Socialists and Radicals had secured a majority in the recent elections,
that the former would not have become a part of the administration.
France had also been mentioned by some of the speakers, since Jaures and
his wing of the French Party had at one time favored the policy of
supporting a progressive capitalist government. But Bebel reminded the
Congress that Jaures had expressly declared that he had not been
persuaded to vote against the budget by the resolution to that effect
passed at the International Congress of Amsterdam, but that, after a
long hesitation, he did it "out of his own free conviction."

Bebel did not hesitate to condemn roundly those who were responsible for
this latest effort to lead the party to abandon its principles. He did
not deny that a majority of the organization in Baden and also in Hesse
agreed with its representatives. But he attributed this partly to the
fact that the revisionists controlled the Baden party newspapers, which
he accused of being partisan and of not giving full information, and
partly to the regrettable influence of "leaders." Similar conditions
occur internationally, and Bebel's words, like so much that was said and
done at this Congress, have the highest international significance.

"The peoples cannot at all grasp why one still supports a government
which one would prefer to set aside to-day rather than to-morrow," he
said. "A part of our leaders no longer understand, and no longer know
what the masses have to suffer. You have estranged yourselves too much
from the masses.

"Formerly it was said that the consuls should take care that the state
suffers no harm. _To-day one must say, let the masses take care that the
leaders prepare no harm. Democratic distrust against everybody, even
against me, is necessary. Attend to your editors._" These expressions,
like the others I have quoted, received the greatest applause from the
Congress.

It was almost unanimously agreed that, although the Socialist members of
the Baden legislature had acted against the decision of the previous
Nuremburg Congress, it was neither wise nor necessary to proceed so far
as expulsion, and Bebel especially was in favor of acting as leniently
as possible, but this does not mean that he found the slightest excuse
for the minority or that he failed to let them understand that he would
fight them to the end, if they did not yield in the future to the
radical majority.

"If a few among us should be mad enough," he said, "to think of a
split, I know it is not coming. The masses will have nothing to do
with it, and if a small body should follow, it would not take three
months until we would have them again in our armies. Our friends in
South Germany who are against our resolution ought to ask
themselves if, since the Nuremburg Congress, there has not appeared
a noteworthy reversal of sentiment. Now to-day North Bavaria is
thoroughly against the granting of the budget. Nuremburg is
decidedly against it. Stuttgarters and others who spoke at that
time occupied an entirely different standpoint to-day. The Hessian
minority against the granting of the budget was never as strong as
it is to-day. In Hanover voices are to be heard which expressed
themselves very differently before, but are now also against it. If
anybody thinks that he can easily escape from all these phenomena,
then he is mightily mistaken. I guarantee that I could draw out
quite another sentiment in Baden." "Try once!" it was called out
from the audience, and Bebel answered: "Yes, we are ready to do
this if we must. The proletarians of Baden would have to be no
proletarians at all if it were otherwise."

The principal resolution on the question, signed by a large minority of
the Congress, proposed that any persons who voted for a budget by that
very act automatically "stood outside the party." Bebel said that this
was not the customary method of the organization, and pointed out that
no means were provided in the constitution of the party for throwing out
a whole group, that the constitution had been drawn up only for
individuals, and provided that any one to be expelled should receive a
very thorough trial. As opposed to this resolution, he offered a report
in the name of the executive committee of the party, which stated,
however, that there was no fundamental difference of opinion between the
executive and the signers of the resolution above mentioned, but only a
difference as to method.

This report declared: "We are of the opinion that in case the resolution
of the party executive is passed, and notwithstanding this the
resolution is not respected, that then the conditions are present for a
trial for exclusion according to Article 23 of the organization
statutes." This article says: "No one can belong to the party who is
guilty of gross misconduct against the party program or of a
dishonorable action. Exclusion of a member may also take place if his
persistent acts against the resolutions of his party organization or of
the party congress damage the interests of the party."

The passage of Bebel's resolution, by a vote of 289 to 80, was an
emphatic repudiation of reformism. In the minority, besides the South
Germans, were to be found a considerable proportion of the delegates
from a very few of the many important cities of North Germany, namely,
Hanover, Dresden, Breslau, and Magdeburg, together with an insignificant
minority from Berlin and Hamburg.

The South Germans claimed to be fairly well satisfied with the somewhat
conciliatory resolution of Bebel in spite of his strong talk. But, as
has been the case for many years, they were very aggressive and, in
closing the debate, Frank made some declarations which brought the
Congress to take even a stronger stand than Bebel had proposed.

"To-day I say to you in the name of the South Germans," said Frank,
"that we have the very greatest interest in union and harmony in
the party. We will do our duty in this direction, but no one of us
can declare to you to-day what will happen in the budget votings of
the next few years. That is a question of conditions." This remark
caused a great disturbance and was taken by the majority as a
defiance and a warning that the South Germans intended to support
capitalistic governments in the future. In fact, other remarks by
Frank left no doubt of this. "In Nuremburg," he said "we rested our
case on the contents of certain points of the budget, namely, the
increase of the wages of laborers, and the salaries of officials.
This time we gave the political situation as a ground. These are,
as Bebel will concede, different things."... Frank went on to say
that he and his associates would obey the resolution of the
Congress not to vote for the budget _under the particular
conditions_ proscribed at Nuremburg or at Magdeburg. "But," he
said, "do you believe that there ever exists a situation in the
world which is exactly like another? Do you believe that a budget
vote to-day must absolutely be like a budget vote two years from
now?"

That is to say, Frank openly and defiantly announced that the South
Germans might easily find some new reason for doing what they wanted to
do in the future, in spite of the clear will of the Congress.

A new resolution was then brought in by the majority to this effect: "In
view of the declaration of Comrade Frank in his conclusion that he and
his friends must take exception to the position taken in the resolution
of the Congress, we move that the following sentence from the
declaration of Comrade Bebel in support of the motion of the party
executive should be raised to the position of a resolution; namely, 'We
are of the opinion that in case the resolution of the party executive is
passed, and notwithstanding the resolution is disrespected, that then
the conditions are present for a trial for exclusion according to
article 23 of the organization statutes.'"

When this motion was put, Frank and the South Germans left the room, and
it was carried by 228 to 64, the minority this time consisting mostly of
North Germans. This vote showed the very highest number that could be
obtained from other sections to sympathize with the South Germans; for
the resolution in its finally accepted form was certainly a very sharp
one, and Richard Fisher, a member of the Reichstag from Berlin, and
others for the first time took a stand with the minority. It is
doubtful, however, whether the total support the South Germans secured
at any and all points together with their own numbers reached as high a
figure as 120 or one third of the Congress. In the matter of their right
openly to disobey the majority, the Baden Party could not even secure
this vote, but was only able to bring together against the majority
(consisting of 301) seventy-one delegates, nearly all South Germans.

It appears, then, that the overwhelming majority of the German Party is
unalterably opposed to "reformism," "revisionism," opportunism,
compromise, or any policy other than that of revolutionary Socialism.
For not only the question of supporting capitalist governments, but all
similar policies, were condemned by these decisive majorities.

How much this means may be gathered from the fact that "revisionists" as
the "reformists" are called in Germany, practically propose that the
Socialist Party should resolve itself for an indefinite period into an
ordinary democratic reform party in close alliance with other
non-Socialist parties.

"The weightiest step on the road to power," wrote the revisionist
Maurenbrecher, "is that we should succeed in the coming Reichstag in
shaping the Liberal and Social-Democratic majority (formed) for defense
against the conservatives, into a positive and effective working
majority." In discussing the support of the budget by the
Social-Democrats of Baden, Quessel explained definitely what kind of
positive and effective work such an alliance would be expected to
undertake; namely, "To fight personal government [of the Kaiser], to
protect earnestly the interest of the consumers against the exploiting
agrarian politicians, to undertake limitations of armaments on the basis
of international treaties, to introduce a new division of the election
districts [which has not been done since 1871], and to bring about a
legal limitation of the hours of labor to ten at the most." Already the
radical parties now united, favor all these measures except the
limitation of armaments, which from the analogy with peace movements in
other countries, and certain indications even in Germany, they may favor
within a very few years. Quessel's program is that of the non-Socialist
reformers, and a step, not towards Socialism, but towards collectivist
capitalism.

Karl Kautsky has dealt with the immediate bearing in German Socialism of
what he calls "the Baden rebellion," at some length, in answer to
Maurenbrecher, Quessel, and others. "The idea of an alliance from
Bassermann [the National Liberal leader] to Bebel appears at the first
glance to be quite reasonable," he writes, for "divided we are nothing,
united we are a power. And the immediate interest of the Liberals and of
the Social-Democrats is the same: 'the transformation of Germany from a
bureaucratic feudal state into a constitutional, parliamentary, Liberal,
and industrial State.'" Kautsky, however, combats the proposed alliance,
from the standpoint of the Social-Democratic Party, along three
different lines. First, he shows that the purposes of the Liberals in
entering into such a combination are entirely at variance with those of
the Socialists; second, that the Liberals are discredited before the
German people and are not likely to have the principle or the capacity
even to obtain those limited reforms which they have set on their
program, and, third, that even if the two former reasons did not hold,
the Socialists would necessarily have everything to lose by such common
action.

The second argument seems to prove too much. Kautsky reasons that
neither the Radical not the Liberal parties can be relied upon even to
carry out their own platforms:--

"The masses now trust the Social Democracy exclusively because it
is the only party which stands in irreconcilable hostility to the
reigning regime, which does not treat with it, which does not sell
principles for offices; the only one which swings into the field
energetically against militarism, personal government, the
three-class election system, the hunger tyranny [the protective
tariff]. On this depends the tremendous efficiency which our party
has to-day. On this depends the great results which it promises
us.... The whole effect of the Great Alliance policy [the proposed
alliance of Socialists with the Radicals and National Liberals], if
ever it became possible in the nation, at the best would be this:
that we would serve to the Liberals as the step on which they would
climb up into the government crib, in order to continue the same
reactionary policies which are now being carried on, with a few
unimportant variations: imperialism, the naval policy, increase of
the army, the increase of officials, the continuation of the
protective tariff policy, and the postponement of Prussian
electoral reforms."

But if the Liberals and Radicals refuse to carry out their own pledges,
the conclusion would seem to be, not Kautsky's revolutionary one, but
that the Socialists, far from stopping with a mere alliance, must take
up the Liberals' or the Radicals' functions, as the "reformists" desire.
However, there are strong grounds for believing that the Liberals in
Germany will at last rise to the level of their own opportunities, as
they have done in other countries. Already, the last Reichstag passed a
resolution demanding that the Kaiser should be held responsible to that
body, which means an end to personal rule; already the Radicals are in
favor of Prussian electoral reform, and would undertake sweeping, if not
satisfactory, changes in the tariff; and already the agitation against
militarism is sincere and profound among those powerful elements of the
capitalists whose interests are damaged by it, as well as among the "new
middle-class." If the present tendencies continue, why may not the
Radicals go farther? Is it not probable even that the Reichstag election
districts will be equalized, and possible that equal suffrage in Prussia
will be established by their support? For if the Radicals recognized,
like those of other countries, that equal suffrage would render the
reforms of capitalist collectivism feasible, they could considerably
increase their vote by means of these reforms and hold the balance of
power for a considerable period; the Socialists would be far from a
majority, as they would thus lose those supporters who have voted with
them solely because for the moment the Socialists were advancing the
Radical program more effectively than the Radicals.

The chief Socialist argument against any political alliance with
capitalist parties is, however, of a more general character. Referring
to the elections of 1912, Kautsky said:--

"How far they will bring us an increase in seats cannot be
determined to-day.... But an increase of votes is certain--if we
remain what we have been, the deadly enemy of the existing social
and political condition, which is oppressing the masses more
cruelly all the time, and for the overthrow of which they are all
the time more ardently longing. If, on the other hand, we go into
the electoral struggle arm in arm with the Freethinkers (Radicals)
or even with the National Liberals, if we make ourselves their
_accomplices_, if we declare ourselves ready for the same miserable
behavior which the Freethinkers made themselves guilty of by
entering into an alliance with von Buelow, we may disillusion the
masses; we may push them from us and kill political life. If the
Social Democracy ceases to be an opposition party, if even this
party is ready to betray its friends as soon as it becomes by such
means "capable of governing," those who are oppressed by
present-day conditions will lose all confidence in progress by
political struggle; then we shall be sowing on the one side the
seeds of political indifference and on the other those of an
anarchistical labor unionism." (Italics mine.)[199]

Here is the generally accepted reason for the Socialist's radical
attitude. In most countries Socialists are unwilling to make themselves
_accomplices_ in what they consider to be the political crimes of all
existing governments. Especially do they feel that no reform to which
the capitalists would conceivably consent would justify any alliance.
The inevitable logic of Kautsky's own position is that, _even if the
liberals in Germany and elsewhere do undertake a broad program of
reform_, including all those Kautsky mentions as improbable, no
sufficient ground for an alliance is at hand.

Kautsky himself now admits that there seems to be a revival of genuine
capitalistic Liberalism in Germany, which may lead the Liberal parties
to become more and more radical and even ultimately to democratize that
country--with the powerful aid, of course, of the Social-Democrats.
Evidence of this possibility he saw both in the support given by
Liberals of all shades to Socialist candidates in many of the second
ballots (in the election of 1912) and the fact that Bebel secured the
overwhelming majority of Liberal votes as temporary President, while
another revolutionary Socialist, Scheidemann, was actually elected by
their aid as first temporary Vice President of the Reichstag.