Socialism As It Is

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Since the Toulouse Congress the divisions within the French Party have
become much more acute. Briand's conduct in the great railway strike in
1911 is discussed below. Yet in spite of this experience of how much the
government is ready to pay for railways and how little it is ready to do
to their employees, Jaures's followers at the Party Congresses of 1911
and 1912 stood again for the policy of nationalization, and Guesde was
impelled to warn the party that Briand's "State Socialism" was the
gravest danger to the movement.

Briand's positive achievements are also defended by Jaures. The recent
workingmen's pension law, unlike that of England, demands a direct
contribution from the employees. Nevertheless, it contained some slight
advantages, and of the seventy-five Socialist members of the Chamber of
Deputies, only Guesde voted against it. Even when the Federation of
Labor was conducting a campaign against registration to secure these
"benefits," Jaures's organ, _L'Humanite_ took the other side. The
working people, as usual, followed their unions. Less than 5 per cent
registered; in Paris only 2.5 per cent, and in Brest 22 out of 10,000.

The experience with Millerand and Briand has made it impossible for
Jaures to tie the French Party to "reformism." But reformism has brought
it about that the Party is often split in its votes in the Chamber of
Deputies. In the Party Congresses, however, Jaures is outvoted where a
clear difference arises, an outcome he does his best to avoid. The
Congress of 1911 (at St. Quentin) reaffirmed the international decision
at Amsterdam which prevents the party going in for reform as a part of a
non-Socialist administration. It declared that "Socialists elected to
office are the representatives of a party of fundamental and absolute
opposition to the whole of the capitalist class, and to the State, its
tool." And Vaillant said that since the Amsterdam Congress in 1904 the
question of participation in capitalist ministries had ceased to exist
in France.

It is true that Jaures secured at this Congress, by a narrow majority,
an indorsement of his policy of accepting the government pension offer.
But the orthodox followers of Guesde and the revolutionary disciples of
Herve joined to secure its condemnation first by the Paris organization,
and later by the National Council of the Party by the decisive vote of
87 to 51. This resolution which marks a great turning point in the
French Party, is in part as follows:--

"The National Council declares that each time a labor question is to be
decided, the Socialist Party should act in accord with the General
Confederation of Labor."

As the Confederation has indorsed Socialism both as an end and as a
means, few, if any, Socialist parties would object to this resolution.
But the Confederation is also revolutionary, and this policy, if adhered
to, marks an end to the influence of the "reformism" of Jaures.

The precise objections to the government's insurance proposal are also
significant. The National Council protested against the following
features:--

(1) The compulsory contributions.

(2) The capitalization (of the fund).

(3) The ridiculous smallness of the pension.

(4) The age required to obtain the pension.

(5) The reestablishment of workingmen's certificates.

Among the working people there is no doubt that the first feature was
the chief cause of unpopularity. But Socialists know that, through
indirect taxes or the automatic fall in wages or rise in prices, the
same object of charging the bill to the workers may be reached. The
capitalization refers to the investment and management of the large fund
required by a capitalist government, thereby increasing its power. The
last point has to do with the tendency to restrict the workers' liberty
in return for the benefits granted--a tendency more visible with the
pensions of the railway employees which were almost avowedly granted to
sweeten the bitter pill of a law directed against their organizations.

The same orthodox and revolutionary elements in the Party overthrew the
Monis Ministry by refusing to vote for it with Jaures and his followers.
But this ministry, perhaps the most radical France has had, was in part
a creation of Jaures, who had hailed it with delight in his organ,
_L'Humanite_. The fact that it only lived for three months and was
overthrown by Socialists was another crushing blow to Jaures. As it came
simultaneously with his defeat in the National Council, it is highly
improbable that the reformists will succeed soon, if ever, in regaining
that majority in the movement which they held for a brief moment at the
time of the St. Quentin Congress and during the first days of the Monis
Ministry.

It is now in Belgium and Italy only that "reformism" is dominant and
still threatens to fuse the Socialists with other parties. In the last
election in Italy the Socialists generally fused with the Republicans
and Radicals, while the Belgian Party has decided to allow the local
political organizations to do this wherever they please in the elections
of 1912.

In Belgium, Vandervelde, who has usually represented himself as an
advocate of compromise between the two wings in international
congresses, has now come out for a position more reformistic than that
of Jaures and only exceeded by the British "Labourites." He was one of
the movers of the Amsterdam resolution (see Chapter VII), which he now
declares merely repeated the previous one of Paris (1900) which, he
says, merely "forbids an individual Socialist to take a part in a
capitalist government without the consent of the Party." On the
contrary, this Amsterdam resolution, as Vaillant says, forbids Socialist
Parties to allow their members to become members of capitalist
ministries except under the most extraordinary and critical
circumstances.[102]

We are not surprised after this to hear Vandervelde say that the Belgian
Party has not decided whether it will take part in a future Liberal
government or not, because, though the occasion for this might occur
this year (1912), he considers it too far off in the future for present
consideration--surely a strange position for a Party that pretends to be
interested in a future society. We are also prepared to hear from him
that Socialists might be ready to accept representation in such a
ministry, not in proportion to their numerical strength, or even their
votes, but in proportion to the number of seats an unequal election law
gives them in Parliament. Whether, when the question actually presents
itself, the Party will follow Vandervelde is more than questionable.

In Italy "reformism" has reached its furthermost limit. When last year
(1911) Bissolati was offered a place in the Giolitti Ministry he
hesitated for weeks and was openly urged by a number of other Socialist
deputies to accept. After consultations with Giolitti and the king he
finally refused, giving as a pretext that, as minister, he would be
forced to give some outward obeisance to monarchy, but really because
such an action would split the Socialist Party and perhaps, also,
because he might not be able altogether to support Giolitti on the one
ground of the military elements of his budget. Far from condemning
Bissolati, the group of Socialist deputies passed a resolution that
expressed satisfaction with his conduct and even appointed him to speak
in their name at the opening of the new Parliament. All the deputies
save two then voted confidence in the new ministry and approbation of
its program.

The opinion of the revolutionary majority of the international movement
on this situation was reflected in the position of the revolutionaries
of the two chief cities of the country, Milan and Rome. At the former
city where they had a third of the delegates to the local Socialist
committee they moved that the Socialist Party could neither authorize
its deputies to represent it in a capitalist ministry or give that
ministry its support, "except under conditions determined, not by
Parliamentary artifices, but by the needs and mature political
consciousness of the great mass of workers." At Rome two thirds of the
Socialist delegates voted a resolution condemning the action of
Bissolati as "the direct and logical consequence of the thought,
program, and practical action of the reformist group," and reproved both
the proposal of immediate participation in a capitalist government and
"the theoretical encouragement of such a possibility" as being opposed
to all sound and consistent Socialist activity.

The "reformists," led by Turati, were of the opinion merely that the
time was not yet ripe for the action Bissolati had contemplated. But the
grounds given in the resolution proposed by Turati on this occasion show
that it was not on principle that he went even this far. He declared
that "in the present condition of the organization and the present state
of mind of the Party" a participation in the government which was "not
imposed by a real popular movement, would profoundly weaken Socialist
action, aggravating the already existing lack of harmony between purely
parliamentary action and the development of the political consciousness
and the capacity for victory on the part of the great mass of the
workers."[103] In other words, as in France, the working people,
especially those in the unions, will not tolerate a further advance in
the reformist direction, but Turati and Bissolati, like Jaures and
Vandervelde are striving to compromise, just as far as they will be
allowed to do so. There is thus always a possibility of splits and
desertions in these countries, but none that the party will abandon the
revolutionary path.

The tactics of the Italian "reformists" were immensely clarified at the
Congress of Modena (October, 1911). For the question of supporting a
non-Socialist ministry and of participating in it was made still more
acute by the government's war against Tripoli, while the Bissolati case
above mentioned was also for the first time before a national Party
Congress. Nearly all Socialists had opposed the war, as had also many
non-Socialists--but after war was declared, the majority of the
Socialist members of Parliament voted against the general twenty-four
hours' strike that was finally declared as a demonstration against it.
This majority had finally decided to support the strike only after it
was declared by a _unanimous_ vote of the executive of the Federation of
Labor, and then its chief anxiety had been lest the strike go too far.
The revolutionary minority in the parliamentary group, however, which
had consisted of only two at the time of the Bissolati affair, was now
increased to half a dozen of the thirty-odd members, while the
revolutionary opposition to "reformism" in the Modena Congress, as a
result of these two issues, rose to more than 40 per cent of the
delegates.

At this Congress the reformists were divided into three groups,
represented by Bissolati, Turati, and Modigliani. All agreed that it was
necessary not only to vote for certain reforms--to this the
revolutionists are agreed--but also at certain times to vote for the
whole budget and to support the administration. Modigliani, however,
declared (against Bissolati) that no Socialist could _ever_ become a
member of a capitalist ministry; Turati, that while this principle held
true at the present stage of the movement, he would not bind himself as
to the future; while Bissolati was unwilling to make any pledge on this
question. As Bissolati did not propose, however, that the Socialists
should take part in the present ministry _at the present moment_, this
question was not an immediate issue. What had to be decided was
whether, in order to hasten and facilitate the introduction of universal
suffrage and other social reforms, the government is to be supported at
the present moment--when it is waging a war of colonial conquest to
which all Socialists are opposed.

The resolution finally adopted by the Congress was drawn up by Turati
and others who represented the views of the majority of reformists.
While purely negative, it was quite clear, and the fact that it was
finally accepted both by Bissolati and by Modigliani is highly
significant. It concluded that "the Socialist group in Parliament ought
not any longer to support the government _systematically_ with their
votes." It did not declare for any systematic _opposition_ to the
administration, even at the time when it is waging this war. It did not
even forbid occasional support, and it left full discretion in the hands
of the same parliamentary group whose policy I have been recording.

As a consequence the Italian Party at this juncture intentionally
tolerated two contradictory policies. Turati declared: "We are in
opposition unless in some exceptional case, in which some situation of
extreme gravity might present itself." Rigola, who was one of the three
spokesmen appointed for the less conservative reformists (with Turati
and Modigliani) said: "We have been ministerialists for ten years, but
little or nothing has been done for the proletariat. Some laws have been
approved, but it is doubtful if they are due to us rather than to the
exigencies of progress itself." In other words, Turati and Rigola
thought there could be occasions for supporting capitalist ministries,
though the present was not such an occasion; while the latter
practically confessed that the policy had always been a failure in
Italy. But in the face of all criticism Bissolati announced that he
refused absolutely _to pass over to the opposition to the ministry of
Giolitti_. Turati and his followers, now in control of the Party, might
tolerate this position; the large and growing revolutionary minority
would not. This could only mean that Socialist group in the Italian
Parliament, like that of France, and even of Germany, would divide its
votes on many vital matters, or at least that the minority would abstain
from voting. Which could only mean that on many questions of the highest
importance there was no longer one Socialist Party, but two.[104]

Turati himself wrote of the Modena Congress:--

"Only two tendencies were to be seen in the discussion and the voting;
_two parties in their bases and principles_: the Socialist Party as a
party of the working people, a class party, a party of political,
economic, and social reorganization, and on the other side a bourgeois
radical party as a completion of, and perhaps also as a center of new
life force for, the sleeping and half moribund bourgeois democratic
radicalism."[105] That is, the "reformist" Turati denied that there is
anything Socialistic about Bissolati's "ultra-reformist" faction. To
this Bissolati answered that compromise and the political collaboration
of the working people with other classes, was not to be reserved, as
Turati had said, for accidental and extraordinary cases, but was "the
very essence of the reformist method."[106] The revolutionaries, of
course, agree with Bissolati that, if the Socialists hold that their
prime function is to work for reforms favored by a large part of the
capitalists, compromises and the habit of fighting with the capitalists
instead of against them are inevitable.

Turati now began to approach the revolutionaries, said that they had
given up their dogmatism, immoderation, and justification of violence,
and that he only differed from them now on questions of "more or less."
The revolutionaries, however, have made no overtures to Turati, and
Turati's overtures to the revolutionaries have so far been rejected.
Turati's "reformism" seems to be less opportunistic than it was, but as
long as he insists, as he does to-day, that it is only conditions that
have changed and not his reformist tactics, that the revolutionaries are
moving towards the reformists, the relation of the two factions is
likely to remain as embittered as ever. Only if the revolutionaries
continue to grow more powerful, until Turati is obliged still further to
moderate his "reformist" principles and to abandon some of his tactics
permanently, instead of saying, as he does now, that he lays them aside
only temporarily, will there be any real unity in the Italian Socialist
Party.

Within a few weeks after the Modena Congress, Turati had already
initiated a movement in this direction when he persuaded the executive
committee of the Party, after a bitter conflict, and by a majority of
one (12 to 13), to enter definitely into opposition to the government,
which in the meanwhile had given a new cause for offense by delaying on
a military pretext the convocation of the Chamber of Deputies.[107]

Among the opportunist and ultra "reformists" who were still anxious to
take no definite action, were such well-known men as Bissolati,
Podrecca, Calda, and Ciotti. Bissolati deplored all agitation in
criticism of the war except a demand for the convocation of the Chamber.
Turati and others who had at last decided to go over definitely to the
opposition, did so on entirely non-Socialist and capitalist grounds such
as the expense of the war, the unprofitable nature of Tripoli as a
colony, the aid the war gave to clericals and other reactionaries
(elements opposed also by progressive capitalists), and the interference
it caused with other reforms (favored also by progressive capitalists).
Turati, indeed, was frank enough to say that he had Lloyd George's
successful opposition to the Boer War as a model, and called the
attention of his associates to the fact that Lloyd George became
Minister (it will be remembered that Turati is not on the whole opposed
to Socialists also becoming ministers--even in a capitalist cabinet).
Even now it was only the revolutionary Musatti who pointed out the true
Socialist moral of the situation, that failure of the non-Socialist
democrats to stand by their principles and to oppose the war, ought to
lead the party to separate from them, not only temporarily, but
permanently, and to make impossible forever either the participation of
the Socialists in any capitalist administration or even the support of
such an administration in the Chamber of Deputies.

It was only when Bissolati secured a majority of the Socialist deputies,
and this majority decided to _compel_ the minority to accept Bissolati's
neutral tactics as to the war and his readiness actively to support the
war government at every point where that government was in need of
support, that Turati rebelled and demanded that his minority, which
announced itself as willing as a unit to obey the decisions of the Party
Congress, should be recognized as its official representative in the
Chamber. Turati's position was the same as before, but Bissolati's
greater popularity among the voters, _including non-Socialists_, gave
the latter control of the Parliamentary group, and forced the former to
a declaration of war. The effect was to throw Turati and his followers
into the arms of the revolutionaries, where they form a minority.

And thus the situation becomes similar to that in France. The reformist
"leaders," Jaures and Turati, do all that is possible to lead the
Socialist Parties of the two countries in the opposite direction from
that in which these organizations are going. But though these "leaders"
are turned in the direction of class conciliation, they are constantly
being dragged backwards in the direction of class war. Unconsciously
they are doing all they can to retard Socialism--short of leaving the
movement. But as long as they consent to go with Socialism when they are
unable to make Socialism go with them, their ability to retard the
movement is strictly limited.

FOOTNOTES:

[101] Charles Rappaport, "Das Ministerium Briand," _Die Neue Zeit_
(1910).

[102] See _Die Neue Zeit_, April, 1911, p. 46. Article by Vandervelde.

[103] The _Avanti_, April, 1911.

[104] The _Avanti_, Oct. 18, 1911.

[105] _Critica Sociale_, Nov. 1, 1911.

[106] _Azione Socialista_, Nov. 19, 1911.

[107] _Avanti_, Dec. 2 and 3, 1911.

CHAPTER III

"LABORISM" IN GREAT BRITAIN

The British Socialist situation is almost as important internationally
as the German. The organized workingmen of the world are indeed divided
almost equally into two camps. Most of those of Australia, South Africa,
and Canada, as well as a large majority in the United States, favor a
Labour Party of the British type, and even the reformist Socialist
leaders, Jaures in France, Vandervelde in Belgium, and Turati in Italy,
often take the British Party as model. On the other hand the majority of
the _Socialists_ everywhere outside of Great Britain, including the
larger part of all the _working people_ in every country of continental
Europe, look towards the Socialist Party of Germany as their model, the
political principles and tactics of which are diametrically opposed to
those of the British Labour Party.

Far from opposing their Socialism to the "State Socialism" of the
government, the British Socialists in general frankly admit that they
also are "State Socialists," and seem not to realize that the increased
power and industrial functions of the State may be used to the advantage
of the privileged classes rather than to that of the masses. The
Independent Labour Party even claims in its official literature that the
"degree of civilization which a state has reached may almost be measured
by the proportion of the national income which is spent collectively
instead of individually."[108]

"Public ownership is Socialism," writes Mr. J. R. MacDonald, until
lately Chairman of the Labour Party,[109] while Mr. Philip Snowden says
that the first principle of Socialism is that the interests of the State
stand over those of individuals.[110]

"I believe," says Mr. Keir Hardie, "the collectivist state to be a
preliminary step to a communist state. I believe collectivism or State
Socialism is the next stage of evolution towards the communist state."
"Every class in a community," he said in this same speech, "approves and
accepts Socialism up to the point at which its class interests are
being served." It would appear, then, that Mr. Hardie means by
"Socialism" a program of reforms a part of which at least is to the
benefit of every economic class. He contends only that this "Socialism"
could never be "fully" established until the working class intelligently
cooeperate with other forces at work in bringing Socialism into
being.[111]

"State Socialism with all its drawbacks, and these I frankly admit,"
said Mr. Hardie, "will prepare the way for free communism." Mr. Hardie
considers it to be the chief business of Socialists in the present day
to fight for "State Socialism," and is fully conscious that this forces
him to the necessity of defending the present-day State, as, for
instance, when he writes elsewhere, "It is not the State which holds you
in bondage, it is the private monopoly of those means of life without
which you cannot live." Private property and war and not the State Mr.
Hardie believes to have been the "great enslavers" of past history as of
the present day, apparently ignoring periods in which the State has
maintained a governing class which consisted not so much of property
owners as of State functionaries; to periods which may soon be repeated,
when private property served merely as one instrument of an all-powerful
State.

Mr. MacDonald still more closely restricts the word "Socialism" to the
"State Socialist" or State capitalist period into which we are now
entering. "Socialism," says MacDonald, "is the _next_ stage in social
growth,"[112] and throughout his writings and policy leaves no doubt
that he means the very next stage, the capitalist collectivism of which
I have been speaking. The international brotherhood of the nations,
which many Socialist thinkers feel is an indispensable condition for the
establishment of anything like democratic Socialism, Mr. MacDonald
expects only in the distant future, while the end of government based on
force, which is also considered essential by the majority of Socialist
writers, Mr. MacDonald postpones to "some far remote generation."[113]
In other words, the position of the recent Chairman of the Labour Party
is that what the world has hitherto known as Socialism can only be
expected after a vast period of time, and his opinion accords with that
of many bitter critics and opponents of the movement, who avoid a
difficult controversy by admitting all Socialist arguments and merely
asking for time--"Socialism, a century or two hence--but not now,"--for
all practical purposes an endless postponement.

Mr. MacDonald, who is not only a leader of the Labour Party, but also
one of the chief organizers also of the leading Socialist Party of that
country, has given us by far the fullest and most significant discussion
of that party's policy. He says that an enlightened bourgeoisie will be
just as likely to be Socialist as the working classes, and that
therefore the class struggle is merely "a grandiloquent and aggressive
figure of speech."[114] Struggle of some kind, he concedes, is
necessary. But the more important form of struggle in present-day
society, he says, is the trade rivalry between nations and not the
rivalry between social classes.[115] Here at the outset is a complete
reversal of the Socialist attitude. Socialists aim to put an end to this
overshadowing of domestic by foreign problems, principally for the very
reason that it aids the capitalists to obscure the class struggle--the
foundation, the guiding principle, and the sole reason for the existence
of the whole movement.