Socialism As It Is

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A very similar political shibboleth, often used by Party Socialists, is
"Let the nation own the trusts." Let us assume that the constitution of
this country were made as democratic as that of Australia or
Switzerland, and the suffrage made absolutely universal (as to adults).
Let us assume, moreover, that the "trusts," including railways, public
service corporations, banks, mines, oil, and lumber interests, the
steel-making and meat-packing industries, and the few other important
businesses where monopolies are established, were owned and operated by
governments of this character. Taken together with the social and labor
reforms that would accompany such a regime, this would be "State
Socialism," but it would not _necessarily_ constitute even a _step
towards_ Socialism--and this for two reasons.

The industries mentioned employ probably less than a third of the
population, and, even if we add other government employments, the total
would be little more than a third. The majority of the community would
still be divided among the owners or employees of the competitive
manufacturing establishments, stores, farms, etc.,--and the professional
classes. With most of these the struggle of Capital and Labor would
continue and, since they are in a majority, would be carried over into
the field of government, setting the higher paid against the more poorly
paid employees, as in the Prussia of to-day.

And, secondly, even if we supposed that a considerable part or all of
the government employees received what they felt to be, on the whole, a
fair treatment from the government, and if these, together with
shopkeepers, farm owners, or lessees, and satisfied professional and
salaried men, made up a majority, we would still be as far as ever from
a social, economic, or industrial democracy. What we would have would be
a class society, based on a purely political democracy, and
economically, on a partly private (or individualist) and partly public
(or collectivist) capitalism.

"Equal opportunities for all" would also mean Socialism. But equal
opportunities for a limited number, no matter if that number be much
larger than at present, may merely strengthen capitalism by drawing the
more able of the workers away from their class and into the service of
capitalism. Or opportunities _more_ equal for all, without a complete
equalization, may merely increase the competition of the lower classes
for middle-class positions and so secure to the capitalists cheaper
professional service. So-called steps towards equal opportunities, even
if rapid enough to produce a very large surplus of trained applicants
for whom capitalism fails to provide and so increase the army of
malcontents, may simply delay the day of Socialism.

I have spoken of Socialists whose underlying object is opportunistic--to
obtain immediate results in legislation no matter how unrelated they may
be to Socialism. Others are impelled either by an inactive idealism, or
by attachment to abstract dogma for its own sake. Their custom is in the
one instance to make the doctrine so rigid that it has no immediate
application, and in the other to "elevate the ideal" so high, to remove
it so far into the future, that it is scarcely visible for the
present-day purposes, and then to declare that present-day activity,
even if theoretically subject to an ideal or a doctrine, must be guided
also by quite other and "practical" principles, which are never clearly
defined and sometimes are scarcely mentioned. Mr. Edmond Kelly, for
instance, puts his "Collectivism Proper," or Socialism, so far into the
future that he is forced to confess that it will be attained only
"ultimately," or perhaps not at all, while "Partial Collectivism may
prove to be the last stage consistent with human imperfection."[100] He
acknowledges that this Partial Collectivism ("State Socialism") is not
the ideal, and it is evident that his ideal is too far ahead or too
rigid or theoretical, to have any connection with the ideals of the
Socialist movement, which arise exclusively out of actual life.

This opportunism defends itself by an appeal to the "evolutionary"
argument, that progress must necessarily be extremely slow. Progress in
this view, like Darwin's variations, takes place a step at a time, and
its steps are infinitesimally small. _The Worker_ of Brisbane,
Australia, says: "The complicated complaint from which society suffers
can only be cured by the administration of _homeopathic_ doses....
Inculcate Socialism? Yes, but grab all you can to be going on with.
Preach revolutionary thoughts? Yes, but rely on the ameliorative
method.... The minds of men are of slow development, and we must be
content, we fear, to accomplish our revolution piecemeal, bit by bit,
till a point is come to when, by accumulative process, a series of small
changes amounts to the Great Change. The most important revolutions are
those that happen quietly without anything particularly noticeable
seeming to occur."

What is a Great Change depends _entirely_, in the revolutionist's view,
on how rapidly it is brought about, and "revolutionary thoughts" are
empty abstractions unless accompanied by revolutionary methods. Once it
is assumed that there is plenty of time, the difference between the
conservative and the radical disappears. For even those who have the
most to lose realize in these days the inevitability of "evolution." The
radical is not he who looks forward to great changes after long periods
of time, but he who will not tolerate unnecessary delay--who is
unwilling to accept the so-called installments or ameliorations offered
by the conservative and privileged (even when considerable) as being
satisfactory or as necessarily contributing to his purpose at all. The
radical spirit is rather that of John Stuart Mill, when he said, "When
the object is to raise the permanent condition of a people, small means
do not merely produce small effects; they produce no effect at all."

Some political standard and quantitative measure is as necessary to
social progress as similar standards are necessary in other relations.
If the political standard of the Socialists is so low as to regard
social reform programs which on the whole are more helpful to the
capitalists than to other classes--and therefore "produce no effect at
all" as far as the Socialist purpose is concerned--as if they were
_concessions_, then it follows naturally that the Socialists will be
ready to pay a price for such concessions. They will not only view as a
relative gain over the capitalists measures which are primarily aimed at
advancing capitalist interests, but they will inevitably be ready at a
price to relax to some extent the intensity of their opposition to other
measures that are capitalistic and antipopular. For instance, if old age
pensions are considered by the workers to be an epoch-making reform and
a concession, they may be granted by the capitalists all the more
readily. But if thus overvalued, advantage will be taken of this
feeling, and they will in all probability be accompanied by restrictions
of the rights of labor organizations. On the other hand, if such
pensions, however desirable, are considered as a reform which will
result indirectly in great savings to the capitalist classes, to public
and private charitable institutions, to employers, etc., then the
Socialists will accept them and, if possible, hasten their
enactment,--but, like the French, will refuse to pay for them out of
their own pockets (even through indirect taxation, as the British
workingmen were forced to do) and will allow them neither to be used as
a cloak for reaction, nor as a substitute for more fundamental reforms.

In other words, a rational political standard would teach that a certain
measure of political progress is normal in capitalist society as a
result of the general increase of wealth and the general improvement in
political and economic organization, especially now that the great
change to State capitalism is taking place; while reforms of an entirely
different character are needed if there is to be any relative advance of
the political and economic power of the masses, any tendency that might
lead in the course of a reasonable period of time to economic and social
democracy.

"A new and fair division of the goods and rights of this world should be
the main object of all those who conduct human affairs," said De
Tocqueville. The economic progress and political reforms of this
capitalistic age are doubtless bringing us nearer to the day when a new
and fair division of goods and rights _can_ take place, and they will
make the great transformation easier when it comes, but this does not
mean that in themselves they constitute even a first step in the new
dispensation. That they do is denied by all the most representative
Socialists from Marx to Bebel.

The most bitter opponents of Socialism, like its most thoroughgoing
advocates, have come to see that the whole character of the movement has
grown up from its unwillingness to compromise the aggressive tactics
indispensable for the revolutionary changes it has in view, until it has
become obvious that, _just as Socialism as a social movement is the
opposite pole to State capitalism, so Socialism as a social method is
the opposite pole to opportunism_.

FOOTNOTES:

[93] The Communist Manifesto.

[94] _The Coming Nation_, Sept. 9, 1911.

[95] Mr. Gompers's articles in the _Federationist_ have recently
appeared in book form.

[96] Carl D. Thompson, "The Constructive Program of Socialism"
(pamphlet).

[97] Victor Grayson and G. R. S. Taylor, "The Problem of Parliament," p.
56.

[98] Editorial in the _Socialist Review_ (London), May, 1910.

[99] _Vorwaerts_ (Milwaukee), Jan. 3, 1893.

[100] Edmond Kelly, "Individualism and Collectivism," p. 398.

CHAPTER II

"REFORMISM" IN FRANCE, ITALY, AND BELGIUM

The Socialist parties in Italy, Belgium, and France, where "reformism"
is strong, are progressing less rapidly than the Socialists of these
countries had reason to expect, and far less rapidly than in other
countries. It would seem that in these cases the same cause that drives
the movement to abandon aggressive tactics also checks its numerical
growth.

For example, it is a matter of principle among Socialists generally to
contest every possible elected position and to nominate candidates in
every possible district. The revolutionary French Socialist, Jules
Guesde, even stated to the writer that if candidates could be run by the
party in every district of France, and if the vote could in this way be
increased, he would be willing to see the number of Socialists in
Parliament reduced materially, even to a handful--the object being to
teach Socialism everywhere, and to prepare for future victories by
concentrating on a few promising districts rather than to make any
effort to become a political factor, at the present moment. Similarly,
August Bebel declared that he would prefer that in the elections of 1912
the Socialists should get 4,000,000 votes and 50 Reichstag members
rather than 3,000,000 votes and 100 members. In the latter case, of
course, the Socialist members would have been elected largely on the
second ballot by the votes of non-Socialists.

The policy actually carried out in both Italy and France has of late
been exactly the opposite to that recommended by Guesde and Bebel. In
the elections of 1909, the Socialist Party of Italy put up 114 less
candidates for Parliament than they had in the election of 1904, while
the number of candidates nominated in France was 50 less in 1910 than it
had been in 1906. The consequence was that the French Party received an
increase of votes less absolutely than that gained by the conservative
republicans and scarcely greater than that of the radicals, while in
Italy the Socialists actually cast a smaller _percentage_ of the total
vote in 1909 than they did in 1904, while the party membership
materially decreased.

This policy had a double result; it sent more Socialists to the
Parliaments, in each case increasing the number of members by about 50
per cent; on the other hand, it helped materially those radical and
rival parties most nearly related to the Socialists, for in many
districts where the latter had withdrawn their candidates these parties
necessarily received the Socialist vote. A vast field of agitation was
practically deserted, and even when the agitation was carried on, the
distinction between the Socialist Party and the parties it had favored,
and which in turn favored it, became less marked, and the chances of the
spread of Socialism in the future were correspondingly diminished.

In France it is this policy which has brought forward the so-called
"independent Socialists" of the recent Briand ministry. Being neither
Socialists nor "Radicals," they are in the best position to draw
advantages from the "rapprochement" of these forces, and it was thus
that Millerand came into the ministry in 1900, that Briand became prime
minister in 1910, and Augagneur minister in 1911. These are among the
most formidable opponents of the Socialist movement in France to-day. It
will seem from this and many other instances that the opportunist policy
which leads at first to a show of success, later results in a weakening
of the immediate as well as the future possibilities of the movement.

The opportunist policy leads not only to an abandonment of Socialist
principle, an outcome that can never be finally determined in any case,
but sometimes to an actual betrayal or desertion, visible to all eyes,
as, for instance, when Ferri left the movement in Italy, or Briand and
Millerand in France. That such desertions must inevitably result from
the looseness taught by "reformist" tactics is evident. Yet all through
Briand's early political career, Jaures was his intimate associate, and
even after the former had forsaken the party, the latter confessed that,
like the typical opportunist, he had still expected to find in Briand's
introductory address as minister "reasons for hoping for the progress of
social justice."

The career of Briand is typical. "One must understand how to manage
principles," he had said in 1900 at the very time he was making the
revolutionary declarations I shall quote (in favor of the general strike
and against the army). Two years later when he made his first speech in
the Chamber, the conservative "Temps" said that Briand was
"ministrable"; that is, that he was good material for some future
capitalistic ministry. Now Briand was making in this speech what
appeared to be a very vigorous attack against the government and
capitalism, but, like some prominent Socialists to-day, he had succeeded
in doing it in such a way that he allowed the more far-seeing of the
capitalistic enemy to understand clearly what his underlying principles
were.[101]

At his first opportunity he became connected with the government, and
justified this step on the ground of "his moral attitude," since he was
the proposer of the famous bill for separating the Church and the State.
He was immediately excluded from the party, since at the time of
Millerand's similar step a few years before the party had reached the
definite conclusion that Socialists should not be allowed to participate
in their opponent's administrations.

When Briand became minister, and later (in 1909) prime minister, he did
not fail at once to realize the worst fears of the Socialists, elevating
military men and naval officers to the highest positions, and promoting
that minister who had been most active in suppressing the post office
strike to the head of the department of justice. So-called collectivist
reforms that were introduced while he was minister, like the purchase of
the Western Railway, were carried through, according to conservative
Socialists like Jaures, with a loss of 700,000,000 francs to the State.
So that now Jaures, who had done so much to forward Millerandism and
Briandism felt obliged to propose a resolution condemning Briand and
Millerand and Viviani as traitors who had allowed themselves to be used
"for the purpose of 'capitalism.'"

"'Socialistic' ministers," says Rappoport, "have fallen below the level
of progressive capitalistic governments. No 'Socialistic' minister has
done near so much for democracy as honorable but narrow-minded democrats
like Combes. 'Socialistic' ministers have before anything else sought
the means of keeping themselves in office. In order to make people
forget their past, they are compelled to give continuously new proofs of
their zeal for the government."

In France, where strong radical, democratic, and "State Socialist"
parties already exist, ready to absorb those who put reform before
Socialism, the likelihood that such desertions will lead to any serious
division of the party seems small, especially since the Toulouse
Congress, when a platform was adopted unanimously. Of course, the
leading factor in this platform was Jaures, who stands as strongly for
a policy of unity and conciliation within the party as he has for an
almost uninterrupted conciliation and cooeperation with the more or less
radical forces outside of it.

If Jaures was able to get the French Party to adopt this unanimous
program, it was because he is not the most extreme of reformists, and
because he has hitherto placed party loyalty before everything. In the
same way Bebel, voting on nearly every occasion with the revolutionists,
is able to hold the German Party together because he is occasionally on
the reformist side, as in a case to be mentioned below. Jaures looks
forward, for instance, to a whole series of "successful general strikes
intervening at regular intervals," and even to the final use of a great
revolutionary general strike, whenever it looks as if the capitalists
can be finally overthrown and the government taken into Socialist
hands--though he certainly considers that the day for such a strike is
still many years off. Nor does he hesitate to extend the hand of
Socialist fellowship to the most revolutionary Socialists and labor
unionists of his country, though he says to them, "The more
revolutionary you are, the more you must try to bring into the united
movement not only a minority, but the whole working class." He says he
is not against revolution, or the general strike, but that he is against
"a caricature of the general strike and an abortive revolution."

It is only by actions, however, that men or parties may be judged, and
though Jaures has occasionally been found with the revolutionists, in
most cases he acts with their rivals and opponents, the reformists, and
in fact is the most eminent Socialist reformer the world has produced.
No one will question that there are Socialists who are exclusively
interested in reform at the present period, not because they are opposed
to revolution, but because no greater movements are taking place at the
present moment or likely to take place in the immediate future--and
Jaures may be one of these. But it is very difficult, even impossible,
to distinguish by any external signs, between such persons and those for
whom the idea of anything beyond the reforms of "State Socialism" is a
mere ideal, which concerns almost exclusively the next or some future
generation. Many of those who were formerly Jaures's most intimate
associates, like the ministers Briand and Millerand, the recent
ministers Augagneur and Viviani, and many others, have deserted the
Party and are now proving to be its most dangerous opponents, while
several other deputies, who are still members like Brousse, recently
Mayor of Paris, are accused by a large part of the organization of
taking a very similar position. Surely this shows that, even if Jaures
himself could be trusted and allowed to advocate principles and tactics
so agreeable to the rivals and enemies of Socialism, there are certainly
few other persons who can be safely left in such a compromising
position.

In view of these great betrayals on the part of Jaures's associates, the
mere fact that his own position towards the Party has usually been
correct in the end--after the majority have shown him just how far he
can go--and will doubtless remain technically correct, becomes of
entirely secondary importance. He has openly and repeatedly encouraged
and aided those individuals and parties which later became the chief
obstacles in the way of Socialist advance, as other Socialists had
predicted. The result is, not that the Socialist Party has ceased to
grow, but that a large part of the enthusiasm for Socialism, largely
created by the party, has gone to elect so-called "Independent
Socialists" to the Chamber and to elevate to the control of the
government men like Briand, who, it was agreed by Socialists and
anti-Socialists alike, was the most formidable enemy the Socialists have
had for many years.

The program unanimously adopted by the French at the Congress of
Toulouse must be viewed in the light of this internal situation. "The
Socialist Party, the party of the working class and of the Social
Revolution," it begins, "seeks the conquest of political power for the
emancipation of the proletariat [working class] by the destruction of
the capitalist regime and the suppression of classes." The goal of
Socialism could not be more succinctly expressed than in these words:
"The destruction of the capitalist regime and the suppression of
classes." Any party that lives up to this preamble in letter and spirit
can scarcely stray from the Socialist road.

"It is the party which is most essentially, most actively reformist,"
continues another section, "the only one which can push its action on to
total reform; the only one which can give full effect to each working
class demand; the only one which can make of each reform, of each
victory, the starting point and basis of more extended demands and
bolder conquests...." Here we have the plank on which Jaures
undoubtedly laid the greatest weight, and it was supported unanimously
partly because of the necessity of party unity. For this is as much as
to say that no reform will ever be brought to a point that wholly
satisfies the working people except through a working class government.
But it cannot be denied that there are certain changes of very great
importance to the working people, like those mentioned in previous
chapters, which are at the same time even more valuable to the
capitalists, and would be carried out to the end even if there were no
Socialists in existence. If the revolutionary wing of the French Party
once conceded to capitalism itself this possibility of bringing about
certain reforms, they would be in a position effectively to oppose the
reformist tactics of Jaures within the Party. By giving full credit to
the semi-democratic and semi-capitalistic reform parties for certain
measures, they would go as far as he does in the direction of
conciliation and common sense in politics; by denying the possibility of
the slightest cooeperation with non-Socialists on other and _still more
important questions_, they could constantly intensify the political
conflict, and since Jaures is a perpetual compromiser, put him in the
minority in every contested vote within the party. By attacking the
capitalists blindly and on all occasions they have created the necessity
of a conciliator--the role that Jaures so ably and effectively fills.

But, however friendly the Toulouse program may have seemed to Jaures's
reform tactics, it is not on that account any less explicit in its
indorsement of revolutionary methods whenever the moment happens to be
propitious. It states that the Socialist Party "continually reminds the
proletariat [working class] by its propaganda that they will find
salvation and entire freedom only in a collectivist and communist
regime"; that "it carries on this propaganda in all places in order to
raise everywhere the spirit of demand and of combat," and that "the
Socialists not only indorse the general strike for use in economic
struggles, but also for the purpose of finally absorbing capitalism."

"Like all exploited classes throughout history," it concludes, "the
proletariat affirms its right to take recourse at certain moments to
insurrectionary violence."

The Toulouse Congress showed, not the present position of the French
Party or of the International, but the points on which Socialist
revolutionists and reformers, everywhere else at sword's point, can
agree. The reformers do not object to promising the revolutionaries that
they shall have their own way in the relatively rare crises when
revolutionary means are used or contemplated. The revolutionaries are
willing to allow the reformers to claim all the credit for all reforms
beneficial to the workers that happen to be enacted. Neither gives up
their first principle, whether it be revolution or reform, but in the
matter of secondary importance, reform or revolution, each side
tolerates in the party an attitude in diametrical opposition to its
principles and the tactics it requires. Both do this doubtless in the
belief that by this opportunism they will some day capture the whole
party, and that a split may thus be avoided in the meanwhile.