Historical and Political Essays

W >> William Edward Hartpole Lecky >> Historical and Political Essays

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23

It was one of those moments in which men's judgments are largely
affected by their temperaments, and it soon became evident that the
Cabinet was seriously divided. Disraeli had now become Lord
Beaconsfield, and sat with his Foreign Secretary in the House of
Lords. With his character it was inevitable that he should meet the
danger by a bold, decisive, and even aggressive, policy. It was no
less natural that Lord Derby should have persistently leaned towards
the side of caution and shrunk from any measure that could cut short
negotiation and diminish the chances of peace. The order given that
the British Fleet should enter the Dardanelles, first produced the
inevitable schism, and Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon resigned. The
order was countermanded, and Lord Derby, for a short time, resumed his
post. He acquiesced, but with great reluctance, in the vote of credit
for six millions which was at once brought before the House of
Commons, but he was soon convinced that measures he did not approve of
were impending, and when orders were given for calling out the
reserves he definitely resigned.

He announced his resignation on March 28, 1878, in terms of much
dignity and moderation. He believed, he said, that his colleagues
desired peace as truly as himself, and he did not maintain that their
later measures led inevitably to war, but he considered that they were
neither necessary nor 'prudent in the interests of European peace.'
He agreed that the terms of the treaty should be submitted to a
European Congress, in which England should take part. On minor matters
he thought it his duty to waive his own opinion, but he could not do
so on a question involving the momentous issue of peace or war. The
threat involved in the last act of the Government, he said, in a later
speech, would make it more difficult for Russia to modify her policy,
and he believed that without a threat such a modification of the
treaty of San Stephano could be obtained as would make it acceptable.
He had been accused of indecision and even of cowardice. For his own
part he thought it needed more courage to stand up in his place to
express views which he knew to be unpopular among the great body of
his friends, than to sit at a desk in Downing Street and issue orders
which would bring no danger or unpopularity to himself, but might
bring about a European war.

The short speech in which Lord Beaconsfield accepted the resignation,
and dwelt on the long friendship, personal as well as political, that
bound him to Lord Derby, seems to me a perfect model of good feeling
and good taste. Unfortunately the example of the Prime Minister was
not followed, and words used in a later debate went far to make the
breach irrevocable.

Lord Derby for a short time maintained a neutral position, but the
foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield was in the highest degree
distasteful to him. A wave of Chauvinism was passing over England,
which was utterly opposed to his views, and he believed that a section
of the Conservative party encouraged it in order to divert the
thoughts of men from internal reforms. He objected to the acquisition
of Cyprus, to some of the responsibilities assumed by England under
the treaty of Berlin, and very strongly to the Afghan war; and in the
beginning of 1880 he formally attached himself to the Liberal party,
on the ground of his objections to the foreign policy of the
Government. His speeches in his new capacity differed very little from
those which he had formerly delivered, but he said that he had learnt
to see more clearly the uselessness of attempting to resist popular
ideas, and to think 'more highly of the moderation, the fairness, and
the general justice with which masses of men, including all conditions
of life, are disposed to use their power.' He thought that England
should mix herself as little as possible with 'the sanguinary muddle'
of European diplomacy; that she should avoid increasing her
responsibilities; that she should take stringent measures to reduce
her debt; that she should pay much more attention than she was
accustomed to do to the condition of her own poorer population; and
that it should be the object of her statesmen to meet every great
popular demand by wise and equitable compromise. One of the greatest
dangers, he said, that could befall the country, would be 'a state of
things in which the comparatively harmless antagonism of parties would
be replaced by the far more serious and dangerous war of classes. From
that danger more than from any other it is the business of a
well-considered Liberalism to protect us.'

In 1882 he accepted the Colonial Office from Mr. Gladstone, and held
it until the fall of the Government in the summer of 1885. His
ministry was not a very eventful one, and it was marked by that steady
adherence to a middle line which had always characterised him. He
congratulated the country that the indifference to our colonies which
had prevailed during his youth had passed away, but he was by no means
favourable to extensions of the Empire. 'We have quite black men
enough,' he was accustomed to say; and he believed that any increase
of our responsibilities was likely to endanger the Empire, and to
divert the energies of politicians from pressing home questions. He
did not condemn the policy which led to the occupation of Egypt by
England, but he declared that even if it was inevitable it was a
misfortune, and that we ought to 'see that we do not on any pretext,
however plausible, get that Egyptian millstone tied permanently round
our necks.' He was very sceptical about Imperial Federation, and
entirely incredulous about the possibility of an Imperial Zollverein.
He deplored the protectionism of the colonies, but was himself a
strict free-trader of the school of Cobden, and utterly opposed to any
attempt to negotiate treaties with the colonies on a basis of
preferential tariffs. On the other hand, he showed himself quite ready
to favour Confederation in Australia, and he accepted gratefully
Australian help in the Soudan, but he was much alarmed by tendencies
in some colonies which might lead to complications with foreign
Powers, and he incurred considerable unpopularity in Australia by
refusing to consent to the annexation by Queensland of New Guinea.

There is, however, one incident in the colonial administration of Lord
Derby on which it is necessary to dwell at somewhat greater length,
for subsequent events have given it an unfortunate prominence and it
has thrown some discredit on his statesmanship. I allude, of course,
to the convention with the Transvaal in 1884. In the preceding
convention, which had been signed in August 1881, complete
self-government had been granted by England to the Transvaal 'subject
to the suzerainty of her Majesty' and her successors, and also to a
large number of carefully specified reservations and limitations. They
comprised the complete control of the external relations of the
Transvaal, including the conclusion of treaties and the conduct of
diplomatic intercourse with foreign Powers, which could only be
carried on through her Majesty's officers; the right of moving British
troops in case of necessity through the Transvaal; a power of veto
over all legislation affecting the interests of the native population.
A number of articles prohibited slavery in the new State; protected
with much detail the interests of the native population; secured
complete religious liberty; established the right of all persons other
than natives who conformed themselves to the laws of the State, to
enter, travel, and reside in any part of the Transvaal, to acquire
property and to carry on their business without being subject to any
other taxation than that which was imposed on the citizens of the
Transvaal; and placed British imports and exports on the same plane as
those of the most-favoured nations. The limits of the new State were
carefully defined and a British Resident was established in the
Transvaal to superintend the carrying out of these provisions. There
was no express provision in the convention for the political
privileges of the English residents in the Transvaal, but the
Government appear to have relied on a not very explicit verbal
assurance given to the British Commissioners by President Kruger in
May 1881. Asked about the rights of British subjects to complete free
trade throughout the Transvaal, President Kruger answered that before
the annexation 'they were on the same footing as the burghers'; that
'there was not the slightest difference in accordance with the Sand
River convention'; that this state of things would be continued and
that 'there would be equal protection for everybody.' Sir Evelyn Wood
then added, 'and equal privileges?' 'We make no difference,' answered
President Kruger, 'so far as burgher rights are concerned. There may
perhaps be some slight difference in the case of a young person who
has just come into the country.' It was subsequently explained that
the words 'young person' did not refer to age, but to the time of
residence in the Republic--according to the old Transvaal
Constitution, a year's residence in the Republic was necessary for
naturalisation. With this assurance the Government of 1881 appears to
have been content. They believed in words expressly sanctioned by Mr.
Gladstone, that the concession of limited independence to the
Transvaal by the convention of 1881 would 'provide for the full
liberty and equal treatment of the entire white population, guard the
interests of the natives, and promote harmony and good-will among the
various races in South Africa.'[43] As a matter of fact, the only
change in the political position of the English residents in the
Transvaal was that the period of naturalisation was extended from one
to five years--a change which appears to have produced little or no
commotion in the Republic.

The convention of 1881 was, however, extremely unpopular among a large
section of the Boer population. Complete independence was their avowed
object, and in order to attain it their first task was to abolish the
suzerainty of Great Britain. Almost immediately after the convention
was signed, the limitations of the Transvaal established by the
convention were flagrantly disregarded by Transvaal filibusters, who
proceeded with the tacit and even with the avowed countenance of their
Government to place new sections of native territory under the
exclusive protectorate of the Transvaal Government;[44] and a
deputation, headed by President Kruger, came to England in 1883 for
the purpose of negotiating with the Colonial Office for the abolition
of the chief articles of the convention of 1881. They avowed with
complete frankness that absolute independence would alone satisfy
them, and that their desire was to revert to the Sand River convention
of 1852, by which this independence had been recognised. This demand
was absolutely rejected by the Imperial Government, but Lord Derby
attempted to meet the objections of the Transvaal leaders by
substituting for the articles of the convention of 1881 new articles
in several respects more favourable to the pretensions of the Boers.

He, in the first place, made a sentimental concession to which it is
probable he attached little importance, but which was regarded by the
Boer population as a considerable step towards the achievement of
their independence. The term 'Transvaal State,' which was accepted in
the convention of 1881 as the designation of the new State, was
dropped and the old title of 'South African Republic' was revived and
recognised. The question of suzerainty was dealt with in a somewhat
ambiguous fashion. The new convention purported only to substitute new
articles in the place of those of the preceding convention; and it was
afterwards argued that the old preamble, which asserted at once the
internal independence of the Transvaal and the suzerainty of Great
Britain, remained in force. In fact, however, this preamble was
neither reprinted nor replaced in the new convention, and the term
'suzerainty,' which occurred in the original draft of the document,
was deliberately expunged--it is said by Lord Derby himself. He
considered the term wholly wanting in the precision which is desirable
in a treaty arrangement, that it was capable of many different degrees
of extension, and that the fact of the paramountcy of Great Britain
over the new State might be sufficiently established without the use
of an ambiguous word which excited the most bitter hostility in the
Transvaal. His own words in defending his conduct in the House of
Lords are perfectly clear. 'The word suzerainty,' he said, 'is a very
vague word, and I do not think it is capable of any precise legal
definition. Whatever we may understand by it, I think it is not very
easy to define. But I apprehend whether you call it a protectorate, or
a suzerainty, or the recognition of England as a paramount Power, the
fact is that a certain controlling power is retained when the State
which exercises this suzerainty has a right to veto any negotiation
into which the dependent State may enter with foreign Powers. Whatever
suzerainty meant in the convention of Pretoria (1881), the condition
of things which it implies still remains; although the word is not
actually employed, we have kept the substance. We have abstained from
using the word because it was not capable of legal definition, and
because it seemed to be a word which was likely to lead to
misconception and misunderstanding.'

The articles of the previous convention relating to slavery, to native
rights, to free trade, to religious liberty, to the rights of
residence of foreigners in the Transvaal, reappear in the new
convention, and the limits of the State were somewhat more fully
defined, but the controlling power of Great Britain over the foreign
policy of the Transvaal, though clearly reasserted, was somewhat
limited in its scope. It was provided that the South African Republic
should conclude no treaty or engagement with any State or nation other
than the Orange Free State, or with any native tribe to the eastward
or westward of the Republic, until the same had been approved by the
Queen; that every such treaty should be at once submitted to her
Majesty's Government for her consent, but that this consent should be
presumed to have been granted if no notification to the contrary was
received within six months. The desire of the Transvaal authorities to
be recognised as representing an independent sovereign power was thus
distinctly rejected, and the English Government positively refused a
proposal to admit foreign arbitration in cases of dispute between
England and the Transvaal.

This convention has been severely censured by later writers on the
ground of the insufficiency and ambiguity of its assertion of the
paramount authority of Great Britain over the Transvaal, and of its
failure to do anything to supply the great deficiency in the preceding
convention by an article securing political equality for the British
population within it. A few years later, when an immense English
immigration had taken place, not only with the consent but at the
express invitation of the Transvaal Government; when the English
element formed a large majority of the inhabitants of the State; when
they paid an enormous preponderance of its taxation, and were the
chief agents in developing its wealth and raising it from the position
of a very poor pastoral community into that of a great and wealthy
State, the Transvaal Government proceeded to impose upon the new
emigrants disqualifications and disabilities which were utterly
unknown when England conceded self-government to 'the inhabitants of
the Transvaal.' They completely deprived the vast majority of
political power or local self-government, and surrounded them at every
turn with the most irritating disabilities. The Transvaal became the
one part of South Africa where one white race was held in a position
of inferiority to another. At a time when perfect equality was enjoyed
by the Dutch population in our own colonies, the political
disqualification of the English race was made the very corner-stone of
the policy of the Transvaal Government. An annual revenue greatly in
excess of what was required for its internal government was raised
almost entirely from the taxation of an unrepresented class, to whom
the prosperity of the State was mainly due, and it was employed in
accumulating a great armament which could only be intended for use
against England and for maintaining the subjection of an English
population.

This was the position to which the paramount Power in South Africa,
the Power which of its own free will had conceded a limited
independence to the Transvaal, found itself reduced. And yet it was
possible for the Boer Government to maintain that there was nothing in
all this legislation which was inconsistent with the terms of the
convention of 1884.

I do not think that the justice of this criticism can be wholly
denied. The Transvaal authorities had already given clear intimation
of their desire to emancipate themselves from all British control, and
especially of their determination to disregard the limitations which
had been imposed on the expansion of their State. There is, however,
one very material fact to be remembered in judging the policy of Lord
Derby. At the time of the convention of 1884 the English population in
the Transvaal was a small, scattered, and powerless minority, and as
their numbers were far too scanty to make them a danger to the State,
there was not much reason to believe that the Transvaal authorities
would repudiate their own assurances and subject them to oppressive
disabilities. It was not until two years after the convention that the
vast gold-mines of the Transvaal were discovered and all the
conditions of the South African problem fundamentally changed. The
gigantic immigration that ensued reversed the proportion between the
two races. The revenue and the expenditure of the State multiplied
more than fifteen fold in little more than ten years.[45] The
Transvaal became the most powerful and wealthy State in South Africa,
and the great preponderance of the Outlander element in numbers,
wealth, energy, and industry rendered a conflict of races almost
inevitable. No statesman could have foreseen this change, and a
convention that might have allayed discontent if the gold-mines had
never been discovered, proved wholly inefficient to meet it.

Though in a politician of the stamp of Lord Derby the change from a very
liberal conservatism to a very conservative liberalism involved little
real modification of opinion, it necessarily involved some change of
attitude, and on some questions he spoke with a freedom which would have
been impossible as a member of the Conservative party. On Church
questions, for example, while strongly maintaining that the country was
not ripe for the disestablishment of the Church in England, he declared
that in his opinion the exclusive alliance of one religious denomination
among many with the State could not be permanently maintained side by
side with a democratic representation--that disestablishment and at
least partial disendowment must ultimately come; that if the
representatives of Scotland desired the disestablishment of their
Church, it was not for Englishmen to oppose them; and that Wales had a
strong claim to be separately dealt with. 'The Welsh people constitute
in many respects a distinct nationality, and I do not see why we should
refuse to Welsh loyalty what we have granted to Irish sedition.' On the
subject of endowments indeed as early as 1875 his view was that of most
moderate Liberals. 'To my mind, so far as right is concerned, the
Legislature may do what it chooses in regard to any endowment, without
injustice, provided only that the rights of living individuals are
respected. How far it is politic to use that power is another matter....
Respect the founder's object, but use your own discretion as to the
means. If you don't do the first, you will have no new endowments. If
you neglect the last, those which you have will be of no use.'[46] He
maintained that the question of local government had in England become
one of pressing importance, and that the administration of county
affairs must be put into the hands of elective bodies. He would give
those local parliaments very large power--but he most urgently insisted
on the importance of one restriction. The new bodies must not be given
an unlimited power of mortgaging the future. The gradual reduction of
the National Debt had been for some years one of the chief aims of
enlightened politicians, but all that had been done in this direction
would be undone if, side by side with the National Debt, there grew up a
municipal debt of perhaps equal amount. In this tendency to municipal
extravagance he saw one of the gravest menaces to property. 'The growth
of Socialism throughout Europe has followed very closely on the gigantic
increase of national indebtedness during the present century, and men
who begin to feel the pressure intolerable are apt to raise questions,
more easily stated than solved, as to the right of any State to impose
burdens in perpetuity for the benefit of one generation.' He urged that
every local body which contracted a debt should be under a statutory
obligation to provide for its repayment in fifty or sixty years at
latest.

The growth of municipal indebtedness; the excessive tendency to
increase the functions of the State; the disaffection of Ireland and
the contingency of an isolated and disloyal body of some eighty Irish
representatives offering their services to any party which would
consent to carry out their designs, appeared to Lord Derby the chief
dangers of English domestic politics. The last danger was very
speedily realised, and the sudden conversion of Mr. Gladstone to Home
Rule produced one more change in the attitude of Lord Derby. On this
question he had never flinched or wavered, and he at once took his
place in the front rank of the Liberal Unionists, whom for some time
he led in the House of Lords. I do not know that the Unionist case has
ever been more powerfully put forward than in his speeches on the
subject, and the eminently judicial character of his mind, and his
entire freedom from all mere party bias, gave a special weight to his
advocacy. With this exception he took little part in party politics
during the last years of his life, but he devoted himself largely to
social questions, and among other things served with great assiduity
and ability on the Labour Commission. His last speech was delivered at
Manchester on the unveiling of the statue of Mr. Bright in October
1891. His last public work was that of presiding over the Labour
Commission in May 1892. In the preceding year an attack of influenza,
followed by a relapse, had shattered a health which had hitherto been
robust. Other complications ensued, and he passed away at Knowsley on
April 21, 1893, in his sixty-seventh year.

The foregoing sketch will, I hope, have given a sufficient idea of his
public character. Few men have made a greater sacrifice of ambition to
a conscientious conviction than he did, when, rather than support a
measure which might lead to war, he abandoned the Conservative
Ministry in 1878. He was then the fully recognised successor of Lord
Beaconsfield, and if he had adopted a different course he would in a
short time have been, beyond all doubt, Prime Minister of England. On
the whole, however, the severance from old friends cost him, I
believe, far more than the sacrifice of his political prospects.
Whatever he may have been in his youth, he was certainly not in mature
life an ambitious man. With the great position he held in England the
world had little to offer him, and the self-knowledge which was not
the least of his many remarkable gifts showed him that party conflict
was not the sphere in which Nature intended him to move. With many of
the qualities of the highest statesmanship he wanted some necessary
ingredients of a great statesman. He wanted the power of appealing to
the imagination and moving the passions. He wanted more decision of
character, more power of initiative, more capacity of bearing lightly
the weight of a great responsibility. His belief that the House of
Lords must always ultimately yield to the House of Commons aggravated
a weakness of resolution which was deeply rooted in his nature. There
were moments when his inveterate moderation tended to exasperate, and
he was accused, not altogether without reason, of sometimes making
admirable speeches, pointing out in the clearest terms all the evils
and dangers of a measure, and then concluding by exhorting the House
of Lords to vote for it, introducing mitigating amendments in
Committee. The measures he treated in this way usually, as he had
predicted, became law, but this was not the attitude of a great
leader. During a considerable part of his career, like a very large
proportion of moderate men in England, he was in the embarrassing
position of agreeing substantially with the home policy of one party
and with the foreign policy of the other. After the death of Lord
Palmerston an element of passion was infused into public life which
was very uncongenial to his temperament, and English politics passed
into phases in which caution, character, judgment, and knowledge were
less prized than brilliant strokes that appealed to the popular
imagination, clever coalitions, a skilful barter of principles for
votes. In spheres governed by such methods Lord Derby was very useful,
but he was not likely to play a foremost part.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23