The Journal of Negro History, Volume 2, 1917

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Was that true? Let us see. Buchanan, of course, was declared defeated
and Hemingway declared elected. Mississippi was thus "_redeemed_, for
which all lovers of good government must rejoice," but Mr. Rhodes
failed to record the fact that this man who was the representative of
the _redemption_ of the State had been in office a comparatively brief
period when the discovery was made that he was a defaulter to the
amount of $315,612.19.[405] It would be a reflection upon Mr. Rhodes's
intelligence to assume that he was ignorant of this important fact.
Oh, no! he must have known about it, but to make any allusion to it
would be out of harmony with the purposes he evidently had in view. It
is safe to assume that, if the will of a majority of the legal voters
of the State had not been violently suppressed in the interest of
_good_ and _honest_ government, which would have resulted in the
election of honest George M. Buchanan, while the State would not have
been _redeemed_, it would have been saved from the loss of
$315,612.19. The writer of these lines has never believed that
Hemingway was the personal beneficiary of this money or any part
thereof, but that he was the instrument in the hands of others. Still
he was the official representative of the _redemption_ of the State
for which "all lovers of good government must rejoice."

That there was a material increase in the population and in the wealth
of the State will not be denied. These results would have followed,
even if the State had never been _redeemed_. They were not due to
_redemption_ but in spite of it. In fact, there was a marked increase
in population and in wealth before as well as subsequent to the
_redemption_. But when the author states that the bonded indebtedness
and taxation are low, the impression necessarily made, and intended to
be made upon the mind of the reader, is that after the _redemption_
took place and as a result thereof, the _rate_ of taxation was
reduced, the volume of money paid into the State treasury annually for
the support of the government was less than it had been before, and
that there had been a material reduction in the bonded debt of the
State, neither of which is true.[406] If Mr. Rhodes had been disposed
to record the truth and nothing but the truth, which is presumed to be
the aim of an impartial historian, he could have easily obtained the
facts, because they are matters of record. To give the reader an idea
of what the facts were and are, I will take, for purposes of
comparison, one year prior and one subsequent to the _redemption_ of
the State. In 1875, the year that the _redemption_ took place, the
assessed value of taxable property was $119,313,834. The receipts from
all sources that year amounted to $1,801,129.12. Disbursements for the
same year, $1,430,192.83. In 1907 the assessed value of taxable
property was reported to be $373,584,960. Receipts from all sources,
same year, $3,391,127.15. Disbursements, same year, $3,730,343.29. The
above figures speak for themselves. They are from the official
records, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned.[407] The records
show too that during the administration of Governor Ames, which was
about half over when the _redemption_ took place, the rate of taxation
had been reduced from seven mills to four mills and that a material
reduction had been made in the bonded debt of the State and that after
the _redemption_ took place the tax rate was increased from four mills
to six mills and that by 1907 $732,890.74 had been added to the bonded
debt of the State. And yet in the opinion of Mr. Rhodes, these are
conditions for the deliverance from which the employment of
regrettable means was necessary, at which, however, "all lovers of
good government should rejoice," since their employment resulted in
the _redemption_ of the State.

But another evidence of Mr. Rhodes's careless and reckless manner of
stating alleged historical facts will be found in a paragraph on page
132 of his seventh volume. In speaking of Governor Ames's unsuccessful
efforts to have troops sent to the State to assist in maintaining
order and insuring a fair and peaceable election, he says: "A number
of the white Republicans of Mississippi who had quarrelled or differed
with Ames, among whom were both the United States senators, used their
influence against the sending of federal troops to Mississippi and
none were sent." The two United States Senators at that time were J.L.
Alcorn and B.K. Bruce. Bruce was a strong friend and loyal supporter
of Ames and did all in his power to have Ames's request granted. This
statement is based upon my own knowledge. Senator Alcorn was one of
the few white Republicans who had quarrelled with Ames. In fact, he
ran as an Independent for governor against Ames in 1873. But he was a
Republican United States Senator and as such he had no sympathy with
the Democratic party. My relations with both senators were cordial. If
Alcorn had used his influence to prevent having federal troops sent to
the State, I am sure I would have known it. If he raised his voice or
used his pen for such purpose, that fact was never brought to my
notice and I am satisfied it was never done. My own opinion is that he
remained reticent and refused to take sides. The true reason why
troops were not sent in compliance with the request of Governor Ames
was that, although the President once directed that the requisition be
complied with, he later rescinded the order when informed by
Republicans from Ohio that such interference would cause the loss of
Ohio to the Republicans at the October election and would not save
Mississippi.[408]

Referring to the Reconstruction policy, Mr. Rhodes says: "Stevens'
Reconstruction Acts, ostensibly in the interest of freedom, were an
attack on civilization.[409] In my judgment Sumner did not show wise
constructive statesmanship in forcing unqualified Negro Suffrage on
the South."[410] The truth is that Stevens and Sumner were wiser than
their day and generation. They were not favorable to an immediate
restoration of the States lately in rebellion upon any conditions.
They knew that after the cessation of hostilities, the flower of the
Confederate Army, an army which it took the entire North with all of
its numbers, immense wealth and almost limitless resources four years
to conquer, would be at the South and that upon the completion of
Reconstruction and the withdrawal of the federal troops, that army
could be utilized to bring about practically the same conditions that
existed before the war. They, therefore, opposed immediate
restoration. This is what Mr. Rhodes characterizes as an attack on
civilization. To what civilization does he refer? He surely could not
have had in mind the civilization which believed in the divine right
of slavery and which recognized and sanctioned the right of one man to
hold another as his property; and yet this was the only civilization
upon which the rebuilding of the rebellious governments was an attack.
But for the adoption of the Congressional plan of Reconstruction and
the subsequent legislation of the nation along the same line, the
abolition of slavery through the ratification of the 13th Amendment
would have been in name only, a legal and constitutional myth. This is
the civilization, however, an attack upon which Mr. Rhodes so deeply
deplores. It is fortunate for the country that a majority of Mr.
Rhodes's fellow citizens did not and do not agree with him along these
lines.

Since Stevens and Sumner could not secure the adoption of the plan
advocated by them, they proceeded to secure the adoption of the best
one that it was possible to obtain under conditions as they then
existed. Hence they insisted, successfully, as was then believed, that
the legislation, including the 14th Amendment, should be so framed as
not only to create national citizenship, as distinguished from State
citizenship, but that it should be made the duty of the Federal
Government to protect its own citizens, when necessary, against
domestic violence, to protect its citizens at home as well as when
they are abroad. The closing clause of the 14th Amendment, therefore,
declares that Congress shall have power to enforce the provisions of
the amendment by appropriate legislation.

But Mr. Rhodes says the Congressional plan of Reconstruction was a
failure. The defeat of the Republican party at the North, especially
in 1874, he believes "was due to the failure of the Southern policy of
the Republican party." In speaking of the action of President Hayes,
he says: "Indeed it was the final admission of the Republican party
that their policy of forcing Negro suffrage upon the South was a
failure." Is it true that Reconstruction was a failure? That depends
upon the view one takes of it. Admitting that some of the things
expected of it by many of its friends and supporters were not fully
realized, its failure even to that extent was, in a large measure, one
of the _results_ but not one of the contributory _causes_ of the
Democratic national victory of 1874. On the contrary, that policy was
a grand and brilliant success.

In the first place, when the split between Congress and President
Johnson took place, there was soon developed the fact that the
enfranchisement of the blacks was the only plan which could be adopted
and by which the one advocated by the President could be defeated. It
had been seen and frankly admitted that the war for the preservation
of the Union could not have been brought to a successful conclusion
without putting the musket in the hands of the loyal blacks. The fact
was now made plain that the fruits of the victory that had been won on
the battlefield could not be preserved without putting the ballot in
their hands. Hence, it was done.

Was this a mistake? Mr. Rhodes says it was; but the results prove that
it was not. But for the enfranchisement of the blacks at the South at
the time and in the way it was done the 14th and subsequently the 15th
Amendment to the Federal Constitution never could have been ratified.
The ratification of these two measures alone vindicated the wisdom of
that legislation. The 14th Amendment, among other things, made the
colored people American citizens. It was, in effect, a recall of the
famous Dred Scott decision. The 15th Amendment gave the colored
American access to the ballot box, in every State in the Union. The
fundamental principles that were carried into effect through the
Reconstruction acts of Congress were embodied in these two amendments.
After the ratification of these measures, what had previously been
local to the South became national. No State north, south, east or
west can now legally and constitutionally make or enforce any law
making race or color the basis of discrimination in the exercise and
enjoyment of civil and public rights and privileges, nor can it make
race or color the basis of discrimination in prescribing the
qualification of electors. By the ratification of those amendments the
right of an American citizen to the exercise and enjoyment of civil
and political rights and the right to vote ceased to be local and
became national. But it is claimed by some that because the 15th
Amendment has been successfully evaded in certain States, it is, for
that reason, a failure. I will state here in passing, however, that
there has never been made nor can be made any law or constitution that
can not at certain times and in some places be successfully evaded.
But this does not necessarily prove that the law or constitution in
question was a mistake and should, for that reason, be repealed. To
this extent and for the reasons and purposes above stated, the wisdom
of the Reconstruction Acts of Congress has been more than vindicated.

The failure of the Reconstruction legislation was not due so much to
the change of sentiment in the North as to an unwise interpretation of
these laws. This started with two unfortunate decisions rendered by
the United States Supreme Court, the result of two unwise appointments
to seats on the bench made by President Grant. The Judges referred to
are Waite of Ohio, and Bradley of New Jersey. Both were supposed to be
Republicans and believed to be in accord with the other leaders and
constitutional lawyers in the Republican party in their construction
of the War Amendments to the Federal Constitution. But they proved to
be strong States' Rights men and, therefore, strict constructionists.
Those two, with the other States' Rights men already on the bench,
constituted a majority of that tribunal. The result was that the court
declared unconstitutional and void, not only the national civil rights
act, but also the principal sections of the different enforcement acts
which provided for the protection of individual citizens by the
Federal Government against domestic violence. National citizenship had
been created by the 14th Amendment and the Federal Government had been
clothed with power to enforce the provisions of that amendment.
Legislation for that purpose had been placed upon the statute books
and they were being enforced whenever and wherever necessary, as in
the case of the lawless and criminal organization called the Ku Klux
Klan. But the Supreme Court, very much to the surprise of every one,
stepped in and tied the hands of the national administration and
prevented any further prosecutions for violence upon the person of a
citizen of the United States, if committed within the limits of any
one of the States of the Union. In other words, if the State in which
a citizen of the United States may reside can not, does not or will
not protect him in the exercise and enjoyment of his personal, civil
and political rights, he is without a remedy. The result is that the
Federal Government is placed in the awkward and anomalous position of
exacting support and allegiance from its citizens, to whom it can not
in return afford protection, unless they should be outside the
boundaries of their own country. By those unfortunate and fatal
decisions the vicious and mischievous doctrine of States' Rights,
called by some State sovereignty, by others local self government,
which was believed to have perished upon the battlefields of the
country, was given new life, strength and audacity, and fostered by
the preaching of the fear of "Negro domination." The decision
declaring the Civil Rights Law unconstitutional was rendered by Mr.
Justice Bradley, and nearly all of those by which the principal
sections of the different enforcement laws were nullified, were
rendered by Chief Justice Waite.

If in every southern State today no attempt were made to violate or
evade the 15th Amendment and colored men were allowed free and
unrestricted access to the ballot boxes and their votes were fairly
and honestly counted, there would be no more danger of "Negro
domination" in any one of these States than there is of female
domination in States where women have the right to vote. All that
colored men have ever insisted upon, was not to dominate but to
participate, not to rule but to have a voice in the selection of those
who are to rule. In view of their numerical strength the probabilities
are that more of them would be officially recognized than in other
sections of the country, but never out of proportion to their fitness
and capacity, unless there should be a repetition of conditions that
existed in the early days of Reconstruction, which is improbable. The
dominant element in the Democratic party in that section at that time
adopted, as stated above, the policy of "masterly inactivity" which
was intended to prevent white men, through intimidation, from taking
any part in the organization and reconstruction of the State
governments, with a view of making the governments thus organized as
odious and as objectionable as possible, in other words, to make them
as far as possible "Negro governments." This policy proved to be
somewhat effective in many localities. The result was the colored men
found much difficulty in finding desirable white men outside of the
Democratic party for the different local positions to be filled. This
made it necessary in some instances for colored men to be selected to
fill certain positions for which white men would have been chosen. But
under the present order of things, a repetition of any thing of this
sort would be wholly out of the question.

I can not close this article without giving expression to the hope
that a fair, just and impartial historian will, some day, write a
history covering the Reconstruction period, in which an accurate
account based upon actual facts of what took place at that time will
be given, instead of a compilation and condensation of untrue,
unreliable and grossly exaggerated statements taken from political
campaign literature.

JOHN R. LYNCH,
Author of "The Facts of Reconstruction."

4352 FORRESTVILLE AVENUE,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

FOOTNOTES:

[402] Lynch, "The Facts of Reconstruction," Chapter XI.

[403] The speech of R. B. Elliott in reply to A. H. Stephens in the
debate on the Civil Rights Bill was admitted to be one of the most
eloquent and scholarly speeches ever delivered in Congress. But Mr.
Rhodes's preconceived opinions and prejudices were so firmly fixed
that he was incapable of detecting anything in the acts or utterances
of any colored member of either branch of Congress that deserved to be
commended or favorably noticed.

[404] Rhodes, "History of United States," VII, 141.

[405] See Chapter 16 of Lynch, "The Facts of Reconstruction."

[406] See Chapter 8 of Lynch, "The Facts of Reconstruction."

[407] _Ibid._

[408] Lynch, "Facts of Reconstruction," pp. 150-151.

[409] Rhodes, "History of the United States," VI, 35.

[410] Rhodes, "History of the United States," VI, 40.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF HAITI AND LIBERIA AS INDEPENDENT
REPUBLICS

The doctrine of recognition as a principle of International law
appeared in definite form at the close of the American Revolution. New
states had arisen and successful revolutions had given birth to new
governments.[411] In Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, the
French Republic was recognized and the neutral position of America was
announced.[412] These principles, developed later by Adams and
Jefferson through application to the South American colonies which had
declared their independence of Spain, marked the beginning of the
well-defined international principle of recognition.[413]

Between 1810 and 1825, the Spanish colonies of Mexico, New Granada
(Columbia), Venezuela, Peru, Buenos Ayres, Chile, Ecuador and Upper
Peru (Bolivia) had revolted and rejected Spanish dominion.[414] In
1824, England recognized the independence of Buenos Ayres, Mexico and
Columbia, and gave no heed to the assertion that this "tended to
encourage the revolutionary spirit which it had been found so
difficult to restrain in Europe."[415]

But before the Spanish colonies had gained their independence, and the
spirit of democracy had begun to diffuse its light, movements were on
foot to secure the recognition of Haiti. After its discovery by
Columbus in 1492, Haitian soil was drenched with the blood of the
Spaniard and the native. Civil wars were begun and bloody scenes were
enacted.[416] In 1533, peace came between the natives and the
Spaniards. Soon thereafter, other Europeans began to arrive. The
French and the English were attracted by the stories of riches and
their chances for gain. The bloody struggles between these nations and
the natives fill many pages of Haitian history.[417] The inhabitants
took now the one side, now the other.

Led by Toussaint L'Ouverture, the cause of the French was championed.
Finding the French yoke as heavy as the Spanish yoke, Toussaint struck
for absolute liberty.[418] He was not, in a real sense, the liberator
of the Haitians, as commonly supposed, but he was the precursor of
their liberty.[419] His deportation aroused them to struggle with new
vigor. Under Dessalines, one of the generals in the army of Toussaint
L'Ouverture, the rebellion grew more successful, and on January 1,
1804, the army swore to abjure their allegiance to France forever, and
thereupon declared the independence of Haiti.[420] Dessalines was
chosen Governor-General and upon abolishing the name "Santo Domingo,"
the aboriginal name "Haiti" was reestablished.

The history of Haiti after 1804 is concerned with internal
dissensions, and contentions with foreign powers. Haiti was not
immediately recognized nor was she welcomed into the family of
nations. Retaliatory measures were taken by her government to compel
the powers to see the advantage in this recognition. Christophe, a
contender for power with Petion, one of the founders of the republic,
issued in 1816 the proclamation that no negotiation would be entered
upon with France unless the independence of the kingdom of Haiti,[421]
political as well as commercial, be previously recognized.[422]

In 1823, the independence of Mexico, Columbia, and others was
recognized by Great Britain, but Haiti after nineteen years of
independence was not given this consideration.[423] As a result the
British trade privileges were abolished and the import tax of 12 per
cent. was levied on the products of all nations.[424]

Early indications of American commercial relations with Haiti and of
an unsatisfactory condition may be discerned in the following
resolutions, the first of which was submitted in the Senate, January
11, 1819:

"_Resolved:_ that the President of the United States be requested
to communicate to the Senate any information in his possession
and which, in his opinion, the public interest may permit to
disclose, relating to the seizure and detention of the property
of American citizens by the government of Haiti, and the state of
any negotiations to procure restitution."[425]

On December 31, 1822, the following resolution was submitted in the
House:

"_Resolved:_ that the committee on commerce be instructed to
inquire into the present state of the trade and intercourse
between the United States and the Island of Haiti, and report
what measures would be necessary to improve the commerce between
the two countries."[426]

As a matter of fact, the trade with Haiti was very important during
this period. By the report of the Register's Office, 1825, Haiti
ranked twenty-ninth in the list of countries trading with the United
States.[427]

The actual presentation of the question to the country as a whole grew
out of an invitation to attend the Panama Congress. In 1825, General
Bolivar, leader of the South American revolutionists, invited the
states north and south of the Isthmus to send delegates to a congress
which would assemble at Panama. Formal invitations to attend the
congress were received from Mexico, Guatemala and Columbia and others.
The following suggestions were made as to questions to be considered:
the interference of European powers in America, the recognition of
Haiti, the slave trade and the formation of an American league.[428]
That the recognition of Haiti was one of the objects of consideration
is so stated among the lists of subjects in the _Official Gazette_ of
Columbia. The congress was to determine on what footing should be
placed the political and commercial relations of those portions of our
hemisphere, which had obtained their independence, but whose
independence had not been recognized by any American or European
power, as was for many years the case with Haiti.[429] Other evidence
is found in a letter of the Columbian minister, Salazar: "On what
basis the relations of Haiti, and of other parts of our Hemisphere
that shall hereafter be in like circumstances, are to be placed," said
he, "is a question simple at first view, but attended with serious
difficulties when closely examined. These arise from the different
manner of regarding Africans, and from their different rights in
Haiti, the United States and in other American states. This question
will be determined at the Isthmus, and if possible, an uniform rule
of conduct adopted in regard to it, or those modifications that may be
demanded by circumstances."[430]

A special message was sent to Congress by President Adams on December
26, naming the delegates to this congress, and asking for an
appropriation for expenses. Both Clay, then Secretary of State, and
President Adams wished to extend the commercial power of the United
States over the Americas, and they welcomed this opportunity. They
disclaimed any desire to enter any league, but left poorly defined the
objects which would be considered.[431]

The southern point of view, as expressed in the debates on this
question, was that disaster awaited the Southern States, if the United
States should send delegates to a congress in which Haitian
representatives would sit, and which would consider the separation of
Cuba and Porto Rico from Spain and the cessation of slavery. This
viewpoint was expressed by Benton of Missouri, saying: "We buy coffee
from her, and pay for it; but we interchange no consuls or ministers.
We receive no mulatto consuls or black ambassadors. And why? Because
the peace of eleven states in this Union will not permit the fruits of
a successful Negro insurrection to be exhibited among them.... Who are
to advise and sit in judgment upon it? Five nations who have already
put the black man upon an equality with the white, not only in their
constitutions but in real life; five nations who have at this moment
(at least some of them) black generals in their armies and mulatto
Senators in their Congresses."[432]

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