The Continental Monthly, Vol. 6, No 2, August, 1864

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The author of the letter from Paris somewhat contradictorily asserts
that the women, being superior in Poland, govern the men, but are
themselves governed entirely by the priests. This scarcely tallies with
strict logic; but, for the sake of truth and of a just respect for our
mothers, who taught us to love our country and freedom, who gave us
strength in exile, and faith through persecution, and who instructed us
how to think, and inspired us with those noble sentiments, seemingly
denied to the mothers of the 'fashionable civilization' (of St.
Petersburg), among whom there is not one lady writer--we will thank this
writer for the refutation offered by him to an impudent slander,
emanating from a contributor to _Chambers' Magazine_, of January last.
We repeat that we thank him for his just tribute to Polish women,
however inimical he may be to the Polish cause, and however much he may
depreciate our sex. Yet it seems strange that, while accusing Polish
women of being entirely under the control of the priests, and hence to
have been chiefly instrumental in fomenting the last insurrection, the
author did not notice, or is purposely silent regarding, a fact which,
as he appears to have been longer in a Galician chateau than elsewhere,
must have fallen under his notice, namely, that in Galicia, the Polish
priest was the _most decided opponent_ to any insurrection. How, then,
could the active Polish women-patriots be instruments of the action
condemned by the apologists of the absolute government of Rossia?

The admonition to France, on the ground that, after the revolution of
1789, she is committing a contradictory error by showing sympathy toward
a revolution gotten up by priests, is but a consequence of the first
judgment, and we may leave to France and her sense of her own interests
to do what she may think right and profitable. We will simply mention
that, for French glory, and for this error, as the author calls it, two
hundred thousand Poles were slain in Egypt, Italy, San Domingo, Spain,
Germany, Holland, and on the plains of Mozajsk, Kraslaw, Boryssow,
Eylau, Friedland, etc. The monument seen from the balcony of the
Tuileries has the names upon it, which we scarcely can suppose to have
been inscribed for the sole purpose of filling space.

The friends of Poland believe that they serve the cause of progress by
aiding in the reestablishment of the Polish nation. We presume there are
plenty of men in France who know that during the last thirty years
Rossia has spread her dominion in Asia over twice the area of Germany
and France together, that she is only eighty miles from Peking, and as
far from India as Vienna is from the Black Sea. Moreover, Asiatic
people, always dreaming of plunder in Europe, once armed with European
Minie rifles and rifled cannon, may repeat anew the incursions of
Attila, Tamerlane, Battu, etc. The end to be gained and the booty will
create the temptation, and offer superior inducements.

The effort to palliate Rossian cruelty, skilful as it is, by the alleged
necessities of war, by denials, or by asserting it to be mere revenge
for similar atrocities committed by Poles, must be appreciated according
to the sources whence it emanates. What the letter writer or similar
twelve-hour visitors saw in Poland, particularly in Kracow, of people
sharpening knives or preparing deadly poisons, need here be merely
referred to by saying that in times of general confusion we have no
means to foresee or to control personal revenge, and also that we will
not here cite the reports of Polish papers or accounts of Germans. We
will take our data from the Moscow _Invalid_, the czar's _Universal
Journal_ at Warsaw, and the _Journal de Petersbourg_. From these we find
it stated that the number of men hanged in three hundred and sixty-five
days of insurrection was eight hundred and fifty, besides many others
whose names were not given because it was simpler and more profitable to
ignore their origin, class, and religion.

From Kiow alone Anienkow sent away fourteen thousand men, chiefly of
Greek or other non-Roman-Catholic religion, over whom the Catholic
priest had neither control or influence. From Warsaw, every Saturday
during fifty-two weeks, an average of four hundred men, women, and
children were deported, all separated from their natural guides and
protectors. From Liefland, north of the Dwina, were sent off, in one
month, thirty-five hundred of the better educated and comfortable class
of people. A Government paper rejoices that Polish and Catholic
principles, growing there during five centuries, were in a fair way of
extinction, since, as it itself admits, forty-five thousand men had been
transferred to the governments of Samara, Orenburg, Kazan, and similar
localities. To burn the villages of Ibanie, Szarki, Hrodki, Smoloy,
Zabolocie, etc., to destroy the furniture, horses, cattle, and all other
property, to send the inhabitants on foot, only allowing for the aged
and young children a few small wagons, far away into a cold, strange,
savage country, without tools, means, etc.--was all this done merely as
a military necessity, and was it excusable, or, at most, merely
_blamable_?

Now, certain correspondents and lecturers, with other gentlemen, deny
the use of the lash or whip on the backs of women and ladies, because
the American people cannot countenance such barbarism. To say the least
of such a denial--it is gratuitous. Austria daily publishes similar
judgments as the result of police court trials. In Rossia, they are not
published, because the administration of lash, whip, and scourge is left
to the _paternal_ discretion of every sergeant, lieutenant, police
commissary, and district constable, and is enjoyed by them to their
hearts' content. It is the method employed for ages by Rossia, and
considered as an indispensable appendage to patriarchal czarism and its
lieutenants. We cannot wonder at such denials, for their authors have
ordinarily been brought up under a better state of things, and never
learned in their youth the possibility of resort to such practices: the
less also can we wonder when we know that they met only similar denials
in the higher Rossian society, and when we consider that such denials
came from a source one is naturally inclined to respect, when the man
denying seems respectable. How can we fancy a lie told by a gentleman in
golden uniform, or a lady in a lace dress? But if the defenders of the
civilization of Rossia and of the noble manners of its aristocracy knew
all the cruel judgments of Rossian masters, the lewdness, recklessness,
indecency, and shallowness often concealed beneath their artificial good
breeding and apparent courtesy, they would learn that laces may cover
coarse tissues, and gold hide corroded brass. The gaudy dress and
uniform serve but to permit more daring deeds; the more they glitter,
the more impunity they confer. Under every Government, and more
especially under a despotism, subaltern officers may be sure of impunity
to abuse, provided it is done under the guise of zeal and devotion.

During the past year we have heard and read in lectures, newspapers,
correspondences, etc., many flattering statements of the beauty of the
Rossian Government, and the czar's liberality--and as many accusations
and imputations detrimental to the Polish cause. Why the same views were
not held and advocated during the Crimean war we will not ask, but
merely hint at. These statements come from organs whose purpose is
readily divined. If we turn to the paper that has opened its columns to
the Paris letter, we find close at hand the advertisement and
recommendation of a programme for our own great country, and the
pointing out of a new Garibaldi for the American Union. Now, neither
said platform nor Garibaldi would be consistent with the condemnation,
irony, and ridicule flung upon the champions for one thousand years of
the growing progress, prosperity, and Christianity of Western Europe.

We of this generation are grown fixedly into our ancient habits of
thought, and now can make no change; but our successors, perchance, may
possibly be reduced to undersign the manifesto of Rossian Liberalism,
published about a year ago in Moscow, and, in return for false promises
and deceptions, consent to make common cause against Germany and the
whole of Western Europe. What _American_ liberties would gain by such an
eventuality, is not for us, nor for to-day, to say.

APHORISMS.--NO. XI.

'A man who has no wants has attained great freedom, and firmness, and
even dignity.'--BURKE.

'Mad wants and mean endeavors,' as Carlyle expresses it, 'are among the
signal characteristics and great follies of our nature.'

But how can we attain to the freedom, firmness, and dignity of having no
wants? Answer: By learning what our real necessities are, and limiting
our sense of want by such knowledge. Otherwise there is little hope for
us; for, as soon as we admit imaginary and factitious needs, we become
the slaves of mere fancy, the sport of mere human opinion, and devoid of
all true dignity.

How sublime, as compared with the ordinary condition of men, is the
possibility suggested by Burke! _Freedom_, instead of such slavery as
the love of pleasure occasions, or such as ambition entails upon men!
_Firmness_, such as he has who does not feel compelled to ask how his
conduct may affect the supply of his wants from day to day! _Dignity_,
such as we see in every man who studies the great interests of his
being, regardless of any harm that may thereby accrue to his earthly
estate! So free, and firm, and dignified may each be that will.

But no such good is possible for men who allow their sense of want to be
ruled by the common opinions of men. If the good at which we aim can be
secured only by the possession of this world's favors, as they are
dispensed by the wealthy or the powerful, or the suffrages of the
multitude (votes for office, and the like), then each one becomes the
servant of his fellow men--a servant just as really as if he were hired
to perform any menial office. The party politician, for example, is just
as fully bound by the will of others as a coachman or foot servant. For
him neither freedom, firmness, or dignity is possible. He can do only as
others bid him: he can resist no solicitations to evil on the part of
those whom he would make his constituents: he has no dignity above that
of a tool, in the hands, it may be, of a very unworthy master.

So in all cases where we allow ourselves to be dependent in such form
and measure that in order to compass our own ends we must look to the
will and behests of others.

AN ARMY: ITS ORGANIZATION AND MOVEMENTS.

_THIRD PAPER._

Cavalry! At this word whose mind does not involuntarily recall pictures
of mailed knights rushing upon each other with levelled lances, and of
the charging squadrons of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Marengo, of the
Peninsula, and of Waterloo? Whose blood is not stirred with a throng of
memories connected with the noble achievements of the war horse and his
rider? Who does not imagine a panorama of all that is gay and glorious
in warfare--prancing coursers, gilded trappings, burnished sabres,
waving pennons, and glittering helmets--rank after rank of gallant
riders--anon the blast of bugles, the drawing of sabres, the mighty
rushing of a thousand steeds, the clash of steel, the shout, the
victory? The chief romance of war attaches itself to the deeds
accomplished by the assistance of the power and endurance of man's
noblest servant. Every one has read so much poetry about valiant youths,
mounted on fiery yet docile steeds, doing deeds of miraculous prowess in
the ranks of their enemies--our literature is so full of tapestried
representations of knightly retinues and charging squadrons--the
towering form of Murat is so conspicuous in the narratives of the
Napoleonic wars--and history has so often repeated the deeds of those
horsemen who performed such illustrious feats in the combats of half a
century ago, that we associate with the cavalry only ideas of splendor
and glory, of wild freedom and dashing gallantry. But the cavalry
service is far different from such vague and fanciful imaginations.
Instead of ease, there is constant labor; instead of freedom, there is a
difficult system of discipline and tactics; and instead of frequent
opportunities for glorious charges, there is a constant routine of
toilsome duty in scouting and picketing, with rarely an opportunity for
assisting prominently in the decision of a great battle, or of winning
renown in overthrowing the ranks of an enemy by the impetuous rush of a
mass of horses against serried bayonets.

In many respects cavalry is the most difficult branch of military
service to maintain and to operate. It is exceedingly costly, on account
of the great loss of horses by the carelessness of the men, by overwork,
by disease, and by the fatalities of battle. The report of General
Halleck, for the year 1863, stated that from May to October there were
from ten thousand to fourteen thousand cavalry in the Army of the
Potomac, while the number of horses furnished them for the same period
was thirty-five thousand; adding to these the horses taken by capture
and used for mounting men, the number would be sufficient to give each
man a horse every _two months_. There were two hundred and twenty-three
regiments of cavalry in the service, which, at the same rate, would
require four hundred and thirty-five thousand horses. This is an immense
expenditure of animals, and is attributable in part to the peculiarities
of the volunteer service--such as the lack of care and knowledge on the
part of the officers, and the disposition of the men to break down their
horses by improper riding, and sometimes out of mere wantonness, for the
purpose of getting rid of animals they do not like, for the chance of
obtaining better. A measure has recently been adopted to remedy these
evils, by putting into the infantry cavalry officers and men who show
themselves incompetent to take proper care of their animals, and who
neglect other essentials of cavalry service. The provision and
transportation of forage for cavalry horses also constitute items of
great cost.

To attain proficiency and effectiveness, cavalry soldiers require much
longer instruction than those of any other arm. They must become expert
swordsmen, and acquire such skill in equitation that horse and rider
shall resemble the mythical centaurs of the ancients--shall be only one
individual in will. The horses should be as thoroughly trained as the
riders. In European armies this is accomplished in training schools. The
Governments keep constantly on hand large supplies of animals, partly
purchased and partly produced in public stables, and capable instructors
are continually employed in fitting both men and horses for their
duties.

To insure the provision of proper horses and to recuperate those which
are sent from the army disabled or sick, an immense cavalry depot has
been established at Giesboro', near Washington. Thousands of horses are
kept there ready for service, and as fast as men in the army are
dismounted by the loss of their animals, they are sent to this depot. It
is one of the most useful and best-arranged affairs connected with our
service, and has greatly assisted in diminishing the expense attending
the provision of animals, and in increasing the efficiency of our
cavalry.

We have had all the difficulties to contend with resulting from
inexperienced riders and untrained horses. No one who has not beheld the
scene, can imagine the awkward appearance of a troop of recruits mounted
on horses unaccustomed to the saddle. The sight is one of the most
laughable that can be witnessed. We have seen the attempt made to put
such a troop into a gallop across a field. Fifty horses and fifty men
instantly became actuated by a hundred different wills, and dispersed in
all directions--some of the riders hanging on to the pommels, with their
feet out of the stirrups, others tugging away at the bridles, and not a
few sprawling on the ground. After a few months' drills, however, a
different scene is presented, and an old troop horse becomes so
habituated to his exercises that not only will he perform all the
evolutions without guidance, but will even refuse to leave the ranks,
though under the most vigorous incitements of whip and spur. An officer
friend was once acting as cavalier to a party of ladies on horseback at
a review, when, unfortunately, the troop in which his horse belonged
happening to pass by, the animal bolted from the group of ladies, and
took his accustomed place in the ranks, nor could all the efforts of his
rider disengage him. Finally, our friend was obliged to dismount, and,
holding the horse by the bit, _back_ him out of the troop to his station
with the party of ladies--a feat performed amid much provoking laughter.

Cavalry can operate in masses only when circumstances are favorable--the
country open, and the ground free from obstructions. Yet it is in masses
alone that it can be effective, and it can triumph against infantry only
by a _shock_--from the precipitation of its weight upon the lines,
crushing them by the onset. Before the time of Frederic the Great, the
Prussian horsemen resembled those to be seen at a militia review--they
were a sort of picture soldiers, incapable of a vigorous charge. He
revolutionized the service by teaching that cavalry must achieve success
by a rapid onset, not stopping to fire themselves, and not regarding the
fire of their opponents. By practising these lessons, they were able to
overthrow the Austrian infantry. But if the force of a charge is
dissipated by obstructions on the ground, or is broken by the fire of
the assailed, the effectiveness of cavalry, as a participant in the
manoeuvres of a battle field, is entirely destroyed.

The question of the future of cavalry is at present one of great
interest among military investigators; for notwithstanding its
brilliant achievements during our civil war, the fact is apparent that
its sphere has been entirely changed, its old system has become
obsolete, and former possibilities no longer lie within its scope. Since
Waterloo there had not been, until our war commenced, any opportunity to
test the action of cavalry; for its operations in the Crimea and in
Italy were insignificant. The art of warfare had, meanwhile, in many
respects, become revolutionized by the introduction of rifled arms.
Military men waited, therefore, with interest, the experience of the war
in this country, to judge from it as to the part cavalry was to perform
in future warfare. That experience has shown that the day in which
cavalry can successfully charge squares of infantry has passed. When the
smooth-bore muskets alone were used by infantry, cavalry could be formed
in masses for charging at a distance of five hundred yards; now the
formations must be made at the distance of nearly a mile, and that
intervening space must be passed at speed under the constant fire of
cannon and rifles; when the squares are reached, the horses are
frightened and blown, the ranks have been disordered by the
impossibility of preserving a correct front during such a length of time
at rapid speed, and by the loss of men; the charge breaks weakly on the
wall of bayonets, and retires baffled. Infantry, before it learns its
own strength and the difficulty of forcing a horse against a bayonet--or
rather to trample down a man--has an absurd and unfounded fear of
cavalry. This feeling was in part the cause of the panic among our
troops at Bull Run--so much had been said about the Black Horse troop of
the rebels. The Waterloo achievements of the French were then thought
possible of repetition. Now adays it is hardly probable that the veteran
infantry of either army would take the trouble to form squares to resist
cavalry, but would expect to rout it by firing in line. Neither party in
our war has been able to make its mounted forces effective in a general
battle. Nothing has occurred to parallel, upon the battle field, those
exploits of the cavalry--French, Prussian, and English--in the great
wars of the last century, extending to Waterloo.

The enthusiastic admirers of cavalry still maintain that it is possible
to repeat those exploits, even in face of the improved firearms now in
use. All that is necessary, they say, is to have the cavalry
sufficiently drilled. The ground to be crossed under a positively
dangerous fire is only five hundred or six hundred yards, and once
taught to continue the charge through the bullets for this distance, and
then to throw themselves on the bayonets, horsemen will now, as
heretofore, break the lines of infantry. All very true, _if_ cavalry to
fulfil the conditions named can be obtained; but in _them_ lies the
difficulty. Occasional instances of splendid charges will undoubtedly
occur in future warfare; but it seems to be an established fact that the
day for the glory of cavalry has passed. Once the mailed knight, mounted
on his mailed charger, could overthrow by scores the poor, pusillanimous
pikemen and crossbow men who composed the infantry; he was invulnerable
in his iron armor, and could ride them down like reeds. But gunpowder
and the bayonet have changed this; and now the most confident and
domineering cavalryman will put spurs to his horse and fly at a gallop,
if he sees the muzzle of an infantryman's rifle, with its glittering
bayonet, pointed at him from the thicket.

Another revolution effected in the mounted service by the improvements
in arms and the consequent changes of tactics, is the diminution of
heavy and the increase of light cavalry--that is, the transfer of the
former into the latter. These two denominations really include all kinds
of cavalry, although the non-military reader may have been puzzled by
the numerous subordinate denominations to be found in the accounts of
European warfare--such as dragoons, cuirassiers, hussars, lancers,
chasseurs, hulans, etc.

Heavy cavalry is composed of the heavier men and horses, and is usually
divided into dragoons and cuirassiers. It is designed to act in masses,
and to break the lines of an enemy by the weight of its charge. Usually,
also, it has had some defensive armor, and is a direct descendant from
the knights of the Middle Ages. But the cuirasses, which were sufficient
to resist the balls from smooth-bore muskets, are easily penetrated by
rifles. Consequently the occupation of this kind of cavalry is gone, and
it is likely to disappear gradually from the service. In this country we
have never had anything except light cavalry--the only kind adapted for
use in our Indian warfare. This kind of cavalry is intended to
accomplish results by the celerity of its movements, and all its
equipments should therefore be as light as possible. The chief
difficulty is to prevent the cavalry soldier from overloading his horse,
as he has a propensity not only to carry a large wardrobe and a full
supply of kitchen utensils, but also to 'convey,' in the language of
Pistol, or, in army language, 'gobble up,' or, in plain English, steal
anything that is capable of being fastened to his saddle.

It is evident that the efficiency of a cavalry soldier depends as much
upon his horse as upon himself; and it is requisite, therefore, that the
weight upon the horse should be as light as possible. The limit has been
fixed at about two hundred pounds for light, and two hundred and fifty
for heavy cavalry; but both of these are too much. A cavalry soldier
ought not to weigh over one hundred and fifty to one hundred and sixty
pounds, and his accoutrements not over thirty pounds additional; but in
practice, scarcely any horse--except where the rider is a very light
weight--carries less than two hundred and twenty or two hundred and
thirty pounds. One great cause of the evils incident to our cavalry
service is the excessive weight imposed on the horses. The French take
particular pains in this respect; while in England the cavalry is almost
entirely 'heavy,' and, though well drilled, is clumsy. John Bull, with
his roast beef and plum pudding, makes a poor specimen of a light
cavalryman. English officers are now endeavoring to revolutionize their
mounted service, so as to diminish its weight and increase its celerity.

The _arms_ of cavalry have been various, but it is now well settled that
its true weapon is the sabre, as its true form of operation is the
charge. A great deal of ingenuity has been expended in devising the best
form of sabre. Different countries have different patterns, but the one
adopted in our army is very highly considered. It is pointed, so as to
be used in thrusting; sharp on one edge for cutting; curved, so as to
inflict a deeper wound; and the weight arranged, by a mathematical rule,
so that the centres of percussion and of gravity are placed where the
weapon may be most easily handled. The lance is a weapon very
appropriate to light mounted troops, and is still used by some of the
Cossacks and Arab horsemen. But to wield it effectively requires
protracted training. For a long time in Europe it was the chief weapon
for horsemen; with the knights it was held in exclusive honor, and
continued in use for a considerable period after firearms had destroyed
the prestige of the gentlemen of the golden spurs. Prince Maurice, of
Orange, when he raised mounted regiments to defend the Netherlands
against the Spanish, rejected it, and since his time it has become
obsolete except in some regiments especially drilled to it. Such a
regiment was raised in Philadelphia at the commencement of our war, but
after eighteen months' experience the lances were abandoned. Besides the
sabre, cavalry-men are armed with pistols or carbines--the men having
the latter being employed particularly in skirmishing, sometimes on
foot.

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