An Inquiry Into The Nature Of Peace And The Terms Of Its Perpetuation

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This shifting of discretionary control out of the hands of the gentlemen
into those of the underbred common run, who know how to do what is
necessary to be done in the face of underbred exigencies, may
conceivably go far when it has once been started, and it may go forward
at an accelerated rate if the pressure of necessity lasts long enough.
If time be given for habituation to this manner of directorate in
national affairs, so that the common man comes to realise how it is
feasible to get along without gentlemen-investors holding the
discretion, the outcome may conceivably be very grave. It is a point in
doubt, but it is conceivable that in such a case the gentlemanly
executive committee administering affairs in the light of the
gentlemanly pecuniary interest, will not be fully reinstated in the
discretionary control of the United Kingdom for an appreciable number of
years after the return of peace. Possibly, even, the regime may be
permanently deranged, and there is even a shadowy doubt possible to be
entertained as to whether the vested pecuniary rights, on which the
class of gentlemen rests, may not suffer some derangement, in case the
control should pass into the hands of the underbred and unpropertied for
so long a season as to let the common man get used to thinking that the
vested interests and the sacred rights of gentility are so much ado
about nothing.

Such an outcome would be extreme, but as a remote contingency it is to
be taken into account. The privileged classes of the United Kingdom
should by this time be able to see the danger there may be for them and
their vested interests, pecuniary and moral, in an excessive
prolongation of the war; in such postponement of peace as would afford
time for a popular realisation of their incompetence and
disserviceability as touches the nation's material well-being under
modern conditions. To let the nation's war experience work to such an
outcome, the season of war would have to be prolonged beyond what either
the hopes or the fears of the community have yet contemplated; but the
point is after all worth noting, as being within the premises of the
case, that there is herein a remote contingency of losing, at least for
a time, that unformulated clause in the British constitution which has
hitherto restricted the holding of responsible office to men of pedigree
and of gentle breeding, or at least of very grave pecuniary weight; so
grave as to make the incumbents virtual gentlemen, with a virtual
pedigree, and with a virtual gentleman's accentuated sense of class
interest. Should such an eventuality overtake British popular sentiment
and belief there is also the remote contingency that the rights of
ownership and investment would lose a degree of sanctity.

It seems necessary to note a further, and in a sense more improbable,
line of disintegration among modern fixed ideas. Among the best
entrenched illusions of modern economic preconceptions, and in economic
as well as legal theory, has been the indispensability of funds, and the
hard and fast limitation of industrial operations by the supply or
with-holding of funds. The war experience has hitherto gone tentatively
to show that funds and financial transactions, of credit, bargain, sale
and solvency, may be dispensed with under pressure of necessity; and
apparently without seriously hindering that run of mechanical fact, on
which interest in the present case necessarily centers, and which must
be counted on to give the outcome. Latterly the case is clearing up a
little further, on further experience and under further pressure of
technological exigencies, to the effect that financial arrangements are
indispensable in this connection only because and in so far as it has
been arranged to consider them indispensable; as in international trade.
They are an indispensable means of intermediation only in so far as
pecuniary interests are to be furthered or safeguarded in the
intermediation. When, as has happened with the belligerents in the
present instance, the national establishment becomes substantially
insolvent, it is beginning to appear that its affairs can be taken care
of with less difficulty and with better effect without the use of
financial expedients. Of course, it takes time to get used to doing
things by the more direct method and without the accustomed
circumlocution of accountancy, or the accustomed allowance for profits
to go to interested parties who, under the financial regime, hold a
power of discretionary permission in all matters that touch the use of
the industrial arts. Under these urgent material exigencies, investment
comes to have much of the appearance of a gratuitous drag and drain on
the processes of industry.

Here, again, is a sinister contingency; sinister, that is, for those
vested rights of ownership by force of which the owners of "capital" are
enabled to permit or withhold the use of the industrial arts by the
community at large, on pain of privation in case the accustomed toll to
the owners of capital is not paid. It is, of course, not intended to
find fault with this arrangement; which has the sanction of "time
immemorial" and of a settled persuasion that it lies at the root of all
civilised life and intercourse. It is only that in case of extreme need
this presumed indispensable expedient of industrial control has broken
down, and that experience is proving it to be, in these premises, an
item of borrowed trouble. Should experience continue to run on the same
lines for an appreciable period and at a high tension, it is at least
conceivable that the vested right of owners to employ unlimited sabotage
in the quest of profits might fall so far into disrepute as to leave
them under a qualified doubt on the return of "normal" conditions. The
common man, in other words, who gathers nothing but privation and
anxiety from the owners' discretionary sabotage, may conceivably stand
to lose his preconception that the vested rights of ownership are the
cornerstone of his life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

* * * * *

The considerations recited in this lengthy excursion on the war
situation and its probable effects on popular habits of thought in the
United Kingdom go to say that when peace comes to be negotiated, with
the United Kingdom as the chief constituent and weightiest spokesman of
the allied nations and of the league of pacific neutrals, the
representatives of British aims and opinions are likely to speak in a
different, chastened, and disillusioned fashion, as contrasted with what
the British attitude was at the beginning of hostilities. The
gentlemanly British animus of arrogant self-sufficiency will have been
somewhat sobered, perhaps somewhat subdued. Concession to the claims and
pretensions of the other pacific nations is likely to go farther than
might once have been expected, particularly in the way of concession to
any demand for greater international comity and less international
discrimination; essentially concession looking to a reduction of
national pretensions and an incipient neutralisation of national
interests. Coupled with this will presumably be a less conciliatory
attitude toward the members of the dynastic coalition against whom the
war has been fought, owing to a more mature realisation of the
impossibility of a lasting peace negotiated with a Power whose
substantial core is a warlike and irresponsible dynastic establishment.
The peace negotiations are likely to run on a lower level of diplomatic
deference to constituted authorities, and with more of a view to the
interests and sentiments of the underlying population, than was evident
in the futile negotiations had at the outbreak of hostilities. The
gentle art of diplomacy, that engages the talents of exalted personages
and well-bred statesmen, has been somewhat discredited; and if it turns
out that the vulgarisation of the directorate in the United Kingdom and
its associated allies and neutrals will have time to go on to something
like dominance and authenticity, then the deference which the spokesmen
of these nations are likely to show for the prescriptive rights of
dynasty, nobility, bureaucracy, or even of pecuniary aristocracy, in the
countries that make up the party of the second part, may be expected to
have shrunk appreciably, conceivably even to such precarious dimensions
as to involve the virtual neglect or possible downright abrogation of
them, in sum and substance.

Indeed, the chances of a successful pacific league of neutrals to come
out of the current situation appear to be largely bound up with the
degree of vulgarisation due to overtake the several directorates of the
belligerent nations as well as the popular habits of thought in these
and in the neutral countries, during the further course of the war. It
is too broad a generalisation, perhaps, to say that the longer the war
lasts the better are the chances of such a neutral temper in the
interested nations as will make a pacific league practicable, but the
contrary would appear a much less defensible proposition. It is, of
course, the common man that has the least interest in warlike
enterprise, if any, and it is at the same time the common man that bears
the burden of such enterprise and has also the most immediate interest
in keeping the peace. If, slowly and pervasively, in the course of hard
experience, he learns to distrust the conduct of affairs by his betters,
and learns at the same move to trust to his own class to do what is
necessary and to leave undone what is not, his deference to his betters
is likely to suffer a decline, such as should show itself in a somewhat
unguarded recourse to democratic ways and means.

In short, there is in this progressive vulgarisation of effectual use
and wont and of sentiment, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, some
slight ground for the hope, or the apprehension, that no peace will be
made with the dynastic Powers of the second part until they cease to be
dynastic Powers and take on the semblance of democratic commonwealths,
with dynasties, royalties and privileged classes thrown in the discard.

This would probably mean some prolongation of hostilities, until the
dynasties and privileged classes had completely exhausted their
available resources; and, by the same token, until the privileged
classes in the more modern nations among the belligerents had also been
displaced from direction and discretion by those underbred classes on
whom it is incumbent to do what is to be done; or until a juncture were
reached that comes passably near to such a situation. On the contingency
of such a course of events and some such outcome appears also to hang
the chance of a workable pacific league. Without further experience of
the futility of upper-class and pecuniary control, to discredit
precedent and constituted authority, it is scarcely conceivable, e.g.,
that the victorious allies would go the length of coercively discarding
the German Imperial dynasty and the kept classes that with it constitute
the Imperial State, and of replacing it with a democratic organisation
of the people in the shape of a modern commonwealth; and without a
change of that nature, affecting that nation and such of its allies as
would remain on the map, no league of pacific neutrals would be able to
manage its affairs, even for a time, except on a war-footing that would
involve a competitive armament against future dynastic enterprises from
the same quarter. Which comes to saying that a lasting peace is possible
on no other terms than the disestablishment of the Imperial dynasty and
the abrogation of all feudalistic remnants of privilege in the
Fatherland and its allies, together with the reduction of those
countries to the status of commonwealths made up of ungraded men.

* * * * *

It is easy to speculate on what the conditions precedent to such a
pacific league of neutrals must of necessity be; but it is not therefore
less difficult to make a shrewd guess as to the chances of these
conditions being met. Of these conditions precedent, the chief and
foremost, without which any other favorable circumstances are
comparatively idle, is a considerable degree of neutralisation,
extending to virtually all national interests and pretensions, but more
particularly to all material and commercial interests of the federated
peoples; and, indispensably and especially, such neutralisation would
have to extend to the nations from whom aggression is now apprehended,
as, e.g., the German people. But such neutralisation could not
conceivably reach the Fatherland unless that nation were made over in
the image of democracy, since the Imperial State is, by force of the
terms, a warlike and unneutral power. This would seem to be the
ostensibly concealed meaning of the allied governments in proclaiming
that their aim is to break German militarism without doing harm to the
German people.

As touches the neutralisation of the democratically rehabilitated
Fatherland, or in default of that, as touches the peace terms to be
offered the Imperial government, the prime article among the
stipulations would seem to be abolition of all trade discrimination
against Germany or by Germany against any other nationality. Such
stipulation would, of course, cover all manner of trade
discrimination,--e.g., import, export and excise tariff, harbor and
registry dues, subsidy, patent right, copyright, trade mark, tax
exemption whether partial or exclusive, investment preferences at home
and abroad,--in short it would have to establish a thoroughgoing
neutralisation of trade relations in the widest acceptation of the term,
and to apply in perpetuity. The like applies, of course, to all that
fringe of subsidiary and outlying peoples on whom Imperial Germany
relies for much of its resources in any warlike enterprise. Such a move
also disposes of the colonial question in a parenthesis, so far as
regards any special bond of affiliation between the Empire, or the
Fatherland, and any colonial possessions that are now thought desirable
to be claimed. Under neutralisation, colonies would cease to be
"colonial possessions," being necessarily included under the general
abrogation of commercial discriminations, and also necessarily exempt
from special taxation or specially favorable tax rates.

Colonies there still would be, though it is not easy to imagine what
would be the meaning of a "German Colony" in such a case. Colonies would
be free communities, after the fashion of New Zealand or Australia, but
with the further sterilisation of the bond between colony and mother
country involved in the abolition of all appointive offices and all
responsibility to the crown or the imperial government. Now, there are
no German colonies in this simpler British sense of the term, which
implies nothing more than community of blood, institutions and language,
together with that sense of solidarity between the colony and the mother
country which this community of pedigree and institutions will
necessarily bring; but while there are today no German colonies, in the
sense of the term so given, there is no reason to presume that no such
German colonies would come into bearing under the conditions of this
prospective regime of neutrality installed by such a pacific league,
when backed by the league's guarantee that no colony from the Fatherland
will be exposed to the eventual risk of coming under the discretionary
tutelage of the German Imperial establishment and so falling into a
relation of step-childhood to the Imperial dynasty.

As is well known, and as has by way of superfluous commonplace been set
forth by a sometime Colonial Secretary of the Empire, the decisive
reason for there being no German colonies in existence is the
consistently impossible colonial policy of the German government,
looking to the usufruct of the colonies by the government, and the fear
of further arbitrary control and nepotic discrimination at the pleasure
of the self-seeking dynastic establishment. It is only under Imperial
rule that no German colony, in this modern sense of the term, is
possible; and only because Imperial rule does not admit of a free
community being formed by colonists from the Fatherland; or of an
ostensibly free community of that kind ever feeling secure from
unsolicited interference with its affairs.

The nearest approach to a German Colony, as contrasted with a "Colonial
Possession," hitherto have been the very considerable, number of
escaped German subjects who have settled in English-speaking or
Latin-speaking countries, particularly in North and South America. And
considering that the chief common trait among them is their successful
evasion of the Imperial government's heavy hand, they show an admirable
filial piety toward the Imperial establishment; though troubled with no
slightest regret at having escaped from the Imperial surveillance and no
slightest inclination to return to the shelter of the Imperial tutelage.
A colloquialism--"hyphenate"--has latterly grown up to meet the need of
a term to designate these evasive and yet patriotic colonists. It is
scarcely misleading to say that the German-American hyphenate, e.g., in
so far as he runs true to form, is still a German subject with his
heart, but he is an American citizen with his head. All of which goes to
argue that if the Fatherland were to fall into such a state of
democratic tolerance that no recidivist need carry a defensive hyphen to
shield him from the importunate attentions of the Imperial government,
German colonies would also come into bearing; although, it is true, they
would have no value to the German government.

In the Imperial colonial policy colonies are conceived to stand to their
Imperial guardian or master in a relation between that of a step-child
and that of an indentured servant; to be dealt with summarily and at
discretion and to be made use of without scruple. The like attitude
toward colonies was once familiar matter-of-course with the British and
Spanish statesmen. The British found the plan unprofitable, and also
unworkable, and have given it up. The Spanish, having no political
outlook but the dynastic one, could of course not see their way to
relinquish the only purpose of their colonial enterprise, except in
relinquishing their colonial possessions. The German (Imperial) colonial
policy is and will be necessarily after the Spanish pattern, and
necessarily, too, with the Spanish results.

Under the projected neutral scheme there would be no colonial policy,
and of course, no inducement to the acquisition of colonies, since
there would be no profit to be derived, or to be fancied, in the case.
But while no country, as a commonwealth, has any material interest in
the acquisition or maintenance of colonies, it is otherwise as regards
the dynastic interests of an Imperial government; and it is also
otherwise, at least in the belief of the interested parties, as regards
special businessmen or business concerns who are in a position to gain
something by help of national discrimination in their favor. As regards
the pecuniary interests of favored businessmen or business concerns, and
of investors favored by national discrimination in colonial relations,
the case falls under the general caption of trade discrimination, and
does not differ at all materially from such expedients as a protective
tariff, a ship subsidy, or a bounty on exports. But as regards the
warlike, that is to say dynastic, interest of an Imperial government the
case stands somewhat different.

Colonial Possessions in such a case yield no material benefit to the
country at large, but their possession is a serviceable plea for warlike
preparations with which to retain possession of the colonies in the face
of eventualities, and it is also a serviceable means of stirring the
national pride and keeping alive a suitable spirit of patriotic
animosity. The material service actually to be derived from such
possessions in the event of war is a point in doubt, with the
probabilities apparently running against their being of any eventual net
use. But there need be no question that such possessions, under the hand
of any national establishment infected with imperial ambitions, are a
fruitful source of diplomatic complications, excuses for armament,
international grievances, and eventual aggression. A pacific league of
neutrals can evidently not tolerate the retention of colonial
possessions by any dynastic State that may be drawn into the league or
under its jurisdiction, as, e.g., the German Empire in case it should be
left on an Imperial footing. Whereas, in case the German peoples are
thrown back on a democratic status, as neutralised commonwealths without
a crown or a military establishment, the question of their colonial
possessions evidently falls vacant.

As to the neutralisation of trade relations apart from the question of
colonies, and as bears on the case of Germany under the projected
jurisdiction of a pacific league of neutrals, the considerations to be
taken account of are of much the same nature. As it would have to take
effect, e.g., in the abolition of commercial and industrial
discriminations between Germany and the pacific nations, such
neutralisation would doubtless confer a lasting material benefit on the
German people at large; and it is not easy to detect any loss or
detriment to be derived from such a move so long as peace prevails.
Protective, that is to say discriminating, export, import, or excise
duties, harbor and registry dues, subsidies, tax exemptions and trade
preferences, and all the like devices of interference with trade and
industry, are unavoidably a hindrance to the material interests of any
people on whom they are imposed or who impose these disabilities on
themselves. So that exemption from these things by a comprehensive
neutralisation of trade relations would immediately benefit all the
nations concerned, in respect of their material well-being in times of
peace. There is no exception and no abatement to be taken account of
under this general statement, as is well known to all men who are
conversant with these matters.

But it is otherwise as regards the dynastic interest in the case, and as
regards any national interest in warlike enterprise. It is doubtless
true that all restraint of trade between nations, and between classes or
localities within the national frontiers, unavoidably acts to weaken and
impoverish the people on whose economic activities this restraint is
laid; and to the extent to which this effect is had it will also be true
that the country which so is hindered in its work will have a less
aggregate of resources to place at the disposal of its enterprising
statesmen for imperialist ends. But these restraints may yet be useful
for dynastic, that is to say warlike, ends by making the country more
nearly a "self-contained economic whole." A country becomes a
"self-contained economic whole" by mutilation, in cutting itself off
from the industrial system in which industrially it belongs, but in
which it is unwilling nationally to hold its place. National frontiers
are industrial barriers. But as a result of such mutilation of its
industrial life such a country is better able--it has been believed--to
bear the shock of severing its international trade relations entirely,
as is likely to happen in case of war.

In a large country, such as America or Russia, which comprises within
its national boundaries very extensive and very varied resources and a
widely distributed and diversified population, the mischief suffered
from restraints of trade that hinder industrial relations with the world
at large will of course be proportionately lessened. Such a country
comes nearer being a miniature industrial world; although none of the
civilised nations, large or small, can carry on its ordinary industrial
activities and its ordinary manner of life without drawing on foreign
parts to some appreciable extent. But a country of small territorial
extent and of somewhat narrowly restricted natural resources, as, e.g.,
Germany or France, can even by the most drastic measures of restraint
and mutilation achieve only a very mediocre degree of industrial
isolation and "self-sufficiency,"--as has, e.g., appeared in the present
war. But in all cases, though in varying measure, the mitigated
isolation so enforced by these restraints on trade will in their degree
impair the country's industrial efficiency and lower the people's
material well-being; yet, if the restrictions are shrewdly applied this
partial isolation and partial "self-sufficiency" will go some way toward
preparing the nation for the more thorough isolation that follows on the
outbreak of hostilities.

The present plight of the German people under war conditions may serve
to show how nearly that end may be attained, and yet how inadequate even
the most unreserved measures of industrial isolation must be in face of
the fact that the modern state of the industrial arts necessarily draws
on the collective resources of the world at large. It may well be
doubted, on an impartial view, if the mutilation of the country's
industrial system by such measures of isolation does not after all
rather weaken the nation even for warlike ends; but then, the
discretionary authorities in the dynastic States are always, and it may
be presumed necessarily, hampered with obsolete theories handed down
from that cameralistic age, when the little princes of the Fatherland
were making dynastic history. So, e.g., the current, nineteenth and
twentieth century, economic policy of the Prussian-Imperial statesmen is
still drawn on lines within which Frederick II, called the Great, would
have felt well at home.

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