The Uncollected Writings of Thomas de Quincey, Vol. 2

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[Transcriber's Notes: Text that was in italics in the original book is
shown between _underscore characters_ and text that was in small caps
is shown as ALL CAPS. Footnotes from the article titles are at the end
of the first paragraph of the article; all others follow the paragraph
in which they are referenced. The variation in the spelling of some
words is maintained from the original.]

THE UNCOLLECTED WRITINGS
OF
THOMAS DE QUINCEY.

WITH
A PREFACE AND ANNOTATIONS
BY
JAMES HOGG.

IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. II.

[Illustration]

LONDON:
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO.,
PATERNOSTER SQUARE.

1890.

RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,

LONDON & BUNGAY.

CONTENTS.

PAGE
THE ENGLISH IN CHINA. 7

SHAKSPERE'S TEXT.--SUETONIUS UNRAVELLED. 37

HOW TO WRITE ENGLISH. 55

THE CASUISTRY OF DUELLING. 65

THE LOVE-CHARM. 113

LUDWIG TIECK. 153

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT.--THE HOUSE OF WEEPING. 160

THE HOUSEHOLD WRECK. 173

MR. SCHNACKENBERGER; OR, TWO MASTERS FOR ONE DOG. 279

ANGLO-GERMAN DICTIONARIES. 348

THE ENGLISH IN CHINA.

This Paper, originally written for me in 1857, and published in _Titan_
for July of that year, has not appeared in any collective edition of the
author's works, British or American. It was his closing contribution to
a series of three articles concerning Chinese affairs; prepared when our
troubles with that Empire seemed to render war imminent. The first two
were given in _Titan_ for February and April, 1857, and then issued with
additions in the form of a pamphlet which is now very scarce. It
consisted of 152 pages thus arranged:--(1) Preliminary Note, i-iv; (2)
Preface, pp. 3-68; (3) China (the two _Titan_ papers), pp. 69-149; (4)
Postscript, pp. 149-152.

In the posthumous supplementary volume (XVI.) of the collected works the
_third section_ was reprinted, but all the other matter was
discarded--with a rather imperfect appreciation of the labour which the
author had bestowed upon it, and his own estimate of the value of what
he had condensed in this Series--as frequently expressed to me during
its progress.

In the twelfth volume of the 'Riverside' Edition of De Quincey's works,
published by Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, U.S.A., the whole of the 152
pp. of the expanded _China_ reprint are given, but not the final section
here reproduced from _Titan_.

The Chinese questions stirred DE QUINCEY profoundly, and roused all the
'John Bullism' of his nature. Two passages from the 'Preliminary Note'
will show his object in throwing so much energy into this subject:--

NATIONAL MORALITY.

'Its purpose[1] is to diffuse amongst those of the middle classes, whose
daily occupations leave them small leisure for direct personal
inquiries, some sufficient materials for appreciating the _justice_ of
our British pretensions and attitude in our coming war with China. It is
a question frequently raised amongst public journalists, whether we
British are entitled to that exalted distinction which sometimes we
claim for ourselves, and which sometimes is claimed on our behalf, by
neutral observers on the national practice of morality. There is no call
in this place for so large a discussion; but, most undoubtedly, in one
feature of so grand a distinction, in one reasonable presumption for
inferring a profounder national conscientiousness, as diffused among the
British people, stands upon record, in the pages of history, this
memorable fact, that always at the opening (and at intervals throughout
the progress) of any war, there has been much and angry discussion
amongst us British as to the equity of its origin, and the moral
reasonableness of its objects. Whereas, on the Continent, no man ever
heard of a question being raised, or a faction being embattled, upon any
demur (great or small) as to the moral grounds of a war. To be able to
face the trials of a war--_that_ was its justification; and to win
victories--_that_ was its ratification for the conscience.'

[1] That is--the publication of the pamphlet.--H.

CHINESE POLICY.

'The dispute at Shanghai, in 1848, equally as regards the origin of that
dispute, and as regards the Chinese mode of conducting it, will give the
reader a key to the Chinese character and the Chinese policy. To begin
by making the most arrogant resistance to the simplest demands of
justice, to end by cringing in the lowliest fashion before the guns of a
little war-brig, there we have, in a representative abstract, the
Chinese system of law and gospel. The equities of the present war are
briefly summed up in this one question: What is it that our brutal enemy
wants from us? Is it some concession in a point of international law, or
of commercial rights, or of local privilege, or of traditional usage,
that the Chinese would exact? Nothing of the kind. It is simply a
license, guaranteed by ourselves, to call us in all proclamations by
scurrilous names; and secondly, with our own consent, to inflict upon
us, in the face of universal China, one signal humiliation.... Us--the
freemen of the earth by emphatic precedency--us, the leaders of
civilisation, would this putrescent[2] tribe of hole-and-corner
assassins take upon themselves, not to force into entering by an ignoble
gate [the reference here is to a previous passage concerning the low
door by which Spanish fanaticism ordained that the _Cagots_ (lepers) of
the Pyrenees should enter the churches in a stooping attitude], but to
exclude from it altogether, and for ever. Briefly, then, for this
licensed scurrility, in the first place; and, in the second, for this
foul indignity of a spiteful exclusion from a right four times secured
by treaty, it is that the Chinese are facing the unhappy issues of war.'

[2] _Putrescent._ See the recorded opinions of Lord Amherst's suite upon
the personal cleanliness of the Chinese.

* * * * *

The position and outcome of matters in those critical years may be
recalled by a few lines from the annual summaries of _The Times_ on the
New Years' days of 1858 and 1859. These indicate that DE QUINCEY was
here a pretty fair exponent of the growing wrath of the English people.

[_January 1, 1858._]

'The presence of the China force on the Indian Seas was especially
fortunate. The demand for reinforcements at Calcutta (caused by the
Indian Mutiny) was obviously more urgent than the necessity for
punishing the insolence at Canton. At a more convenient season the
necessary operations in China will be resumed, and in the meantime the
blockading squadron has kept the offending population from despising the
resentment of England. The interval which has elapsed has served to
remove all reasonable doubt of the necessity of enforcing redress.
Public opinion has not during the last twelvemonth become more tolerant
of barbarian outrages. There is no reason to believe that the punishment
of the provincial authorities will involve the cessation of intercourse
with the remainder of the Chinese Empire.'

* * * * *

[_January 1, 1859._]

'The working of our treaties with China and Japan will be watched with
curiosity both in and out of doors, and we can only hope that nothing will
be done to blunt the edge of that masterly decision by which these two
giants of Eastern tale have been felled to the earth, and reduced to the
level and bearing of common humanity.'

* * * * *

The titles which follow are those which were given by DE QUINCEY himself to
the three Sections.--H.

HINTS TOWARDS AN APPRECIATION OF THE COMING WAR IN CHINA.

Said before the opening of July, that same warning remark may happen to
have a prophetic rank, and practically, a prophetic value, which two
months later would tell for mere history, and history paid for by a
painful experience.

The war which is now approaching wears in some respects the strangest
features that have yet been heard of in old romance, or in prosaic
history, for we are at war with the southernmost province of
China--namely, Quantung, and pre-eminently with its chief city of
Canton, but not with the other four commercial ports of China, nor; in
fact, at present with China in general; and, again, we are at war with
Yeh, the poisoning Governor of Canton, but (which is strangest of all)
not with Yeh's master--the Tartar Emperor--locked up in a far-distant
Peking.

Another strange feature in this war is--the footing upon which our
alliances stand. For allies, it seems, we are to have; nominal, as
regards the costs of war, but real and virtual as regards its profits.
The French, the Americans,[3] and I believe the Belgians, have pushed
forward (absolutely in post-haste advance of ourselves) their several
diplomatic representatives, who are instructed duly to lodge their
claims for equal shares of the benefits reaped by our British fighting,
but with no power to contribute a single file towards the bloodshed of
this war, nor a single guinea towards its money costs. Napoleon I., in a
craze of childish spite towards this country, pleased himself with
denying the modern heraldic bearings of Great Britain, and resuscitating
the obsolete shield of our Plantagenets; he insisted that our true
armorial ensigns were the leopards. But really the Third Napoleon is
putting life and significance into his uncle's hint, and using us, as in
Hindostan they use the cheeta or hunting-leopard, for rousing and
running down his oriental game. It is true, that in certain desperate
circumstances, when no opening remains for pacific negotiation, these
French and American agents are empowered to send home for military
succours. A worshipful prospect, when we throw back our eyes upon our
own share in these warlike preparations, with all the advantages of an
unparalleled marine. Six months have slipped away since Lord Clarendon,
our Foreign Secretary, received, in Downing Street, Sir J. Bowring's
and Admiral Seymour's reports of Yeh's atrocities. Six calendar months,
not less, but more, by some days, have run past us since then; and
though some considerable part of our large reinforcements must have
reached their ground in April, and even the commander-in-chief (Sir John
Ashburnham) by the middle of May, yet, I believe, that many of the
gun-boats, on which mainly will rest the pursuit of Yeh's junks, if any
remain unabsconded northwards, have actually not yet left our own
shores. The war should naturally have run its course in one campaign.
Assuredly it will, if confined within the limits of Yeh's command, even
supposing that command to comprehend the two Quangs. Practically, then,
it is a fantastic impossibility that any reversionary service to our
British expedition, which is held out in prophetic vision as
consecrating our French and American friends from all taint of mercenary
selfishness, ever can be realised. I am not going to pursue this
subject. But a brief application of it to a question at this moment
(June 16) urgently appealing to public favour is natural and fair.
Canvassers are now everywhere moving on behalf of a ship canal across
the Isthmus of Suez. This canal proposes to call upon the subscribers
for L9,000,000 sterling; the general belief is, that first and last it
will call for L12,000,000 to L15,000,000. But at that price, or at any
price, it is cheap; and ultimate failure is impossible. Why do I mention
it? Everywhere there is a rumour that 'a narrow jealousy' in London is
the bar which obstructs this canal speculation. There is, indeed, and
already before the canal proposal there _was_, a plan in motion for a
_railway_ across the isthmus, which seems far enough from meeting the
vast and growing necessities of the case. But be _that_ as it may, with
what right does any man in Europe, or America, impute narrowness of
spirit, local jealousy, or selfishness, to England, when he calls to
mind what sacrifices she is at this moment making for those very
oriental interests which give to the ship canal its sole value--the men,
the ships, the money spent, or to _be_ spent, upon the Canton war, and
then in fairness connects that expense (or the similar expense made by
her in 1840-42) with the operative use to which, in those years, she
applied all the diplomatic concessions extorted by her arms. The first
word--a memorable word--which she uttered on proposing her terms in
1842, was, What I demand for myself, _that_ let all Christendom enjoy.
And since that era (_i. e._, for upwards of fourteen years) all
Christendom, that did not fail in the requisite energy for improving the
opportunities then first laid open, _has_ enjoyed the very same
advantages in Chinese ports as Great Britain; secondly, without having
contributed anything whatever to the winning or the securing of these
advantages; thirdly, on the pure volunteer intercession made by Britain
on their behalf. The world has seen enough of violence and cruelties,
the most bloody in the service of commercial jealousies, and nowhere
more than in these oriental regions: witness the abominable acts of the
Dutch at Amboyna, in Japan, and in Java, &c.; witness the bigoted
oppressions, where and when soever they had power, of the colonising
Portuguese and Spaniards. Tyranny and merciless severities for the ruin
of commercial rivals have been no rarities for the last three and a half
centuries in any region of the East. But first of all, from Great
Britain in 1842 was heard the free, spontaneous proclamation--this was a
rarity--unlimited access, with advantages the very same as her own, to a
commerce which it was always imagined that she laboured to hedge round
with repulsions, making it sacred to her own privileged use. A royal
gift was this; but a gift which has not been received by Christendom in
a corresponding spirit of liberal appreciation. One proof of _that_ may
be read in the invidious statement, supported by no facts or names,
which I have just cited. Were this even true, a London merchant is not
therefore a Londoner, or even a Briton. Germans, Swiss, Frenchmen, &c.,
are settled there as merchants, in crowds. No nation, however, is
compromised by any act of her citizens acting as separate and
uncountenanced individuals. So that, even if better established as a
fact, this idle story would still be a calumny; and as a calumny it
would merit little notice. Nevertheless, I have felt it prudent to give
it a prominent station, as fitted peculiarly, by the dark shadows of its
malice, pointed at our whole nation collectively, to call into more
vivid relief the unexampled lustre of that royal munificence in England,
which, by one article of a treaty, dictated at the point of her
bayonets, threw open in an hour, to all nations, that Chinese commerce,
never previously unsealed through countless generations of man.

[3] '_America_:'--For America in particular there is an American
defence offered in a Washington paper (the _Weekly Union_, for May 28,
1857), which, for cool ignoring of facts, exceeds anything that I
remember. It begins thus:--'Since our treaty with China in 1844' (and
_that_, be it remembered, was possible only in consequence of our war
and its close in 1842), 'the most amicable relations have existed
between the United States and China--China is our friend, and we are
hers.' Indeed! as a brief commentary upon that statement, I recommend to
the reader's attention our Blue-books on China of last winter. The
American commander certainly wound up his quarrel with Yeh in a
mysterious way, that drew some sneers from the various nationalities
then moving in that neighbourhood, but no less certainly he had, during
the October of 1856, a smart exchange of cannon-shots with Yeh, which
lasted for some days (three, at least, according to my remembrance), and
ended in the capture of numerous Chinese forts. The American apologist
says in effect, that the United States will not fight, because they have
no quarrel. But that is not the sole question. Does the United States
mean to take none of the benefits that may be won by our arms? He speaks
of the French as more belligerently inclined than the United States.
Would that this were really so. No good will come of schisms between the
nations of Christendom. There is a posthumous work of Commissioner Lin,
in twelve quartos, printed at Peking, urgently pressing the necessity
for China of building upon such schisms the one sole policy that can
save her from ruin.

Next, then, having endeavoured to place these preliminary points in
their true light, I will anticipate the course by which the campaign
would naturally be likely to travel, supposing no alien and mischievous
disturbance at work for deranging it. Simply to want fighting allies
would be no very menacing evil. We managed to do without them in our
pretty extensive plan of warfare fifteen years ago; and there is no
reason why we should find our difficulties now more intractable than
then. I should imagine that the American Congress and the French
Executive would look on uneasily, and with a sense of shame, at the
prospect of sharing largely in commercial benefits which they had not
earned, whilst the burdens of the day were falling exclusively upon the
troops of our nation; but _that_ is a consideration for their own
feelings, and may happen to corrode their hearts and their sense of
honour most profoundly at some future time, when it may have ceased to
be remediable. If that were all, for us there would be no arrears of
mortified sensibilities to apprehend. But what is ominous even in
relation to ourselves from these professedly inert associates, these
sleeping partners in our Chinese dealings, is, that their presence with
no active functions argues a faith lurking somewhere in the possibility
of _talking_ the Chinese into reason. Such a chimera, still surviving
the multiform experience we have had, augurs ruin to the total
enterprise. It is not absolutely impossible that even Yeh, or any
imbecile governor armed with the same obstinacy and brutal arrogance,
might, under the terrors of an armament such as he will have to face,
simulate a submission that was far from his thoughts. We ourselves found
in the year 1846, when in fidelity to our engagements we gave back the
important island of Chusan, which we had retained for four years, in
fact until all the instalments of the ransom money had been paid, that a
more negligent ear was turned to our complaints and remonstrances. The
vile mob of Canton, long kept and indulged as so many trained bull-dogs,
for the purpose of venting that insolence to Europeans which the
mandarins could no longer utter personally without coming into collision
with the treaty, became gradually unmanageable even by their masters. In
1847 Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, was reduced to the
necessity of fulminating this passage against the executive government
of the murdering city--'You' (Lord Palmerston was addressing Sir John
Davis, at that time H. M. Plenipotentiary in China) 'will inform the
Chinese authorities, in plain and distinct terms, that the British
Government will not tolerate that a Chinese mob shall with impunity
maltreat British subjects in China, whenever they get them into their
power; and that if the Chinese authorities will not punish and prevent
such outrages, the British Government will be obliged to take the matter
into their own hands; and it will not be _their_ fault if, in such case,
the innocent are involved in the punishment sought to be inflicted on
the guilty.'

This commanding tone was worthy of Lord Palmerston, and in harmony with
his public acts in all cases where he has understood the ground which
he occupied. Unhappily he did _not_ understand the case of Canton. The
British were admitted by each successive treaty, their right of entry
was solemnly acknowledged by the emperor. Satisfied with this, Lord
Palmerston said, 'Enough: the principle is secured; the mere details,
locally intelligible no doubt, I do not pretend to understand. But all
this will come in time. In time you will be admitted into Canton. And
for the present rest satisfied with having your right admitted, if not
as yet your persons.' Ay, but unfortunately nothing short of plenary
admission to British flesh and blood ever will satisfy the organised
ruffians of Canton, that they have not achieved a triumph over the
British; which triumph, as a point still open to doubt amongst
mischief-makers, they seek to strengthen by savage renewal as often as
they find a British subject unprotected by armed guardians within their
streets. In those streets murder walks undisguised. And the only measure
for grappling with it is summarily to introduce the British resident, to
prostrate all resistance, and to punish it by the gallows[4] where it
proceeds to acts of murder. It is sad consideration for those, either in
England or China, who were nearly or indirectly connected with Canton
(amongst whom must be counted the British Government), that beyond a
doubt the murders of our countrymen, which occurred in that city, would
have been intercepted by such a mastery over the local ruffians as could
not be effected so long as the Treaty of Nanking was not carried into
effect with respect to free entrance and residence of British subjects.
As things stood, all that Sir J. Davis could do, in obedience to the
directions from the Home Government, was to order a combined naval and
military attack upon all the Chinese forts which belt the approaches to
Canton. These were all captured; and the immense number of eight hundred
and twenty-seven heavy guns were in a few hours made unserviceable,
either by knocking off their trunnions, or by spiking them, or in both
ways. The Imperial Commissioner, Keying, previously known so favourably
to the English by his good sense and discretion, had on this occasion
thought it his best policy to ignore Lord Palmerston's letter: a copy
had been communicated to him; but he took not the least notice of it. If
this were intended for insolence, it was signally punished within a few
hours. It happened that on our English list of grievances there remained
a shocking outrage offered to Colonel Chesney, a distinguished officer
of the engineers,[5] and which to a certainty would have terminated in
his murder, but for the coming up at the critical moment of a Chinese in
high authority. The villains concerned in this outrage were known, were
arrested, and (according to an agreement with our plenipotentiary) were
to be punished in our presence. But in contempt of all his engagements,
and out of pure sycophantic concession to the Canton mob, Keying
notified that we the injured party were to be excluded. _In that case no
punishment at all would have been inflicted._ Luckily, our troops and
our shipping had not yet dispersed. Sir J. Davis, therefore, wrote to
Keying, openly taxing him with his breach of honour. 'I _was_ going'
[these were Sir John's words] 'to Hong-Kong to-morrow; but since you
behave with evasion and bad faith, in not punishing the offenders in
the presence of deputed officers, I shall keep the troops at Canton, and
proceed to-morrow in the steamer to Foshan, where, if I meet with
insult, I will burn the town.' Foshan is a town in the neighbourhood of
Canton, and happened to be the scene of Colonel Chesney's ill usage.
Now, upon this vigorous step, what followed? Hear Sir John:--'Towards
midnight a satisfactory reply was received, and at five o'clock next
morning three offenders were brought to the guard-house--a mandarin of
high rank being present on the part of the Chinese, and deputed officers
on the part of the British. The men were bambooed in succession by the
Chinese officers of justice;' and at the close of the scene, the
mandarin (upon a requisition from our side) explained to the mob who
crowded about the barriers _why_ the men were punished, and warned them
that similar chastisement for similar offences awaited themselves. In
one point only the example made was unsatisfactory: the men punished
were not identified as the same who had assaulted Colonel Chesney. They
might be criminals awaiting punishment for some other offence. With so
shuffling a government as the Chinese, always moving through darkness,
and on the principles of a crooked policy, no perfect satisfaction must
ever be looked for. But still, what a bright contrast between this
energy of men acquainted with the Chinese character, and the foolish
imbecility of our own government in Downing Street, who are always
attempting the plan of soothing and propitiating by concession those
ignoble Orientals, in whose eyes all concession, great or small,
through the whole scale of graduation, is interpreted as a distinct
confession of weakness. Thus did all our governments: thus, above all
others, did the East India Company for generations deal with the
Chinese; and the first act of ours that ever won respect from China was
Anson's broadsides, and the second was our refusal of the _ko-tou_. Thus
did our Indian Government, in the early stages of their intercourse,
deal with the Burmese. Thus did our government deal with the
Japanese--an exaggerated copy of the Chinese. What they wanted with
Japan was simply to do her a very kind and courteous service--namely, to
return safe and sound to their native land seven Japanese who had been
driven by hurricanes in continued succession into the Pacific, and had
ultimately been saved from death by British sailors. Our wise government
at home were well aware of the atrocious inhospitality practised
systematically by these cruel islanders; and what course did they take
to propitiate them? Good sense would have prescribed the course of
arming the British vessel in so conspicuous a fashion as to inspire the
wholesome respect of fear. Instead of which, our government actually
drew the teeth of the particular vessel selected, by carefully
withdrawing each individual gun. The Japanese cautiously sailed round
her, ascertained her powerless condition, and instantly proceeded to
force her away by every mode of insult; nor were the unfortunate
Japanese _ever_ restored to their country. Now, contrast with this
endless tissue of imbecilities, practised through many generations by
our blind and obstinate government (for such it really is in its modes
of dealing with Asiatics), the instantaneous success of 'sharp
practice' and resolute appeals to _fear_ on the part of Sir John Davis.
By midnight of the same day on which the British remonstrance had been
lodged an answer is received; and this answer, in a perfect rapture of
panic, concedes everything demanded; and by sunrise the next morning the
whole affair has been finished. Two centuries, on our old East Indian
system of negotiating with China, would not have arrived at the same
point. Later in the very same year occurred another and more atrocious
explosion of Canton ruffianism; and the instantaneous retribution which
followed to the leading criminals, showed at once how great an advance
had been made in winning respect for ourselves, and in extorting our
rights, by this energetic mode of action. On Sunday, the 5th of
December, six British subjects had gone out into the country on a
pleasure excursion, some of whom unhappily carried pocket-pistols. They
were attacked by a mob of the usual Canton character; one Chinese was
killed and one wounded by pistol-shots; but of the six British,
encompassed by a countless crowd, not one escaped: all six were
murdered, and then thrown into the river. Immediately, and before the
British had time to take any steps, the Chinese authorities were all in
motion. The resolute conduct of Sir John Davis had put an end to the
Chinese policy of shuffling, by making it no longer hopeful. It lost
much more than it gained. And accordingly it was agreed, after a few
days' debate, that the emperor's pleasure should not be taken, except
upon the more doubtful cases. Four, about whose guilt no doubts
existed, were immediately beheaded; and the others, after communicating
with Peking, were punished in varying degrees--one or two capitally.

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