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Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Authors of Greece

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"if you wish to live in disgrace, after going back on your contract
and agreement with us, we will be angry with you while you are alive
and in death our Brother Laws will give you a cold welcome; they
will know that you have done your best to destroy our authority."

Sound and concrete teaching like this is always necessary, but is
hardly likely to be popular. The doctrine of disobedience is everywhere
preached in a democracy; violation of contracts is a normal practice
and law-breakers have been known to be publicly feasted by the very
members of our legislative body.

A different lesson is found in the _Euthyphro_. After wishing Socrates
success in his coming trial, Euthyphro informs him that he is going to
prosecute his father for manslaughter, assuring him that it would be
piety to do so. Socrates asks for a definition of piety. Euthyphro
attempts five--"to act as Zeus did to his father"; "what the gods
love"; "what all the gods love"; "a part of righteousness, relating to
the care of the gods"; "the saying and doing of what the gods approve
in prayer and sacrifice". Each of these proves inadequate; Euthyphro
complains of the disconcerting Socratic method as follows:

"Well, I do not know how to express my thoughts. Every one of
our suggestions always seem to have legs, refusing to stand still
where we may fix it down. Nor have I put into them this spirit of
moving and shifting, but you, a second Daedalus."

It is noticeable that no definite result comes from this dialogue;
Plato was within his rights in refusing to answer the main question.
Philosophy does not pretend to settle every inquiry; her business is
to see that a question is raised. Even when an answer is available,
she cannot always give it, for she demands an utter abandonment of all
prepossessions in those to whom she talks--otherwise there will be no
free passage for her teaching. Though refuted, Euthyphro still
retained his first opinions, for his first and last definitions are
similar in idea. To such a person argument is mere waste of time.

An admirable illustration of Plato's lightness of touch is found in
the _Laches_. The dialogue begins with a discussion about the
education of the young sons of Lysimachus and Melesias. Soon the
question is raised "What is courage?" Nicias warns Laches about
Socrates; the latter has a trick of making men review their lives; his
practice is good, for it teaches men their faults in time; old age
does not always bring wisdom automatically. Laches first defines
courage as the faculty which makes men keep the ranks in war; when
this proves inadequate, he defines it as a stoutness of spirit. Nicias
is called in; he defines it as "knowledge of terrors and confidence in
war"; he is soon compelled to add "and knowledge of all good and evil
in every form"--in a word, courage is all virtue combined. The
dialogue concludes that it is not young boys but grown men of all ages
who need a careful education. This spirited little piece is full of
dramatic vigour--the remarks of Laches and Nicias about each other as
they are repeatedly confuted are most human and diverting.

Literary criticism is the subject of the _Ion_. Coming from Ephesus,
Ion claimed to be the best professional reciter of Homer in all
Greece. Acknowledging that Homer made him all fire, while other poets
left him cold, he is made to admit that his knowledge of poetry is not
scientific; otherwise he would have been able to discuss all poetry,
for it is one. Socrates then makes the famous comparison between a
poet and a magnet; both attract an endless chain, and both contain
some divine power which masters them. Ecstasy, enthusiasm, madness are
the best descriptions of poetic power. Even as a professional reciter
Ion admits the necessity of the power of working on men.

"When I am on the platform I look on my audience weeping and
looking warlike and dazed at my words. I must pay attention to
them; if I let them sit down weeping, I myself shall laugh when
I receive my fee, but if they laugh I myself shall weep when I get
nothing."

Homer is the subject of the _Hippias Minor_. At Olympia Hippias once
said that every single thing that he was wearing was his own
handiwork. He was a most inventive person--one of his triumphs being
an art of memory. In this dialogue he prefers the Iliad to the Odyssey
because Achilles was called "excellent" and Odysseus "versatile".
Socrates soon proves to him that Achilles was false too, as he did not
always keep his word. He reminds Hippias that he never wastes time
over the brainless, though he listens carefully to every man. In fact,
his cross-examination is a compliment. He never thinks the knowledge
he gains is his own discovery, but is grateful to any who can teach
him. He believes that unwitting deceivers are more culpable than
deliberate tricksters. Hippias finds it impossible to agree with him,
whereupon Socrates says that things are for ever baffling him by their
changeability; it is pardonable that unlearned men like himself should
err; when really wise people like Hippias wander in thought, it is
monstrous that they are unable to settle the doubts of all who appeal
to them.

_Channides_, the young boy after whom the dialogue was named, was the
cousin and ward of Critias, the infamous leader of the Thirty Tyrants.
On being introduced to him Socrates starts the discussion "What is
self-control?" The lad makes three attempts to answer; seeing his
confusion, Critias steps in, "angry with the boy, like a poet angry
with an actor who has murdered his poems". But he is not more
successful; his three definitions are proved wanting.

"Like men who, seeing others yawn, themselves yawn, he too was in
perplexity. But because he had a great reputation, he was put to
shame before the audience and refused to admit his inability to
define the word."

The dialogue gives no definite answer to the discussion. It is a vivid
piece of writing; the contrast between the young lad and the elder
cousin whose pet phrases he copies is very striking.

In the _Lysis_ the characters and the conclusion are similar. Lysis is
a young lad admired by Hippothales. The first portion of the dialogue
consists of a conversation between Lysis and Socrates; the latter
recommends the admirer to avoid foolish converse. On the entry of
Lysis' friend Menexenus, Socrates starts the question "What is
friendship?" It appears that friendship cannot exist between two good
or two evil persons, but only between a good man and one who is
neither good nor bad, exactly as the philosopher is neither wise nor
ignorant, yet he loves knowledge. Still this is not satisfactory; up
conclusion being reached, Socrates winds up with a characteristic
remark; they think they are friends, yet cannot say what friendship
is. This dialogue was carefully read by Aristotle before he gave his
famous description in the Ethics: "A friend is a second self". Perhaps
Socrates avoided a definite answer because he did not wish to be too
serious with these sunny children.

The _Euthydemus_ is an amusing study of the danger which follows upon
the use of keen instruments by the unscrupulous. Euthydemus and his
brother Dionysodorus are two sophists by trade to whom words mean
nothing at all; truth and falsehood are identical, contradiction being
an impossibility. As language is meaningless, Socrates himself is
quickly reduced to impotence, recovering with difficulty. Plato was no
doubt satirising the misuse of the new philosophy which was becoming
so popular with young men. When nothing means anything, laughter is
the only human language left. The _Cratylus_ is a similarly conceived
diversion. Most of it is occupied with fanciful derivations and
linguistic discussions of all kinds. It is difficult to say how far
Plato is serious. Perhaps the feats of Euthydemus in stripping words
of all meaning urged him to some constructive work--for Plato's system
is essentially destructive first, then constructive. At any rate, he
does insist on the necessity for determining a word's meaning by its
derivation, and points out that a language is the possession of a
whole people.

In the _Protagoras_ Socrates while a young man is represented as
meeting a friend Hippocrates, who was on his way to Protagoras, a
sophist from Abdera who had just arrived at Athens. Socrates shows
first that his friend has no idea of the seriousness of his action in
applying for instruction to a sophist whose definition he is unable to
give.

"If your body had been in a critical condition you would have
asked the advice of your friends and deliberated many days before
choosing your doctor. But about your mind, on which depends your
weal or woe according as it is evil or good, you never asked the
advice of father or friend whether you ought to apply to this
newly-arrived stranger. Hearing last night that he was here, you
go to him to-day, ready to spend your own and your friends' money,
convinced that you ought to become a disciple of a man you neither
know nor have talked with."

They proceed to the house of Callias, where they find Protagoras
surrounded by strangers from every city who listened spell-bound to
his voice.

Protagoras readily promises that Hippocrates would be taught his
system which offers "good counsel about his private affairs and power
to transact and discuss political matters". Socrates' belief that
politics cannot be taught provokes one of the long speeches to which
Plato strongly objected because a fundamental fallacy could not be
refuted at the outset, vitiating the whole of the subsequent argument.
Protagoras recounted a myth, proving that shame and justice were given
to every man; these are the basis of politics. Further, cities punish
criminals, implying that men can learn politics, while virtue is
taught by parents and tutors and the State. Socrates asks whether
virtue is one or many. Protagoras replies that there are five main
virtues, knowledge, justice, courage, temperance and piety, all
distinct. A long rambling speech causes Socrates to protest; his
method is the short one of question and answer. By using some very
questionable reasoning he proves that all these five virtues are
identical. Accordingly, if virtue is one it can be taught, not
however, by a sophist or the State, but by a philosopher, for virtue
is knowledge.

This conclusion is thoroughly in harmony with Socrates' system. Yet it
is probably false. Virtue is not mere knowledge, nor vice ignorance.
If they were, they would be intellectual qualities. They are rather
moral attributes; experience soon proves that many enlightened persons
are vicious and many ignorant people virtuous. The value of this
dialogue is its insistence upon the unity of virtue. A good man is not
a bundle of separate excellences; he is a whole. Possessing one virtue
he potentially has them all.

The _Gorgias_ is a refutation of three distinct and popular notions.
Gorgias of Leontini used to invite young men to ask him questions,
none of whom ever put to him a query absolutely new. It soon appears
that he is quite unable to define Rhetoric, the art by which he lived.
Socrates said it was a minister of persuasion, that it in the long run
concerned itself with mere Opinion, which might be true or false, and
could not claim scientific Knowledge. Further, it implied some
morality in its devotees, for it dealt with what was just or unjust.
Polus, a young and ardent sophist, was compelled to assent to two very
famous doctrines, first that it is worse to do evil than to experience
it, second, that to avoid punishment was the worst thing for an
offender. But a more formidable adversary remained, one Callicles, the
most shameless and unscrupulous figure perhaps in Plato's work. His
creed is a flat denial of all authority, moral or intellectual. It
teaches that Law is not natural, but conventional; that only a slave
puts up with a wrong, and only weak men seek legal protection.
Philosophy is fit only for youths, for philosophers are not men of the
world. Natural life is unlimited self-indulgence and public opinion is
the creation of those who are too poor to give rein to their
appetites; the good is pleasure and infinite self-satisfaction is the
ideal. Socrates in reply points out the difference between the kinds
of pleasures, insists on the importance of Scientific knowledge of
everything, and proves that order is requisite everywhere--its visible
effects in the soul being Justice and Wisdom, not Riot. To prevent
injustice some art is needed to make the subject as like as possible
to the ruler; the type of life a man leads is far more important than
length of days. The demagogue who like Callicles has no credentials
makes the people morally worse, especially as they are unable to
distinguish quacks from wise men. Nor need philosophers trouble much
about men's opinions, for a mob always blames the physician who wishes
to save it. A delightful piece of irony follows, in which Socrates
twits Callicles for accusing his pupils of acting with injustice, the
very quality he instils into them. Callicles, though refuted, advises
Socrates to fawn on the city, for he is certain to be condemned sooner
or later; the latter, however, does not fear death after living
righteously.

Most men have held doctrines similar to those refuted here. There is
an idea abroad that what is "natural" must be intrinsically good, if
not godlike. But it is quite clear that "Nature" is a vague term
meaning little or nothing--it is higher or lower and natural in both
forms. Those who wish to know the lengths of impudence to which belief
in the sacredness of "Nature" can bring human beings might do worse
than read the _Gorgias_.

Plato's dramatic power and fertility of invention are displayed fully
in the _Symposium_. Agathon had won the tragic prize and invited many
friends to a wine-party. After a slight introduction a proposition was
carried that all should speak in praise of Love. First a youth
Phaedrus describes the antiquity of love and gives instances of the
attachments between the sexes. Pausanias draws the famous distinction
between the Heavenly and the Vulgar Aphrodite; the true test of love
is its permanence. A doctor, Eryximachus, raises the tone of the
discussion still further. To him Love is the foundation of Medicine,
Music, Astronomy and Augury. Aristophanes tells a fable of the sexes
in true comic style, making each of them run about seeking its other
half. Agathon colours his account with a touch of tragic diction. At
last it is Socrates' turn. He tells what he heard from a priestess
called Diotima. Love is the son of Fulness and Want; he is the
intermediary between gods and men, is active, not passive; he is
desire for continuous possession of excellent things and for beautiful
creation which means immortality, for all men desire perpetual fame
which can come only through the science of the Beautiful. In
contemplation and mystical union with the Divine the soul finds its
true destiny, satisfying itself in perfect love.

At this moment Alcibiades arrives from another feast in a state of
high intoxication. He gives a most marvellous account of Socrates'
influence over him and likens him in a famous passage to an ugly
little statue which when opened is all gold within. At the end of the
dialogue one of the company tells how Socrates compelled Aristophanes
and Agathon to admit that it was one and the same man's business to
understand and write both tragedy and comedy--a doctrine which has
been practised only in modern drama.

In this dialogue we first seem to catch the voice of Plato himself as
distinct from that of Socrates. The latter was undoubtedly most keenly
interested in the more human process of questioning and refuting, his
object being the workmanlike creation of exact definitions. But Plato
was of a different mould; his was the soaring spirit which felt its
true home to be the supra-sensible world of Divine Beauty,
Immortality, Absolute Truth and Existence. Starting with the fleshly
conception of Love natural to a young man, he leads us step by step
towards the great conclusion that Love is nothing less than an
identification of the self with the thing loved. No man can do his
work if he is not interested in it; he will hate it as his taskmaster.
But when an object of pursuit enthrals him it will intoxicate him,
will not leave him at peace till he joins his very soul with it in
union indissoluble. This direct communication of Mind with the object
of worship is Mysticism. It is the very core of the highest form of
religious life; it purifies, ennobles, and above all it inspires. To
the mystic the great prophet is the Athenian Plato, whose doctrine is
that of the Christian "God is love" converted into "Love is God". It
is not entirely fanciful to suggest that Plato, in saying farewell to
the definitely Socratic type of philosophy, gave his master as his
parting gift the greatest of ail tributes, a dialogue which is really
the "praise of Socrates".

The intoxication of Plato's thought is evident in the _Phaedrus_. This
splendid dialogue marks even more clearly the character of the new
wine which was to be poured into the Socratic bottles. Phaedrus and
Socrates recline in a spot of romantic beauty along the bank of the
Ilissus. Phaedrus reads a paradoxical speech supposed to be written by
Lysias, the famous orator, on Love; Socrates replies in a speech quite
as unreal, praising as Lysias did him who does not love. But soon he
recants--his real creed being the opposite. Frenzy is his subject--the
ecstasy of prophecy, mysticism, poetry and the soul. This last is like
a charioteer driving a pair of horses, one white, the other black. It
soars upwards to the region of pure beauty, wisdom and goodness; but
sometimes the white horse, the spirited quality of human nature, is
pulled down by the black, which is sensual desire, so that the
charioteer, Reason, cannot get a full vision of the ideal world beyond
all heavens. Those souls which have partially seen the truth but have
been dragged down by the black steed become, according to the amount
of Beauty they have seen, philosophers, kings, economists, gymnasts,
mystics, poets, journeymen, sophists or tyrants. The vision once seen
is never quite forgotten, for it can be recovered by reminiscence, so
that by exercise each man can recall some of its glories.

The dialogue then passes to a discussion of good and bad writing and
speaking. The truth is the sole criterion of value, and this can be
obtained only by definition; next there must be orderly arrangement, a
beginning, a middle and an end. In rhetoric it is absolutely essential
for a man to study human nature first; he cannot hope to persuade an
audience if he is unaware of the laws of its psychology; not all
speeches suit all audiences. Further, writing is inferior to speaking,
for the written word is lifeless, the spoken is living and its author
can be interrogated. It follows then that orators are of all men the
most important because of the power they wield; they will be potent
for destruction unless they love the truth and understand human
nature; in short, they must be philosophers.

The like of this had nowhere been said before. It opened a new world
to human speculation. First, the teaching about oratory is of the
highest value. Plato's quarrel with the sophists was based on their
total ignorance of the enormous power they exercised for evil, because
they knew not what they were doing. They professed to teach men how to
speak well, but had no conception of the science upon which the art of
oratory rests. In short, they were sheer impostors. Even Aristotle had
nothing to add to this doctrine in his treatise on _Rhetoric_, which
contains a study of the effects which certain oratorical devices could
be prophesied to produce, and provides the requisite scientific
foundation. Again, the indifference to or the ridicule of truth shown
by some sophists made them odious to Plato. He would have none of
their doctrines of relativity or flux. Nothing short of the Absolute
would satisfy his soaring spirit. He was sick of the change in
phenomena, the tangible and material objects of sense. He found
permanence in a world of eternal ideas. These ideas are the essence of
Platonism. They are his term for universal concepts, classes; there
are single tangible trees innumerable, but one Ideal Tree only in the
Ideal world beyond the heavens. Nothing can possibly satisfy the soul
but these unchanging and permanent concepts; it is among them that it
finds its true home. Lastly, the tripartite division of the nature of
the soul here first indicated is a permanent contribution to
philosophy. Thus Plato's system is definitely launched in the
_Phaedrus_. His subsequent dialogues show how he fitted out the hulk
to sail on his voyages of discovery.

The _Meno_ is a rediscussion on Platonic principles of the problem of
the _Protagoras_: can virtue be taught? Meno, a general in the army of
the famous Ten Thousand, attempts a definition of virtue itself, the
principle that underlies specific kinds of virtues such as justice.
After a cross-examination he confesses his helplessness in a famous
simile: Socrates is like the torpedo-fish which benumbs all who touch
it. Then the real business begins. How do we learn anything at all?
Socrates says by Reminiscence, for the soul lived once in the presence
of the ideal world; when it enters the flesh it loses its knowledge,
but gradually regains it. This theory he dramatically illustrates by
calling in a slave whom he proves by means of a diagram to know
something of geometry, though he never learned it. Thus the great
lesson of life is to practise the search for knowledge--and if virtue
is knowledge it will be teachable.

But the puzzle is, who are the teachers? Not the sophists, a
discredited class, nor the statesmen, who cannot teach their sons to
follow them. Virtue then, not being teachable, is probably not the
result of knowledge, but is imparted to men by a Divine Dispensation,
just as poetry is. But the origin of virtue will always be mysterious
till its nature is discovered beyond doubt. So Plato once more
declares his dissatisfaction with a Socratic tenet which identified
virtue with knowledge.

The _Phaedo_ describes Socrates' discussion of the immortality of the
soul on his last day on earth. Reminiscence of Ideas proves
pre-existence, as in the _Meno_; the Ideas are similarly used to prove
a continued existence after death, for the soul has in it an immortal
principle which is the exact contrary of mortality; the Idea of Death
cannot exist in a thing whose central Idea is life. Such in brief is
Socrates' proof. To us it is singularly unconvincing, as it looks like
a begging of the whole question. Yet Plato argues in his technical
language as most men do concerning this all-important and difficult
question. That which contains within itself the notion of immortality
would seem to be too noble to have been created merely to die. The
very presence of a desire to realise eternal truth is a strong
presumption that there must be something to correspond with it. The
most interesting portion of this well-known dialogue is that which
teaches that life is really an exercise for death. All the base and
low desires which haunt us should be gradually eliminated and replaced
by a longing for better things. The true philosopher at any rate so
trains himself that when his hour comes he greets death with a smile,
the life on earth having lost its attractions.

Such is the connection between the _Meno_ and the _Phaedo_; the life
that was before and the life that shall be hereafter depend upon the
Ideal world. That salvation is in this life and in the practical
sphere of human government is possible only through a knowledge of
these Ideas is the doctrine of the immortal _Republic_. This great
work in ten books is well known, but its unique value is not always
recognised. It starts with a discussion of Justice. Thrasymachus, a
brazen fellow like Callicles in the _Gorgias_, argues that Justice is
the interest of the stronger and that law and morality are mere
conventions. The implications of this doctrine are of supreme
importance. If Justice is frank despotism, then the Eastern type of
civilisation is the best, wherein custom has once for all fixed the
right of the despot to grind down the population, while the sole duty
of the latter is to pay taxes. The moral reformation of law becomes
impossible; no adjustment of an unchanging decree to the changing and
advancing standard of public morality can be contemplated;
constitutional development, legal reformation and the great process by
which Western peoples have tried gradually to make positive law
correspond with Ethical ideals are mere dreams.

But the verbal refutation of Thrasymachus does not satisfy Glaucus and
Adeimantus who are among Socrates' audience. In order to explain the
real nature of Justice, Socrates is compelled to trace from the very
beginning the process by which states have come into existence.
Economic and military needs are thoroughly discussed. The State cannot
continue unless there is created in it a class whose sole business it
is to govern. This class is to be produced by communistic methods; the
best men and women are to be tested and chosen as parents, their
children being taken and carefully trained apart for their high
office. This training will be administered to the three component
parts of the soul, the rational, the spirited and the appetitive,
while the educational curriculum will be divided into two sections,
Gymnastic for the body and Artistic for the mind--the latter including
all scientific, mathematical and literary subjects. After a careful
search, in this ideal state Justice, the principle of harmony which
keeps all classes of the community coherent, will show itself in
"doing one's own business".

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