Authors of Greece
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T. W. Lumb >> Authors of Greece
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A slight digression tells the amusing story how the Athenian
Hippocleides in his cups lost the hand of the princess of Sicyon
because he danced on his head and waved his legs about, shouting that
he didn't care. The great victor Miltiades did not long survive his
glory. His attempt to reduce the island of Paros, which had sided with
Persia, completely failed. Returning to Athens he was condemned and
fined, shortly after dying of a mortified thigh.
In the third portion Herodotus gradually rises to his greatest height
of descriptive power. Darius resolved on a larger expedition to reduce
Greece. He made preparations for three years, then a revolt in Egypt
delayed his plans and his career was cut short by death in 485. His
successor Xerxes was disinclined to invade Europe, but was overborne
by Mardonius his cousin. A canal was dug across the peninsula of
Athos, a bridge was built over the Hellespont, and provisions were
collected. A detailed account of the component forces is given,
special mention being made of Artemisia, Queen of Herodotus' own city,
who was to win great glory in the campaign. The army marched over the
Hellespont and along the coast, the fleet supporting it; advancing
through Thessaly, it reached the pass of Thermopylae, opposite Euboea,
in 480.
On the Greek side was division; the Spartans imagined that their duty
was to save the Peloponnese only; they were eager to build a wall
across the isthmus of Corinth, leaving the rest of Greece to its fate.
But Athens had produced another genius named Themistocles. Shortly
before the invasion the silver mines at Laureium in Attica had yielded
a surplus; he persuaded the city to use it for building a fleet of two
hundred sail to be directed against Aegina. When the Athenians got an
oracle from Delphi which stated that they would lose their land but be
saved by their wooden walls, he interpreted the oracle as referring to
the fleet. Under his management the city built more ships. The Council
of Greece held at the Isthmus of Corinth decided that an army should
defend Thermopylae while the fleet supported it close by at
Artemisium. The Persian fleet had been badly battered in a storm as it
sailed along the coast of Magnesia, nearly four hundred sail
foundering; the remainder reached safe anchorage in the Malian gulf,
further progress being impossible till the Greek navy was beaten or
retired.
At Thermopylae the advance-guard was composed of Spartans led by
Leonidas who determined to defend the narrow pass. A Persian spy
brought the news to Xerxes that this small body of warriors were
combing their hair. The King sent for Demaratus, the ex-Spartan
monarch, who assured him that this was proof that the Spartans
intended to fight to the death. After a delay of four days the fight
began. The Spartans routed all their opponents including the famous
Immortals, the Persian bodyguard. At length a traitor Ephialtes told
Xerxes of a path across the mountains by which Leonidas could be taken
in the rear. Learning from deserters and fugitives that he had been
betrayed, Leonidas dismissed the main body, himself advancing into the
open. After winning immortal glory he and his men were destroyed and
the way to Greece lay open to the invader.
In three naval engagements off Artemisium the Greek fleet showed its
superiority; a detachment of two hundred sail had been sent round the
island of Euboea to block up the exit of the channel through which the
Greek navy had to retreat, but a storm totally destroyed this force.
When the army retreated from Thermopylae the Greek ships were obliged
to retire to the Isthmus; in spite of much opposition the Athenians
compelled Eurybiades the Spartan admiral to take up his station at
Salamis, whither the Persian navy followed. Their army had advanced
through Boeotia, attacking Delphi on the way. The story was told how
Apollo himself defended his shrine, hurling down rocks on the invaders
and sending supernatural figures to discomfit them. Entering Attica
the barbarian host captured a deserted Athens, Xerxes sending the glad
news to his subjects in the Persian capital.
The Greeks were with difficulty persuaded not to abandon the sea
altogether. Themistocles was bitterly opposed in his naval policy by
Adeimantus, the Corinthian; it was only by threatening to leave Greece
with their fleet that the Athenians were able to bring the allies to
reason. By a stroke of cunning Themistocles forced their hands; a
messenger went to Xerxes with news of the Greek intention to retreat;
on hearing this the Persians during the night blocked up the passages
round Salamis and landed some of their best troops on a little island
called Psyttaleia. The news of this encircling movement was brought to
the allies by Aristides, a celebrated Athenian who was in exile, and
was confirmed by a Tenian ship which deserted from the Persians. Next
morning the Greeks sailed down the strait to escape the blockade and
soon the famous battle began. Among the brave deeds singled out for
special mention none was bolder than that of Artemisia who sank a
friend to escape capture. The remainder of the Persian captains had no
chance of resisting, being huddled up in a narrow channel. Seeing
Artemisia's courage Xerxes remarked that his men had become women, his
women men. The rout of the invaders was quickly completed, the chief
glory being won by Aegina and Athens; the victory was consummated by
the slaughter of the troops on Psyttaleia. The Persian monarch sent
tidings of this defeat to his capital and in terror of a revolt in
Ionia decided to retreat, leaving Mardonius in command of picked
troops. He hurriedly passed along the way he had come, almost
disappearing from Herodotus' story.
Mardonius accompanied him to Thessaly and Macedonia; he sent
Alexander, King of the latter country, as an envoy to Athens, offering
to rebuild the temples and restore all property in exchange for an
alliance. Hearing the news the Spartans in fear for themselves sent a
counter-embassy. The Athenian reply is one of the great things in
historical literature. "It was a base surmise in men like the Spartans
who know our mettle. Not all the gold in the world would tempt us to
enslave our own countrymen. We have a common brotherhood with all
Greeks, a common language, common altars and sacrifices, common
nationality; it would be unseemly to betray these. We thank you for
your offer to support our ruined families, but we will bear our
calamities as we may and will not burden you. Lead out your troops;
face the enemy in Boeotia and there give him battle."
The last book relates the consequences of the Athenian reply to
Alexander. Mardonius advanced rapidly to Athens, which he captured a
second time. The Spartans were busy keeping the feast of Hyacinthia;
only an Athenian threat to come to terms with the foe prevailed on
them to move. Mardonius soon evacuated Attica, the ground being too
stony for cavalry, and encamped near Plataea. The Greeks followed,
taking the high ground on Mount Cithaeron. A brave exploit of the
Athenian infantry in defeating cavalry heartened the whole army. After
eleven days' inaction, Mardonius determined to attack, news of his
plan being brought secretly at night to the Athenians by Alexander.
The Spartans, afraid of facing the Persians, exchanged places with the
Athenians; when this movement was discovered by Mardonius, he sent a
challenge to the Spartans to decide the battle by a single conflict
between them and his Persian division. Receiving no reply, he let his
cavalry loose on the Greeks who began to retire to a place called the
Island, where horse could not operate. This action took place during
the night. When morning broke the battle began. The Persian wicker
shields could not resist their enemies' weapons; the host fled and
after Mardonius fell was slaughtered in heaps. The Greek took
vengeance on the Thebans who had acted with the Persians, of whom a
mere remnant reached Asia under the command of Artabazus.
The victorious Greek fleet had advanced as far as Delos, commanded by
Leotychides, a Spartan of royal blood. To them came an embassy from
Samos, urging an attack on the Persians encamped on Mycale. It is said
that the battle was fought on the same day as that of Plataea and that
a divine rumour ran through the Greek army that their brothers had
gained the day. In the action at Mycale the Athenians took the palm of
valour, bursting the enemy's line and storming his entrenchments. This
victory freed Ionia; it remained only to open the Dardanelles. The
Spartans returned home, but the Athenians crossed from Abydos in Asia
to Sestos, the strongest fortress in the district. The place was
starved into surrender; with its capture ends the story of Persia's
attempt to destroy European civilisation.
In this great Epic nothing is more obvious than the terror the Greeks
felt when they first faced the Persians. The numbers arrayed against
them were overwhelming, their despondency was justifiable. It required
no little courage from a historian to tell the awkward truth--that
Herodotus did tell it is no small testimony to his veracity. Yet only
a little experience was needed to convince the Greeks that they were
superior on both land and sea. Once the lesson was learned, they never
forgot it. Mycale is the proof that they remembered it well. This same
consciousness of superiority animated two other Greek armies, one
deserted in the middle of Asia Minor, yet led unmolested by Xenophon
through a hostile country to the shores of the Black Sea--the other
commanded by Alexander the Great who planted Greek civilisation over
every part of his conquests, from the coast to the very gates of
Persia itself.
Modern history seems to have lost all powers of interesting its
readers. It is as dull as political economy; it suspects a stylist,
questions the accuracy of its authorities, tends to minimise personal
influence on events, specialises on a narrow period, emphasises
constitutional development, insists on the "economic interpretation"
of an age and at times seems quite unable to manage with skill the
vast stores of knowledge on which it draws. To it Herodotus is often a
butt for ridicule; his credulity, inability to distinguish true
causes, belief in divine influences, love of anecdote and
chronological vagueness are serious blemishes. But to us Herodotus is
literature; we believe that he himself laughs slyly at some of the
anecdotes he has rendered more piquant by a pretended credulity; this
quick-witted Greek would find it paid him to assume innocence in order
to get his informers (like his critics) to go on talking. Like
Froissart, Joinville, de Comines and perhaps even like Macaulay he
wishes to write what will charm as well as what will instruct.
Yet as a historian Herodotus is great; he sifts evidence, some of
which he mentions only to reject it; the substantial accuracy of his
statements has been borne out by inscriptions; in fact, his value
to-day is greater than it was last century. If a man's literary bulk
is measured by the greatness of his subject, Herodotus cannot be a
mean writer. His theme is nothing less than the history of
civilisation itself as far as he could record it; his broad sweep of
narrative may be taken to represent the wide speculation of a
philosophic historian as opposed to the narrower and more intense
examination of a short period which is characteristic of the
scientific historian. He tells us of the first actual armed conflict
between East and West, the never-ending eternally romantic story. As
Persia fought Greece, so Rome subdued Carthage, Crusader attacked
Saladin, Turkey submerged half Europe, Russia contended with Japan.
The atmosphere of Herodotus is the unchanging East of the Bible,
inscrutable Egypt, prehistoric Russia, barbarous Thrace, as well as
civilised Greece, Africa, India; had he never written, much
information would have been irretrievably lost, for example, the
account of one of the "Fifteen decisive battles" in history. Let him
be judged not as a candidate for some Chair of Ancient History in some
modern University, but as the greatest writer of the greatest
prose-epic in the greatest literature of antiquity.
Of his inimitable short stories it is difficult to speak with measured
praise; it is dangerous to quote them, they are so perfect that a word
added or omitted might spoil them. His so-called digressions have
always some cogent reason in them; they are his means of including in
the panorama a scene essential to its completeness. The narrow type of
history writing has been tried for some centuries; all that it seems
able to accomplish is to go on narrowing itself until it cannot enjoy
for recording or remembering. It is a refreshing experience to move in
the broad open regions of history in which Herodotus trod. If it is
impossible to combine accurate research with the ecstasy of pure
literature, be it so. Herodotus will be read with joy and laughter and
sometimes with tears when some of our modern historians have been
superseded by persons even duller than themselves.
TRANSLATIONS:
Rawlinson's edition with a version contains essays of the greatest
value. It has been the standard for two generations and is not likely
to be superseded.
The Loeb Series contains a version by A. D. Godley.
The great annotated edition of the text by R. W. Macan (Oxford) is the
result of a lifetime's work. It contains everything necessary to
confirm the claims of the historian.
_The Great Persian War,_ by Grundy (London), is valuable.
See Bury, _Ancient Greek Historians_ (Macmillan).
THUCYDIDES
History, like an individual's life, is a succession of well-defined
periods. Herodotus took as his subject a long cycle of events; the
shorter period was first treated by Thucydides who introduced methods
which entitle him to be regarded as the first modern historian. Born
in Attica in 471 he was a victim of the great plague, was exiled for
his failure to check Brasidas at Eion in 424 and spent the rest of his
life in collecting materials for his great work. His death took place
about 402.
His preface is remarkable as outlining his creed. First he states his
subject, the Peloponnesian war of 431-404; he then tests by an appeal
to reason the statements in old legends and in Homer, arguing from
analogy or from historical survivals in his own time to prove that
various important movements were caused or checked by economic
influence. He uses his imagination to prove that the importance of an
event cannot be decided from the extant remains of its place of
origin, for if only the ruins of both Sparta and Athens were left,
Sparta would be thought to be insignificant and Athens would appear
twice as powerful as she really is. Poetical exaggeration is easy and
misleading, and ancient history is difficult to determine by absolute
proofs.
"Men accept statements about their own national past from one
another without testing them."
"To most men the search for truth implies no effort; they prefer to
turn to the first accounts available."
"It was difficult for me to write an exact narrative of the speeches
actually made; I have therefore given the words that might have been
expected of each speaker, adhering to the broad meaning of what was
really uttered. The facts I have not taken from any chance person,
nor have I given my own impressions, but have as accurately as
possible written a detailed account of what I witnessed myself or
heard from others. The discovery of these facts was laborious owing
to conflicting statements and confused memories and party favour.
Perhaps the unromantic nature of my record will make it uninteresting;
but if any person will judge it useful because he desires to consider
a clear account of actual facts and of what is likely to recur at some
future time, I shall be content. As a compilation it is rather an
eternal possession than a prize-essay for a moment."
The essentially modern idea of history writing is here perfectly
evident.
Having pointed out the significance of the war, not only to Greece but
to the whole of the world, he gives its causes. To him the real root
of the trouble was Sparta's fear of Athenian power: the alleged
pretexts were different. The rise of Athens is rapidly described, her
building of the walls broken down by the Persians, her control of the
island-states in a Delian league which eventually became the nucleus
of her Empire, her alliance with Megara, a buffer-state between
herself and Corinth. This last saved her from fears of a land
invasion; when she built for Megara long walls to the sea she incurred
the intense anger of Corinth which smouldered for years and at last
caused the Peloponnesian conflagration. The reduction of Aegina in 451
compensated for the loss of Boeotia and Egypt. Eventually the Thirty
Years' Peace was concluded in 445; Athens gave up Megara, but retained
Euboea; her definite policy for the future was concentration on a
maritime empire; she controlled nearly all the islands of the Aegean
and was mistress of the Saronic gulf, Aegina, "the eyesore of the
Peiraeus", having fallen.
But if she was to confine her energies to the sea, it was essential
that she should be mistress of all the trade-routes which in ancient
history usually ran along the coast. On both east and west she found
Corinth in possession; a couple of quarrels with this city ruptured
the peace. In the west, Corinth had founded Corcyra (Corfu); this
daughter colony quarrelled with her mother and prevailed. In itself
Corcyra was of little importance in purely Greek politics, but it
happened to possess a large navy and commanded the trade-route to
Sicily, whence came the corn supply. When threatened with vengeance by
Corinth, she appealed to Athens, where ambassadors from Corinth also
appeared. Their arguments are stated in the speeches which are so
characteristic of Thucydides. The Athenians after careful
consideration decided to conclude a defensive alliance with Corcyra,
for they dreaded the acquisition of her navy by Corinth. But
circumstances turned this into an offensive alliance, for Corinth
attacked and would have won a complete victory at sea but for timely
Athenian succour. In the east Athens was even more vitally concerned
in trade with the Hellespont, through which her own corn passed. On
this route was the powerful Corinthian city Potidaea, situate on the
western prong of Chalcidice. It had joined the Athenian confederacy
but had secured independence by building strong walls. When the
Athenians demanded their destruction and hostages as a guarantee, the
town revolted and appealed to the mother-city Corinth. A long and
costly siege drained Athens of much revenue and distracted her
attention; but worst of all was the final estrangement of the great
trade rival whom she had thwarted in Greece itself by occupying
Megara, in the west by joining Corcyra, and in the east by attacking
Potidsea.
The final and open pretext for war was the exclusion of Megara from
all Athenian markets; this step meant the extinction of the town as a
trading-centre and was a definite set-back to the economic development
of the Peloponnese, of which Corinth and Megara were the natural
avenues to northern Greece. The cup was full; Athenian ambition had
run its course. The aggrieved states of the Peloponnese were invited
to put their case at Sparta; Corinth drew a famous picture of the
Athenian character, its restlessness, energy, adaptability and
inventiveness. "In the face of such a rival," they added,
"Sparta hesitates; in comparison Spartan methods are antiquated,
but modern principles cannot help prevailing; in a stagnant state
conservative institutions are the best, but when men are faced with
various difficulties great ingenuity is essential; for that reason
Athens through her wide experience has made more innovations."
An Athenian reply failed to convince the allies of her innocence; one
of the Spartan Ephors forced the congress to declare that Athens had
violated the peace. A second assembly was summoned, at which the
Corinthians in an estimate of the Athenian power gave reasons for
believing it would eventually be reduced. They further appealed to
what has never yet failed to decide in favour of war--race antagonism;
the Athenians and her subjects were Ionians, whereas the
Peloponnesians were mainly Dorians. The necessary vote for opening
hostilities was secured; but first an ultimatum was presented. If
Athens desired peace she must rescind the exclusion acts aimed at
Megara. At the debate in the Athenian assembly Pericles, the virtual
ruler, gave his reason for believing Athens would win; he urged a
demand for the withdrawal of Spartan Alien Acts aimed at Athens and
her allies and offered arbitration on the alleged grievances.
It is well to repeat the causes of this war: trade rivalry, naval
competition, race animosity and desire for predominance. Till these
are removed it is useless to expect permanent peace in spite of
Leagues or Tribunals or Arbitration Courts. Further, it should be
noted that Thucydides takes the utmost care to point out the excellent
reasons the most enlightened statesmen had for arriving at
contradictory conclusions; the event proved them all wrong without
exception. The future had in store at least two events which no human
foresight could discover, and these proved the deciding factors in the
conflict.
The war began in 431 by a Theban attack on Plataea, the little town
just over the Attic frontier which had been allied with Athens for
nearly a century and protected her against invasion from the north.
This city had long been hated by Thebes as a deserter from her own
league; it alone of Boeotian towns had not joined the Persians.
Burning with the desire to capture it, a body of Thebans entered the
place by night, seizing the chief positions. But in the morning their
scanty numbers were apparent; recovering from panic the Plataeans
overwhelmed the invaders and massacred them. This open violation of
the treaty kindled the war-spirit. Both sides armed, Sparta being more
popular as pretending to free Greece from a tyrant. Their last
ambassador on leaving Athenian territory said: "This day will be the
beginning of mighty woes for Greece".
The Spartans invaded Attica, cutting down the fruit trees and forcing
the country folk into the city; the Athenians replied by ravaging
parts of Peloponnese and Megara. The funeral of the first Athenian
victims of the war was the occasion of a remarkable speech. Pericles
in delivering it expounds the Athenian ideal of life.
"We do not compete with other constitutions, we are rather a pattern
for the rest. In our democracy all are equal before the law; each man
is promoted to public office not by favour but by merit, according as
he can do the State some service. We love beauty in its simplicity, we
love knowledge without losing manliness. Our citizens can administer
affairs both private and public; our working classes have an adequate
knowledge of politics. To us the most fatal error is the lack of
theoretical instruction before we attempt any duty. In a word, I say
that Athens is an education for all Greece; individually we can prove
ourselves competent to face the most varied forms of human activity
with the maximum of grace and adaptability.... We have forced the
whole sea and every land to open to our enterprise. Look daily at the
material power of the city and love her passionately. Her glory was
won by men who did their duty and sacrificed themselves for her. The
whole world is the sepulchre of famous men; their memory is not only
inscribed on pillars in their own country, it lives unwritten in the
hearts of men in alien lands."
At the beginning of the next year a calamity which no statesman could
have foreseen overtook Athens. A mysterious plague of the greatest
malignity scourged the city, the mortality being multiplied among the
crowds of refugees. The city's strength was seriously impaired, public
and private morality were undermined, inasmuch as none knew how long
he had to live. Discouraged by it and by the invasions the Athenians
sent a fruitless embassy to Sparta and tinned in fury on Pericles. He
made a splendid defence of his policy and gave them heart to continue
the struggle; he pointed out that it was better to lose their property
and save the State than save their property and lose the State; their
fleet opened to them the world of waters over which they could range
as absolute masters. Soon afterwards he died, surviving the opening of
the war only two years and a half; his character and abilities
received due acknowledgment from Thucydides.
At this point Sparta decided to destroy Plataea, the Athenian outpost
in Boeotia. A very brilliant description of the siege and
counter-operations reveals very clearly the Spartan inability to
attack walled towns and explains their objection to fortified friends.
Leaving the town guarded they retired for a time, to complete the work
later. The war began to spread beyond the Peloponnese to the north of
the Corinthian gulf, the control of which was important to both sides.
The Acarnanians were attacked by Sparta and appealed to the Athenian
admiral Phormio. Two naval actions in the gulf revealed the
astonishing superiority of the Athenian navy on the high seas.
Threatened in her corn supply in the west, Sparta began to intrigue
with the outlying kingdoms on the north-east, the "Thraceward parts"
on the trade-route being the objective.
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