The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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'November 18th.--Edmond Fitzmaurice consulted me as to Central Asia.
The Russians had agreed in principle to the delimitation, but ...
had made much delay in questions of detail.'

On the Committee Sir Charles and Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice were unequally
yoked with the lethargic Secretary of State for War. Lord Fitzmaurice
has vivid recollection of Lord Hartington's entry at one sitting half an
hour late, after his fashion. The question turned on the probable action
of some Afghan chiefs, whereupon Lord Hartington broke silence by
observing reflectively: "I wonder what an Afghan chief is like." Sir
Charles, with a glance at the high-nosed, bearded, deliberate face of
his colleague, pushed a scribbled note to Lord Edmond: "I expect an
Afghan chief is very like the Right Honourable the Marquis of
Hartington."'

Sir Charles's interest in this Central Asian question, where political
and military interests lay so close together, led to a correspondence,
and the correspondence to a friendship, with Lord Roberts.

'In March I received a letter from Sir Frederick Roberts, not yet
personally known to me, in which he enclosed a memorandum by him
called "Is an Invasion of India by Russia Possible?" In his letter
he said that he had given up the idea of returning to Kandahar, and
only desired that we should make ourselves secure upon our new
frontier, improve our relations with the Afghans, and clearly show
that we could not allow the Russians to establish themselves in
Northern Afghanistan. In his printed paper he showed that Persia
might be looked upon as virtually Russian, and that what we had to
do was to prevent Afghanistan falling into the same position. He
incidentally admitted the strength of the view of those of us who
had advocated the evacuation of Kandahar by saying that the Afghans
"must be assured that we have no designs upon their country, and
that even should circumstances require a British occupation of
Kandahar, the direction of all internal affairs would be left in
their hands; we must guarantee them the integrity of their kingdom."
He strongly supported my view that no time should be lost in
defining the northern boundary of Afghanistan.

'Roberts went on to lay down the principle that the main body of a
Russian army destined for the invasion of India must advance by
Herat and Girishk on Kandahar, whence, if not defeated, the Russians
must move by Ghazni, Kabul, and the Khyber. Sir Frederick Roberts
pointed out that India could not place in the field, under the then
conditions, more than 40,000 men, with from 130 to 140 guns. Part of
the native army could be relied on, but, writing as Commander-in-
Chief in Madras, he pointed out that the Southern Indian Sepoys had
not the courage and physique to fight against Russian troops, or
even against natives from the north. On the other hand, many of our
northern native troops would be of doubtful loyalty in the event of
Russia becoming predominant in Afghanistan. "Sir Fred" laid down
the principle of completing railway communication to a point near
Kandahar, with a bridge across the Indus near Sukkur, and generally
described the plan of a vigorous offensive on the Kandahar side and
a defensive on the Khyber line, which has since been adopted.'

'At the end of May I received from Sir Frederick Roberts a letter in
reply to mine, acknowledging the receipt of the Defence of India
papers which I have named. I had told him that the real danger was
that Russia would detach Herat by local intrigue without appearing,
and that I did not see how we could prevent this alarming danger.
Sir Frederick admitted the truth of my view, and again pointed out
the importance of trying to win the friendship of the Afghans. He
favoured my proposals for the delimitation of the northern frontier
of Afghanistan. "But I much doubt Russia's now agreeing to any
proposal of the sort." He ended by expressing his gratification at
our issue of the order for the completion of the railway to Quetta
and Pishin.'

Discussions preliminary to the Budget occupied the Cabinet in January,
1884, and Mr. Childers announced that the Army and Navy Estimates would
leave him with a deficit, chiefly because the newly introduced parcel
post had been 'a disastrous failure.'

'In the course of this Cabinet of January 24th, I for the first time
stated my views on the subject of army reform. I have a slip of
paper which passed backwards and forwards between Chamberlain and
myself, headed "The condition of the army." I wrote: "Do you
remember my saying one night in our cab to you that I could not go
to the W.O. because of my views upon this very point?" Chamberlain
wrote back: "But that really is the reason why you should go. I have
the lowest opinion of army administration wherever I can test it--
contracts, for instance. It is most ludicrously inefficient." To
which I replied: "The Duke of Cambridge and the old soldiers and the
Queen would make it very nearly hopeless."'

The War Office never tempted Sir Charles as did the Admiralty, where, he
wrote to Lord Granville in 1885, 'I fear I should be extravagant.'

III.

A holiday home in the South of France had ceased to be easily accessible
to the 'most hard-worked member of the Government.' Though for many
years he retained his little villa of 'La Sainte Campagne' near Toulon,
nestling in its olive groves with, from windows and cliff, the view of
the red porphyry rocks across the deep blue of the bay, he had for some
time been negotiating for the purchase of strips of land by the
riverside near Shepperton, and among the pines at Pyrford.

In 1883 the building of the cottage at Dockett Eddy was begun, over the
door of which he set this inscription:

"Parva sed apta mihi, sed nulli obnoxia, sed non Sordida, parta meo sed
tamen aere, domus."

[Footnote: Thus rendered in English by the Rev. W. Tuckwell:

''Tis tiny, but it suits me quite,
Invades no jealous neighbour's right;
'Tis neat and clean, and--pleasant thought--
I earned the cash with which 'twas bought.'

(It was bought out of his official salary.)]

This was to be always his riverside home, and in it he always slept,
even after the larger house had been built near by. There he was one of
the river's most jealous guardians, and in this year notes that he

'gave evidence before the Select Committee on the River Thames, and
was instrumental in securing the insertion of a clause in the Bill,
afterwards produced by the Committee, which put an end to shooting
on the Thames, and did a great deal to protect the quiet of the
river.'

The Dockett cottage was not finished till 1885, and:

'On Saturday, March 21st, I took a holiday on the river, starting
down with my punt from Taplow Court, and bringing her down to
Dockett Eddy, of which I now took possession, the little house being
now finished.'

On May 22nd, 1884,

'I settled to go on Whitsun Tuesday to look at Lord Onslow's land at
Pyrford, for a winter house. I had forgotten that my ancestor Sir R.
Parkhurst had been Lord of the Manor of Pyrford, and that my
ancestor Sir Edward Zouche had lived even nearer to my new purchase,
at old Woking St. Peter, whence I hear his bells.'

Late in the year

'I settled on my motto for my cottage at Pyrford--a line of Ruskin,
"This is the true nature of Home,--it is the place of Peace."

'The selection meant in my mind that home was about to exist once
more for me.'

'In July, 1884, Mrs. Mark Pattison had been left a widow by the
death of the Rector of Lincoln College. She went to live at The
Lodge, Headington, near Oxford.

'Later in the year we became privately engaged, and told Mr. and
Mrs. Frank Pattison, Mrs. Westlake, Mrs. Earle, and Mrs. Grant Duff,
as well as Chamberlain, but no one else. It was decided that others
should not be told until much later, and to Lord Granville, who
(without mentioning a name) congratulated me, I had to feign
ignorance of what he meant. Mrs. Pattison settled to go to India in
February, March, or April, 1885, to stay with the Governor of Madras
and Mrs. Grant Duff in the hills, and to return in September or
October for our wedding, which before her departure was fixed for
October. Before the return there happened Emilia's typhoid fever at
Ootacamund, and our terrible misfortunes; but the date of October,
1885, was fated to remain the date, and Chamberlain, who had, before
Emilia left, consented to be best man, was best man still. The place
of the wedding alone was changed--from Christ Church Cathedral,
Oxford, to the parish church of Chelsea. Mrs. Grant Duff wrote to us
on being told a most pleasant letter.

'Chamberlain wrote the best letter of his life to her.'

This was the letter:

'40, Prince's Gardens, S.W.,

'November 5th, 1884.

'My Dear Mrs. Pattison,

'Dilke has told me his great secret, and I sympathize with him so
warmly in the new prospects of happiness which are opening for him
that I have asked leave to write to you and to offer my hearty
congratulations.

'I venture to think that we are already friends, and this adds
greatly to the pleasure which this intelligence has given me.

'For many years I have been on the most intimate terms with your
future husband; and while I share the general opinion of the world
as to his talents and force of character, I have better reason than
any other man to appreciate his generosity and goodness, and the
chivalrous delicacy which a natural reserve conceals from casual
acquaintance.

'I prize his friendship as the best gift of my public life, and I
rejoice unfeignedly that he will have a companion so well able to
share his noblest ambitions and to brighten his life.

'I know that you will forgive me this intrusion, which is justified
by the fact that next to yourself I am more interested than anyone
in the change which will bring so much happiness to my dear friend.

'Believe me always,

'Yours most sincerely,

'J. Chamberlain.'

CHAPTER XXXVIII

DIVIDED COUNSELS

JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1885

At the close of 1884 Mr. Gladstone's colleagues expected that he would
resign, and it appears that he had really thought of doing so, provided
that a ministry could be formed under Lord Hartington's leadership.
Franchise and Redistribution were virtually settled, and there was no
legislative proposal before either the Cabinet or the country on which
Lord Hartington was in marked disagreement with his colleagues. But they
were still 'an Egyptian Government,' and here differences seemed to be
irreconcilable.

'The Egyptian policy of the Government had now become thoroughly
unpopular, and those of us who, although we had favoured
intervention as necessary at the time, had deplored alike the
engagements of our predecessors which had made it necessary, and the
occupation which, unnecessarily in my opinion, followed it, were as
unpopular as were those like Hartington, and the majority of the
peers in the Cabinet, who had insisted not only on going, but on
staying--at least in Cairo. It is curious to reflect how
intervention in the East is judged by subsequent complications which
do not affect the principle. The intervention of 1860-61 in Syria
gave considerable popularity to the Government who agreed to it, and
to Lord Dufferin who conducted it on the spot; and it was as popular
in France which found the troops, as in England which found the man.
By that intervention Syria was pacified and war in the East
prevented, and ultimately it was followed by evacuation and
reversion to what diplomatists style in their jargon "an improved
_status quo_."

'It is too often now (1891) forgotten that we actually proposed in
1884 to France (in connection with a Conference which took place,
obtaining therefore to some extent, it might be contended, valuable
consideration for our proposal) that we would, at or before the
expiration of our occupation, propose to the Powers and to the Porte
a scheme for the neutralization of Egypt on the basis of the
principles applied to Belgium. A document which we printed at the
beginning of 1885 gave our suggested wording for the neutralization
treaty, declaring that Egypt should be an independent and
perpetually neutral State under the guarantee of the contracting
parties; limiting the strength of the Egyptian army, the claim of
Turkey to military aid from Egypt, and so forth.'

The suggestion was not welcomed by the Powers.

'On New Year's Day I left Antibes for Paris, which I reached on
Friday, the 2nd January, and quitted for London on Saturday, the
3rd.

'Chamberlain wrote to me that Mr. Gladstone was threatened with a
return of his illness, that he required rest, that Egypt had been
for the moment tided over, though it might at any moment break up
the Government. It had been decided to send a firm but courteous
despatch to France demanding immediate consideration of our
proposals, failing which we should "take our own course."
Chamberlain, however, added, "What that course is to be is the
question on which agreement appears impossible. It is 'scuttle and
bankruptcy' against 'protectorate and guarantee.' Sufficient unto
the day is the evil thereof."'

Mr. Gladstone was with Dilke and Chamberlain in opposing protectorate or
guarantee in any shape. But there were other questions of Imperial
policy upon which the Imperialism of these two Ministers divided them
from Mr. Gladstone.

'New Guinea had also been discussed, and Chamberlain was for
demanding explanations from the Germans. Zululand had been
mentioned. Chamberlain supported the annexation of the coast of
Pondoland: Mr. Gladstone, with the support of Trevelyan, "opposing
any attempt to anticipate Germany."

'On Sunday, January 4th, Chamberlain wrote again from Birmingham.
His letter shows that I was anxious for resignation on the Egyptian
question, and Chamberlain replied that he could not find a
satisfactory boat to leave the ship in, and that he thought that the
Government had more lives than a cat. Chamberlain added that he had
to speak on January 5th, and should find it difficult to steer
between Jingoism and peace-at-any-price.'

'He also was engaged in preparing a programme for the future to be
set forth at Ipswich. This last was the memorable "Unauthorized
Programme."'

A first instalment of this programme was given by Mr. Chamberlain in a
speech at Birmingham, which advocated restriction of game-preserving,
provision of land for agricultural labourers, and better housing. The
accusations of Communism brought against Mr. Chamberlain began at this
point; and they, of course, redoubled after he had proposed on January
10th at Ipswich to give local bodies power for compulsory acquisition of
land.

At this juncture Mr. Chamberlain was absent from London, and
communicating only by letter with Sir Charles, whom he had not seen
since the middle of December, when Sir Charles crossed to Paris, on his
way to Toulon; and before the unauthorized programme was launched Lord
Hartington contemplated forming a Government which would have given the
foremost positions to Dilke and Chamberlain.

'On the morning of January 5th Harcourt had told me that Mr.
Gladstone intended to resign, and that Lord Granville would follow
Mr. Gladstone, in which case Hartington intended to make him,
Harcourt, Chancellor, to move Lord Derby and Childers, to put in
Rosebery, [Footnote: As Secretary for the Colonies.] to offer
Chamberlain the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, and me the
Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs. But, great as were the
offices proposed, Chamberlain and I could not have consented to
remain in if Mr. Gladstone had gone out notoriously dissatisfied. If
he had gone out on grounds of health alone, it would, of course,
have been another matter.'

In a letter,

'probably of Monday morning, January 5th, Chamberlain said that Mr.
Gladstone's retirement was possible, and might be necessary; that
Hartington and Harcourt could bring it about; but that we must be
most careful not to allow them to say that we had been engaged in an
intrigue with them against Mr. Gladstone. He thought that we ought
to tell them frankly that we could enter into no negotiations with
them, and to put this in a Memorandum to which we could afterwards
appeal. On the other hand, he was willing to state his views as to
policy, provided all reference to personal questions was avoided. As
his Egyptian policy, he stated "immediate bankruptcy, communication
to the Powers of our fixed intention to leave, declaration that we
would not allow intervention by other Powers in our place, and
Conference to settle details of neutralization." As to domestic
policy, he agreed in my suggestion that we should insist upon an
immediate Civil List Committee, and proposed an inquiry into labour.
He gave me leave to discuss his letter with Harcourt ("the latter
has always been a most loyal friend, though he can not be expected
to agree with us in everything"), and I did so before the Cabinet of
January 7th.'

By this time Mr. Chamberlain had come to London, and there is no
indication that his speech at Birmingham had created friction. But the
party which wished to offer resistance to Germany's high-handed policy
had been strengthened by a new instance of usurpation.

'Mr. Gladstone was absent from this Cabinet. The first matter
discussed was that of Samoa raised by me. There had been received on
the night of the 6th from the Governor of New Zealand a telegram
saying that the Germans had made a treaty giving the whole authority
of Government to the German Consul. While Muenster had been telling
Lord Granville that Germany would take no step hostile to Samoan
independence, the Germans had sent warships there with secret
orders, and had hoisted their flag in various parts of the islands.
The next subject mentioned was that of Zanzibar, and it was decided
that we should warn Germany that we would not brook interference
there. At the same time I had much doubt whether Lord Granville
would act upon the instructions of the Cabinet in this matter, and
my doubts were justified. The third matter was that of the Pondo
coast, and also the coast of Zululand. Mr. Gladstone alone objecting
to a protectorate and being absent, it was decided to have one.'

'Then came the old question of sending troops to Suakim; [Footnote:
Colonial troops were offered about this time, and the Diary contains
the entry, February 20th: "The sending of a Colonial force to
Suakim. Hartington and Derby had snubbed the Colonists, and were
snubbed by the Cabinet in consequence."] then that of Egyptian
Finance, on which Harcourt broached his scheme by which the United
Kingdom was to pay the difference caused by a reduction of the rate
of interest, to which scheme Chamberlain and I were opposed. We were
informed that the Queen "most strongly protested against our binding
ourselves to leave Egypt."'

Meanwhile the Radicals in the Cabinet considered their concerted action
in view of a change of leadership.

'We settled during the Cabinet that Trevelyan, Chamberlain, and I
should meet at my room at the Local Government Board, directly the
Cabinet was over, to discuss the terms on which we would join a
Hartington administration; and we did so, finding Egypt and my
proposed inquiry into the Civil List the only real difficulties. The
Civil List could be got over, as it was certain that the Whigs would
give in to pressure from us upon this point. But Harcourt had
informed us that our Egyptian policy made the formation of a
Government impossible, as Hartington would not consent to accept
office on our Egyptian policy.'

It was very difficult to come to an agreement about Egypt. Lord Derby
had declared that the only alternatives were guaranteed neutrality or
annexation. Dilke and Chamberlain stood for the former, considering
their duty done if they prevented occupation by any other European
Power, and took steps to establish internal order--which meant
completing the organization of an Egyptian army. There was a third
policy; for Lord Hartington, who repeatedly in public repudiated the
idea of annexation, insisted upon the retention of a single control
during a prolonged occupation. In this he had the strongest backing from
the Queen.

'Chamberlain at our meeting added a fresh proviso--namely, that
Parnell or some other Irishman should be Chief Secretary. I
afterwards informed Harcourt of Chamberlain's views, adding that
Chamberlain was willing to avoid all personal questions, although he
much wished that John Morley should be in the Cabinet, [Footnote:
Sir Charles had noted his own strong wish to this effect in the
previous year.] that he wholly rejected Harcourt's plan for Egypt as
being a bribe to buy off the Powers, forced on us by unworthy fears.
Chamberlain wished, if his own Egyptian policy was not adopted, to
simply evacuate the country.

'Chamberlain, I was empowered to say, had also mentioned the English
land question, and was opposed to allowing Lord Salisbury to come
in,' as this, he said to Sir Charles, 'would surely be a hopeless
confession of weakness, and give him a chance with the new electors.

'I argued against Chamberlain's Egyptian policy, not on the merits,
but on the chances of our getting our own way.

'"I doubt our getting our way as to bankruptcy, and am not sure that
we ought to put that forward as sole or chief cause for not joining
Hartington." To this Chamberlain replied: "True. But how can we join
another Government without any settled policy about Egypt?
Harcourt's alternative is impossible; then what is there? I should
refuse to join Hartington unless we can agree as to Egypt policy,
and if we do agree, there can in that case be no reason for letting
Salisbury in."'

Egypt was in Sir Charles's view the main, but not the only, difficulty.
The Government policy of 'lying down to Germany' was another. At the
same date:

'January 7th, Chamberlain and I had a conference with regard to
Samoa, in which I pointed out that if we quarrelled with France
about Egypt she would have all Europe behind her, whereas in our
dealings with Germany about Samoa, Zanzibar, and other matters,
Germany would stand alone.' [Footnote: A letter to Lord Hartington
from his secretary, Mr. Brett, which is quoted by Mr. Bernard
Holland (_Life of Duke of Devonshire_, vol. ii, pp. 38, 39),
suggests that the Hartington section had difficulty in reconciling
Sir Charles's attitude on other Imperial matters with his Egyptian
policy: "It would indeed be a farce, after all the fuss about the
Cameroons and Angra Pequena, to allow Suakim, which is the port of
Khartoum, and the Nile to pass into the hands of foreigners." The
answer is, first, that Sir Charles would certainly never have
consented to let any port in Egypt or the Soudan pass into the hands
of any European Power: his proposal was neutralization of Egypt
under international guarantee; and, secondly, that the questions
were governed by different conditions, which he set out in
conference with Mr. Chamberlain about Samoa.]

January 9th, 'I had decided that if I resigned, or if I refused to join
a Hartington administration, I should mention four subjects--Egypt,
Samoa, Zanzibar, and (probably) the Civil List inquiry (if I were not
completely satisfied). On the same day I was at work on our draft
despatch to Sir Edward Malet as to Zanzibar, which had been settled on
the 8th after the Cabinet of the 7th, but which did not go off until the
14th. On January 14th I noted in my Diary, "The Zanzibar despatch went.
Seven days' delay. I know that two days' delay was caused by the
necessity of sending to Osborne and to the Prime Minister, but why seven
days?"

'On January 21st the first matter discussed was that of New Guinea,
in which we found ourselves in difficulties caused by absence of
jurisdiction over foreigners, and we agreed in consequence to
annexation.'

The situation with Germany was undoubtedly grave, but ought not, Sir
Charles maintained, to entail the sacrifice of Zanzibar. On February
24th Count Muenster, the German Ambassador, told Mr. Alfred de Rothschild
that he expected to be withdrawn, but that New Guinea was the only
serious matter in dispute.