The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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'On June 6th Lord Granville called a meeting to ask us whether,
Waddington having now agreed to all our demands, we could devise
some plan of getting out of them. He said that for his own part he
should not have asked the question, but that Hartington had
suggested it.... He said: "I must rather complain of Hartington's
conduct--from so intimate a friend. If it had been Dodson I should
have been very angry." After such an introduction, the meeting could
hardly come to a conclusion favourable to Hartington's views.

'On June 9th Sir Henry Ponsonby came to see me before the Cabinet,
wishing to talk to me before he spoke to any other member, as the
Queen thought that I was the most in agreement with her views, which
was not the case, as regarded evacuation. He discussed with me two
points: First the term of years, as to which I explained that, under
the agreement, if at the end of three and a half years any one Power
thought we had better stay, and we ourselves wished to stay, then we
could stay. It was not my wish that we should. Secondly, as to the
union of Bulgaria and East Roumelia, about which I did not care, and
as to which I suggested that the Queen should propose to Lord
Granville to take counsel with Austria. [Footnote: The union took
place in 1885.] At the Cabinet which followed we discussed the words
of our promise to lay our French agreements before Parliament, and
also our answer as to the Turks and Suakim. The French having
written us a disagreeable despatch, we agreed that they must be made
to take it back.

'On the next day, June 10th, there was a Cabinet to begin the
railway from Suakim. and to consider the draft despatch to
Waddington, and as the Government at this time was not very strong,
it was decided to leave for our successors a Cabinet minute upon the
subject of our relations at this time with France. After the Cabinet
I had to see Mr. Gladstone from Lord Granville upon the question
whether we should insist on a casting vote on the Caisse. Mr.
Gladstone, against the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet, replied:
"No, not to the point of breaking off."'

On June 12th Sir Charles made two notes in his Diary of that date:

'I think that if Mr. Gladstone was to stay in, and live on, we
should come as regards Egypt to evacuation and neutralization. Under
the Tories, or under Hartington, the _status quo_ may be tried for a
long time.'

'When Bismarck offered Egypt to Dizzy, it was in order to embroil
England with France.'

III.

From this point onwards in the Memoir the focus of the Egyptian question
changes; attention is centred on the diplomatic questions arising out of
the financial problem.

As between England and France the issue concerned itself with the
proposal to pay less than the promised interest on previously existing
loans. The French view, expressed through M. Barrere, the French agent
in Egypt, was that interest need not be reduced; the alternative view
was that the bondholders must make a sacrifice of part of their
interest, at any rate for some period of years, in return for the better
security they were obtaining.

'On July 3rd Barrere called and explained to me a scheme of his on
Egyptian finance, in which he was now highly skilled, having been
French Agent in Egypt for some time. I put the matter before Lord
Granville, who sent it to Mr. Gladstone and Childers. Barrere argued
that it was not necessary to reduce interest, or, to use the slang
of the moment, to "cut the coupon." We called a meeting of the
Commons Ministers, and Chamberlain announced that he should resign
if the coupon were not cut.

'July 18th, 1884.--We had virtually decided on declaring Egypt
bankrupt in order to force the hands of the French, but Waddington,
at a meeting with Childers, had broached a plan, which had
originally been suggested by the Germans, for a temporary reduction
of interest, to be reconsidered at the end of a certain number of
years.' (These proposals were discussed at the Conference, which met
in the latter half of July, held seven sittings, and then broke down
without arriving at a conclusion on August 1st.) 'The question now
raised was--at the end of what number of years? The French said
three, and we decided to propose ten; but with a willingness to take
six or even five; we advancing 4 1/2 millions instead of 8, or, in
other words, leaving out the indemnities due by Egypt. If this
arrangement failed, then we were to fall back on bankruptcy.
Harcourt was much against declaring bankruptcy, and in favour of the
policy of "scuttle." Hartington was against bankruptcy, and for
paying the differences ourselves; so as to force us into annexation.
Spencer, Childers, Chamberlain, and I, were for bankruptcy or for a
strong threat of bankruptcy.

'On July 21st there was a meeting of members of the Cabinet after
questions, at which Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Hartington,
Harcourt, Childers, and I, were present. The French had backed out
of their proposals, and we considered a new scheme of Childers's to
put all administrative charges in Egypt before interest of debt, a
scheme which it was certain that the French would refuse. Harcourt
was again violent against bankruptcy, which he announced he thought
grossly "illegal," as if there were such a thing as illegality in
such affairs.

'On August 2nd there was a full Cabinet, every member being present,
and we had to consider whether, the Conference having broken down,
Baring should go back to Egypt or remain at the Foreign Office and
continue to advise us. Lord Granville proposed that he should
remain, and that Malet should go to Egypt. Chamberlain proposed that
Goschen should go. Childers proposed J. K. Cross. [Footnote:
Under-Secretary for India.] Dufferin was mentioned; then Lord
Granville proposed Northbrook. All other names were immediately
withdrawn, and Northbrook took time to consider, but evidently meant
to go, and decided, I think, in the course of the same evening.
Baring was then called in, and we once more began to chop straw by
considering the "ulterior consequences" of the collapse of the
Conference--i.e., bankruptcy. Lastly, Gordon was dealt with, and
it was decided that a supplementary estimate should be proposed,
with the understanding that we should spend more if it was wanted. I
wrote to Chamberlain: "We always have two subjects--(a) Conference,
(b) Gordon." And he wrote back: "The first always taking up two or
three hours; and the second five minutes at the fag end of
business."

'On August 3rd I noted "we are going to send Northbrook to Egypt to
put down Barrere."

'On August 5th we considered the instructions to Northbrook, or
rather whether he should have any at all, and if so, what they
should be. Northbrook read us a scheme which he had written, which
attempted to conciliate Turkey and Italy, so as to have great naval
strength in the Mediterranean and to prevent all chance of a sudden
occupation of Egypt by France. We were to express our continued
determination not to annex. We were to stay five years at the
request of the Sultan. We were again to propose to the Powers those
arrangements with regard to the Canal which we had proposed already.
We were to pay the indemnities in stock; and the next coupon in
full; and we were to promise for the future not less than 4 per
cent, on privileged stocks, and not less than 3 per cent, on the
Unified debt, while we were in Egypt. Indian troops were to hold
Massowah. Harcourt, in reply, read a written counter-statement,
again proposing to "scuttle," and again threatening us that we
should have war with France. Hartington again spoke for a guarantee
by us of the whole Egyptian debt. After Hartington's observations
the discussion was, as usual, adjourned. Chamberlain and I decided
that we would ask for our old term of three and a half years'
occupation, as against Northbrook's five. Next came Gordon, and
Hartington proposed that we should embody some militia.

'On August 6th there was another Cabinet, and the first question was
that of Northbrook's scheme. Lord Granville agreed to a temporary
use of Turkish troops provided that they were to leave Egypt when we
left. Chamberlain would not agree, and wished to stick to
Northbrook's phrase only inviting "co-operation." This view
prevailed, and it was decided that if the Turks proposed to send a
commissioner, we were to refuse. But the question of troops was
really left open for more discussion. Next came the question of an
advance of nearly a million which had been made by Rothschild to
Egypt, and we asked him, as a favour to ourselves, to let it run,
which was all he wanted us to do. Northbrook, who is not strong, had
been a good deal fatigued with the discussion on his scheme, and
instead of sleeping (his usual practice at a Cabinet) on this
occasion fainted, and we had to get up and look after him at this
point.

'On August 26th I received a letter from Hartington, saying that
Northbrook was going to Osborne at the end of the week, and starting
for Egypt from there. Hartington told me he was coming up to meet
him, and he afterwards wrote to me to fix an appointment at the War
Office on the 29th. This I kept. Northbrook was deplorably weak. He
had returned from Rosebery's completely under the influence of Mr.
Gladstone's pro-French views. [Footnote: At Dalmeny Lord Northbrook
"met Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone." See Life of Lord Northbrook, p. 190.]
He had settled to spend a day at Walmer, and had telegraphed to Lord
Lyons to meet him there. His plan now was to ask the French
Government to send a man to Egypt in order that he and the Frenchman
might settle matters together. Hartington and I pointed out to him
that the Frenchman's instructions from his Government must either be
to refuse all reduction of interest, or to consent to it upon
obtaining from us a better political position than that given to
France by the Anglo-French agreement. We explained to him that it
would be impossible for us to tolerate such proposals. I wrote to
Chamberlain a full account of the interview.

'September 22nd_.--We decided with reference to Egyptian finance
that Chamberlain should write a strong letter to Lord Granville
protesting against any British advance to Egypt, unless accompanied
by a cutting of the coupon. He did so, and on September 25th sent me
a copy, and I sent the copy to Childers, and wrote myself to Lord
Granville. On the 27th I received a memorandum from Chamberlain as
to Lord Granville, Lord Derby, and Bismarck.

'Chamberlain's memorandum was a fierce denunciation of the
principles laid down in Northbrook's despatch No. 4, dated September
13th, and received September 22nd.' [Footnote: Lord Northbrook had
arrived in Egypt.]

Controversy now raged over Lord Northbrook's scheme, and added to the
difficulties of the Cabinet, which was divided on the question of
lowering or not lowering the rate of interest.

'On 19th November the second matter mentioned was Northbrook's
scheme, against which I fought hard.... I pointed out that early in
April, when Mr. Gladstone had wished to borrow on the future value
of the Canal shares, that proposal had not been accepted, and we
laid down the principle that it was for the bondholders to make
sacrifices. On July 3rd we had decided that the coupon must be
"cut." On July 18th the whole Cabinet had taken the same view except
Harcourt and the Chancellor, and four members--Childers, Spencer,
Chamberlain, and I--had advocated distinct bankruptcy. On August 2nd
we had seen Baring to lay our plans for bankruptcy. On August 5th
Northbrook himself had proposed a reduction of the interest. On
August 29th there had been a general agreement to the same effect.
Northbrook's policy had enormously sent up Egyptian stocks. After my
strong observations the opinions stood: Mr. Gladstone, Childers,
Chamberlain, Harcourt, Trevelyan, and Dilke against Northbrook's
scheme; for it, Lord Granville, the Chancellor, Hartington, Spencer,
Kimberley, Derby, Carlingford, and Northbrook himself. All the Lords
on one side, curiously enough, and all the Sirs and Mr.'s on the
other; eight to six against us. But I noted: "Mr. Gladstone is so
strong that we shall win." "As we did."' [Footnote: Letter from Sir
Charles to Mr. Brett (afterwards Lord Esher):

Local Government Board,
Whitehall,
_November_ 19_th_, 1884.

'_My_ policy has always been bankruptcy and stand the shot, and if
we had stuck to that we should have had no trouble with the Powers;
but indiscretions have made that difficult. It is not pleasant to be
called in too late. I quite agree in your general view, but how can
the bondholder be got to make sacrifices without his consent?']

'At the meeting of the Cabinet of December 2nd, Egyptian finance
again came up. We were informed that Prince Bismarck suggested oral
communications among ambassadors. For this Malet proposed Paris, and
we replied Berlin.'

IV.

During this time the Government continued to waver as to the Soudan
expedition.

On June 21st

'with regard to Gordon it was decided to wait ten days before
settling anything, and to see whether we heard from him in reply to
the silly questions which had been asked.'

On June 27th came the definitive news that Berber had fallen on May
26th. On July 5th

'We discussed the Egyptian army of the future, and then the question
of whether we should send an expedition to Khartoum, as to which we
again could come to no decision; Mr. Gladstone still opposing.'

Dilke, backed by Chamberlain, was still pressing the military solution
which he favoured. On July 16th

'Hartington on this occasion gave up the Berber-Suakim route, and
pressed for a decision as to an immediate expedition by the Nile. He
was supported by the Chancellor, Northbrook, Carlingford, and
Dodson. Mr. Gladstone, Harcourt, and Childers opposed.

'Chamberlain and I opposed a large expedition by the Nile, and
supported a small expedition, under the control of the navy, with a
body of picked men. Baring was called in about the police in Egypt,
and his views in support of Nubar were approved. Nubar was to have
his own way in the appointment of Inspectors of Police in Egypt.'

'On July 22nd we found that Mr. Gladstone had again taken up Zebehr,
and was anxious to send him to Khartoum in order to avoid a British
expedition.

'On July 25th there was a full Cabinet, Spencer being present, which
first discussed the Conference and then the Gordon expedition, for
which for the first time a large majority of the Cabinet pronounced.
The issue was narrowed down to that of sending some sort of British
force to or towards Dongola; and this was supported by Hartington,
the Chancellor, Derby, Northbrook, Spencer, Carlingford, Dodson,
Chamberlain, and me, while on the other side were only Mr.
Gladstone, Harcourt, and Kimberley. Lord Granville said nothing. By
the stoutness of their resistance the three for the moment prevailed
over the nine.

'On July 31st a storm was brewing about Gordon, and Harcourt went
about declaring that the Government would break up upon the
question. On the next day, August 1st, a way out of the difficulty
was found in an agreement that we should ask for a small vote of
credit, which we were to use or not as should be thought right
later.'

It must be remembered that communications with Gordon were now
interrupted, though occasionally renewed, and this added to the
confusion.

'On September 17th we received a telegram from Gordon which looked
as though he were perfectly mad, although some of the other
telegrams from him sent at the same time were sane enough.'

Since Parliament had risen and the Cabinet scattered, preparations had
been going on apace.

'When Hartington came to me on September 15th he told me that he had
already spent "L750,000 out of the L300,000" for the Gordon
expedition.' [Footnote: 'On August 9th Lord Hartington again asked
us for permission to embody militia or call out a portion of the
First-Class Army Reserve.']

'On October 4th Chamberlain had written strongly against Wolseley's
great expedition, Harcourt was still opposing the whole thing. After
this meeting of the Cabinet Northbrook wrote to Gordon a long letter
based on the Cabinet decision. He stated that the expedition under
Wolseley was not sent for the purpose of defeating the Mahdi, but
only of enabling the Egyptian garrison of Khartoum, the civil
employees and their families, with Gordon, to return to Egypt. He
offered the Grand Cross of the Bath' (to Gordon) 'as from the Queen
personally. He explained our refusal of Zebehr, and he suggested the
placing at Khartoum of the Mudir of Dongola. It was easy, however,
to write to Gordon, but it was not easy to get the letters to him;
and we had to attempt even to send them by Tripoli and the desert.'
[Footnote: As to the last communications with Gordon, see _Life of
Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 397-399. Besides the authorities already
quoted, the Parliamentary Papers Nos. 2, 6, 12, 13, and 25, for
1884, may be referred to.]

That is the last detailed reference to Gordon in the Memoir until
February 5th, 1885, when the news of the fall of Khartoum reached
London. The matter had passed out of the hands of the Cabinet into those
of the soldiers.

This comment in the Diary may fitly end this chapter:

'On February 20th I noted (conversation, I think, not printed), Lord
Acton says of Gladstone: "Cannot make up my mind whether he is not
wholly unconscious when working himself up to a change of position.
After watching him do it, I think that he is so. He lives completely
in what for the moment he chooses to believe."'

CHAPTER XXXVI

FRANCHISE AND REDISTRIBUTION

JULY TO DECEMBER, 1884.

In the summer of 1884 the Government Bill for extension of the franchise
had strong and even passionate support throughout the country; but that
policy threatened a breach with Lord Hartington, who in the opinion of
many was by prescriptive right Mr. Gladstone's successor. Still more
entangling were the difficulties in respect of Egypt, over which the
Government was so hopelessly divided that no coherent policy could be
pursued. Sir Charles notes that on July 18th Mr. Gladstone,

'who had the greatest abhorrence for City dinners, proposed the
extinction of the Lord Mayor's ministerial banquet; the fact being
that the Government of London Bill and the failure to send an
expedition to Khartoum had made the Ministry so unpopular in the
City that he did not think it wise to subject himself to the torture
which such banquets are to him.'

'The Tory game,' Sir Charles wrote on May 24th, 1884, to his agent,
'is to delay the franchise until they have upset us upon Egypt,
before the Franchise Bill has reached the Lords.' [Footnote: This
letter is also quoted in Chapter XXXIV.]

When the Franchise Bill went up to the Lords in the first week of July,
it was rejected for a reasoned amendment which declined to alter the
franchise except as part of a scheme dealing with redistribution of
seats.

'On July 5th there was a Cabinet to consider what was called the
crisis--our relations with the House of Lords over the franchise,
and Spencer was present.... The question to be considered was that
of dissolution or an autumn Session. Lord Granville, Hartington, and
Lord Derby were for an immediate dissolution on the old franchise,
which was at once negatived.'

'On June 21st there was mentioned the attitude of the House of
Lords. Lord Granville said something in favour of life peerages. I
asked Chamberlain whether he thought that it was seriously meant,
and writing passed between us in which he replied: "Serious, I
think"; to which I answered: "You won't have it, will you?" Answer:
"No."'

'On July 7th Mr. Gladstone explained to me his plan for dealing with
the House of Lords, which was not so objectionable to me as the
schemes known as "Reform of the House of Lords." It was to imitate
the French constitution, and in cases of difference to make the two
Houses sit in Congress and vote together. From the practical point
of view it would be as difficult to carry as the abolition of the
House of Lords, and if carried would not be of much use to the
Liberal party except on occasions when their majority was absolutely
overwhelming.

'On July 8th offers of compromise came to us from the Lords, but
they would not offer terms which we could accept. We decided to
propose to them a solemn resolution by both Houses pledging us to
redistribution. This they refused.'

The extent of real agreement which existed between the two sides had not
yet been divined; and it was Sir Charles who set on foot the work which
finally averted conflict.

'Early in July I began to take time by the forelock by preparing,
without instructions from the Cabinet, a Redistribution scheme; and
the first memoranda drawn up by Sir John Lambert for my use were
written in that month, although it was not till after Parliament had
separated for the recess that we got seriously to work. In the
evening of July 14th Mr. Gladstone broached to me his views on
Redistribution, and we practically hatched the Bill.'

Party feeling ran high, and the Queen intervened.

'On July 9th in the morning Sir Henry Ponsonby came up to see the
Duke of Richmond and some of us, and tried to settle the deadlock,
but failed.... The Cabinet decided that Chamberlain must not take
the chair at a meeting at the Agricultural Hall to denounce the
House of Lords.'

Liberals in general were, however, speaking out, and at a Cabinet a week
later they had 'some fun with Hartington concerning his Lancashire
meetings, with strong resolutions directed against the House of Lords
for doing that which he privately approved.' Also, there was a
tremendous demonstration in the Metropolis.

'On July 21st I saw the Franchise Demonstration on this day from the
Speaker's window, the procession passing from three till six.'

'After the Cabinet on August 5th we congratulated Chamberlain upon
his Birmingham franchise meeting, and he told us that Birmingham was
"thirsting for the blood of the Lords"--saying to Bright: "You are
too lenient with them. We won't stand them any longer." I told him
that as the _Times_ had said that he was too violent, I had no doubt
the Queen would say so also, to which he replied: "Probably, and if
she does I shall most likely ... deny her right to criticise my
speeches, although she may, if she likes, dismiss me, in which case
I will lead an agitation against the Lords in the country." I
answered: "Yes, but you cannot go alone in such a case, and
therefore should not appear to contemplate doing so." He replied: "I
am not going, but perhaps she can dismiss me. What then? I am not
going to tie my tongue." I retorted: "In that case it would surely
be even more essential than usual that I should go too." He closed
the matter by saying: "If it really arose out of the agitation
against the Lords and the interference of the Crown with the liberty
of speech of ministers, I do not see how a Radical could stay in.
Remember, I have observed Mr. Gladstone's limits. I have said
nothing about the future; only denounced past action."'

Mr. Chamberlain's outside agitation coincided with Sir Charles's work
towards a peaceful solution. On August 9th

'A Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with
Redistribution--to consist of Hartington, Kimberley, Childers,
Chamberlain, and me, with the addition of Lefevre. They forgot
James, who was anxious to be on it, [Footnote: Sir Charles wrote to
Sir Henry James on the matter, and received a reply admitting that
he had been "slightly touched" by the omission of his name, but
saying that he would still give his services.] but I soon got rid of
the Committee and went on by myself with Lambert.'