The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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But if he thought that an alliance with Russia was not a necessity for a
sound British foreign policy, on the other hand he was equally convinced
that a good understanding with the United States of America was such a
necessity. He believed that if fresh subjects of difference were not
created, and any remaining questions of difference--like the Fisheries--
were settled, as the _Alabama_ and Alaska questions had been settled,
the old Jeffersonian tradition of suspicion of English policy would die
out, even in the Democratic party, and that no obstacle would then
remain to prevent the co-operation of all the branches of the race in a
common policy.

In a speech made in June, 1898, he had referred to the improved
relations with the United States in terms which gave credit for the
improvement mainly to Sir Julian Pauncefote, then Ambassador at
Washington, for whose services he had the greatest admiration.
[Footnote: Sir Julian Pauncefote had previously been Permanent Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs for many years.] When, in 1896, the
question of Venezuela had threatened to make trouble between the two
English-speaking Powers, he counted the claims of Great Britain in
respect of the frontiers of Guiana as "dust in the balance" when weighed
against the advantage of not "running across the national line of policy
of the United States." He desired to sink all such petty affairs in a
policy of Anglo-American co-operation in the Far East. Rivals for trade
in China they must be, but the interest of both lay in working for the
"open door" which admitted a friendly rivalry. He wrote in the _American
Independent_ for May 1st, 1899: "The will of the United States, if it be
in accordance with the will of Great Britain and of the Australian
Commonwealth--the will, in other words, of the English-speaking
peoples--will be paramount in the Pacific if they are united"; and he
was never weary of urging the improvement in England's relations with
the United States which would follow from a friendly settlement with
Ireland. [Footnote: In _Present Position of European Politics_, 1887, he
had said: "I, for one, still have hope that the causes of strangement
between Great Britain and the chief of her daughter-countries, which are
mainly to be found in the friction produced by the Irish Question, may
even within our lifetime be removed, and the tie of blood, and tongue,
and history and letters, again drawn close." And in a note written later
in his own copy are the words: "It is for the Americans of the United
States to decide how far towards firm alliance this shall be carried."
Cf. _Life of Beaconsfield_, iv. 231.]

Bearing in mind all these considerations, he believed, notwithstanding
all the wars and the rumours of wars, that the Great Armageddon so much
dreaded could be avoided by diplomacy combined with proper measures of
defence. The long chain of events formed by the Sino-Japanese War, the
Boer War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and the Russo-
Japanese War, were in his opinion "secondary events," however important,
appearing to threaten the peace of Europe from time to time--very
disquieting, no doubt, and ominous occasionally of yet worse things--but
things such as diplomacy had conjured away before, and ought to be able
to conjure away again. He did not think that Morocco, long regarded at
the Foreign Office as a danger-point, would ever prove a sufficient
object to induce Germany to break the general peace. She would threaten,
take all she could get, and then withdraw with the spoils, just avoiding
the danger-point; and so it no doubt turned out to be in 1905-06 at the
time of the troubles which ended in the Algeciras Conference. But he
recognized the personal character of the German Emperor as a new factor
of danger in the situation.

The essential point since 1871, he wrote in 1905, had been that there
never had existed a serious and settled intention of making the much-
dreaded "European War" on the part of any of those with whom the great
decision rested. There was, he said, to the good this main
consideration--that, if any Power had intended war, a sufficient
pretext could always have been found, yet the war had not come. The
security for the maintenance of the long "armed peace" was, in fact,
this: that no Power had really intended war, or intended it now. What
the consequences would be was too well known by the responsible leaders.
The sudden heats which most seemed to jeopardize peace had arisen in
regard to questions not of European importance, mostly outside Europe,
where sometimes on one side or the other, and sometimes upon both,
tactful treatment in advance, and what might be styled "a long view,"
would have saved the world from trouble altogether, and ought to do so
in future under analogous circumstances, whenever the question of the
Bagdad Railway and the remaining questions relating to Africa came up
for final settlement. [Footnote: _English Review_, October, 1909.]

The guarantee of peace he believed to lie in the policy of _ententes_,
but on condition that the policy begun by Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcasse
should aim at agreement between two Powers only, and be limited to
specific objects. [Footnote: See the same opinion expressed in 1871,
Vol. I., p. 133.] Beyond this it was dangerous to go. An _entente_
between more than two Powers, as distinct from one between two only,
reminded him of an American game of cards which he had seen played in
the Far West. This game when played by two persons was called _euchre_,
but when played by three persons was called by another and very
disagreeable name, because it so frequently ended in the use of knives.
The Franco-Italian agreements of 1898 and 1900, the Anglo-French
agreement of 1904, the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904, the agreements
between Japan and Russia which had followed and grown out of the
Portsmouth Treaty of September, 1905, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty which
followed, and the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 as to Persia, were
guarantees for peace, because they came within the above definition. It
does not appear, however, that he considered the alliance of France and
Russia, dating so far as was then known from 1895, as a real guarantee
for peace, or that he shared the later views attributed to Gambetta, of
the desirability of an _entente_ between Great Britain, France, and
Russia.

[Footnote: "M. Gaston Thomson publishes in the _Matin_ extracts from
letters by Gambetta to M. Ranc. In one letter, written apparently at the
time of the crisis of 1875, Gambetta says:

"'You must know that the forger of the Ems despatch is about to
commit another act of treachery. But our calmness and
self-possession will prevent us from falling into the same trap as
in 1870. The croakings of a sinister raven will not plunge us into
folly this time. He has understood his mistake. He has been able to
transform a divided and impotent Germany into a great, strong,
disciplined Empire. For us and for himself he was less well inspired
when he exacted the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, which was the
germ of death for his work.... Until they have remedied this error
no one will disarm. The world's peace, which is so necessary for all
peoples, will remain always at the mercy of an incident.' In order
to prepare France to meet the future, Gambetta strove to bring about
the alliance which to-day unites France, Great Britain, and Russia.
In a striking passage he writes:

"'The number and importance of Russia's difficulties grow every day.
L---- keeps the Prince of Wales informed day by day of the
difficulties of that Power. The political ambitions of Russia will
be impeded by Austria, who is already assuming a hostile attitude.
She is exerting pressure upon Rumania. Do you see, as a consequence,
Austria allying herself with Rumania and Turkey against Russia? What
a conflict!

"'The Prince of Wales, however, foresees it. He does not share the
hostility of a section of the English nation against Russia. With
all his young authority he fights against measures which may be
prejudicial to Russia. I see in him the makings of a great
statesman....

"'I desire that our enemies should be Russia's enemies. It is clear
that Bismarck wants an alliance with the Austrians. Russia must
therefore be made to see that we might be her ally.... Since the
Revolution our country exerts great influence in Europe. Before long
I see Russia and England at our side, if we only have a proper
internal policy.'" (_Times_, December 30th, 1915).]

He was strongly convinced that the improvement of the French army since
1871 had been so great that it afforded by itself a sufficient reason to
give Germany pause, and he believed that the German Emperor considered
the French army better in some respects than his own. [Footnote: Baron
Beyens says that in 1911 it was the general opinion that in many
respects the French was in advance of the German army (_L'Allemagne
avant la Guerre_, p. 229). Ibid., p. 220.] An alliance between the two
Western Powers and Russia might, in given circumstances, on the one hand
encourage the party of _revanche_ and push the country into dangerous
adventures, and on the other tempt the war party in Germany to try again
some extreme course, as it had in 1875.

From this point of view Dilke regarded with suspicion and anxiety the
journeys of the King on the Continent after 1905, unaccompanied by a
Secretary of State according to the ancient constitutional practice, but
accompanied by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State from the Foreign
Office, a former Ambassador to St. Petersburg. This gave plausible
opportunities for encouraging the belief then prevalent in Germany that
some mysterious policy was being devised, outside the ordinary channels
of diplomacy and Parliamentary knowledge--a policy which, with the aid
of France and Russia, was to take the shape of encircling Germany with
enemies, and cutting her off from legitimate development. These
anxieties were stimulated by a considerable amount of foolish writing in
London newspapers, and still more foolish and unauthorized talk.

"France and Russia," he wrote in 1908, "are drawn together by
geographical considerations--given the detachment of French territory to
the benefit of Germany in 1871. It did not need the parade of an
alliance to cause Kings and statesmen to recognize the fact. War was
made impossible in 1875--the last occasion when the well-informed
thought renewed German attack on France probable--by the absolute
refusal of the German Emperor; but behind that refusal lay the certainty
that Russia would not forward the aims of the Prussian military party,
as she had done, for a consideration, in 1870. It is, perhaps, too
trivial a suggestion, but one which comes inevitably to the mind, that
the householder is apt to be friendly with the man who lives next door
but one, on account of their common dislike of their next-door
neighbour. During the 'reign of force,' still extant upon the Continent
of Europe, a more appropriate simile may be found in the proverbial
habit of each of two men, in a street fight, frightening his opponent by
recognition of a personage in the background. That Germany, however
ambitious, and however boastful of her military strength, should be
rendered nervous by the menace of Franco-Russian co-operation is a
consideration modified only by the universal recognition of the desire
of France for self-respecting peace. As soon as another Power is
suspected of any intention of making use of the Franco-Russian
co-operation for the purpose of isolating Germany, a dangerous situation
has arisen.

"We are so confident in our own profound knowledge of our wish for
European peace that we hardly realize the extreme danger for the
future which is caused by all suggestion that we have succeeded in
isolating Germany, or are striving to bring about that result. The
London articles written in violent support of a supposed alliance
did the harm; and to anyone who keeps touch for himself of
Continental opinion the harm was undoubted, and tended to produce
several undesirable results.

"There is a word to be addressed to those who believe that our navy
is our true defence, until the progress of pacific thought in the
working classes of all countries has rendered the other Powers as
peaceful as France. Those who crowed over the isolation of Germany
took the best means of increasing the German Fleet, and contributed
at the same time, by the proposed inflation of our expeditionary
force, to the weakening of the British Navy.

"The true explanation of the _entente_, and it needs no better, is
to be found in the defence of its essentially pacific nature by one
of its original authors, M. Delcasse. [Footnote: M. Delcasse had to
resign office in 1905, under German pressure, in connection with the
controversies about Morocco.] He had his faults as a Minister, and
on two occasions provoked alarms or dangers, which afterwards,
however, he did more than any other man to allay. Should
circumstances change and European war become likely, as it has not
in fact been likely since 1871, the basis for our alliances, if we
needs must have them, lies in our peaceful policy, our vigour, and
our fleet.

"Thanks to the alarm itself, which the harum-scarum articles
excited, prudence will once more gain control of our foreign
affairs. The _entente_ will continue: Italy, we may hope, will not
once more be scared out of her improved relations with Powers
outside the Triplice. Recent occurrences may be turned to useful
end, by courage in speaking out displayed by those who insist that a
policy, profoundly peaceful in fact, shall not be exposed to being
represented as directed against any one of the European Powers."

Italy, he believed--and events have justified the forecast--would be
compelled by the pressure of circumstances to leave the Triple Alliance.
How far Germany would be able to keep a permanent hold on Austria-
Hungary might also, he thought, be doubtful, as it would largely depend
on the developments of home issues in Austria itself, as to which
prophecy was always rash. Like other statesmen of an older school, he
still probably clung to the hope that the Dual Empire might yet be
gradually converted into a Federal State, in which the Slavonic
populations of the Empire would play a larger part and would not submit
to take marching orders from Berlin in regard to policy in the Balkans.
[Footnote: A short time before his death, in 1902, Lord Kimberley said
to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice: "If ever there is another Liberal
Government--which is perhaps doubtful--Grey or you, or both of you, may
have something to say to foreign affairs. Now, remember, there is on no
account to be any quarrelling with Austria. She has been the only steady
friend we have had in Europe--I mean since 1866. The Hungarians have
always been our friends. So, I repeat, _no quarrelling with Austria_. I
have said the same thing to Grey." (Notes communicated by Lord
Fitzmaurice). See, too, the opinion of M. Ribot, cited in Rene Henry's
_Questions d'Autriche-Hongrie_, pp. 176-178: "Quant a l'Autriche, nos
rapports avec elle ont toujours ete bons; ils ont ete pleins, non
seulement de courtoisie, mais de quelque chose de plus; parceque
l'Autriche sait que, de toutes les puissances europeennes, la France est
la derniere qui pourrait souhaiter que l'Empire d'Autriche, garantie
necessaire de l'equilibre europeen, se brisat et disparut pour le
malheur de l'Europe." (Speech in the Senate, March 11th, 1903). An
interesting collection of opinions on the development of Austria into a
federal State, and the probable results on the Balkan Peninsula, will be
found in the last chapter of the work of Dr. Aurel Popovici, _Die
Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich_ (Leipzig, 1906).]

Both in 1908 and 1909, in the debates on the Foreign Office Votes in the
House of Commons, Sir Charles had expressed apprehensions of the
development of Great Britain's _entente_ with Russia, in regard to
Persia, into something far more extensive, and therefore dangerous--into
something, in fact, very like an "alliance." He feared that in the
Bosnian question it had been pushed to extreme limits. The result, he
said, had been to lead to a diplomatic humiliation. He claimed also that
recent debates in the French Chamber, which had taken place at the time
of the fall of M. Clemenceau's Ministry in the later half of 1909,
showed that a large body of French opinion shared this view. [Footnote:
See, for a summary of these views, an article by Sir C. Dilke in the
_English Review_ of October, 1909, p. 495; and Hansard for 1908,
cxviii., 955-970; and for 1909, vol. viii., 621-635.]

With these preoccupations present to his mind he spoke on the last
occasion on which he addressed the House of Commons at any length on
foreign affairs--on July 22nd, 1909--when the policy of Sir Edward Grey
in regard to the final annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by
Austria-Hungary was discussed on the Foreign Office Vote. He attacked
this policy because it seemed to confirm the belief in the alleged
tendency of the Foreign Office to extend the Anglo-Russian arrangement
in regard to Persia into a general _entente_, with the probable result
of producing exactly the opposite of the result intended, and of thereby
strengthening the consolidation of the Central Powers. The diplomatic
admissions and confessions of Lord Salisbury, both before and at the
time of the Berlin Congress of 1878, had, he thought, made it difficult
for the Foreign Office to take any decided stand against the final
annexation, which the existing position had been certain to cause sooner
or later. Turkey and Servia both complained. He did not deny that the
Turkish Revolution brought about by the so-called "Young Turks," who
were the cause of the crisis in the Balkans, held out some possible
prospect of a future less hopeless than the previous state of things;
but this might have been conceded without expressing "unreserved
approval of a military pronouncement attended by a good deal of
hanging." Servia also, no doubt, might be said in some degree to
represent democratic principles upon the banks of the Danube; but he
thought it difficult to reconcile the expression before a rather cynical
Europe--and in very strong language, too--of our official horror at the
conduct of the Servians in the barbarous murder of their King and Queen,
with our joining Russia so very soon afterwards in a support of Servia
against Austria-Hungary too absolute even for French concurrence.

Lord Salisbury, he fully believed, had become acquainted in 1877, if not
before, with the substance of an agreement between Russia and Austria
which contemplated, amongst other things, the annexation by the latter
of the Provinces; and it was perfectly clear, from what passed at the
Berlin Congress, that in 1878, before the meeting, Lord Salisbury must
himself have concluded an engagement with Austria-Hungary, though the
word "annexation," no doubt, did not appear in it, and more general
terms probably were used, but containing no reservation, and promising
support to the Austrian policy in those Provinces. Technically the
engagement might have lapsed with the treaty, and probably it had; but
the fact remained, with its moral consequences. Meanwhile Lord
Beaconsfield had taken Cyprus from Turkey, and had given a greater shock
to Europe, by the form and the secrecy of the proceedings, than could
possibly attach to the recent unilateral action of Austria-Hungary.
During the proceedings at Berlin, it must also be remembered, Lord
Salisbury had practically promised Tunis to France. Turkish sovereignty
was technically, indeed, still maintained in Cyprus, as it also had been
for thirty years in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, [Footnote: See, on the
whole subject. Hanotaux, _La France Contemporaine_, vol. iv., pp. 314,
363-370; _Etudes Diplomatiques: La Politique de l'Equilibre_, by the
same author, p. 184. A secret clause was signed on July 13th, 1878, by
the Austro-Hungarian Plenipotentiaries, in which the occupation was
described as temporary and ordered to be the subject of a special
arrangement with Turkey. The secret clause was really made to save the
face of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries on their return to
Constantinople.] and as it was at that time in the Sudan; but at no time
did the Turks expect to see those territories again under their
effective sovereignty. Insistence on the letter of the treaty also
weakened our position in regard to Crete, where, as he had so frequently
contended, nobody could wish or believe the position made by the treaty
to be permanent. Lastly, he insisted that the policy into which we had
been drawn by M. Isvolski had been damaging to our interests, not only
because it had strengthened the ties between the members of the Triple
Alliance, but because it assisted the popularity in Germany of a naval
rivalry, which oppressed us with the cost of ever-increased armaments at
sea.

Sir Edward Grey, he went on to say, had taken for his text the
declaration of the London Conference of 1871 as to the denunciation by
Russia, in 1870, of the Black Sea clauses of the treaty of 1856. But
Russia got her way, and had practically been told she would get it on
the main question before the Conference met. When in 1885 Eastern
Roumelia was swallowed by Bulgaria, all the Great Powers theoretically
protested, but nothing came of their remonstrance. In 1886 Russia broke
the article of the treaty which related to the port of Batoum; and Lord
Rosebery, no doubt, wrote a despatch based on the same doctrine as that
now adopted by Sir Edward Grey. But Lord Rosebery at least avoided
introducing new matters. His final despatch concluded with the words:
"It must be for other Powers to judge how far they can acquiesce in this
breach of an international engagement." Russia again succeeded. Why,
then, have complicated the original issue in the present case by joining
with Russia and France, at the instigation of the former, in putting
forward suggestions to be considered at a European Conference for the
territorial expansion of Servia, if possible to the Adriatic, and in
regard to the Danube, that thorniest of diplomatic subjects? [Footnote:
"L'independance des bouches du Danube est pour nous un dogme" were the
words attributed to Count Andrassy in June, 1877 (Hanotaux, _La France
Contemporaine_, iv. 315). See, too, the opinion of Radetzki, quoted by
Rene Henry, _Questions d'Autriche-Hongrie_, p. 128.]

"Our action," Dilke argued, "in such matters ought to be, as it
generally is, to bring people together for public peace, and not to
interfere with matters where our interfering in details is certain to be
resented. Of course, there was more than this in the German resistance.
That resistance was always, I think, certain. It was certain to be
provoked by common action on the part of the three Powers in such
matters, but it was doubly caused by the indiscreet language used, not
by us, but by the Press, in support of the three Governments, and
officially in Russia. We heard talk about Russia having at last
completely joined two Western Powers in an anti-Austrian movement, and
articles headed 'Revelations of a New Triple Alliance' were calculated
to intensify opposition on the part of Austria and Germany.

"The net result has been a set-back, not so much for us as for our
supposed and suspected client, Servia. Servia has had her position
very much worsened by our interference on her behalf. It is
unfortunate that small Provinces in the Balkans should be in this
position, that when Powers who are not going to fight appear to take
up their cause against neighbouring Powers, however natural and wise
it may be in the abstract, the result is almost certain to be to
make their position worse; and undoubtedly there has been a set-
back, caused by us and Russia, to Servia. We have not even with us
our Mediterranean ally Italy, because Italy herself abstained from
supporting us in this matter, as she was bound to abstain under her
engagements. I therefore end this part of the matter by saying I
think we have set the doctrine of the sacredness of the Treaty of
Berlin, in the circumstances, too high. We have had two previous
examples of the risk of setting up that doctrine, and pressing it
too far, in such a case. We have tried to set it up on two previous
occasions, and have failed. The second of those two occasions, in
1886, is very clear. There was a distinct violation of an article of
the Treaty of Berlin, and of the protocol outside that article. Lord
Rosebery wrote a strong despatch with regard to that violation, and
he raised the same comparison of 1871 as we raised on this question,
but nothing happened. That is a very long time ago, and the Treaty
of Berlin has not become more sacrosanct since 1886 than it was at
that time, which was more near its conclusion. My main point is, we
have supported principles that we could not justifiably or wisely
support. If we had had any political or European idea behind us, any
idea of improving the conditions of peoples, or of giving greater
liberty to the peoples, the country would have been more inclined to
give support than it is on the mere bare doctrine of the sacredness
of a treaty. On the last occasion when these matters were discussed,
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a most brilliant
speech on the Naval Vote of Censure. In that speech he defended what
is very near the old doctrine of the balance of power in Europe. No
one will take exception to his statement of the effect of the
existing balance upon our position in Europe. The danger is now, as
it was 100 years ago, and still more 120 or 130 years ago, that you
may be tempted by these understandings, which are good, to convert
them into something very near, but not quite, an alliance, and to
pursue a policy in support of the balance of power which will keep
you in permanent hot water all round with everybody, and will risk
war."