The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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Crete was now again in a state of chronic rebellion against Turkish
rule; and Turkish methods of repression only stimulated the popular
demand to be joined to Greece. Sir Charles Dilke thought that, if the
Powers really wished to coerce Turkey to bring about better government
within its dominions, coercion could most safely begin in the Greek
islands, where European fleets could absolutely control the issue and no
question of Continental partition need arise. In Crete the Sultan could,
Sir Charles believed, have been compelled to accept a nominal
sovereignty, such as he retained over Cyprus; and the aspiration towards
Hellenic unity, the need for Hellenic expansion, might thus have been
satisfied.

If England had taken "instant and even isolated action," France would,
he thought, not have thwarted British policy. "The effect would
ultimately have been the addition of Crete to the Greek kingdom under
the auspices, perhaps, of all the Powers, perhaps of the Powers less
Germany, perhaps of only three or four of them." [Footnote: Ibid.]

The occasion was missed, and war, declared by Turkey against Greece,
followed, and years of anarchy in Crete. The Ministers of the Powers
"even in the free Parliaments of the United Kingdom and France" "used
pro-Turkish language," and attacked those who, because they upheld the
traditional Liberal policy of both countries, were accused of abetting
the Greeks.

"The blockade by the fleets of the Powers became pro-Turkish, and
Europe took sides against Greece in the war. If Greece had been
allowed to hold Crete, she could have exchanged it against Thessaly,
if the worst had come to the worst, without those financial
sacrifices which are now necessary. [Footnote: Such a proposal had
actually been made in 1881 by Prince Bismarck. _Life of Goschen_, i.
214; _Life of Granville_, ii. 226.] The very claim of the Powers to
have localized the war by stopping the Slav States from attacking
Turkey is in itself a claim to have interfered on one side."

When Greece was defeated, "the majority in the Parliament of the United
Kingdom, if not of the British people," Sir Charles wrote, "professed
that their burning sympathies for Greece had been destroyed by Greek
cowardice, although the stand, at Domoko, of ill-supplied young troops
against an overwhelmingly superior force of Turkish veterans deserved
fairer criticism." He interpreted his own duty differently, and when the
Hellenic cause was most unpopular he continued to express his faith in
the "rising nationalities of the Eastern Mediterranean," and looked
forward with confidence to a future in which Palmerston's generous
surrender of the Ionian Islands should be emulated by a new act of
Liberal statesmanship. "There can be little doubt that Cyprus, as a part
of a great scheme for strengthening the elements of the Eastern
Mediterranean that are hopeful for the future, will not be kept out of
the arrangement by any reluctance on the part of the United Kingdom to
let its inhabitants follow the tendencies of their race!" [Footnote: The
above Notes on Crete relate to the period when war broke out, in 1897,
between Greece and Turkey, and the Turks invaded Thessaly.]

"Oh for an hour of Canning or of Palmerston!" he said, at a great public
meeting in the North in October, 1898. "Canning was a Tory, a Tory
Foreign Secretary of State, a Tory Prime Minister, although at odds with
the Duke of Wellington upon some subjects. Lord Palmerston was looked
upon by many Radicals as a Whig, but in foreign affairs he had never
exhibited that carelessness and that absence of a willingness to run
risks for the sake of freedom which no doubt marred his conduct of home
affairs. Canning had seen the interest of Great Britain in maintaining
the Greek cause, as Palmerston had seen her interest in strengthening
Greece by allowing the Republic of the Ionian Isles, of which we had the
protectorate, to join her after the downfall of the Prince called by
Palmerston 'the spoilt child of autocracy, King Otho.' Canning had
consistently refused in circumstances of far greater difficulty and
danger than those which attended the Greek or Cretan questions in our
times, to be dragged at the heels of the great despotic Powers. Canning
resolved not only to assist the Greek cause, but in doing so to maintain
the superiority of British influence in the Eastern Mediterranean; and,
seeing the course which was clear in the interest of Europe and in our
own interest, he determined to settle the question in his own way, as he
at the same time settled that of South America to the immense advantage
of this country, which now had found in South America one of the best of
all markets for her trade. There never was a greater loss to England
than when Canning died as Prime Minister and was succeeded in office by
one of those fleeting figures who, in the language of Disraeli, were but
transient and embarrassed phantoms. [Footnote: Lord Goderich, Prime
Minister from August 8th, 1827, to January 8th, 1828.] The deeds of
Canning in the questions of Greece and South America, his regard at once
for liberty and for Britain, might be read in all the lives of that
great Minister, and what Palmerston did of the same kind in the case of
Italy was perfectly known."

In consequence of observations of this kind, he had to defend himself
more than once against the charge of "Jingoism," as the cant term of the
day had it; and more particularly in the debate on foreign policy on
June 10th, 1898, when it was made by an old political friend, Mr.
Leonard Courtney.

"I am one of those," Dilke replied, "who are in favour of large
armaments for this country, and believe in increasing the strength of
our defences for the sake of peace; and one of the very reasons why I
desire that is because I repudiate the idea of making our policy depend
upon the policy of others. I have always repudiated, and never ceased to
repudiate, the policy of grab which is commonly associated with the name
of Jingo.... I submit that the worst policy in these matters is to have
regard to our own rights only, and not to the rights of others. We want
our country to be viewed with that respect which men will ever cherish
for unbending integrity of purpose. We should be more scrupulous with
regard to asserting nominal rights which we do not intend to maintain.

"When such transactions are criticized, the Government always reply
by asking: 'Would you have gone to war at this or that particular
point, for this or that particular object?' It always appears to me
in these cases that there is some confusion in our minds about this
risk of war on such occasions. If the intention of the other Power
is to avoid war, war will be avoided when you quietly hold your own.
But if the intention of the other Power is war, there will be no
lack of pretexts to bring it about."

His policy, therefore, would have been to advance no claims but such as
could be made good, if need arose, by England's own carefully measured
resources in connection with those of France.

It was, however, impossible at this time to focus public attention upon
events in the Mediterranean, or even in the Nile Valley. The eyes of all
politicians alike were becoming fixed upon a different part of the
African continent.

Mr. Chamberlain had taken the Colonial Office in 1895, and it was in
reply to a short speech from Sir Charles Dilke during the brief Autumn
Session of that year that he expressed himself glad to outline his
general policy, and spoke of finding in the Colonies an undeveloped
estate, which he was determined to develop. His phrases caught the
popular imagination then as always. Colonial enterprise was the theme of
all pens and tongues. Then on New Year's Day of 1896 had come the
Jameson Raid. But in the stormy chapters of Parliamentary life which
followed Sir Charles took little part, beyond commending Mr.
Chamberlain's promptitude in condemning the Raid. The speech which he
made in the vote of censure on the colonial policy of Mr. Chamberlain,
moved on January 30th, 1900, as an amendment to the Address, by Lord
Edmond Fitzmaurice on behalf of the Opposition, was of an independent
character, dealing more with the military and naval aspects of the
position than those purely political. But, though standing rather apart
from the general line of attack, the speech was recognized as one of the
most weighty contributions to the debate, as it brought home to the
country on how dangerously narrow a margin of strength the policy of Mr.
Chamberlain rested, and how entirely it owed its success to the
maintenance of the navy of this country, which German Navy Bills were
about to threaten. Four years later, when the German naval preparations
were assuming a definite shape, he repeated these warnings in a still
more decisive manner by a speech which attracted great attention in
Germany itself, as well as at home. [Footnote: "Der fruehere
Unterstaatsecretaer des Auswaertigen, und sehr angesehene Sir Charles
Dilke, wies damals auf Deutschland bin und sagte: man vergroessere dort
die Flotte mit einer ausgewohnten Schnelligkeit und richte sich damit
oeffentlich gegen England." (Reventlow, p. 242).]

Sir Charles disapproved of the Boer War, [Footnote: "I am myself opposed
to the Milner policy, which led up to the South African War. But in
spite of the Natal events I do not share the opinion either that the war
itself will be a long one, or that foreign complications will arise."
("Risk of European Coalition," _Review of the Week_, November 4th,
1899).] but he held that when the country was seized by the war-fever
interposition was useless: it did more harm than good both at home and
abroad. Staying in Paris, in the early days of the contest, when we were
suffering and beaten for the moment, he told those who commiserated us
and threatened European complications to "wait and see," laughing at the
idea that England could be permanently at a disadvantage, but not
entering into the abstract merits of the question. If forced to speak,
he admitted that the war was "unwise," but his utterances were very few.
It, however, raised a general principle, inducing him to recall facts
which had been too frequently forgotten. The party which was now
opposing government by Chartered Company was, he said, the party which
had revived it in 1881 in the case of North Borneo; while the Tories,
who then had condemned that method of colonization, were now
enthusiastic for it. Sir Charles, who had opposed the system in regard
to Borneo, where it was attended by little danger, now pointed out that
not only had it produced the Jameson Raid in South Africa, but that on
the West Coast the Niger Company threatened to involve England in
differences with France by action which England could not control. These
were conclusive proofs that the principle which in 1881 he had resisted
to the point of seriously differing from his official chief was fraught
with inconvenience and dangers. The Niger Company's position, however,
was the affair of political specialists; South African policy was
embroiled with the fortunes of a gigantic gambling speculation.
[Footnote: This is recalled by a fact in Sir Charles's personal history.
His son became entitled on coming of age in September, 1895, to a legacy
of L1,000. Sir Charles offered him in lieu of that bequest 2,000
"Chartered South African shares." Had he accepted, he could, when the
legacy became due, 'have sold them for L17,000 and cleared L16,000
profit! But he refused them when offered, and,' says Dilke, 'not
thinking them things for a politician, I sold them, and (purposely) at a
loss.']

The Transvaal War destroyed whatever prospects there might have been of
a permanent understanding with Germany, and Mr. Chamberlain before the
war was over had to make at least one speech which brought on himself
the fiercest denunciations of the German Press, when he replied in
vigorous language to the charge of cruelty brought against the British
military authorities in Africa. The absolute mastery of the sea
possessed by Great Britain probably alone prevented the Emperor forcing
his Ministers into some imprudent act; and it was clearly seen that
Count von Buelow, who had succeeded Baron Marschall as Foreign Secretary
in June, 1897, and afterwards succeeded Prince Hohenlohe as Chancellor
in 1900, though not desiring a conflict, and convinced, as he has since
told the world, that none need come, was nevertheless less friendly than
his predecessors, and intended to pursue rigidly the policy of a free
hand with a strong navy behind it. [Footnote: Buelow, _Imperial Germany_
(English translation), p. 47. A later edition, with considerable
alterations and additions, was published in 1916.] Events were visibly
fighting on the side of those who saw that France was the only possible
ally of Great Britain, and that the only other alternative was, not an
alliance with Germany, but a return to the policy of "splendid
isolation." The apologist of Prince von Buelow has himself told the world
that the policy of an absolutely "free hand" now inaugurated by the new
Chancellor was evidently one, in itself, of great difficulty, because
Germany might frequently be compelled to change front; and, to use an
expression attributed to Bismarck, might have to "face about" until
friendship with this country became impossible. The prognostication was
soon to be justified. [Footnote: Reventlow, p. 159.]

It was perhaps the decisive moment in the relations of Great Britain and
Germany, when Count von Buelow, with the ink hardly dry on the Anglo-
German treaty of October, 1900, which was supposed to be intended to
protect China against further Russian advances on the north, cynically
went out of his way to make a statement in the German Parliament that
the treaty did not apply to Manchuria. The reply of the British
Government was the Anglo-Japanese treaty of February 11th, 1902.
[Footnote: Reventlow (_German Foreign Policy_, 1888-1914) speaks of this
incident as the "Wendepunkt der Britischen Politik und der Deutsch-
Englischen Beziehungen." (p. 168). See, too, Berard, _La Revolte de
l'Asie_, pp. 192-194, 208, 209, 293.]

In February, 1901, a typical article from Sir Charles's pen appeared in
the _Figaro_, strongly urging the absolute necessity for the creation of
really cordial relations between Great Britain and France, which he
considered were the sure and sufficient guarantee of European peace. It
was true, no doubt, that the increasing strength and efficiency of the
French army were a guarantee, up to a certain point, of peace with
Germany, just as the weakness of the French army had been an active
temptation to Germany in 1870 to attack France. The joint action of the
Powers in China at the moment was also itself a sign of improved
relations. Nevertheless, as Moltke had said, Germany would remain armed
for half a century after 1870, if she intended, as she did intend, to
keep Alsace-Lorraine; and as Europe had for the present to remain an
armed camp, more could hardly be hoped than to maintain peace, however
burdensome the cost. Europe, Sir Charles urged, should try to realize
that a great war would probably be fatal, whoever might be the victor,
to her commercial world-supremacy--as the great and ruinous burdens,
which would everywhere result, would surely cause that supremacy to pass
to America. There the development of the resources, not of the United
States only, but also of the Argentine Confederation, ought to give
pause to those who did not look beyond the immediate future and seemed
unable to realize that a Europe laden with all the effects of some
gigantic struggle would prove a weak competitor with the New World on
the other side of the Atlantic. To remind Frenchmen that the English
have not always been victorious in war was no very difficult task; but
he ventured to remind Englishmen also that, as the English army was
quite inadequate to take a large part in a Continental war under the
changed conditions of modern warfare, Great Britain and France, while
united, should more than ever walk warily, and distrust the counsels of
those who occasionally in Great Britain spoke lightly of war. It was
easy to talk about the victories of Marlborough and Wellington; but the
military history of England was really a very chequered one, and of this
Englishmen were, unfortunately, mostly unaware. Our military prestige
had never been great in the commencement of our wars, and, as he had
said in the recent debates on the Boer War, [Footnote: House of Commons,
February 1st, 1900] we had too often had to "muddle through." On more
than one occasion--in America, for example, during the Seven Years' War,
and more recently in New Zealand--we had only been got out of our
difficulties by the help of our own colonists. Here at least was a great
future source of as yet undeveloped strength. The disastrous Walcheren
Expedition was on record; even Wellington had had to retire over and
over again in the earlier period of the Peninsular War; in the Crimea we
had not shown any great military quality beyond the bravery of our
troops. These were truths, unpalatable truths, but they had to be
uttered, if on the one hand the cause of army reform in Great Britain
was to prosper, and if on the other France was not to reckon too much on
the assistance of a British army on the Continent of Europe, especially
in the earlier stages of a war. [Footnote: _Figaro_, February 11th,
1901.]

In a cordial understanding with France, therefore, Sir Charles Dilke
considered to lie the sheet-anchor of British foreign policy and the
best guarantee of peace. In 1898 the arrival of the French force at
Fashoda, on the Nile, had brought things to a crisis, and the firm
attitude then adopted by Lord Salisbury at length convinced France, as
Sir Charles always believed it would, that she must make her choice
between Germany and Great Britain. In the action of Lord Lansdowne, who
had succeeded Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office in 1900, and in the
policy eventually embodied in the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, Sir
Charles recognized the views which persistently, but not always
successfully, he had urged for many years on his own friends in France
and England. But the new departure was only rendered possible by the
appearance at the French Foreign Office of a statesman who, after the
bitter experience of the final failure of the policy of "pin-pricks"
before Lord Salisbury's firm stand in the Fashoda affair, boldly threw
his predecessors overboard, and managed to make himself the inevitable
Foreign Minister of France for a long period of years, successfully
maintaining himself in office against every competitor and every rival,
while other Ministers came and went. Late, perhaps too late, the policy
of Gambetta was revived by M. Delcasse, and it held its own.

By 1903, owing to the complete change in the attitude of France, matters
had so much improved as between England and the Republic that Sir
Charles could write in the _Empire Review_ of "An Arrangement with
France" as possible, basing himself on recent articles in _La Depeche
Coloniale_, which had been the extreme anti-British organ. "That the
French colonial party should have come frankly to express the desire
which they now entertain for an arrangement of all pending questions
between the English and the French is indeed a return towards relations
better than any which have existed since Gambetta's fall from power."
But this improvement in the relations of the two countries was
materially aided by the influence of the personality of King Edward
VII., which Sir Charles fully recognized, as he also did one of the
consequences, which was perhaps not so fully seen by others. "The wearer
of the crown of England plays in foreign affairs," he wrote, "a part
more personal than in other matters is that of the constitutional King.
No one can deny that there are advantages, and no one can pretend that
there are never drawbacks, attendant on this system. It is not my
purpose to discuss it, but it makes the adoption in this country of
control by a Parliamentary Committee difficult, if not impossible."
[Footnote: _English Review_, October, 1909. Article by Sir C. Dilke.]
"The great and sudden improvement in the relations between the
English-speaking world and France is largely due to the wisdom and
courtesy with which the King made clear to France that there was no
ground for the suspicions which prevailed."

[Footnote: _Quarterly Review_, July, 1905, p. 313. Article by Sir C.
Dilke. With France Sir Charles had for the moment again a certain
official relation, having been placed on the Royal Commission charged
with British interests at the Paris Exhibition--an honour due to him not
only in his own right, but as his father's son. At this moment also,
when relations between the neighbouring countries were severely
strained, he gave to the Luxembourg the reversion of Gambetta's
portrait, and sent the portrait itself to be placed among the works of
Legros on exhibition in June, 1900. M. Leonce Benedez, curator of the
Luxembourg, in writing to press for the chance of exhibiting the
picture, said:

"Je m'excuse vivement de mon importunite, mais je serais tres
desireux que notre public peut etre admis a juger Legros sur cette
belle oeuvre. De plus, je serais, en meme temps, tres heureux que
les amis de votre grande nation, plus nombreux que la sottise de
quelques journalistes ne voudrait le laisser croire, fussent a meme
d'apprecier la pensee elevee et delicate de l'illustre homme d'etat
anglais qui, au milieu des circonstances presentes, a tenu a donner
a notre pays une marque si touchante de sympathie en lui offrant le
portrait d'un de ses plus glorieux serviteurs."

The exhibition drew Sir Charles and Lady Dilke for a summer visit to
Paris, and it was during this visit that the sculptor Roty executed his
medallion of Sir Charles.]

But wisdom and courtesy were not a little aided by the royal habit of
mixing easily with men at home and abroad, just as, on the other hand,
the long retirement of Queen Victoria had been injurious in an opposite
direction. This feeling finds expression in the fragment of commentary
in which Sir Charles dealt with the change of Sovereigns:

'The Accession Council after the Queen's death was a curious comment
on history. History will tell that Victoria's death plunged the
Empire into mourning, and that favourable opinion is more general of
her than of her successor. Yet the Accession Council, attended
almost solely by those who had reached power under her reign, was a
meeting of men with a load off them. Had the King died in 1902, the
Accession Council of his successor would not have been thus gay;
there would have been real sorrow.'

Sir Charles thought hopefully of the situation at this moment, and there
is a letter dated as far back as 1900 in which Mr. Hyndman noted the
"unusual experience" of finding an Englishman who took a more favourable
view of France than he himself, and expressed his fear that Sir Charles
underrated "the strength of the National party." [Footnote: How well he
understood France may perhaps best be judged by an article written, at
the desire of M. Labori, for the _Grande Revue_ in December, 1901. It is
called "Torpeur Republicaine," and begins with the observation that
English Radicals are tempted to think French Republicans more
reactionary than any English Tories, for the reason that all English
parties had practically, if not in theory, accepted municipal Socialism.
"In France," he said, "the electors of certain cities return Socialist
municipal councils. They are all but absolutely powerless. We, on the
other hand, elect Tory or Whig municipalities, and they do the best of
Socialist work."] But, notwithstanding the alliance of France with
Russia, the action of Russia in the Far East in the period covered by
the events which ended in the Japanese War had not diminished Sir
Charles's rooted dislike of any idea of _entente_ or alliance between
Russia and Great Britain. He considered that Sir Edward Grey meant to be
Foreign Secretary in the next Liberal Government, and was intent on
making an arrangement or alliance with Russia to which he would
subordinate every other consideration. "Grey," he wrote early in 1905 to
Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, "has always favoured the deal with Russia. I
hope I may be able to stay outside the next Government to kill it, which
I would do if outside, not within. This," he said, alluding to the
recent death of Lady Dilke, "assumes that I regain an interest in
affairs which I have wholly lost. I am well, but can at present think of
nothing but of the great person who is gone from my side." [Footnote:
February 2nd, 1905.] At this time the old controversy was again raging,
both at home and in India, over the question of the defence of the
North-Western Frontier of India; and a recent Governor-General and his
Commander-in-Chief in India, it was believed, had not altogether seen
eye to eye. The latter was credited with very extensive views as to the
necessity of an increase in the number of British troops, with a view to
the defence of the frontier against Russian attack. Sir Charles put
neither the danger of a Russian invasion nor the general strength of
Russia as a military nation so high as did some who claimed to speak
with authority; and he did not believe that we had any reason for
constant fear in India or elsewhere, or to seek alliances, in order to
avoid a Russian attack on India. The vulnerability of Russia on the
Pacific, which he had always pointed to, was demonstrated in the
Japanese War; as well as the miserable military administration of
Russia, which he had indicated thirty-eight years before as a permanent
source of weakness, certain to be exposed whenever Russia undertook
operations on a large scale at any great distance from her base.
[Footnote: In _Greater Britain_, ii. 299-312.] The Japanese alliance, he
believed, could never be directly utilized for resisting in Afghanistan
an attack by Russia on India. Happily, as he considered, the facts had
demonstrated that there was no need for such a display of timidity as
would be involved in marching foreign troops across India to defend it
on the frontier. [Footnote: _Monthly Review_, December, 1905. It is to
be observed that this argument does not involve any criticism of the
Anglo-Japanese Treaty considered as a defensive measure elsewhere.]