The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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Year after year he persevered in the effort to counteract the tendency
to exaggerate the importance of military schemes and military
expenditure, especially upon troops not fully trained and not kept ready
for action abroad, and to point out that the effect of such schemes
could not but be to reduce the amount of attention and of money devoted
to the navy. In 1904 (March 1st) he had said:

"It was an extraordinary fact that, in all calculations on the
subject of the expenditure of the army, the cost of the army outside
the United Kingdom was never taken into account. We were spending
vastly more upon the land services than we were upon our naval
services, and so long as that was so he confessed that he should
view with more than indulgence what was called the extravagant
policy in regard to the navy."

In 1907 (March 5th) he expressed his disapproval of the sweeping change
by which the defence of ports by submarine mines had been abolished.
"Newcastle had been defended by means of an admirable system of
submarine mines which had no equal in the world. So good was it that the
volunteer submarine miners of the Tyne division were employed to do the
laying of electric mines at Portsmouth and other naval ports. Newcastle
was now without that defence." He explained that these mines, which had
cost a million, had been sold. Had they fetched L50,000? He was not
content with Mr. Haldane's account of the steps taken to prepare for
defence against possible raid. On this subject, writing for the _United
Service Magazine_ of May, 1908, a paper entitled "Strong at all Points,"
which enforced his view of the supreme importance of the navy, he said:

"The provision for time of war, after complete mobilization of the
Territorial army, may be perfect upon paper; but the real question
is, how to obtain the manning of the quick-firing guns, say on the
Tyne, in time of political complication, by trained men, who sleep
by the guns and are able to use them when awakened suddenly in the
dead of night."

In the discussion of the estimates of July 31st, 1907, he said that,
"bearing in mind the enormous importance in naval matters of a steady
policy, he should resist any reduction that might be moved." On the same
occasion he pointed out that, "if there was any danger from Germany, it
was not the danger of invasion or from the fleet, but it was her growing
superiority in the scientific equipment of her people." Yet he declined
to encourage panic, and in the debate of March 22nd, 1909, when the
Opposition moved a vote of censure because of a supposed unforeseen
start gained by Germany in shipbuilding, pointed out the reasons for not
indulging in a scare.

Dilke closely watched the new developments in armament and construction,
and from time to time pressed them upon the attention of the Government.
As early as 1901, in an article reviewing the progress of war in the
nineteenth century, he had said: "The greatest change in the
battlefields of the future, as compared with those of a few years ago,
will be found in the developments and increased strength of the
artillery." In 1907, in the debate on the Navy estimates, he suggested
that "the reserve of guns was a matter which needed the utmost
diligence." Docks, he thought, were proportionately more important than
battleships. In 1907 (April 25th) he said: "A base was needed east of
Dover--Rosyth or Chatham: he need not suggest or criticize the spot that
should be chosen. Whether the Hague Conference prohibited floating mines
or not, they would be used; and that being so, they must contemplate
either the extension of Chatham or the creation of an establishment at a
different point of the east coast." To this subject he repeatedly
returned. In 1908 (March 3rd): "The necessity for a large establishment
in a safer place than the Channel had been raised for many years, and
was fully recognized when Rosyth was brought before them. Both parties
had shirked the expenditure which both declared necessary." On March
10th: "There were important works, docks and basins in which big ships
could be accommodated, and these by universal admission should be made
as rapidly as possible. Big ships were worse than useless if there was
no dock or basin accommodation for them.... The limited instalment of
one dock and one basin contemplated was only to be completed in eleven
years. He believed that was bad economy.... The need for this
expenditure had long been foreseen." Again, in 1909, on July 1st, he
pointed out that the Governments of both parties had shirked the
expenditure on Rosyth, of which the need had been known as early as
1902. The delay had been enormously grave. The report which contained
the whole scheme had been presented to Parliament in January, 1902; the
land had been bought in 1903, and the contract was made only in March,
1909.

Sir Charles's command of detail made his hearers apt to suppose that he
was mainly concerned with technical matters. But no impression could be
farther from the truth. Never for a moment did he lose sight of the
large issues, and of the purpose to which all measures of naval and
military preparation are directed. It was to the large issues that his
last important Parliamentary speech on the subject of defence was
directed.

"We talk a little," he said on March 7th, 1910, "about the possibility
of invasion when we talk of our Territorial army, but we do not--the
overwhelming majority of us--believe the country is open to invasion, or
that the fleet has fallen off in its power of doing its duty as compared
with days past.... No one of us who is prepared to pay his part, and to
call upon others to pay their part, to keep the fleet up to the highest
standard of efficiency and safety which we at present enjoy--no one of
us ought to be prepared to run the Territorial army on this occasion as
though it were the main and most costly portion of the estimates that
are put before the House. The Territorial army is defensible as the
Volunteers were defensible. It is an improvement on the volunteer
system, and it might have been made without the statute on which it is
based, but that it will add an enormous expenditure to our army is not
the case. Our Territorial army, in fact, cannot be kept in view as the
first object which we have to consider in the course of these
debates.... It is supposed to be the one certain result of the last
General Election that there is a large majority in favour of maintaining
our naval position; but we cannot maintain that naval position without
straining every nerve to do it, and we shall not be able to put all our
energy into maintaining that position if we talk about invasion, and
tell the people of this country that the fleet cannot do its duty.... If
you put the doctrine of invasion so high, and if you tell them that in
any degree their safety depends upon the Territorial army trained and
serving here at home, then you run a great risk of compromising your
naval defence and taking money out of one pocket and putting it into
another, and of being weak at both points, and creating a Territorial
army which could not face a great Continental force landed on our
shores, and at the same time detracting from the power of your fleet....
The Territorial army, like the Volunteers, is really defended by most of
us, in our hearts if not in our speech, as a reserve of the regular,
expeditionary, offensive army for fighting across the seas.... My right
hon. friend Mr. Haldane has always maintained the view that your army
and army expenditure must depend upon policy. It is no good fighting
him; he has both Houses of Parliament and both parties in his pocket. He
is a man of legions political as well as military. The school
represented by myself and the dominant school represented by him have
differed, not upon the question of policy dictating your armaments, but
upon the question of how your policy and your armaments together would
work out."

Sir Charles Dilke's last utterance on defence was a review of Sir
Cyprian Bridge's _Sea-Power, and Other Studies_, in July, 1910. It was a
plea for reliance upon the navy to prevent invasion and upon a mobile
military force for a counter-stroke. "I confess," Dilke ended, "that, as
one interested in complete efficiency rather than especially in economy
to the national purse, I join Sir Cyprian Bridge in asking to be shown,
at least, the mobile, efficient, regular force ready for immediate
service across the seas."

In the effort of a quarter of a century to have his country prepared for
the struggle which was to come Dilke was associated with others, many of
them conspicuous for knowledge and zeal; the services of Arnold-Forster,
of John and Philip Colomb, and of Chesney, have been too little
appreciated by their countrymen. Of their common endeavour Dilke was the
chief exponent. At every stage of the movement his was its most
characteristic and most comprehensive expression, marking the central
line of thought. Some of the dominant ideas were his own. From him came
the conception of defence as not merely national but imperial. He first
pointed out the true function of the Prime Minister in relation to it.
The actual development proceeded along the lines which he drew--a strong
navy; a general staff at the War Office; a regular army of first-rate
quality, that could be sent abroad at short notice, most likely for the
defence of Belgium against attacks from Germany; expansion to be sought,
in the first instance, from the numbers furnished by the volunteer
system. There were points which he failed to carry--the provision of
arms and ammunition for the multitude of soldiers who would be
forthcoming from the Empire, as well as of that modern artillery which
must play so great a part in a future campaign; the search for generals
capable of command in war; the enforcement of the responsibility of
Ministers for preparations neglected. What was accomplished and what was
left undone give the measure of Sir Charles Dilke as the statesman of
Imperial Defence.

APPENDIX I

'"_December 21st_, 1893.

'"Dear Mr. Balfour,

'"I have been thinking over the matter which you mentioned in the
tea-room yesterday. I am absolutely convinced of your own detachment
from party in connection with it, and I write as one not likely at
any time to act generally in connection with your party, unless in
the (I hope most improbable) event of doubtful or unfortunate war.

'"The suggestion that I am inclined to make is that a letter should
be written, to be signed by Sir George Chesney as a Conservative, by
myself as a Gladstonian Liberal, by Arnold-Forster as a Liberal
Unionist, and Spenser Wilkinson as a civilian expert, to Mr.
Gladstone as Prime Minister, you and Chamberlain as leaders of your
parties in the House of Commons, and Lord Salisbury and the Duke of
Devonshire as leaders of the same parties in the House of Lords;
that a copy should be sent by me confidentially to the Prince of
Wales, it not being right, of course, that we should in any way
address the Queen; that this letter should not be made public either
at the time or later; that this letter should press for the joint
consideration of the naval and military problem, and should point to
the creation of a Defence Ministry, of which the War Office and the
Admiralty would be the branches, or to a more active control of the
Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty by
the Prime Minister personally. We should be put in our places by Mr.
Gladstone, but I fancy, probably, not by the other four.

'"I had sooner discuss this matter first with you, if you think
there is anything in it, than with Chamberlain, because he is, oddly
enough, a much stronger party man than you are, and would be less
inclined (on account of national objects which to him are
predominant) to keep party out of his mind in connection with it. I
have not, therefore, as yet mentioned the matter to him. If you
think ill of the whole suggestion, and are not even disposed to
suggest modification of it, it can be stopped at the present point.

'"The addition of Spenser Wilkinson to a member of each party is
because I owe to him the clearing of my own mind, and believe that
he is probably the best man on such questions who ever lived, except
Clausewitz. When I first wrote upon them in _The Present Position of
European Politics_ in 1886-87, and in _The British Army_ in 1887-88,
I was in a fog--seeing the existing evils, but not clearly seeing
the way out. In the Defence chapter of _Problems of Greater Britain_
I began to see my way. Admiral Colomb, and Thursfield of _The
Times_, who are really expositors of the application to our naval
position of the general principles of military strategy of
Clausewitz, helped me by their writings to find a road. I then set
to work with Spenser Wilkinson, whose leaders in the _Manchester
Guardian_ (which he has now quitted, except as an amateur) struck me
as being perfect, to think out the whole question; and we succeeded,
by means of a little book we wrote together--_Imperial Defence_,
published in February, 1892--in afterwards procuring the agreement
of Lord Roberts in views widely different in many points from those
which Lord Roberts had previously held. We are now in the position
of being able to declare that in naval particulars there is no
difference of opinion among the experts, and that in military there
is so little upon points of importance that the experts are
virtually agreed. This is a great point, never reached before last
year, and it is owing to Spenser Wilkinson, and in a less degree to
Arnold-Forster, that it has been reached.

'"The question of the length at which the proposed letter should
develop the existing dangers and the remedies is, of course,
secondary.

'"The dangers are much greater than even the alarmist section of the
public supposes. For example, the public have not in the least
grasped the fact that we were on the brink of war with France at the
moment of the Siam blockade, nor have they realized the great risk
of the fall of the monarchy in Italy and of a complete change in
Italian policy, leading more or less rapidly to an alliance with
France and Russia. The adoption of Lefevre's policy by the Liberal
party, which is possible at any time, and the announcement that we
do not hope to hold the Mediterranean, might attach to the Franco-
Russian combination even the present advisers of King Humbert.

'"With regard to Siam, neither the English nor the French Government
dare publish the despatches which passed about the blockade, and
they have not been able to come to an agreement as to what portion
of the papers should be published, although both Governments have
long since promised publication. The words used in the House of
Commons by Sir Edward Grey were altered by the French Government
into meaningless words, and the words actually used excluded by
Governmental action from every newspaper in France."'

[Footnote: On December 25th, 1913, M. d'Estournelles de Constant
wrote to the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ an article warning Europe against
the chance of war breaking out, not because it is desired, but "by
chance, by mistake, by stupidity," and he cited an instance from his
experiences in 1893:

"The stage was Siam, where British India and French Indo-China were
seeking to push, one against the other, their rival spheres of
influence. Lord Dufferin, British Ambassador in Paris and ex-Viceroy
of India, was upholding the British claim, but it was in London that
the negotiations were carried on. The irreparable conflict broke out
on the day when the French Admiral, the bearer of an ultimatum,
anchored his ships in the very river of Bangkok. I was negotiating,
but during this time the British Government telegraphed to the
Admiral commanding the Pacific station to proceed also to Bangkok
with his whole fleet, which was far superior in numbers to ours.

"I knew nothing about it; no one knew anything about it. I was
negotiating, and it was war almost to a certainty without anybody
suspecting it. I only knew this later. Happily, wireless telegraphy
did not then exist, and the orders of the Admiralty did not reach in
time the British squadron, which was then sailing somewhere in the
Pacific. Thanks to this chance delay, the negotiations had time to
come to a successful conclusion, and the agreement was concluded."]

On the same day Dilke received the following reply:

"I shall be most pleased to have a further conversation with you on
the all-important subject on which we had a brief talk yesterday,
and which is dealt with in your letter of to-day.

"I should like, however, to discuss the matter first with Lord
Salisbury (whom I shall see to-morrow), and, if you will allow me,
to show him your letter.

"I may, however, say at once that I have _always_ been in favour of
a Defence Committee of Cabinet, with expert advisers and permanent
records carrying on the work from Government to Government; and
that, oddly enough, I pressed the idea on Asquith last week. I think
he and Rosebery would be in favour of the plan; not so the older
members of the Cabinet."

'On Friday, January 5th, 1894, I had a long interview with Balfour
upon my letter, and wrote on it to Wilkinson as follows:

'"_Confidential_.

'"76, Sloane Street, S.W.,
'"_January_ 5_th_, 1894.

'"Dear Wilkinson,

'"I saw Balfour (in a full discussion) this afternoon. We
provisionally agreed, with Lord Salisbury's consent, that Sir George
Chesney, Arnold-Forster (if he agrees), you, and I, should sign a
letter which we should address (with the view to publishing it with
the replies) to Mr. Gladstone as Prime Minister and leader of my
party, to Lord Salisbury and to Balfour as leaders of Sir George
Chesney's party, and to the Duke of Devonshire and Chamberlain as
leaders of Arnold-Forster's party, and of which I should privately
send a copy to the Prince of Wales in the hope of its reaching the
Queen. In this letter we should press for the joint consideration of
the naval and military problem, and point either to the creation of
a Defence Ministry, of which the War Office and Admiralty would be
the branches--to which the objection is that Parliamentary consent
would be necessary--or to a more active control over the Secretary
of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty, and their
Estimates, by the Prime Minister personally, or to that which is
Balfour's own scheme and which has the support, among our people, of
Rosebery and Asquith: the creation of a Defence Committee of the
Cabinet, ordinarily to consist of the Prime Minister, of the leader
of the other House, of the Secretary of State for War, the First
Lord, and (doubtless) the Chancellor of the Exchequer (?), with
expert advisers and permanent records which would carry on their
work from Government to Government. Mr. Gladstone would snub us. The
other four would not, and our proposal (that is, our third proposal,
which is Balfour's) would probably be adopted when the Conservatives
came in, and continued by the Liberals.

'"Balfour would be very willing to express his favourable opinion of
our view in debate in the House of Commons, should we raise one next
Session, and Lord Salisbury is less inclined to make a strong and
distinctly favourable reply to our letter than is Balfour.

'"Balfour would go more willingly, if possible, than he does into
the schemes if he could see his way beforehand to the saving of
money on the army for the purpose of devoting it to the navy. He
says that he himself cannot put his finger on the waste which he
knows must exist, that Buller has to some extent his confidence and
tells him that there is none, although Balfour is not convinced by
this. We discussed our Indian army scheme, to which he sees no
objection, and (very fully) the Duke of Cambridge and the extent to
which he will be supported by the Queen.

'"Balfour sees immense difficulty in the absence of a sufficiently
commanding expert, and in the consequent jealousy between the
Admiralty and War Office officials.

'"Will the letter which Sir George Chesney has do as a base, or
would it be better to write a shorter and a fresh letter? If the
latter, will you try your hand at it, if you approve? And after
noting this will you return it to me, that I may send it to Sir
George Chesney and then to Arnold-Forster?

'"Balfour had in reading _us_ [Footnote: "Us" refers to the joint
work on Imperial Defence. One of the recommendations was to
substitute marines for soldiers in the small garrisons, such as
Bermuda.] asked questions through George Hamilton, who agrees with
us, on the point of further employment of marines, and has been told
that they would be sadly costly.

'"Yours very truly,
'"Charles W. Dilke."'

APPENDIX II

In reply to the joint letter, Chamberlain wrote to Dilke:

"I have received the interesting paper on the subject of National
Defence which you have communicated to me on behalf of yourself and
the other signatories. One of the greatest difficulties which any
politician must feel in dealing with this question has been the
apparent difference of opinion among those best qualified to speak
authoritatively on the subject, and it is an important advance to
find practical proposals agreed to by some of those who have given
special study to the problems involved. Without venturing at the
present state of the inquiry to commit myself to any specific
proposal, I may say that I am favourably inclined to the main lines
laid down in your paper--namely, the closer union between the two
great departments of national defence, and the recognition of the
responsibility of the professional advisers of the Cabinet on all
questions of military and naval provision and administration."

Mr. Balfour wrote:

"I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 12th,
dealing with certain very important points connected with the
problem of National Defence. Though it would be inopportune for me
to pass any detailed judgment upon the scheme which you have laid
before me in outline, and though it is evident that difficulties of
a serious kind must attend any effort to carry out so important a
change in our traditional methods of dealing with the Admiralty and
the War Office, I may yet be permitted to express my own conviction
that the evils that you indicate are real evils, and that the
imperfections in our existing system, on which you insist, might
under certain not impossible contingencies seriously imperil our
most important national interests.

"That four gentlemen of different training, belonging to different
parties in the State, approaching this subject from different points
of view, and having little, perhaps, in common except a very
intimate knowledge of the questions connected with National Defence,
should be in entire agreement as to the general lines along which
future reformation should proceed, is a fact of which the public
will doubtless take note, and which is not likely to be ignored by
those responsible for the preservation of the Empire."

'Our letter was in all the papers about February 28th (1894), with
replies from Balfour and Chamberlain. Mr. Gladstone's reply, written
just before he resigned, was in his own hand, and more than usually
legible. Though it was not marked "Private," I did not print it, as
it seemed too personal and playful. It meant that he had resigned,
but I did not know this till an hour after I had received it:

'"You will forgive my pleading eyesight, which demanded the help of
others and thereby retarded operations, as an excuse for my having
failed to acknowledge the paper on Naval Defence which you were so
good as to send me. You will, I fear, find me a less interesting
correspondent than some who have replied at length, for I fear I
ought to confine myself to assuring you that I have taken care it
should come to the notice of my colleagues."

'On March 9th I sat near to Asquith at a dinner, and he told me that
his Defence Committee of the Cabinet, favoured by Balfour and
Rosebery, would soon be "a fact." The decision was made known in a
debate which I raised on the 16th.'