The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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In the new Ministry formed by Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister, Mr.
Balfour became First Lord of the Treasury and Leader of the House of
Commons, Lord Lansdowne Secretary of State for War, Mr. Brodrick
Under-Secretary of State for War, and Mr. Goschen First Lord of the
Admiralty. The first act of the new Government was to remodel the
general arrangements for national and imperial defence. The scheme was
described in general terms by Lord Lansdowne in the House of Lords on
August 26th, and more specifically by Mr. Brodrick in the House of
Commons on August 31st. There was to be a Defence Committee of the
Cabinet under the presidency of the Duke of Devonshire. Mr. Brodrick's
words implied that the creation of this body was due to the action of
Sir Charles Dilke, who, in the debate on the Address, had again urged
his views on this subject.

Of the army Lord Wolseley was to be the new Commander-in-Chief. But,
instead of being at the head of the military departments of the War
Office, he was to have charge only of the intelligence and mobilization
departments, and to be the President of an Army Board of which the other
members were to be the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the
Director of Artillery, and the Inspector-General of Fortifications, each
of whom was to be directly responsible for his own department to the
Secretary of State. "The main principle of the change," said Mr.
Brodrick, "is the separate responsibility of the military heads of
departments to the Secretary of State for their departments, and the
focussing of military opinion by means of the Army Board presided over
by the Commander-in-Chief." When Mr. Brodrick had finished his
statement, Dilke immediately rose and said that

"he had listened to the statement with something like dismay, for
some of the changes made had been in his view entirely in the wrong
direction.... There certainly had not been, during the many years he
had been in the House, any debate in which the issues presented to
the House had been so momentous.... To that portion of the
Government's scheme which involved the position of the Duke of
Devonshire in relation to Imperial defence he was fully favourable.
He believed he was the original suggester of the proposal in 1888.
What had been said by the Undersecretary went to suggest the
creation of a Committee of the Cabinet only, which had been formed,
they were told, by the late Government. If so, the matter was
minimized, and there was less security given to the country than
they had hoped. The first thing to be secured was that there should
be the individual responsibility of one great member of the Cabinet
rather than the collective responsibility of a considerable number.

"In regard to the reorganization of the War Office itself, he viewed
with dismay the further explanations given to-day by the
Under-Secretary. What had been the main objection to the past
management of the army in this country? It had been that
responsibility had been frittered away among a great number of
different Boards.... He hoped that the new man chosen to be the head
of the army would be in practice the real head of the army and the
real adviser of the Secretary of State. What he feared they were
doing was to create a copy of the Admiralty in those particular
points in which the Admiralty itself had been the subject of
criticism.... The Government, he contended, ought to recommend the
one man, the Commander-in-Chief, and in the first instance take his
opinion and regard him as ultimately responsible. Having picked out
the most competent man, he hoped the Government would put the
arrangement under that man and not under the civilian Secretary of
State.... It was a mistake to give the Commander-in-Chief a
department; he ought to be above the departments, and the
departments ought to report to him. He had ventured for many years
to ask in the first place that the Cabinet should consider the whole
problem of Imperial defence, and in the second place that they
should pick out the best man and trust him."

In reply to Dilke, Mr. Balfour said:

"If you put the Secretary of State for War in direct communication
with the Commander-in-Chief alone, I do not see how the Secretary of
State for War can be anything else than the administrative puppet of
the great soldier who is at the head of the army. He may come down
to the House and express the views of that great officer; but if he
is to take official advice from the Commander-in-Chief alone, it is
absolutely impossible that the Secretary of State should be really
responsible, and in this House the Secretary of State will be no
more than the mouthpiece of the Commander-in-Chief. It seems to me
that the differences in this branch of the subject between the right
hon. gentleman (Sir Charles Dilke) and the Government are of a more
fundamental character than I anticipated."

The difference was indeed fundamental, for Dilke was thinking about war,
and Mr. Balfour was thinking only of Ministerial responsibility. In case
of a war in which the welfare, possibly the independence, of the nation
would be at stake, what civilian Secretary of State would wish to be
personally responsible for victory or defeat, or to be more than the
mouthpiece of a great soldier at the head of the army?

The Commander-in-Chief had been a military officer whose function was to
co-ordinate the work of the heads of the several military departments.
The change made in 1895 transferred to the Secretary of State this duty
previously performed by the Commander-in-Chief. Sir James Stephen's
Commission had reported in 1887 that it was morally and physically
impossible that any one man should satisfactorily discharge the
functions which at that time belonged to the Secretary of State. To them
in 1895 the Government added those of the Commander-in-Chief. The result
was that in 1899 the Secretary of State failed to fulfil the most
important of all his functions, that of maintaining accord between the
policy of the Cabinet and the military preparations. The Committee of
Defence, which was appointed in 1895, might perhaps have performed this
essential function if it had ever taken a serious view of its work. But
it in doubtful whether it ever did any work at all.

II.

In the new Parliament, Dilke moved on March 5th, 1896, for a return of
the number of British seamen available for service in the navy in time
of war.

"One difficulty," he said, "that had to be faced was that in debates
like the present they had no real opportunity of engaging in a
collective review of the whole defensive expenditure of the country on
the army and navy taken together.... They expected from the Government a
policy which could be explained to the House--either a policy of
alliances, to which he himself was rootedly opposed; or the policy,
which was the only true policy for this country, of keeping up such a
fleet as would make us safe against any probable combination. The point
to which he wished to draw most urgent attention was that the real
reserve of England was disappearing very fast. The British sailor was
becoming more and more a rare article of luxury. He was used on the
first-class liners, and not used elsewhere.... There was another point
of importance. Among these foreigners there were many masters of ships,
and they were taught the pilotage of our rivers. That was a very serious
matter, and might become a great danger in time of war."

It soon became evident that the changes made in 1895 had not produced
improvement either in the Government's arrangements for national defence
or in the management of the army. In November, 1896, Lord Lansdowne,
Secretary of State for War, and Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Chancellor of
the Exchequer, made speeches the same evening at Bristol. The Secretary
of State expressed the intention to make a slight increase in the number
of battalions in the army, while the Chancellor declared that he would
consent to no increase in the Army Estimates until he could feel more
confidence in the manner in which the money was expended. This
disagreement between members of the Cabinet led to inquiries, through
which Dilke became aware that the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley,
wished for a larger increase in the number of battalions than the
Secretary of State was willing to propose. The opportunity seemed
suitable for raising the question whether or not the military measures
proposed by the Government were those suggested by their military
adviser--a fundamental question. Lord Lansdowne having explained in the
House of Lords in February, 1897, that his proposal was to add two
battalions to the Guards and one to the Cameron Highlanders, and that he
hoped in this way to restore the equilibrium between the number of
battalions at home and the number abroad, Dilke in the House of Commons
pointed out (February 8th) that the measure proposed would not establish
the desired equilibrium, and that the proposal was anonymous. Who, he
asked, were the military authorities on whose advice the Government
relied? Mr. Brodrick, in reply, said that the proposals of the
Government, taken as a whole, had been gratefully accepted by one and
all of the military heads of the War Office, as, in the words of the
Commander-in-Chief, "such a step forward as has not been made for many
years." Thus it became clear that the military heads, including the
Commander-in-Chief, were as ready to be overruled in regard to their
views as to what was necessary for the army as the civilian Minister was
to overrule them.

In the Christmas recess of 1897-98 Dilke prepared for the next Session
by writing a pamphlet on Army Reform in which he reviewed the position.
He and the other reformers had steadily asserted that the home army
could not take the field until it had drawn heavily on the reserve; that
it was terribly short of artillery; that the seven to eight years'
enlistment was a hybrid, and that the sound course was to have a
short-term service with the colours at home followed by a choice between
a long term in the reserve and a long term in the Indian or Colonial
army; and, lastly, that the administration was over-centralized at the
War Office, to the detriment of the authority, the efficiency, and the
character, of the generals. The critics had further urged that the
linked-battalion system and the hybrid term, bad as they were, could not
be worked at all without a large increase of the number of battalions at
home. In 1897 the War Office had replied that an increase of three
battalions would suffice.

The new estimates were introduced in the House of Commons on February
25th, 1898, by Mr. Brodrick, who admitted that, in order to put 50,000
infantry into the field, it would be necessary to call out 28,000
reservists. In order to have artillery enough for a fraction of the army
he asked for fifteen more batteries. He had to admit that the three
battalions added in 1897 were not enough, and to ask for six more. The
speech was an admission of all the contentions of the critics, though it
began by abusing them.

In the debate Dilke moved: "That no scheme for the reorganization of the
army will be satisfactory which involves the sacrifice of one unit to
secure the efficiency of any other." He referred to the admitted
breakdown of the eight-years and linked-battalion system. Mr. Brodrick,
quoting Lord Wolseley, had reassured the country by telling them that
they could despatch two army corps abroad.

"Two army corps!" exclaimed Dilke, "when it is twenty army corps which
this country pays for!... Out of the men at home, if cavalry and
artillery were provided, twenty corps instead of two corps might be
made.... In the last three years the cost of the army has been
considerably increased, and there has been an increase in numbers voted.
Yet there has been a decrease not only in the militia, but also in the
regular army and in the army reserve as well during that period--an
additional evidence of breakdown.... The territorial system here can
never be anything more than a sham so long as we have to provide for
India and garrison coaling-stations, and so long as the battalions are
constantly moved about.... We have year by year made our statements with
regard to artillery to the House. Nobody believed a word we said, and it
was only last year, when three batteries were sent out to the Cape, and
twenty batteries wrecked in men and horses to provide them, that the War
Office at last admitted that we had all along been right.... On this
occasion we see some results, in the speech of the right hon. gentleman
to-night, of our action in the past."

The Navy Estimates were introduced in July. Lord Charles Beresford in
his argument had pointed out that the cost of the navy bore a much
smaller proportion to our mercantile marine than that of the navies of
other countries. Dilke said:

"The position of the British Empire is such that, if by the
mercantile policy of other countries our mercantile marine were
wholly to disappear, or if it were to disappear as the result of a
war in which our carrying trade passed, say, to the United States,
it would be just as necessary as now for us to have a predominant
fleet.... If the pressure of taxation on the poorer classes, if the
unrest in this country on the subject, were so great that it was not
possible to make the sacrifices which I for one think it necessary
to make, I would sooner give up the whole expenditure on the army
than give way upon this naval programme.... This matter of the fleet
is vital to our position in the world. The army is an arguable
question."

Dilke continued steadily to press for a strong navy. In 1899 he once
more supported Mr. Goschen's proposals, and again urged that, if the
cost of the army and navy should be too great, we must save on the army,
but not on the navy. His chief criticism of the Admiralty was that "we
have got into the vicious position of beginning our building programme
each year at the extreme end of the financial year."

The keynote of his speech was: "This Empire is an Empire of the seas,
and the navy is vital to our existence, but our army is not. Our Indian
army is vital to our possession of India, but India pays the full cost
of it, perhaps rather more."

III.

During the winter of 1898-99 the opposition of purposes between the
British Government and the Government of the South African Republic was
causing grave apprehension to public men. The High Commissioner, Sir
Alfred Milner, paid a visit to England, and on his return to the Cape
was authorized in May, 1899, to meet President Kruger in a Conference at
Bloemfontein. On June 7th the failure of the Conference was announced,
and was thought by many to be the equivalent of a diplomatic rupture,
the prelude to hostilities. No serious military preparations were made
by the British Government, though various measures were suggested by the
Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley, and by Sir Redvers Buller. It was not
until September 10th that 10,000 men were ordered from India to Natal,
and not until October 7th that orders were issued for the calling out of
the reserve and for the mobilization of an army corps and other troops
for South Africa. The Boers began hostilities on October 11th, and the
operations were unfavourable to the British until the middle of
February, when Lord Roberts began the advance towards Kimberley.

At the end of January, 1900, the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, said in
the House of Lords: "I do not believe in the perfection of the British
Constitution as an instrument of war ... it is evident that there is
something in your machinery that is wrong."

In the debate on the Army Estimates on February 1st, Dilke, with his
usual courage, raised the question of responsibility, in a speech to
which little attention was paid at the time, but which will now, in the
light of subsequent events, be better appreciated.

"The country," he said, "has gone through an awful winter, and under our
constitutional system there are persons responsible, and we have to
examine the nature of their responsibility. Some Government speakers,
who during the recess have addressed the country, have drawn certain
comparisons between the occurrences in this war and those of the Crimean
War.... I confess that I believe the present war has been far more
disgracefully conducted than the Crimean War had been, and that the
mourning is far more applicable to this case. Now, with regard to the
checks or reverses--that is the accepted phrase--we are really afraid in
these days to talk about 'disasters.' The First Lord of the Treasury at
Manchester distinctly stated there had been 'no disaster.' There has
been no single great engagement in which we have met with an absolute
disaster, but for the first time in our military history there has been
a succession of checks or reverses--unredeemed as they have been by a
single great military success in the whole course of the war--in many of
which we have left prisoners in the enemy's hands. We began with the
abandonment of the entrenched camp at Dundee, and of the great
accumulation of stores that had been made there, of the wounded, and of
the dying General, and we lost the headquarters of a regiment of cavalry
that tried a cavalry pursuit. We lost the headquarters of two battalions
at Nicholson's Nek; we lost the headquarters of one battalion and a very
large portion of another battalion in the repulse at Stormberg; we lost
the Colonel, most of the field officers, and the whole of one company of
the Suffolks, on another occasion. These headquarters of cavalry, and
the principal portion of the remaining men of five battalions of British
infantry, are now prisoners at Pretoria--not to speak of what happened
to the Highland Brigade at Magersfontein, or of the loss of the guns in
the repulse at the Tugela, or of the fact that thirteen of our field
guns, besides a mountain battery, are now in the enemy's hands. The loss
of guns in proportion to our small strength of guns is equivalent to the
loss of some 300 guns by the German army. None of these events
constitutes what the First Lord of the Treasury calls a disaster.
Probably he is right. But can any member of this House deny that the net
result of these proceedings has been disastrous to the belief of the
world in our ability to conduct a war? Therefore, if there has been, as
the right hon. gentleman says, not one disaster, surely the result of
the proceedings has been one disastrous to the credit of this country.
There has been one immense redemption of that disaster, which is that
all the Powers, however hostile, have very frankly acknowledged on these
occasions the heroism of the officers and men. Our military reputation,
which undoubtedly never stood lower in the eyes of the world than at the
present moment, is redeemed in that respect, and the individual courage
of officers and men never stood higher in the estimate of the world than
it does now. It seems to me to be a patriotic duty of those who have in
the past discussed in this House the question of Cabinet responsibility
for military preparations to discuss the question now; to see who is
responsible, whom--I will not say we will hang, but whom we are to hold
blameworthy in the highest degree for what has occurred. I believe that
the opinion is attributed to the Prime Minister that the British
Constitution is not a fighting machine. I am told that he has thrown
doubt upon the working of the British Constitution as a Constitution
which will allow this country successfully to go to war. That is a very
serious matter. The Constitution of this country has been maintained as
a fighting machine by the members of this House who are now responsible
for the Administration. No one has ever put the doctrine of Cabinet
responsibility for the preparation for war higher than it has always
been put by the present Leader of the House (Mr. Balfour), and anything
more direct than the conflict on that point, as on many others, between
his opinion and the opinion of the Prime Minister it is impossible to
conceive.... On Thursday last the right hon. member who preceded me in
this debate--the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr.
Brodrick)--delivered a speech and said that all that had been done in
this war had been 'solely dictated by military advice,' and 'military
advice alone determined all that had been done.' I should like the House
to consider what that statement means. The right hon. gentleman was the
member who, on three occasions, brought the question of the ammunition
supplies of this country before the House: it was he who moved the
amendment which turned out the Rosebery Administration on the cordite
vote, and he led the discussion on two subsequent occasions on which we
debated the same question. At the opening of the next Parliament the
whole question of Ministerial responsibility for war preparation was
thoroughly and exhaustively considered by this House. I confess that I
did not expect to hear the right hon. gentleman--who on those three
occasions so firmly pressed, to the very extinction of the Government
itself, the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility--as it were sheltering
the Cabinet behind military advice, advice which he rejected, as also
did the Leader of the House, with scorn upon that occasion.... I feel it
a duty to myself, and to all who hold the same opinion, to press home
this doctrine of Cabinet responsibility on this occasion. In that debate
the hon. member who seems likely to follow me in this debate--the
present Under-Secretary for War (Mr. Wyndham)--took part. He was then a
private member and warmly occupied his mind upon this question, and he
used these words: 'If they were overwhelmed by disasters, the Minister
for War would be held responsible.' Not only he, but the whole Cabinet
are responsible, and the present Leader of the House, in following the
hon. member in that debate, emphasized that fact, and pointed out the
importance of complete Cabinet responsibility. That doctrine was
emphatically maintained. There are practical reasons why this question
should be pressed home on this occasion. This is obviously the time to
press it home if ever it should be done, and it seems to me that such
practical reasons are to be found in two considerations. We have been
told that at the beginning of every war it is always fated that there
should be muddling. We have been told it from both sides of the House,
that we always begin by muddling our wars. If there is one fact more
certain than another, it is that in future wars, not with Boer
Republics, but with Great Powers, there will be no time for muddling at
the beginning of war, and it is vital that this muddling should be
guarded against. If we are to look forward as a matter of certainty that
this country is always to muddle at the beginning of a war, then we may
look forward with almost certainty to defeat."

Dilke then examined the excuses that had been made for the Government,
to the effect that the war took them by surprise and that they had no
knowledge of the Boer preparations. He showed that both these pleas were
inconsistent with the facts. Mr. Balfour had said that the Government
had thought it their duty, during the negotiations which preceded the
war, to abstain from unnecessary menace. Dilke pointed out that they did
not so abstain. Lord Salisbury had said on July 28th, 1899, "the
Conventions are mortal ... they are liable to be destroyed." That could
only be understood by the Boers as holding out the prospect of a war in
which the independence of their country would be taken away. Were these
words wise when used without the smallest preparation for war having
been made? As regards knowledge of the Boer preparations, the
Intelligence Department had admirably done its work. No Government was
ever so well informed as to the resources of its opponents as the
British Government in entering upon this war. Dilke went on to say:

"Both by those who would have anticipated war and by the Government
it has been alleged that the existence of a Parliamentary Opposition
was the reason why the military precautions of the Government were
inefficacious. But the Government has been in power since July,
1895, and has been supported by overwhelming majorities, and it
would have had the cheerful acquiescence of the House of Commons for
every measure of military precaution and all the military
expenditure which was asked. The Cabinet are responsible; but if
there is to be any difficulty on account of the existence of a
constitutional Opposition--even a weak one--I say that by that
doctrine we are fated to be beaten on every occasion we go to war.
The time for the reform of our military system will come when this
war has ended. We cannot reform it in a time of war. We have often
addressed the House upon this subject. We preached to deaf ears. We
were not listened to before war. Shall we be listened to when war is
over? While I admit that in a time of war you cannot reform your
military system, what you can do is to press home to the Cabinet the
responsibility.... For some years past there have been discussions
as to Empire expansion which have divided some of us from others on
military questions. There are some of us, who are strong supporters
of the Government in preparing for war in the present situation of
the world, who are not in favour of what is called the expansion of
the Empire. We have resisted it because we believed the military
requirements of the Empire were greater--as it was put by Lord
Charles Beresford, whom we see here no longer--than we were prepared
to meet. And the Government now come down to the House and quietly
tell us that that is so. They have put it in the Queen's Speech. We
have it stated that, although the money we have to spend in military
preparations is more than that of any other Power in the world, we
are going to be asked to spend more. I should hope that good may
come out of evil, and that a result of this sad war may be the
proper utilization of our resources in preparing, in times of peace,
all the military forces of what people call Greater Britain.... I
venture to say that the Government went into this war without the
preparation they should have made. Their neglect of that precaution
has brought about the reverses we have met with, and the natural
consequence is the failure of our arms I have described. As regards
the Crimean War, which in some respects has been compared with this,
one is reminded of the present Commander-in-Chief, who has written
these momentous words: The history of the Crimean War shows 'how an
army may be destroyed by a Ministry through want of ordinary
forethought.' I confess that I think there is only one point in
which the two cases are exactly parallel--for there are many
distinctions between them--and that is in the heroism of officers
and men."