The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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[Footnote: Mr. Drew, editor of the _Transvaal Leader_, wrote:

"I am truly glad that (if my view of the somewhat vague cablegram is
correct) you have alienation of native lands reserved everywhere in
South Africa. This provision, together with the entrenchment of the
Cape Franchise, will form a solution of the question not
unfavourable to the natives. It gives the natives and their friends
something to bargain with. If the Cape Franchise should ever go, its
place will be taken by something which will benefit all the natives
and be acceptable to all."

From a different quarter came even stronger expression of gratitude.
M. Jacottet, of the Swiss Mission, wrote:

"I beg on behalf of all my fellow-missionaries in Basutoland, as
well as of all the friends of justice and liberty in this territory,
to thank you most sincerely for your courageous and strong advocacy
of the rights and interests of Basutoland and the other territories.
All thoughtful and civilized Basutos know how much they are indebted
to you, and your name is held in reverence by them."]

Sir Charles, always a strong advocate of colonial autonomy, nevertheless
did not go to extreme lengths in this doctrine. An Imperialist first, he
was fully prepared to say to the colonies, So long as you claim Imperial
protection, you must recognize the full rights of citizenship within the
Empire. He feared gravely the tendencies which might develop under the
British flag, if uncontrolled liberty of action were given to the
Colonial Parliaments in dealing with such questions as forced labour.
"The Australian rule in New Guinea is going to be terrible," is a stray
note on one of his communications with the Aborigines' Protection
Society.

This labour question was to him essentially the problem of the future,
and he watched its developments with ceaseless anxiety. At the annual
meeting of the society in April, 1910, he spoke of the energy which the
Colonial Office displayed in promoting the growing of cotton as laudable
but dangerous. "The chiefs had sometimes exercised compulsion to make
their tribes cultivate the unfamiliar product." More generally he felt
that wherever the white man introduced taxation there would be a
tendency to requisition labour, and that all such projects would
inevitably generate an interested commercial support. The Portuguese
system of recruiting for the cocoa plantations might be barbarous; but
if it were pleaded in defence that without it the supply of cocoa must
fail, Sir Charles foresaw the gravest difficulties with the House of
Commons. "How are we to make that 'would-be' practical Assembly tell the
Government to induce Portugal to put an end to so enormous a
cultivation?" The only method of avoiding these evils was to prevent
their growth; and the soundest plan was to insure that the natives
retained their own familiar means of livelihood, and so could not be
brought down to the choice between starvation and selling their labour
in a restricted market. For that reason he fiercely opposed the whole
policy of concessions, and by public and private representations he
pressed the Colonial Office to reject every such alienation of native
rights in the land.

He had promised to read a paper on Indentured and Forced Labour at the
Native Races Conference held in July, 1911. It reviewed all the facts of
the situation as they existed--the growing demand for indentured
service, the respective record of the European Powers, and the varying
results produced by varying methods which the same Power has adopted in
different regions. It was, he thought, not easy to decide whether the
anti-slavery cause had lost or gained ground in his lifetime; new
insidious and widespread forms of the evil had taken a hold. Great
Britain's escutcheon was marred by the inclusion of a colour-bar in the
most recent Constitution of her oversea dominions; and the Government of
India had recently failed to obtain from some British States that
measure of rights for emigrating British Indian subjects which it had
formerly been able to secure. Forced labour was being employed under
British auspices in Egypt; while the French, who had "more nearly than
any other nation" done away with this evil in colonies, were open to
grave reproach in the matter of concessions--especially in that region
where French administration was affected by the neighbouring example of
the Congo Free State. The danger both of forced labour and of
concessions was that they alike tended to destroy native law and tribal
custom, and so to create 'one universal black proletariat'--a vast
reservoir of cheap defenceless labour.

What he wrote was duly read at the Conference, and is included in the
volume of their proceedings called _Inter-Racial Problems_. But before
the Conference took place, silence had been imposed for ever on this
advocate of equal justice. Among his papers is the manuscript of this
composition corrected for the press by him within a week of his death--
work done against the entreaty of those who cared for him, but work that
he would not leave undone.

In defending the interest of the native races, Dilke always felt himself
to be defending the dignity and the safety of labour at home--even
though the representatives of European labour did not recognize the
common concern. He was defending labour where it was weakest; and it is
in his championship of the weak that one of the younger men who worked
with him and learnt from him sees the characteristic note of his life.
General Seely writes:

"To many of the younger men who found themselves in the Parliament
of 1900 Dilke was an enigma. We could all appreciate his immense
store of knowledge, his untiring industry, his courtesy to younger
men, and his striking personality. But what the real purpose was to
which he was devoting these talents, what was the end in view--put
shortly, 'what he was at'--was to us a puzzle.

"Clearly, it was no bitter hostility either to a Government with
which as a Radical he profoundly disagreed, or to an Opposition
amongst whom he sat, but whose chiefs had not restored him to their
inner councils. Not the former, for in matters of foreign policy and
in Imperial Defence, where his unrivalled knowledge gave him
powerful weapons of attack, he never pursued an advantage he had
gained beyond very moderate limits. Not the second, for no man was
more steadfast in his attendance and in his support, given by speech
and in the lobby, to those of his own political faith.

"Still less was it personal ambition or self-seeking; for if he
spoke often, it was only to put forward some definite point of view,
and not for the purpose of taking part in a debate just because the
House was crowded and the occasion important.

"Least of all was his constant attendance in the House of Commons
the refuge of a man with no other object in life, for no man was
more many-sided or had so many and such varied interests.

"His Parliamentary action was often baffling to the observer,
especially in its restraint. It was only after many years that the
present writer found the master-key to Dilke's actions, and it was
revealed in a flash at the time of the passing of the South Africa
Union Act. The question was the representation of the native
population in the Union, and the cognate questions of their
treatment and status. Dilke came to see me. He pleaded the native
cause with earnestness, with eloquence, with passion. The man was
transfigured as the emotions of pity and love of justice swept over
him. No record could be kept of what he said; there could have been
no thought of using his eloquence to enlist popular support or
improve a Parliamentary position, for we were alone. And so I came
to see that the mainspring of all his actions was the intense desire
to help those who could not help themselves--to defend the
under-dog.

"Looking through the long list of the speeches he made, and of the
questions he asked, from the beginning of the Parliament of 1900
until the time of his death, one sees plainly that this was his
guiding motive. No detail was so small as to escape his attention if
the people he was endeavouring to protect were poor and helpless.

"On the wider questions of the general treatment of natives he
displayed the same meticulous care in finding out the true facts of
the case. In the controversy that raged round the administration of
the Congo, he would not move until he had ascertained the facts, not
only from official documents, but from inquiries he himself had set
on foot. Indians, Africans, Chinese, as well as his own countrymen
and countrywomen, all would find in him a champion and defender,
provided only that they were poor, unrepresented, or oppressed."

III.

In some cases the defence of the "under-dog" was a duty imposed by our
acknowledged sovereignty or by international obligations.

What might follow from the growing rush for tropical products, capital
pursuing large returns "into every jungle in the world," was shown to
Europe, in the last months of Sir Charles's life, by the revelations
from the Amazon Valley, a scandal to which he was among the first to
call attention. This was a region where Great Britain had no special
duty. But a series of facts not less horrible, on a scale infinitely
vaster, and affecting a population which, originally, could not have
numbered less than thirty millions, had, long before the Putumayo
revelations, been proved to exist throughout the basin of a great
African river. No labour of Sir Charles's later years was more
continuous and persistent than his effort to fix on the Imperial
Parliament the responsibility for what was done in the Congo Free State,
and the duty of putting an end to it.

"He perceived with increasing clearness of vision, as the years went
on," says Mr. Morel, "that the future relationship between the white
and coloured races in the tropical regions of the globe was bound up
with the problem of the Congo, and that the effects of the success
or the failure of the movement for Congo reform would govern in
great measure the attitude of Europe towards these questions for
very many years."

A State that had been brought into being by England's express sanction,
for solemnly defined purposes of civilization in Africa, was proved by
its own agent to be employing cannibal troops. That was the circumstance
which most impressed a startled House of Commons when, on April 2nd,
1897, Sir Charles raised the first of many discussions upon the question
of the Congo.

In 1896 a violent action had brought home to England what had been the
fulfilment of the promised free trade for all nations, and of King
Leopold's protestations in 1884. Mr. Stokes, a British trader, was
arrested and shot by the order of a Belgian officer, Major Lothaire. His
offence was trading in ivory. Sir Charles, when he raised the debate in
April, 1897, combined then as always the diplomatic with the
humanitarian aspect of the case; and brought before the House the
existence of the secret decree of September, 1891, declaring a State
monopoly of all rubber and ivory, for violation of which Mr. Stokes had
been executed. [Footnote: Stokes was also accused of bartering guns to
the Arabs for that ivory. This, true or not, does not affect the initial
outrage, that, though he was entitled to a proper trial, he was trapped
and summarily executed without trial of any kind.] But it was the
publication of Captain Hinde's book, [Footnote: _The Fall of the Congo
Arabs_.] with its revelation of the fact that European officers had
commanded an army fed for long periods by organized cannibalism, which
gave authority to Sir Charles's demand for a new conference of the
Powers. "We should take action," he said, "to remove from ourselves the
disgrace which had fallen upon our declarations."

Mr. Curzon, who as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs then spoke for
Lord Salisbury's Government, treated the matter coolly enough, though
admitting that the agents of the Congo State had sometimes adopted
methods repugnant to Christian feeling; and so for the moment the
controversy ended, but Sir Charles with persistent application returned
to the question again and again, although his efforts were hampered by
lack of information. So well was the secret of those dark places kept
that even he, with his widespread net of acquaintance in many capitals,
found facts hard to gather; and he was naturally attracted by the
appearance in 1900 of a series of anonymous articles in the _Speaker_,
which dealt with the system set up in the Congo, and its inevitable
results. These articles displayed an unusual knowledge of the whole
complicated subject, and revealed aspects of it which had previously
baffled inquiry. The writer proved to be Mr. E. D. Morel. So began a
co-operation whose influence upon the administration of African races
was destined to be far-reaching.

The campaign was steadily pressed. Within the House of Commons, Sir
Charles spoke session after session, using language of a vehemence that
startled in one so moderate. He organized representations to the Senate
and Chamber in Belgium, summarizing what was being done in the Congo and
urging Belgium's moral responsibility. Out of doors, the Press campaign
was vigorous--so vigorous that no Government could disregard it; and at
the beginning of 1903, in reply to a question from Sir Charles, Mr.
Balfour promised a formal debate "on the position of the signatories to
the Berlin General Act of 1885, in regard to the abuses which had grown
up under the Congo Free State's rule in violation of that Act." The
debate, on May 20th, 1903, was opened by Mr. Herbert Samuel. Sir
Charles, following him, was in turn supported by Sir John Gorst, an old
ally in such causes. Mr. Balfour, in face of a unanimous House,
accepted, not without reluctance, the motion which asked him to consult
the co-signatories of the Berlin Act, and thus committed Great Britain
to a diplomatic re-opening of the case. Inquiry necessarily followed,
and with the publication of our Consul's report in December, 1903, the
affair reached a new phase.

When the Foreign Office vote came to be discussed in the Session of
1904, Sir Charles, basing himself on that report, delivered what Sir
John Gorst called a "terrible speech." Replying for the Government, Lord
Percy used these words: "There never has been a policy of which it might
be said as truly as of this one that it was the policy not so much of
His Majesty's Government as of the House of Commons." Not less is it
true that Sir Charles had guided the House to the adoption of that
policy.

By this time the cause commanded popular interest. The questioning of
Ministers was frequent, and it was done by men from all camps. Sir
Charles could afford henceforward to select his portion of the work. He
limited himself as far as possible to the diplomatic aspect of the case,
more technical and less popular in its appeal, but giving the surest
right of intervention.

The Foreign Office does not naturally look with favour upon policies
forced upon it by the House of Commons, and perhaps for this reason the
permanent officials proved opponents very difficult for the House of
Commons to control. But Sir Charles's knowledge gave him the necessary
advantage. For instance, on November 22nd, 1906, he asked if the United
States had not expressed a desire to co-operate with Great Britain in
this matter. An official denial was given. On December 16th the question
was put again, and the admission made that "the United States have
recently expressed" such a desire.

After various obscure negotiations on the part of King Leopold to secure
German support for his personal rule, there came at length with the
beginning of 1907 the announcement that Belgium would annex the Free
State.

[Footnote: The delay which took place in the transference of the Congo
Free State from the personal rule of King Leopold to the rule of the
Belgian Government is dealt with in the following letter from Lord
Fitzmaurice from the Foreign Office to Sir Charles:

"_February_ 16th, 1906.--The King of the Belgians puts about these
stories for the same sort of reason which made the German Emperor put
about the story that there was a change of policy in regard to France.
At the same time there must be a little 'law' given to the King while
his second Commission is reporting on the methods of carrying out the
reforms indicated in the first Commission's report. As you know, I am
not a believer in the King 'at all, at all,' but one has to observe the
forms of diplomacy. It is, perhaps, not unfortunate that this pause
coincides with a moment when it is not our interest to be having a row
with Belgium also, if perchance we were having a row with Germany." This
letter was written while the Algeciras Conference was sitting.]

Yet the matter was not allowed to sleep in either House of Parliament;
it was raised by Sir Charles on the Whitsuntide adjournment, and again
in August. In 1908 the subject was mentioned in the King's Speech. But
by this time a "Colonial Law" had been proposed in Belgium, which went
far to re-establish King Leopold's power under the new system and
created new difficulties. Sir Charles's allies now were not in England
only. He had made friends with M. Vandervelde, leader of the Socialist
party in Belgium, and the one Socialist who had ventured to vote for
annexation. They met during Sir Charles's Christmas stay in Paris in
1907, and had "two days' thorough discussion of Congo." The result was
written to Lord Fitzmaurice (then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs)
on January 6th, 1908: "I tell you confidentially that, after seeing
Vandervelde, I cease to advise moderation, and shall say so to the
private Congo Reform meeting called for the 21st." This tone made itself
felt in the debate on the Address, and in two subsequent discussions.
The points pressed for were, first, that Belgium in taking over the
Congo should take over fully and honor the Free State's treaty
obligations, and, secondly, that full guarantees should be given for
native rights. [Footnote: On Sir Charles Dilke's action in regard to the
Congo, see also _Red Rubber_ (T. Fisher Unwin), pp. 4, 11, 177, 195; and
_Great Britain and the Congo_ (Smith, Elder and Co.), pp. 122, 124, 138,
142, 193, by Mr. E. D. Morel. The official organs of the Congo Reform
Association from 1904 until Sir Charles's death contain a complete
record of his speeches, both in the House and outside, during this
period.]

But discussion in the Belgian Parliament showed reluctance to accept
this view, and on November 4th, 1908, a strong memorandum was despatched
by Great Britain. When Parliament reassembled in 1909, a question put by
Sir Charles elicited the fact that no answer had been returned to this
despatch, and an amendment to the Address was put down by a Unionist,
Sir Gilbert Parker. Sir Charles, in supporting it, laid special stress
on backing from America, being well aware that relations were strained
in Europe.

His speech indicated some fear that the question might be submitted to
the Hague Conference.

"That," he said, "is not our intention. That is not what Parliament
meant. That is not the policy which successive Governments have given
their adhesion to. In a state of Europe far more disturbed, even Lord
Castlereagh several times took in similar matters far stronger action
than is now necessary."

But the Parliament elected in 1906 did not see the end of this affair;
and when they next met in February, 1910, King Leopold had died, and
there was a new King of the Belgians. On March 10th, Sir George White
moved upon the matter, pointing out that there was no improvement in the
treatment of the natives and no extension of freedom for trade; and the
Foreign Secretary replied in a somewhat ambiguous speech. Annexation, he
said, had not yet received the sanction of Great Britain, and could not
until improvement in the administration had taken place. But beyond this
negative attitude of disapproval, Sir Edward Grey seemed to think that
Great Britain could not wisely act alone, and that under the Berlin Act
isolated action was in some measure barred. This, in the temper of the
moment, was construed as a hint that insistence on reform might drive
Belgium into the arms of Germany. Sir Charles said in this debate:

"There is one case, and one only, where I think we see very distinct
signs of weakening in our policy, a weakening caused by terror, and
undue terror, of the risks which may follow. The papers issued by
the Belgian Government with regard to the Congo show a distinct
weakening of attitude on our part.... In the Belgian despatch they
treat us with contempt, with a sort of lofty scorn which is almost
inconceivable. I have never known such a thing before; it is an
entirely new departure.

"I believe the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has been here
to-day, knowing that many members in all quarters of the House have
incurred a certain disappointment, which is reflected in the letter
in to-day's papers from the Archbishop of Canterbury, with regard to
the speech with which he wound up the other night the short debate
upon the Congo question.... He says that we have not weakened our
position, that we have given nothing away, that we have not
'recognized.' But it is not a mere paper recognition or a paper
non-recognition to which we attach high importance and which we
formerly thought we understood from his speeches.... We have before
us a Bill for the largest naval expenditure that our country has
ever incurred in time of peace. We add for the first time to that
expenditure colonial expenditure which swells out beyond that of our
own Estimates. The House has supported those Estimates, and the
Empire is spending on land forces even a larger amount than it is
spending on the fleet. None of us believe that war is probable, but
we do think, and many of us in this House believe, that the
armaments of this country, if they are to have weight in time of
peace, ought to have weight behind our diplomacy; and if they are to
be justified by many of the arguments put before this House, there
is no reason why at this moment we should be afraid of our own
shadow. We have been afraid of our own shadow on the Congo question.
I think there can be no doubt that we have received from M. Renkin,
the Colonial Minister, such treatment as we have never had to put up
with from any Power, at all events in recent years." Dilke warned
members not to be silenced by unnecessary fears on these matters.
"Not even a single question was asked in the far more dangerous case
of the ultimatum which we now know was sent to the Turkish
Government when they came into office in the beginning of 1906, in
regard to the occupation of the village of Tabah. That ultimatum
might have raised serious questions in that part of Europe. I think
a little more courage would be desirable in a case like that of the
Congo. It is not a question of ten pounds or one hundred pounds of
somebody's property. We are shocked in the case of the Congo because
that which would never happen is put as a conceivable danger at the
end of a long train of hypothetical events. It is said that there
might be an act of violence.... There would not be an act of
violence, and I beg the House not to be led away by the fear of
trifling complications following upon our insisting, not upon
anything new, but upon that which we have been insisting upon for
years past in a matter in which our moral obligation is very
weighty."

Yet it was not Sir Charles's fortune to see the fulfilment of the long
labour in which he had played so great a part. Not till three years
later--in June, 19l3--did the Congo Reform Association feel that its
work was completed, and that it could disband its forces.

Sir Charles's part had been to apply in Parliament the force that was
generated outside. From a private position to have guided without
seeming to dictate; to have inspired common action among colleagues
holding all shades of political thought; to have avoided miscarriage by
infinite tact and patience; to have possessed so wide a knowledge of all
the complicated issues involved that official reluctance could never
avoid action by mysterious pretexts; to have been always so moderate in
expression that strong condemnation from him, when it came, was indeed
weighty; to have watched time and opportunity, the dispositions of men,
the temper of the assembly--all this was necessary to carry through such
a Parliamentary task without the power of office, and all this Sir
Charles performed. No finer example has been given of what in the
Imperial Parliament a member of Parliament can do; and Sir Charles Dilke
could well afford to be judged by it, and it alone, as typical of his
life-work.