The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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The appearance of cholera in French and Spanish ports disquieted the
public, and as early as July 25th, 1883,

'I circulated a draft of a Bill to meet the cholera scare, which I
carried into law as the Diseases Prevention Act. I did not much
believe in cholera, but I took advantage of the scare to carry some
useful clauses to deal with smallpox epidemics, the most important
clause being one giving compulsory powers for acquiring wharves, by
which we could clear the London smallpox hospitals, removing the
patients to the Atlas and Castalia floating hospitals on the Thames.
I was a strong partisan of the floating hospitals for smallpox. I
used to pay frequent visits to them, and in the early summer of 1885
stayed there from Saturday to Monday; and I used also to go to the
camp at Darenth to which we removed convalescents from the ships.'

He notes that he was revaccinated before one of these visits:

'September, 1884.--My arm was in a frightful condition from the
vaccine disease, though I was still a teetotaller, now of about ten
years' standing.'

During the autumn recess:

'In the course of this week I was every day inspecting schools and
asylums, the imbecile asylums at Caterham, Leavesden, and many
others; and my smallpox wharves were also giving me much trouble, as
Rotherhithe and the other places showed strong objections to them,
which I was, however, able to remove.'

But the veteran official who has been already quoted attaches a very
different importance to this whole matter. In France and Spain, says Mr.
Preston Thomas, the Governments were chiefly concerned to deny the
existence of any danger. In England the medical staff demanded such an
increase in the number of inspectors as would enable them to take proper
precautions at the ports.

'Fortunately, Sir Charles Dilke had become President of the Board,
and carried with him a political weight which his two worthy, but
not particularly influential, predecessors, Sclater-Booth and
Dodson, had not enjoyed. He had one or two passages of arms with
Childers, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when it was attempted to
interfere with the estimates which he had put forward, and which he
declined to defend in Parliament if they were curtailed. There was
an appeal to the Premier, and Sir Charles Dilke had come off
victorious. So when he proposed largely to increase the medical
staff in order to make a sanitary survey of the entire coast, the
Treasury's sanction was given, and the work was carried out with
far-reaching results. The authorities of the ports ... were
impressed with a sense of their responsibilities; not only did they
organize special arrangements for the inspection of ships from
infected countries, but they also recognized the necessity of
setting their own houses in order in a literal sense, and many of
them for the first time displayed activity in providing pure water,
efficient sewerage, and a prompt removal of nuisances.... The
communications of the Board's expert with the local authorities and
their officers ... did something more than lay the foundations of
that Public Health System ... which has saved us from any outbreak
of cholera for the last quarter of a century, [Footnote: Written in
1909.] and has reduced the mortality from preventable diseases to a
rate which such countries as France and Germany may well envy.'
(_Work and Play of a Government Inspector_, p. 148.)

It should be noted, too, that the first definite action of the Housing
Commission concerned the Local Government Board:

'It was decided to ask Parliament to alter its standing orders with
regard to persons of the labouring class displaced under
Parliamentary Powers, and to insist on local inquiry in such cases,
and the approval of the Local Government Board after it has been
shown that suitable accommodation had been found for the people
displaced. This was done by resolution of both Houses of
Parliament.'

V.

The friendliness which had grown up between Sir Charles and Lord
Salisbury, and was later in this year to be of public service, is
illustrated by an amusing note in the Memoir. Sir Charles Dilke was
never a clubman, and had incurred the remonstrances of Sir M. Grant Duff
by refusing to take up membership of the Athenaeum, as he was entitled
to do on entering the Cabinet. But there is a club more august than the
Athenaeum, and here also Dilke showed indisposition to enter. He notes
in May:

'Before this I had been much pressed to accept my election at
Grillion's Club on Lord Salisbury's nomination. The Club considers
itself such an illustrious body that it elects candidates without
telling them they are proposed, and I received notice of my election
accompanied by some congratulations. I at first refused to join, but
afterwards wrote to the secretary: "Carlingford has been to see me
about Grillion's, and tells me that I should have the terrible
distinction of being the first man who ever declined to belong to
it, an oddity which I cannot face, so ... I will ask your leave to
withdraw my refusal." On May 3rd I breakfasted at the Club for the
first time, Mr. Gladstone and a good many other Front Bench people,
chiefly Conservatives, being present.'

The meetings of the Housing Commission had also increased the frequency
of intercourse between Sir Charles Dilke and the Prince of Wales, who
was in this May

'showing a devotion to the work of my Commission which was quite
unusual with him, and he cut short his holiday and returned from
Royat to London on purpose for our meeting.'

On January 11th, 1884, the Duke of Albany wrote to Sir Charles that he
had hoped to call, but was not sure whether he had returned to England.
'I write to express a hope that your opinions will coincide with the
request which I have made to Lord Derby ... namely, to succeed Lord
Normanby as Governor of Victoria.' He referred to their talk at
Claremont of his 'hopes, which were not realized, of going to Canada.'
'The Prince went on to say that, as I had been in Australia, I was "a
more competent judge than some others of the Ministers as to the
advisability of my appointment."' He spoke of the matter as one in which
he was 'vitally interested,' and his 'sincere trust' in Sir Charles's
support. The Cabinet agreed to the appointment,

'unless the Queen persisted in her opposition. The matter had been
discussed at Eastwell (where I stayed with the Duchess of Edinburgh
from the 19th to the 21st) by me with the Duchess as well as with
Princess Louise and Lorne, who were also there. The Duke of
Edinburgh was not there, but at Majorca in his ship. The party
consisted of Nigra, the Italian Ambassador, the Wolseleys, Lord
Baring and his sister Lady Emma, and Count Adlerberg of the Russian
Embassy, in addition to the Princess Louise and Lome already named.'

'On January 24th there was a regular Cabinet. The Queen had written
that she would not allow Prince Leopold to go to Victoria.'

On March 28th 'we heard of the death of Prince Leopold,' codicils to
whose will Sir Charles had witnessed in the preceding year. 'All
newspapers wrote of the pleasant boy as though he had been a man of
literary genius.'

But anxious as Sir Charles had been to further Prince Leopold's wishes,
and in spite of his 'respect for his memory,' he could not allow a
principle, for which he always fought, to be waived.

'The Queen wrote to Mr. Gladstone at this time (April 5th) with
regard to provision for the child and possible posthumous child of
the Duke of Albany, and I wrote to Mr. Gladstone that I could not
possibly agree to any provision for them, for which there was no
exact precedent, without the Select Committee which I had previously
been promised as regarded any new application.'

On April 22nd Mr. Gladstone alluded 'to a letter to the Queen, but he
did not read it to us,' and Sir Charles again insisted 'upon inquiry
before the proposal of any provision for which there was no direct
precedent.'

'At the Cabinet of Monday, April 28th, we found that the Queen was
indignant with us for our refusal to make further provision for the
Duchess of Albany.... None of the precedents of the century
warranted provision for children in infancy. It was agreed that Mr.
Gladstone was to write to the Queen again, but "our negative answer
is only applicable to the case where the children are in infancy."
In other words, we did not wish to bind those who might come after
us, but the phrase was not to commit us as to what we would do in
five years' time.'

CHAPTER XXXV

EGYPT

1884

I.

At the close of 1883 the destruction of Hicks's army had made clear to
all that the Soudan was, for the time at least, lost to Egypt; and close
upon this disaster in the central region had followed defeats on the Red
Sea coast. But Egyptian garrisons were holding out at Sinkat, some fifty
miles from the port of Suakim, and at Tokar, only twenty miles from the
coast. In October, 1883, a small force sent to relieve Sinkat was cut up
by the Dervishes under Osman Digna; in November, a larger column of 500,
accompanied by the British Consul, was utterly routed in an attempt to
reach Tokar. General Baker, with his newly formed gendarmerie, was then
ordered to Suakim. He desired to enlist the services of Zebehr Pasha, a
famous leader of men, but a former dealer in slaves. To this the British
authorities objected, and Zebehr was not sent. Baker went, attempted
with 3,500 troops to reach Tokar, and on February 2nd, 1884, lost 2,000
of them near the wells of El Teb. Both Tokar and Sinkat soon after fell
into the hands of the Dervishes.

Long before this event, the evacuation of the Soudan had been decreed. A
peremptory mandate from the British Government was sent to Cherif Pasha,
the Egyptian Prime Minister, who, as he had intimated that he would do,
resigned rather than be responsible for giving up so vast a possession.
On January 8th, Nubar took office to carry out the prescribed policy.
But the problem was how to get away the garrisons, and, since England
had ordered evacuation, the Egyptian Government looked to England for
assistance.

'On January 16th I noted: "Baring wants to make us send a British
officer to conduct the retreat from Khartoum. I have written to Lord
Granville to protest." Baring had been pressing for an answer to his
suggestion named above. I had all along fought against the "Hicks
Expedition," and this seemed a consequence. The Egyptian Government
had resigned, and the sole supporter of the abandonment policy among
the Egyptians in Egypt was the Khedive himself; but Nubar was sent
for, and accepted office (with a number of cyphers) to carry it into
effect. On January 10th Lord Granville had telegraphed to Baring,
without my knowledge, "Would Gordon or Wilson be of use?" [Footnote:
Colonel Sir Charles Wilson. See his _Life_, by Sir Charles Watson,
p. 244.] On the 11th Baring replied, "I do not think that the
services of Gordon or Wilson can be utilized at present"; and after
a reply had been received I saw the telegrams. The earlier Gordon
suggestions by Granville, now revealed by E. Fitzmaurice from the
Granville Papers, and expounded in Cromer's (1908) book, were never
before the Cabinet. [Footnote: Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii., pp.
381, 382.]

'On the 14th Lord Granville telegraphed to Baring: "Can you give
further information as to prospects of retreat from (? for) army and
residents at Khartoum, and measures taken? Can anything more be
done?" Power, our Consular Agent at Khartoum, had also been told
that he might leave. On January 16th Baring telegraphed: "The
Egyptian Government would feel obliged if Her Majesty's Government
would send out at once a qualified British officer to go to Khartoum
with full powers, civil and military, to conduct the retreat." Lord
Granville then telegraphed for Gordon, and on the 18th I was
summoned suddenly to a meeting at the War Office in Hartington's
room, at which were present, before I arrived, Hartington, Lord
Granville and Lord Northbrook, and Colonel Gordon. Gordon said that
he believed that the danger at Khartoum had been "grossly
exaggerated," and that the two Englishmen there had "lost their
heads"; he would be able to bring away the garrisons without
difficulty. We decided that he should go to Suakim to collect
information and report on the situation in the Soudan. This was the
sole decision taken, but it was understood that if he found he could
get across he should go on to Berber. Gordon started at night on the
same day.

'On January 22nd the first subject mentioned was that of Egyptian
finance, a Rothschild loan for six months being suggested, but
nothing settled. The Cabinet approved our action in sending Gordon.
But they had before them a great deal more than what we had
done--namely, what he had done himself. On his road between London
and Brindisi he had prepared a series of decrees which he
telegraphed to us and which we telegraphed to Baring. In these he
announced the restoration to the various Sultans of the Soudan of
their independence, and he made the Khedive say: "I have
commissioned General Gordon, late Governor-General of the Soudan, to
proceed there as my representative, and to arrange with you" (the
peoples of the Soudan) "for the evacuation of the country and the
withdrawal of my troops." He then made the Khedive appoint him
"Governor-General for the time necessary to accomplish the
evacuation." He also telegraphed to the Hadendowa and Bishareen
Arabs of the desert between Suakim and Berber, directing them to
meet him at Suakim, and saying that he should be there in fourteen
days. In sending these we told Baring: "Suggestions made by Gordon.
We have no local knowledge sufficient to judge. You may settle
terms, and act upon them at once, as time presses, or after
consultation with him." Mr. Gladstone did not object, although
strongly opposed to our undertaking responsibility in the Soudan,
because Gordon still spoke in every sentence of conducting the
evacuation; but reading his proclamations in the light of his
subsequent change of mind, and desire to stay in Khartoum and be
supported by force, it seems clear that he had deceived us and did
not really mean evacuation. This, however, could not yet be seen
from the words he used. I wrote to Lord Granville on January 22nd,
to point out that in addition to the danger in the Soudan, which had
been foreseen, there was a risk that Gordon might get himself
carried off alive into the desert by some of the Arab chiefs that he
was to meet, and that in that case we should have to send an
expedition after him.

'On January 31st there was a meeting at the War Office about Egypt
between Hartington, Lord Granville, Edmond Fitzmaurice and myself.
As the facts about Gordon were beginning to be misrepresented in the
Press, Lord Granville set them down in writing. [Footnote: See _Life
of Gladstone_, vol. iii., pp. 152-155; Life of Granville, vol. ii.,
pp. 381-385 and 512, where a letter from Lord Cromer on General
Gordon's instructions is printed; and chap. xvi. ('Gordon, and the
Soudan') in _The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1900_, by
Dr. J. Holland Rose.] It had been stated, and was afterwards
repeated by Justin McCarthy in his history, that the mission on
which we sent Gordon "was in direct opposition to his own ideas. He
was not in favour of the abandonment of the Soudan or the evacuation
of Khartoum." It had also been said that the whole mission had been
forced upon us by the Press--i.e., by Stead, in the _Pall Mall
Gazette_. Lord Granville gave me a memorandum saying that Gordon had
acknowledged that the statements in the _Pall Mall_ were "not
accurate." Lord Granville went on to say that he did not think that
Gordon could be said to have "changed his mind. It appeared in his
conversation with Wolseley on the Tuesday that he (Gordon) was not
decided in his opinion, and that he was as likely to recommend one
course as another.... I told him that we would not send him out to
re-open the whole question, and he then declared himself ready to go
out merely to help in the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan.
He is not remarkably precise in conversation, though I found him
much more so than Wolseley had led me to expect."

'Lord Granville had previously written to me on this point: "The
papers seem to think that Gordon is a new discovery by the
Government under pressure of the Press. It happens that I consulted
Malet on the subject months ago. But after communicating with Cherif
he sent me an unfavourable reply. I subsequently consulted Baring,
who agreed with Cherif that it was best not to do so. I consulted
him again after the change of Ministry, with the same result. On the
other hand Gordon was in Syria, having declared before leaving
England that he would not enter the Egyptian service. It was only on
his return to England that I heard indirectly that, although he had
no wish to go, he would willingly obey the orders of Her Majesty's
Government and act under the instructions of Sir Evelyn Baring and
the orders of General Stephenson. Having got the full concurrence of
Sir E. Baring by telegraph, the matter was arranged."

'The fact was that it was Wolseley, Gordon's friend, who suggested
that he should be sent and who induced him to go; but Wolseley's
account of the matter could not, I fear, be trusted, as he is more
inclined to attack Gladstone than to let out anything which in the
light of subsequent events might be unpleasant to himself.

'Edmond Fitzmaurice had drawn up an elaborate memorandum for our
meeting at the War Office, which I have, with my own corrections. He
thought that the public was hostile to us on four grounds: our
non-interference to stop Hicks; [Footnote: General Hicks advanced
west of the Nile, contrary to the views of Lord Dufferin, who wished
him to limit his advance to the province lying between the
bifurcation of the Blue and White Nile. See the _Life of Dufferin_,
by Alfred Lyall, vol. ii., pp. 56, 57.] our failure to withdraw the
garrisons of Khartoum and of the Equatorial Provinces in time to
avoid disaster; our failure to relieve Sinkat; and, on the other
hand, our decision to force the Egyptians to evacuate the Soudan in
the face of defeat, a decision which had overturned Cherif Pasha.
With regard to Hicks, we could only tell the truth, which was that
our policy was to limit, not extend, the sphere of our
responsibilities in Egypt; that we followed the advice we got, which
was either for doing exactly what we did, or for a moderate support
of Hicks, which latter we declined. Our opponents were prophesying
after the event. We should have taken a great responsibility had we
absolutely forbidden the Egyptian Government to make use of their
own troops (not including any portion of the army officered by
English officers under Sir Evelyn Wood for the defence of Lower
Egypt) to crush the Mahdi. Hicks had at first defeated the Mahdi in
every encounter and cleared him out of the whole country east of the
Nile. [Footnote: Hicks Pasha complained that directly Lord Dufferin
had left Cairo for Constantinople, he ceased to received adequate
support from the Egyptian Government (_Life of Dufferin_. vol. ii.,
p. 55).] The main point, however, and that of present importance,
was our forcing upon the Egyptians the policy of evacuating the
Soudan after Hicks's defeat. Fitzmaurice wrote: "The Soudan could
not be held without the assistance of England, and it is not a
British interest to hold the Soudan.... The cost of the Soudan is
one of the causes which ruin the Egyptian Treasury." Edmond
Fitzmaurice then went on to explain in his memorandum the reasons
which had forced us to wait until January 4th before we had told the
Egyptian Government as to withdrawal from the interior of the
Soudan, including Khartoum--"that the Ministers must carry out the
advice offered them, or forfeit their places."

'On January 9th we had been told from Khartoum that, if a retreat
was ordered at once, it could be safely effected; and it was on the
next day, the 10th, that we offered the services of Colonels Gordon
and Sir Charles Wilson, which were declined. It was not till January
16th that we were able to induce the Egyptians, even under their new
withdrawal Government, to ask for a British officer, and on the 18th
Gordon was sent. Gordon, however--who had left us to go to Suakim,
and for whom we had drawn up a route from Suakim to Berber, in case
he should go forward, and negotiated with the tribes for his free
passage, and of whom we had telegraphed to Baring, "He does not wish
to go to Cairo"--went to Cairo, "at Baring's" suggestion. He did not
even land at Alexandria, but he was stopped by Baring at Port Said
when on his way to Suakim, Baring sending Sir Evelyn Wood to meet
him. Baring had already given orders, through Nubar, to commence the
evacuation. Gordon had telegraphed to us requesting us to send
Zebehr Pasha to Cyprus--that is, arbitrarily to arrest him and
deport him. Yet, when he reached Cairo, at his own wish he had had
an interview with this very man, and shortly afterwards he
telegraphed to us, asking leave to take him to Khartoum and to make
him virtually Governor of the Soudan, which, indeed, would have been
entirely outside our power; for Forster, supported by the Anti-
Slavery Society and the Conservatives, would at once have upset us
in the House of Commons and reversed the policy. Wolseley had
already begun to press as early as the 23rd for the sending of an
expedition via Suakim and Berber.

'On January 26th Gordon had left for Khartoum without any
communication with us upon the question whether he should go, and
the last thing we had from him before he started was a memorandum in
which, among other things, he said of the Soudan: "Few men can stand
its fearful monotony and deadly climate." He insisted on absolute
authority, and Stewart, who was with him, did the same for him, and,
backing up his chief's arguments at this moment against Zebehr, said
that Zebehr's return would undoubtedly be a misfortune to the
Soudanese, and also a direct encouragement to the slave trade.

'On February 1st we received a telegram from Baring, telling us that
Gordon had taken with him proclamations of evacuation, and other
proclamations less direct, with authority to issue those which he
thought best; but "he fully understands that he is to carry out the
policy of evacuation, in which he expressed to me his entire
agreement. I have sent home by last mail my instructions to him,
which leave no doubt on this point, and which were drafted at his
request and with his full approval.... There is no sort of
difference between his views and those entertained by Nubar Pasha
and myself." Here ended our responsibility, because it must be
remembered that Gordon at Khartoum was entirely outside our reach,
and openly told us that he should not obey our orders when he did
not choose to do so. From this moment we had only to please
ourselves as to whether we should disavow him and say that he was
acting in defiance of instructions, and must be left to his fate, or
whether we should send an expedition to get him out.

'Doubtless "we" wavered between these two opinions. Mr. Gladstone
from the first moment that Gordon broke his orders was for the
former view. Lord Hartington from the first moment was for the
latter. Chamberlain and I supported Hartington, although we fully
recognized Gordon's violations of his orders in much of his action
at Khartoum, where he changed the policy agreed upon with Baring and
with us to that expressed by him in the words, "Smash the Mahdi."
Many members of the Cabinet went backwards and forwards in their
opinion, but the circumstances were of incredible difficulty, and it
must be remembered that we were not sure of being allowed to carry
out either policy; and not only was it difficult to decide which of
the two was right, but it was also difficult to decide whether
either policy was possible--that is to say, whether the one adopted
would not be immediately upset by a Parliamentary vote. The Liberal
party in the House of Commons was divided on the matter, the Whigs
generally wishing for an expedition, and the Radicals being hot for
immediate abandonment of the Soudan, which meant abandonment of
Gordon. The Conservatives were divided; most of them probably wished
for an expedition, but they were afraid to say so; and Randolph
Churchill, whose strength at this time was immense, was in full
agreement with Labouchere and Wilfrid Lawson, and was denouncing the
retention of the Soudan as a violation of the principles of freedom.