The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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Estimating the probabilities of a Continental war, he thought that
Russia came next to England in staying power, because her enormous army
formed a smaller proportion of her working class than in the case of any
other great Continental Power. Notwithstanding his suspicions of her
policy, he spoke of Russia with a deep and discriminating interest born
of numerous visits to all parts of her dominions, and deprecated the
attitude of those Englishmen whose dislike of Russia had done harm to
the cause of sense and truth by exaggeration, and had led them to ignore
'her power and the marvellous patriotism of her people.' 'In the union
of patriotism with religion I know no nation which can approach them.'
There could be no doubt in any reasonable mind of her real and lasting
strength. But her unlimited power of self-deception; the necessary
instability of a policy resting upon the will of a single man; her
misgovernment of Poland and her alienation of Bulgaria, constituted
dangers which it was idle to ignore. He, however, set against these
weaknesses her popularity with all the Slav nations; her influence in
the Baltic provinces of Germany, and even with the Poles, 'who, like
everyone else of Slavonic race, seem born with a hatred of the Teutons.'

'The only foreigner who is known to the Russian peasantry is the
German, and the name for German and for foreigner with the peasantry
is the same, and the hatred of the "dumb men," as they call their
German neighbours, is intense. The peasantry know little of the
English, and if you listen to their sentiments you discover that it
is their belief that one day there will be between _them_ and
Germany a war compared with which, their soldiers say, that of 1870
will be child's play, and that if Germany wins this will not be the
end, but that war after war will follow until Germany is destroyed.'

'Because Russia is very violent in her language and her acts, we
often fail to see how a peasantry, which an aristocratic government
or a government of political economists could never win, is won over
by her to her rule. The Moscow men failed in Bulgaria, but in Poland
they succeeded, and in the Baltic provinces, too, their methods and
their policy have not been wanting, and the problems that have so
long perplexed this country in her relations with Ireland would have
been solved in a week by Samarin, or Miliutin, or Prince
Teherkasky.' [Footnote: _Present Position of European Politics_, pp.
125, 134.]

The popular phrases which dubbed Sir Charles Dilke as 'anti-German' or
'anti-Russian' were never more curiously misapplied. The flaw to be
found even in the mental constitution of Gambetta's great personality,
as shown by his antagonism to Russia, had no part in his friend's
outlook; nor did Sir Charles's friendship for all things French make him
an enemy to Germany, though the possibility of conjuring 'the German
peril' was ever in his mind. But he doubted the wisdom of the wavering
counsels which began with 'lying down to Germany,' and were to be marked
by the cession of Heligoland. Strong men and strong Governments
recognize and respect one another; and in dealing with Germany he
believed that it was necessary never to forget this trite yet valuable
warning.

If personal friendships and political sympathy made Sir Charles, as the
previous chapters have shown, look constantly to France as the natural
ally of Great Britain, and also her most desirable ally, neither
friendships nor sympathies could blind him to the constant danger
arising from the instability of French Administrations, and the
consequent difficulty of relying on any certainty in arrangements
projected for joint action. Of this the events connected with Egypt had
been a most conspicuous illustration. Nor were these the only dangers:
for the best friends of France were painfully aware of the immense
influence exercised by powerful financial interests both in her domestic
and in her foreign affairs, and by the growth of fierce antagonisms on
home questions which seemed to tear the country asunder and paralyze her
position abroad. Numerous questions, not only in Egypt, but elsewhere in
Africa; the old quarrels about the Newfoundland fisheries, on which Sir
Charles was constantly putting his finger as a possible cause of a
serious quarrel; and increasing jealousies in the Pacific, contributed
to produce a condition of permanent tension for many years in the
relations of the two countries, until the Fashoda incident in 1898
brought a crisis which cleared the air. Two of the ablest men in France,
M. Jules Ferry and M. Hanotaux, were, to say the least, not friendly to
Great Britain, and a plan which Sir Julian Pauncefote [Footnote: Then
Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and afterwards Lord
Pauncefote and Ambassador at Washington.] had suggested in 1884, of
attempting to bring all outstanding questions with France into one great
settlement, fell still-born, to be vivified, but twenty years later, by
Lord Lansdowne in more favourable circumstances.

In all possible complications Sir Charles relied much on Italy's close
friendship for England--notwithstanding her entry into the Triple
Alliance--a friendship due to permanent gratitude for the support which
she had received from Lord Russell, Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Palmerston,
at the crisis of her fate in 1859; and also to the offer to her of a
joint occupation of Egypt in 1882--an offer rejected indeed, but
fruitful of good feeling.

But more important even than any question of alliances was, he insisted,
the necessity that Great Britain should know her own mind, and have a
definite policy in regard to the future of Constantinople and of Egypt,
and in regard to the Belgian guarantee. Army organization itself
obviously depended on policy, and in this connection there was a danger
at home greater, perhaps, than any originating abroad.

'It is too much the case with us in England,' he wrote, 'that when
we are occupied with the consideration of the Irish problem, or
dealing with the circumstances which most often lead to the rise and
fall of Ministries, we allow the foreign affairs of the country to
be transacted in the dark: with an absence of control which, owing
to the efficiency of our Foreign Office, may produce no ill, but
also with an absence of knowledge which cannot be advantageous. On
the other hand, when some awkward circumstance arises, a
disproportionate weight is attached to it by those who have wilfully
remained in ignorance of the true position, and the diplomacy of the
country is suddenly unduly hampered by criticism which rests on no
foundation of fact.'

Speaking from experience, he uttered a warning as to the danger of
uninstructed debates and foolish questions--then so frequent--on foreign
affairs in the House of Commons, and the harm done by them abroad. He
spoke of the tendency to take advantage of some rebuff in foreign
affairs for party motives, and urged that, as secrecy was not to be
hoped for, members should at least try to inform themselves and the
electorate, and avoid 'periods of ignorant calm' or 'equally ignorant
panic.' In this connection he never ceased to insist on the weakness of
our position abroad, owing to the deficient strength and want of
organization of our army; the small results shown for the immense amount
spent; the insufficient stock of arms and ammunition, and the poor
reserves of rifles; and he urged that, whatever our economies, none
should fall upon equipment or reserves of material. Such economies he
stigmatized as a 'horrible treachery to the interests of the country.'
[Footnote: The military situation as a whole is discussed in chapter vi.
of _The Present Position of European Politics_, 'The United Kingdom.']

CHAPTER XLIX

PUBLIC LIFE AND RETURN TO PARLIAMENT

1886-1894

Pathways of return to political life soon began to open to Sir Charles
Dilke. In November, 1886, Mr. Labouchere wrote:

'It looks as though Chamberlain will be the scapegoat. At present
his going over bag and baggage to the Whigs has utterly disgusted
the Radicals. As long as Gladstone lives things will go on fairly
with us, but after--the deluge. The Radical M.P.'s are regretting
your not being in, as they would have accepted you as the leader.'

In the autumn of 1886 the Council of the Chelsea Liberal Association
unanimously asked him to be their candidate (for Parliament), but he
replied that he could not serve the borough to his own satisfaction
while so large a section of the public still attached weight to the
'gross calumnies' with which he had been assailed. He was, however, from
the autumn of 1887, increasingly active in local affairs, both on the
Vestry and the Board of Guardians, [Footnote: In the winter of 1888, Sir
Charles was unanimously elected Chairman of the Board of Guardians, as
also of the Vestry ('as was the case in subsequent years'). He wrote to
Mr. Chamberlain: 'I've taken the chairmanship of the Chelsea Board of
Guardians, so am keeping my hand in on the prevention of obstruction. I
am forced to begin gradually with them, and have only as yet ruled that
I cannot _let two speak at once_.'] and also on the newly formed Library
Committee, on which he served for three years, till both the local
libraries were established and opened.

To M. Joseph Reinach he wrote in April, 1887: 'I have a splendid
position as a writer, and writing projects which will occupy me for
three years at least; and if any great calamity should occur which would
force me back into public life--such as war with Russia, for example--I
do not know that I should like the change.' Nor was the political scene
attractive at this moment. His friends were tearing each other asunder;
and not only his political friends--both parties were rent with faction.

'On October 1st, 1886, Chamberlain called and gave me an interesting
picture of the political state. He seemed to think that he could
keep Mr. Gladstone out for life, and was persuaded that Randolph
would give him all he wanted and leave Hartington and Salisbury in
the lurch. Randolph had promised him to have an anti-Jingo foreign
policy, leaving Turkey to her fate, and to pacify Ireland with the
National Councils scheme, modified into two Councils, or into
Provincial Councils, to suit Ulster; and Churchill had also promised
him procedure reform--that is, a sharper closure--and a three-acres-
and-a-cow policy for England.

'There was an article in the _Morning Post_, October 2nd,
representing Churchill's democratic views, but in the later autumn
(while Chamberlain was away abroad) Churchill was beaten in the
Cabinet both on his Irish scheme and also on the amendments which he
proposed to make in the Local Government (England) Bill in the
three-acres-and-a-cow direction. On December 17th Chamberlain, who
had returned from abroad, came to lunch with me, furious at the
defeat of Randolph Churchill. He found no fault with the Irish
policy' (which was strongly coercionist), 'or with the foreign
policy of the Cabinet; but he was anxious to defeat them on their
Local Government (England) Bill, if it was not altered back again to
suit his policy. Ultimately a compromise on this matter was
arranged.'

For a moment it seemed as if Chamberlain's anger with the Tory party was
going to drive him back into his old associations. On December 31st,

'Chamberlain and John Morley came in together to lunch, Chamberlain
having been asked and Morley not, and it was somewhat startling.
"Chamberlain thinks that he can get Mr. Gladstone by the bait of
'Four times Prime Minister' to accept his terms. On the other hand,
Mr. Gladstone thinks that he can detach Chamberlain from Hartington.
Conferences are sitting: Harcourt, Herschell, and Morley, meeting
Chamberlain and Trevelyan. Hartington is crusty at this. Chamberlain
has threatened Hartington with the consequences if he, as he wants
to, supports a reactionary Local Government Bill of Salisbury's.
Chamberlain has written to Salisbury as to this Local Government
Bill, and received a dilatory reply." He told me the whole long
history of Randolph's troubles with the Cabinet which preceded his
resignation; first on procedure, as to which he finally obtained his
own way, secondly as to foreign affairs, thirdly as to allotments,
fourthly as to Local Government, and fifthly as to finance.
Churchill always stood absolutely alone, and, being in a minority of
one, could only get his way at all by continually tendering his
resignation. At last he resigned once too often, as it was of course
on the wrong subject; Salisbury jumped at it, and accepted it in a
cool letter when Churchill did not mean it in the least. It was only
the classical annual resignation of a Chancellor of the Exchequer
against his colleagues of the army and navy. The Budget always
involves the resignation either of the Secretary of State for War
and First Lord of the Admiralty, or else of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, but hitherto they have always managed to make it up.'

Within a fortnight Sir Charles 'was hearing from all sides about the
Round Table Conferences which were intended to reunite the Liberal
party.... From Chamberlain I heard that his view was to bring about a
_modus vivendi_ only, under which the Conservative Government was to be
turned out on some side-issue. Mr. Gladstone would become Prime Minister
for the fourth time, if the Irish would consent to take Local Government
and a Land Bill first, and to leave Home Rule over. He thought that Mr.
Gladstone was not unwilling, but that there would be difficulty in
getting the Irish to consent. Morley and Harcourt were, according to
Chamberlain, friendly to his suggestions, and Hartington hostile, not
trusting Mr. Gladstone.'

On January 15th, 1887, Sir Charles wrote to Mr. Chesson [Footnote: See
note, p. 273.] that

'Chamberlain and Morley were both going to make conciliatory
speeches, but that nothing had really been done at Harcourt's house,
every difficulty having been "reserved." There could be no doubt
that several of the five who were there meeting were anxious to keep
things open, on the chance of Mr. Gladstone not remaining in
sufficiently good health to continue to lead the party. The
independent Liberals were vexed at the Conferences. Willy Bright
called on me, and said that obviously the great difficulty of the
moment was "to keep Mr. Gladstone in the Gladstonian party." Morley,
who also called on me, casually observed, "Harcourt was never a Home
Ruler. The only Home Rulers in the last Cabinet were Lord Granville
and Spencer, in addition to myself and Mr. Gladstone." When we
remember the views of Spencer in May, 1885, his violent Home Rule,
which dates from July, 1885, is laughable.'

'On the 15th I had a long and curious conversation with Chamberlain
about the matter. He said that the articles which had been appearing
in the _Birmingham Post_ about his own position were inspired by
him--that he and the other members of the Conference were telling
the newspapers that everything was going on swimmingly, but that the
whole thing was in reality a sham on both sides. Parnell was
frightened at Mr. Gladstone's declining health, and Mr. Gladstone
did not wish to end his life by having smashed his party, so that
the Conference was willingly continued, although it was doing
nothing. It was the wish of all concerned in it to be at the point
of an apparent reconciliation whenever Mr. Gladstone might become
incapacitated, but he, Chamberlain, was firmly decided not to take
office under Mr. Gladstone.

'Chamberlain said that Randolph Churchill on the previous night had
asked him, "Shall I come over?" but that he, Chamberlain, had
replied that he advised him not to, being afraid that Randolph would
play for the lead of the party, and not liking the notion of having
him for leader. He had advised Randolph to simulate moderation
towards Lord Salisbury, in spite of his anger at the Duke of Norfolk
and the members of the Conservative party who, since his quarrel
with the Government, had been "attacking his private character."'

'On February 4th, 1887, Chamberlain again came to see me, and I
noted in my diary that he was "very sore against Labouchere and
others."

'On February 13th, Morley called and said that the Round Table
Conference was hopeless, although they were to meet at dinner on the
14th, and once again after that. He said, "Both sides are very
cross, and each side asks, 'What is to become of the other?'"

'On the same day Chance, M.P., told me, he being the attorney of the
Nationalist party, that O'Shea was going forward with his divorce
case against Parnell, and that Parnell had no defence possible. I
have never known what was the reason of the immense delays which
afterwards occurred.'

Parties now began to settle into their new groupings.

'On March 2nd, 1887, Chamberlain came to lunch, and told me a good
deal about the failure of the Round Table Conference, but it was not
till April 3rd that he told me the whole story. On this latter day
Deakin, the Chief Secretary of Victoria, and most interesting of
Colonists, was with me; and Chamberlain came in before Deakin had
gone, and, talking with his customary frankness, discussed the whole
matter before the astonished Victorian. There had been a sad split
caused by a letter which he had written, and which he admitted was
an indiscreet one, to the _Baptist_, as to Welsh Disestablishment. A
hint was then let fall that the Gladstonians were going to negotiate
with Hartington direct. On this Chamberlain went off to Hartington
and got from him a letter to say that Hartington would not negotiate
himself, but that Chamberlain was in possession of his views.
Efforts were then made to get Chamberlain to meet Mr. Gladstone.
Chamberlain agreed to do so, but not to ask for the meeting. At
length a meeting was fixed at Mr. Gladstone's request for the
morrow, Monday, April 4th. It was settled that at this Mr. Gladstone
would ask what Chamberlain had to propose. Chamberlain was going to
reply that Mr. Gladstone knew his views, and to then ask whether
they were accepted, and he knew perfectly that nothing would come of
it. He had on the same day, April 3rd, met Randolph at Mrs. Jeune's
at lunch. They had walked away together, when Randolph had proposed
a Chamberlain-Hartington-Randolph league against both parties. This
had tempted Chamberlain, but was an idle suggestion, as Hartington
and Randolph could never work together.'

In the autumn of 1887 Sir Charles and Lady Dilke went to Constantinople,
and he writes:

'I had received at this time a letter from James, in which he said
that Mr. Gladstone had sent for him to talk to him about me in the
friendliest way, and, Mr. Gladstone having called, I wrote to him,
and transmitted some messages from the Sultan, in the following
letter:

"Athens,
"_October 14th_.

'"I have never thanked you except verbally through James for a kind
and pleasant message which I had from you by James and Chamberlain
last session.

'"At Constantinople last Friday, and again to Lady Dilke last
Monday, the Sultan said that he wished complimentary messages
conveyed to you. The Greek Patriarch said the same thing to us on
Tuesday and Wednesday. My wife told both that she hardly knew you,
and I replied that I was unlikely to see you for some time, but
would see that the messages reached you.

'"The Greeks on the one hand, and the Bulgarians on the other, are
now very friendly with the Sultan, but I regret to find that the
dislike between the Greeks and the Bulgarians is as strong as ever.
The common preference of both for the Sultan over Russia has not
sufficed to draw them together. The split between the Bulgarian
Government and the Exarch of Bulgaria will, however, probably draw
Bulgaria closer to the Phanar."'

Mr. Gladstone replied, on October 24th, that his message to Sir Charles
expressed his real feeling, which he should have been glad to find other
modes of expressing. He added that if the Sultan spoke sincerely in the
message which Sir Charles transmitted,

'he must be acting as a good Christian: for Hobart Pasha when here,
as a spy on Fehmi, told me the Sultan believed I was his greatest
enemy. I have never been so great an enemy to him as he to himself.
I have never had extreme views about Turkey. Had I the settling of
the affair, I should be disposed to keep the Turks in
Constantinople, and not to let Home Rule when freely and honestly
given mean total severance. But the materials of convulsion are, I
fear, slowly gathering in that quarter, and Russia, shut out from
her just claim to the passage of the Straits, means to have the
mastery of them. I always grieve over the feud of Hellene and Slav,
out of which much mischief may come. The situation here is
favourable to those who view the Irish Question as you do. The
relations with Chamberlain have been rather painful. I think he has
developed since the schism of March, 1886, even greater speaking and
debating talents than he had shown before. I think also that the
organization of dissentient Liberalism, in which he has borne so
large a part, has been enormously favourable to his general creed as
an advanced Radical, whereas Hartington with his weak-kneed men has
been utterly hoodwinked, and hoodwinked by himself. On the other
hand, I own myself amazed at Chamberlain's proceedings during the
last month. Everyone took a favourable view of his accepting the
American mission; [Footnote: Mr. Chamberlain was corresponding with
Sir Charles in regard to his mission, for which he started on
October 29th, 1887. It had for its object the negotiation of a
treaty with America on several outstanding questions.] but a man of
one-tenth of his talent ought to have seen the folly of widening
breaches and exasperating all passions as a preliminary to charging
himself with a business that eminently requires a serene atmosphere.

'We witnessed at Nottingham an enthusiasm literally the greatest I
have ever seen.'

'On my return to England before the middle of November, 1887, I
received a letter from the Cinderford Liberal Association, in the
Forest of Dean, in which they referred to an attempt which had been
made to induce me to stand for the Forest of Dean when Blake retired
in July, 1887, and went on to press me to go there to speak....
After the completion of the army articles and of the book, I
intended to set to work on a new version of my _Greater Britain_.
This afterwards became the book published under the title of
_Problems of Greater Britain_.'

On October 28th, 1887, 'Chamberlain wrote ... "Mr. Gladstone's last
speech shows distinct signs of old age. I think matters cannot long
remain in their present state, and the whole policy of England--both
foreign and domestic--may be greatly altered."'

On reaching Washington, Chamberlain wrote: 'I do not find the "civilized
world" so much pro-Irish as Mr. Gladstone would have us believe. On the
contrary, I have as yet only met two Americans who have expressed
themselves favourable to Mr. Gladstone's policy. They are, generally
speaking, inclined to some concession in the direction of State rights,
but they are entirely opposed to anything in the nature of a self-
governing colony, and they have no personal liking for the Irish. Above
all, they are horrified at Mr. Gladstone's recent utterances about law
and order, and say openly that he must have lost his head.'

'On January 4th, 1888, I made a speech in which I laid down my
position as regarded Parliamentary candidature. It was made in
presiding at the first dinner of the Hammersmith Central Liberal
Club. About the same time I received requests to stand as candidate
for Merthyr and for the northern division of the borough of West
Ham, which I declined, pointing to my Hammersmith speech without
giving further reasons.'

'About this time, my son being now at Rugby, we went down to see him
and lunched with the Percivals.'

In the new session of 1888 Mr. Ritchie introduced his Local Government
Bill, which (as Sir Charles had predicted to the Chelsea electors in
1885) was much influenced by the Liberal scheme that lay accessible in
an official pigeonhole. The outline given by the new President of the
Local Government Board in introducing the measure showed, however, that
it fell short of expectation, and Sir Charles immediately criticized the
project in an evening paper without waiting for publication of the text.
When the Bill was published, he issued notes upon it, in concert with
Mr. Cobb, M.P. for the Rugby Division, condemning the absence of any
attempt to 'reform and revivify the parish.'