The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

S >> Stephen Gwynn >> The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50

'"As regards Radical programme I stuck to the terms of your speech,
namely, first, compulsory powers for acquiring land to be inserted
in the Local Government Bill. Second, freedom to speak and vote as
we liked on questions of free schools. He boggled a good deal over
this, and said it was very weakening to a Government; but I told him
we could not honestly do less, and that I expected a large majority
of Liberals were in favour of the proposal. We did not come to any
positive conclusion, nor do I think that he has absolutely made up
his mind, but the tone of the conversation implied that he was
seeking to work with us, and had no idea of doing without us. At the
close he spoke of his intention to give up the leadership soon after
the new Parliament met. I protested, and said that if he did this
our whole attitude would be changed, and we must and should ask from
Hartington much larger concessions than we were prepared to accept
from him. I expect the force of circumstances will keep him in his
place till the end, though I believe he is sincerely anxious to be
free."' [Footnote: Mr. Gladstone's account of this interview is to
be found in Morley's _Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii., p. 224.]

On October 17th Chamberlain wrote 'on another letter of Mr. Gladstone's,
which I do not possess:

'"I do not think it is wise to do anything about Mr G.'s letter on
Ireland. I agree with your recollection of the matter. But Mr. G. is
not far wrong, and we have our hands full of other things. The Irish
business is not the first just now."

'About this time I was taken as arbitrator in a considerable number
of disputed candidatures, in most of which I acted by myself, and in
one, the Walworth case, with Chamberlain and John Morley.'

'I had been to see Manning, at his wish, with my wife, and he had
spoken kindly about Chamberlain, on which I wrote to Chamberlain
about him; and Chamberlain replied:

'"Our experience in the Irish Question has not been encouraging. We
understood the Cardinal cordially to approve of my scheme of
National Councils and to be ready to use his influence in any way to
promote its acceptance. On our part we were prepared to press the
question at any sacrifice, and to make the adoption of our scheme a
condition of our membership of any future Government. And yet, when
the time came to ask the Cardinal for his help, he refused
categorically so small a matter as an introduction to the Irish
Bishops, and, as I understood, on the ground that the Conservatives
were in office. Would not the same influence prevail in the matter
of education? Besides, I do not see what Cardinal Manning has to
offer. The majority of English Catholics are Conservative, and no
concession that it is in our power to make would secure their
support for the Liberal party. I am therefore of opinion that the
differences between us can only be decided by the constituencies."

'The Cardinal wrote concerning Chamberlain:

'"Mr. Chamberlain was good enough to send me his scheme for Local
Government in Ireland, in which in the main I agree, and did all in
my power to promote its acceptance. The Government went out, and you
asked of me to promote what I called a 'Midlothian in Ireland,'
under the eyes of the new Lord Lieutenant. (I wrote on this to
Chamberlain: 'I answered this at the time and have done so again
now.') Did Mr. Chamberlain understand my agreement with his scheme
as carrying any consequences beyond that scheme or any solidarity in
such an aggressive action against any party whatsoever in power?...
In the matter in which he was courteous enough to make known his
scheme to me, I have promoted it where and in ways he does not
know."

'In a day or two there came another letter from Manning:

'"It is true you did disclaim a Midlothian; but I told you that I
know my Irishmen too well, and believe that even Paul and Barnabas
would have been carried away. Moreover, if you had been silent as
fishes, the moral effect would have been a counter-move. Your
humility does not admit this. So you must absolve me for my one
word."'

Mr. Chamberlain commented in strong terms on the diplomatic methods of
the great ecclesiastic. The 'countermove' implied that there had been a
Tory move in the direction of Home Rule with a view to securing Irish
support. Manning believed, as Mr. Gladstone also believed, that the
Tories meant business; later it became clear that they had no
constructive Irish policy at all. Yet the question grew daily more
pressing.

'At the end of October Chamberlain wrote:

'"I had a note from Mr. G. this morning urging unity, and saying he
had an instinct that Irish questions 'might elbow out all others.'
This makes me uneasy. I hear from another source that he is trying
to get Parnell's ideas in detail. It is no use."'

To Mr. Gladstone, Chamberlain wrote, on October 26th, that he could not
see his way at all about Ireland. He emphasized his view that Ireland
had better go altogether than the responsibilities of a nominal union be
accepted, and that probably the majority of Liberals would not give more
than English Local Government; and that, if possible, Irish and English
Local Government should be dealt with together. Unless the principle of
the acquisition of land by local authorities was accepted, neither he
nor Dilke nor Morley, nor probably Lefevre, could join the Government.

The strife between Chamberlain and Hartington was maintained, and Mr.
Gladstone interposed by a letter to the Chief Whip, in which he advised
the intervention of Lord Granville in view of 'his great tact, prudence,
and experience.' On November 5th Mr. Chamberlain wrote to Sir Charles,
enclosing Mr. Gladstone's letter, and adding:

'Mr. G.'s is the most definite proof I have had yet that he does not
mean to quarrel with us. Lord Granville has just been here. He told
me nothing about Ireland, but _I am convinced_ that Mr. Gladstone
has been trying to make a treaty all to himself. It must fail.'

No such treaty was made, and on the eve of the General Election of
November, 1885, Parnell issued an instruction that the Irish in England
should vote Tory.

'On Tuesday, November 24th, our poll took place in Chelsea, and on
Wednesday, November 25th, the count, which showed that I was
returned, although only by a small majority.... The Irish had voted
for Whitmore, the Conservative candidate, my opponent, in
consequence of the issue at the last moment of the bill, "Mr.
Parnell's order--Vote for the Conservative, Mr. Whitmore. Irishmen,
do your duty and obey your leader."'

'I had been summoned by Chamberlain, who desired a meeting of our
party within the party, in a letter in which he said:

'"It does not look as if the Tories would have the chance of doing
much mischief; but I should much like them to be in for a couple of
years before we try again, and then I should 'go for the Church.'"'

Dilke notes that Chamberlain was persuaded to drop this line of attack,
on which he had already embarked. Disestablishment of the Church of
England had proved to be anything but a good election cry; the ransom
doctrine had not brought in more votes than it lost; and the 366 certain
Liberal seats with twenty-six doubtful ones which Mr. Schnadhorst
counted up at the end of October were now an illusion of the past. The
election was generally taken as a set-back to the extreme Radicals.

'On Saturday, December 5th, we met at Highbury, and remained in
council until Monday, December 7th. Mr. Gladstone, we were informed
(that is Morley, Lefevre, and myself), had presented a Home Rule
scheme to the Queen, who had shown it to Lord Salisbury, and
Randolph Churchill had told Lady Dorothy Nevill, who had told
Chamberlain, but no statement had been made by Mr. Gladstone to his
former colleagues.'

CHAPTER XLV

BEGINNING OF THE HOME RULE SPLIT

DECEMBER, 1885, TO FEBRUARY, 1886

After the meeting of Radicals, December 5th to 7th, at Highbury, Sir
Charles went back to London.

'On Wednesday, December 9th, I spoke at the Central Poor Law
Conference.... I carried the assembly, which was one of Poor Law
Guardians, and therefore Conservative, along with me in the opinion
that it was desirable to elect directly the whole of the new bodies
in local government, instead of having either a special
representation of Magistrates or any system of indirect election or
choice of Aldermen.'

He argued in the belief that the next session might still see a Tory
Government in power. 'If the Conservatives propose a Local Government
Bill,' he said at Chelsea, 'it will be our Local Government Bill which
they will propose.' He notes: 'They proposed two-thirds of it, and
carried one-third, in 1888.'

'At this moment, not knowing how far Mr. Gladstone was willing to go
in the Home Rule direction, and that there was, therefore, any
chance of his securing the real support of the Irish party, I was
opposed to the attempt to turn out the Government and form a Liberal
Administration resting on the support of a minority, and I spoke in
that sense to my constituents. My view was that it would be
disastrous to advanced Liberalism to form a Government resting on a
minority, as it would be impossible to carry any legislation not of
a Conservative type.'

'Chamberlain wrote to me on December 15th, with regard to one of my
speeches, that I was too polite to the Tories. "This," he added, "is
where I never err."

'On December 18th I received some copies of important letters. Mr.
Gladstone's scheme had got out on the 16th, [Footnote: Lord Morley's
_Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii., pp. 264,265, shows that the "scheme
got out" owing to Sir Charles Dilke's speech to his constituents.
Mr. Herbert Gladstone came to town on the 14th partly in consequence
of a speech "made a few days before by Sir Charles Dilke," and the
talk it caused. The speech was "taken to mean" that the two Radical
leaders preferred keeping the Tories in power "in the expectation
that some moderate measures of reform might be got from them, and
that meanwhile they would become committed with the Irishmen.
Tactics of this kind were equivalent to the exclusion of Mr.
Gladstone, for in every letter that he wrote he pronounced the Irish
Question urgent." Accordingly, on December 16th there came the
unauthorized version of Mr. Gladstone's scheme, given to the Press
through his son.] and on the 17th he wrote to Lord Hartington a
letter of which the latter sent me a long extract. [Footnote: The
letter, which has been printed both by Lord Morley and by Mr.
Bernard Holland, is that in which Mr. Gladstone detailed the
"conditions of an admissible plan" of Home Rule, and expressed a
determination "on no account to do or say anything which would
enable the Nationalists to establish rival biddings between us." It
is so germane to this discussion that part of it is again printed in
the appendix following this chapter (p. 208).]

'At the same time I received a letter from Chamberlain in which he
said:

'"Have I turned round? Perhaps I have, but it is unconsciously.
Honestly I thought you went beyond us in your speeches, but I feel
that your judgment is very likely better and certainly as good as
mine, and I should have said nothing but for the flood of letters I
received.

'"The situation changes every minute. The announcement of Mr. G.'s
plan makes it much more serious; and I altered my speech somewhat
to-night to meet it, but unless I have failed in my endeavour I have
not said anything which will embarrass you, and I had you constantly
in mind throughout. Please read it carefully and let me know exactly
what you think and how far I have succeeded. I would not put you in
a hole for a King's ransom if I could avoid it.

'"I agree entirely with you as to dissolution. The Tory game is to
exaggerate Mr. Gladstone's performance and to go to the country on
the 'integrity of the Empire.' I have endeavoured to reserve our
position, and, as to taking office, to make it clear that we are
opposed to it, unless we can get a big majority, which is
impossible. Unless I am mistaken, the Gladstone business will
exclusively occupy attention the next few days, and my speech will
pass without much notice. But again I say that I have tried (and I
hope and believe I have succeeded) to avoid anything which may
appear like contradiction or opposition to your line.

'"Finally, my view is that Mr. G.'s Irish scheme is death and
damnation; that we must try and stop it; that we must not openly
commit ourselves against it yet; that we must let the situation
shape itself before we finally decide; that the Whigs are our
greatest enemies, and that we must not join them if we can help it;
that we cannot take office, but must not offer assistance to the
Tories publicly; that we must say all we can as to their shameful
bargain and surrender of principle; that even if they bring in good
measures they will also bring in bad, which we shall be forced to
oppose; and that the less we speak in public for the present, the
better."

'I had told Chamberlain that his speech had given the impression
that he had turned round.'

Sir Charles, in a further speech to his constituents at Chelsea,
reaffirmed the principles which he had already publicly laid down.

'In speaking on the night of Friday, December 18th, at Chelsea, I
declared that we ought not to allow ourselves to be driven either
forward or backward from the principles that we had put forward with
regard to Ireland, and that our course should be to continue to
propose the measures which we had previously proposed without
reference to the Parnellite support of Conservative candidates. The
scheme which I had put forward at the General Election was the one
to which I adhered. If it had been generally adopted when first
suggested, it would have received very large support in Ireland.'

He then quotes from the report of his speech this sentence: 'We are told
that now it is too late, but for my part I should not be inclined to
recede from it because it does not meet with general support.'

On this Chamberlain wrote:

'_December 19th_, 1885.

'My Dear Dilke,

'The papers this morning seem to show that I have succeeded in
avoiding any kind of conflict with you. Your own speech was most
judicious. What a mess Mr. G. has made of it! What will be the end
of it all? Why the d---- could he not wait till Parnell had
quarrelled with the Tories? I fancy that a large number, perhaps the
majority, of Liberals will support _any_ scheme of Mr. G.'s, but I
doubt if the country will endorse it. The Tories, if they are wise,
will throw everything else aside and go for the "Empire in danger,"
dissolving at the earliest possible opportunity. The Liberals would
be divided and distracted, and I think we shall be beaten into a
cocked hat. Our game--yours and mine--is to avoid definite committal
for the moment. Circumstances change every hour. Harcourt is coming
to me on Saturday and Sunday.'

'On the next day Chamberlain sent me a copy of a letter to him from
Mr. Gladstone:

'"_December 18th_, 1885.

'"My Dear Chamberlain,

'"I thank you very much for your references to me in your speech
last night.

'"In this really serious crisis we must all make efforts to work
together; and I gladly recognize your effort.

'"Moreover, reading as well as writing hastily, I think we are very
much in accord.

'"Both reflection and information lead me to think that time is very
precious, and that the hour-glass has begun to run for a definitive
issue.

'"But I am certainly and strongly of opinion that only a Government
can act, that especially this Government should act, and that we
should now be helping and encouraging them to act as far as we
legitimately can.

'"In reply to a proposal of the Central News to send me an
interviewer, I have this morning telegraphed to London: 'From my
public declarations at Edinburgh _with respect to the Government_,
you will easily see that I have no communication to make.'

'"Be _very incredulous_ as to any statements about my views and
opinions. Rest assured that I have done and said _nothing_ which in
any way points to negotiation or separate action. The time may come,
but I hope it will not. At present I think most men, but I do not
include you, are in too great a hurry to make up their minds. Much
may happen before (say) January 12th. The first thing of all is to
know _what will the Government do?_ I know they have been in
communication with Parnellites, and I hope with Parnell.

'"I remain always,

'"Sincerely yours,

'"W. E. Gladstone."

'I fancy that I was the cause of Chamberlain receiving this letter,
as I had told Brett (who at once wrote to Hawarden) that Chamberlain
was angry at not having been consulted.'

'On December 21st we went down to Pyrford, which was now just
finished, to stay there for the first time, and remained until
Christmas Eve. On December 22nd I received a letter from Chamberlain
from Highbury.'

In this letter Mr. Chamberlain chronicled Sir William Harcourt's
visit--who, after 'raving against the old man and the old cause,' had
left in better spirits. Mr. Chamberlain was in much doubt whether Mr.
Gladstone would go on or would retire after Lord Hartington's letter to
the Press, [Footnote: This is a reference to Lord Hartington's letter in
the Press of December 21st, 1885, which he alludes to, in writing to Mr.
Gladstone, as "published this morning" (_Life of Duke of Devonshire_,
vol. ii., p. 103).] and had written to Mr. Gladstone to say that he did
not think the country would stand an independent Parliament. He saw
nothing between National Councils and Separation, and wondered whether
Mr. Gladstone thought that--in the event of a separate Irish
Legislature--Ireland could be governed by a single Chamber, and England
and Scotland by two.

'On December 26th Chamberlain wrote:

'"I do not envy you the opportunity of speaking on the 31st. It is a
dangerous time, and I am inclined myself to 'lie low.' Is it
desirable to say anything? If it is right to speak at all, I think
something like a full expose of motifs is necessary, and I put the
following before you as the heads of a discourse.

'"At present there are two different ideas, for settlement of
Ireland, before the public imagination, viz.: (A) National Councils;
(B) Separation.

'"As to A, the fundamental principles are supremacy of Imperial
Parliament and extension of local liberties on municipal lines. It
is a feasible, practical plan. But it has the fatal objection that
the Nationalists will not accept it. It is worse than useless to
impose on them benefits which they repudiate. As to B, everyone
professes to reject the idea of separation. If it were adopted, I
have no doubt it would lead to the adoption of the conscription in
Ireland; then to the conscription in England, and increase of the
navy; fresh fortifications on the west coast, and finally a war in
which Ireland would have the support of some other Power, perhaps
America or France. Between these alternatives there is the hazy idea
of Home Rule visible in Morley's speech and Gladstone's assumed
intention. It is dangerous and mischievous to use vague language on
such a subject. Those who speak ought to say exactly what they mean.
It will be found that Home Rule includes an independent separate
Irish Parliament, and that all guarantees and securities, whether
for the protection of minorities or for the security of the Empire,
are absolutely illusory.

'"At the same time we are to continue to receive Irish
representatives at Westminster in the Imperial Parliament, and we
shall not even get rid of their obstruction and interference here by
the concession of their independence in Ireland. To any arrangement
of this kind, unworkable as I believe it to be, I prefer
separation--to which, indeed, it is only a step.

'"Is there any other possible arrangement which would secure the
real integrity of the Empire for Imperial purposes, while allowing
Irishmen to play the devil as they like in Ireland?

'"Yes, there is. But it involves the entire recasting of the British
Constitution and the full and complete adoption of the American
system. According to this view you might have five Parliaments, for
England, Scotland, Wales, Ulster, [Footnote: This is the first
suggestion of a scheme under which part of Ireland would be
separated from the rest.] and the three other provinces combined.
Each Parliament to have its own Ministry, responsible to it and
dependent on its vote. In addition an Imperial Parliament or
Reichsrath with another Ministry dealing with foreign and colonial
affairs, army, navy, post-office, and customs.

'"To carry out this arrangement a Supreme Court or similar tribunal
must be established, to decide on the respective attributes of the
several local legislatures and the limits of their authority.

'"The House of Lords must go, or you must establish a separate
Second Chamber for each legislature.

'"It is impossible to suppose that the authority of the Crown could
survive these changes for long. One or other of the local
legislatures would refuse to pay the expense, and, as it would have
some kind of local militia at its back, it is not likely that the
other legislatures would engage in civil war for the sake of
reimposing the nominal authority of the Sovereign.

'"As a Radical all these changes have no terrors for me, but is it
conceivable that such a clean sweep of existing institutions could
be made in order to justify the Irish demand for Home Rule? Yet this
is the only form of federal government which offers any prospect of
permanence or union for Imperial purposes.

'"If English Liberals once see clearly that indefinite talk about
Home Rule means either separation or the entire recasting of the
whole system of English as well as Irish government, they will then
be in a position to decide their policy. At present they are being
led by the _Daily News_ and Morley and Co. to commit themselves in
the dark."

'Next day, December 27th, Chamberlain wrote:

'"The situation (Irish) is now as follows:

'"(1) The Government have been informed that Mr. Gladstone thinks
this great question should not be prejudiced by party feeling, and
that he will support them in any attempt they may make to give Home
Rule to Ireland.

'"(2) Mr. Gladstone has been informed that the Government will see
him damned first.

'"(3) The Irishmen have been informed that Mr. Gladstone will not
move a step till the Government have spoken or until the Irish have
put them in a minority.

'"(4) In either of these events he will do his best to effect a
thorough settlement. 'He will go forward or fall.'

'"(5) I gather that he will not, as he ought, challenge Parnell to
say publicly exactly what he wants, but that he will propose his own
scheme, which is an Irish legislature with a veto reserved to the
Crown--to be exercised on most questions on the advice of the Irish
Ministry, but on questions of religion, commerce, and taxation, on
the advice of the Imperial Ministry.

'"(6) The Irish are suspicious, and have not made up their minds.
Parnell says nothing, but the rank and file are inclined to give Mr.
Gladstone his chance and turn him out again if they are not
satisfied with his proposals.

'"The Tories hope to get out Mr. Gladstone's intentions in debate on
Address, and threaten another immediate dissolution if they are
placed in a minority; I think, however, their true policy is and
will be to let Mr. Gladstone come in and make his proposals. This
will divide the Liberal party, and in all probability alarm and
disgust the country.

'"Was there ever such a situation? Test Mr. Gladstone's scheme in
practice. The Irish Ministry insist on necessity of restoring Irish
manufactures by protection. The Imperial Parliament veto their
proposals. Thereupon the Irish representatives join the Tories and
turn out the Government on a foreign and colonial debate, the same
Government being in a great majority on all English and Scotch
questions. How long can such a state of things last? Mr. Gladstone
will have the support of a portion of the Liberal party--Morley, for
instance, Storey, the Crofters' representatives, and probably some
of the Labour representatives. How many more will he get? Will he
have the majority of the Radicals? Will he have the majority of the
Liberals, following the party leader like sheep? It is curious to
see the _Scotsman_ and the _Leeds Mercury_ leading in this
direction. What are we to do? Certainly I will not join a Government
pledged to such a mad and dangerous proposal. But this may mean
isolation for a long time.