The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2

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APPENDIX

The Memoir gives the following account of the proposals made for defence
of the North-West Frontier in India in the spring of 1885, and some
observations arising from them:

'The general idea was to hold the northern route by an entrenched
position, and, as regards the southern or flank road, to fortify the
mountains before Quetta. Roads and railways were to be made for
concentration in the direction of Kandahar, and Sir Frederick
Roberts afterwards very wisely noted, "It is impossible to threaten
Russia's base, but we should do all in our power to keep it as far
away as possible." Unfortunately, Sir Frederick Roberts afterwards
forgot this, and suggested the possibility of advance upon Herat
with the view to attack Russia at her Sarakhs base. The suggestions
made in 1885 with regard to Kashmir and the Gromul Pass were acted
upon in 1890. Sir Donald Stewart, however, went on to recommend a
railway extension from Peshawur towards Kabul, and Sir Frederick
Roberts, with greater judgment, on succeeding him, vetoed this
scheme. Lord Kitchener revived it, but was not allowed to complete
his work. Sir Donald Stewart's committee recommended the tunnel at
the Khojak, which was carried out. Roberts reported against it, and
he was right.

'On the whole, when Sir Frederick Roberts sent me his view on the
defence proposals, I was struck with the contrast between the
completeness of the manner in which a defence scheme for India has
been considered, and the incompleteness, to say the least of it, of
all strategic plans at home. Sir Charles Macgregor put on record at
the same time his view that a mere offensive on the North-West
Frontier of India would be folly, if not madness, and that it would
be necessary also to undertake offensive operations against Russia.
Quite so, according to all rules of war, and if ultimate defeat is
to be avoided. Unfortunately, however, it is not easy to attack
Russia, and the proposals made by Sir Charles Macgregor would not
bear investigation. Sir Frederick Roberts himself afterwards tried
his hand at proposals of his own in a Memorandum entitled, "What are
Russia's vulnerable points?" But I do not know that he was more
successful, and I fear that his first question, "Has Russia any
vulnerable points?" must, if we are looking to permanency, and not
to merely temporary measures, be answered in the negative, except as
regards Vladivostock--a case I put. After much correspondence with
me on this last memorandum, Sir Frederick Roberts quoted me, without
naming me, as having, to his regret, informed him that English
public opinion would oppose a Turkish alliance, that a Turkish
alliance would not be of much use if we could obtain it, and that
apart even from these considerations we could not obtain it if we
wished.'

The importance which Sir Charles attached to Vladivostock, as the
vulnerable point at which Russia could be attacked in time of war,
explains his regret when Port Hamilton, which threatened Vladivostock,
was abandoned. [Footnote: See _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p.
440; and _Europe and the Far East_, by Sir Robert K. Douglas, pp. 190,
248, 249.]

'May, 1885.--The Port Hamilton matter began about this time. We had
seized it, and, as Northbrook and I agreed, "for naval reasons we
ought to keep it." Northbrook also wrote that he was laying a cable
from Shanghai to Port Hamilton, which he thought a most important
precaution in time of war; but Port Hamilton was afterwards given up
because the sailors found it dull--an insufficient reason.'

CHAPTER XL

REDISTRIBUTION: COERCION AND DEVOLUTION

1885

I.

The year 1885 saw the Seats Bill, with its numerous compromises in
detail, passed into law, but not without attendant difficulties.

'On Ash Wednesday, February 18th, I saw Sir Stafford Northcote, and
settled with him, in view of the meeting of the House on the next
day, the whole course of affairs for the 19th and 20th, under guise
of discussing details of the Seats Bill. After we had parted,
Northcote wrote to me that on consideration he had come to the
conclusion that he must give notice of a vote of censure, but our
amicable communication continued on the next day. "On
consideration," with Northcote, always meant "After bullying by
Randolph."'

In the process of settlement there were constant meetings with Lord
Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote together, with Lord John Manners,
with Sir Michael Hicks Beach; while on the Conservative scheme for Irish
grouping

'I saw Healy for them, to discover if the thing could be done by
general consent; and, although Healy did not oppose right out, the
prospect of an agreement on details was far from promising. Healy
and I took the opportunity to discuss the Parnell-Chamberlain Irish
National Board scheme, of which I had written to Grant Duff on
January 23rd, "Chamberlain has a grand scheme for an Irish Board."'

March 6th.--'Healy having told me that he was sure Lord Salisbury had
"rigged" the Irish Boundary Commission, and I having written this to
Spencer, I received an indignant denial. "If indignation were justified
at anything that Healy says, I should indignantly deny his accusation."'

'Between March 11th and 13th the Conservatives had given me a good
deal of trouble by trying, under pressure from their friends, to
vary the Seats Agreement upon several points.... They then attacked
the two-member towns in England, which, it may be remembered, had
been insisted on by Mr. Gladstone against my wish; and Northcote
wrote: "Lord Salisbury and I never liked that _privilegium_, and
wished to have single-member constituencies everywhere"; he tried
hard to get me to reopen the question, knowing doubtless that I was
with him on the merits. He continued to press the question as late
as March 15th, when he wrote: "Our men are getting hard to hold,
and, having twice walked through the lobby almost alone, I have no
taste for repeating the operation." Conference with Lord Salisbury
followed, and the final stages were reached: from Monday, March
23rd, I had the Seats Bill in Committee four days a week.'

The essential fact in these dealings is that emphasized by Mr. Howel
Thomas, Secretary to the Boundary Commission:

'No political or other pressure would induce Sir Charles--and the
strongest pressure was used again and again--even to contemplate a
departure from the spirit of the compact. When once an agreement
became possible, he would spare no trouble to modify details. But
without agreement, however strong the argument for a change, nothing
was listened to.'

'On May 6th I received from Sir John Lambert, the retired Permanent
Secretary of the Local Government Board, a most grateful letter
about the Privy Councillorship, which had been announced to him by
Mr. Gladstone, and which no man ever more greatly deserved as an
honour, or by his character more greatly honoured.' [Footnote: John
Lambert's letter to Sir Charles contained these words: 'I have had
the opportunity of assisting you in a work which has placed you in
the very foremost rank of statesmen, and I have formed a friendship
which is one of the most gratifying incidents of my declining
years.']

'On the morning of May 9th I received a letter from Northcote,
congratulating me on the manner in which I had conducted the
Redistribution Bill "through its difficult stages.... Let me thank
you once more for the great consideration, as well as the perfect
loyalty, with which you have dealt with the numerous questions, and
congratulate you on having brought your ship so well into port."'
[Footnote: Upon a table in the larger drawing-room at 76, Sloane
Street there stood always a bronze 'Victory' sent by Sir George
Trevelyan to Sir Charles to celebrate the passing of the
Redistribution Bill, with these words:

'Dear Dilke,--The bronze is a Victory on a globe. The Victory is
obvious. The globe below signifies the manner in which your conduct
of the Redistribution Bill got the Tory Press under your feet. I am
pleased to think that, as a work of art, it may pass muster even
before such an artist as the future Lady Dilke.... It is a copy of a
Herculaneum bronze.... I cannot help hoping that you will think it
not unworthy of the event which it is meant to commemorate.']

But 'port' was not finally reached till after the fall of the Ministry
in June.

Work on the Housing Commission was also practically completed.
Throughout the year the Report had been under discussion.

On February 16th 'I told Chamberlain that the Labourers' Ireland
Committee had "advised taking of land under compulsory powers in order
to attach it to cottages"--a proposal which was afterwards carried; to
which Chamberlain replied: "And your Commission?" and I answered: "We
_shall_, I hope, but Lord Salisbury is jibbing since your speeches" (on
the unauthorized programme).

'On March 11th, at the meeting of my Housing Commission, Lord
Salisbury proposed what Goschen at once described as "Revolution,"
and Broadhurst "Socialism." He wanted to give public money out of
taxes to London. It may have been silly, but it was not either
revolutionary or socialistic.'

When it came to the point of acting on the Report, the Tory leader was
very far from revolutionary; on June 4th,

'I was also seeing Lord Salisbury as to the Housing Commission
Bills, which he was to introduce into the House of Lords, [Footnote:
Sir Charles was to take charge of the measures in the Commons.] He
was strongly opposed to putting it into the power of Boards of
Guardians "to build out of the rates as many cottages, with half-
acres attached, as they like, taking for the purpose any land
they please." In another letter he wrote: "I should provide that--
(1) The Local Authority must pass a petition to the Local Government
Board to apply the Acts. (2) The Local Government Board must send
down and inquire with a long notice. (3) If the Local Government
Board inspector reports (i.) that the poorer classes of the parish
are not, and are not likely to be, sufficiently housed without the
application of the Acts; (ii.) that the Acts can be applied without
ultimate loss to the ratepayers, then a vote of the local
authorities should be sufficient to apply the Acts. It would be
better that a sufficient interval should be passed in these
processes to insure that the second vote should be given by a newly
elected local authority."'

On April 4th to 9th the Housing Commission visited Scotland.

'On the evening of April 4th I dined with the Lord Provost of
Edinburgh. On Easter Day I attended the Kirk with the Lord Provost,
hearing a magnificent sermon by Principal Caird, and in the evening
dined with the Lord Advocate. On Easter Tuesday I dined with the
Convention of Royal Burghs. On Thursday, April 9th, we left
Edinburgh for London.'

There remained only the question of inquiring and reporting with regard
to Ireland, and here perplexities abounded.

As far back as February 7th at the Cabinet, 'the third matter discussed
was that of the proposed visit of the Prince of Wales to Dublin as a
member of my Commission, or, by himself, in advance of the visit of the
Commission. It was decided that Parliament could not be asked for his
expenses without trouble with the Irish.'

April 9th.--'I now began discussing with Spencer the conditions on which
the Commission was to appear at Dublin, with regard to which there were
great difficulties. Gray was on the Commission, but could not be
Spencer's guest in any way, although, on the other hand, he and his
friends were willing to receive me in spite of my being a member of the
Government. [Footnote: Mr. Dwyer Gray, Nationalist member for Carlow in
1885. In 1886 he represented St. Stephen's Green, Dublin.] Spencer, in
inviting me to stay with him, wrote: "I do not think you will fear the
denunciation of _United Ireland_."

'On April 17th I entered in my diary, after the meeting of the Royal
Commission at which we signed our report: "Pleasures of Ireland. If
we stay with Spencer, the Irish witnesses say that they will not
appear before the Commission; and if we do not, I am told that the
'loyalists' will not appear." On this day I wrote to Grant Duff: "I
may go" (out) "with Chamberlain over Budget [Footnote:
Correspondence with Mr. Gladstone on the Budget and the Beer Tax has
been given in the previous chapter, pp. 118-120.] or over Irish
Coercion." He replied, and my rejoinder will be found below.'
[Footnote: Sir Charles's summary of this letter will be found in
this chapter (p. 143).]

Trouble had arisen also over Mr. Childers's wish to increase the duty on
sparkling wines. This Sir Charles strongly opposed

'on the ground that it would upset the French and make them withdraw
the most favoured nation treatment which I had won, and the matter
was adjourned.'

'On Saturday, May 16th, there was another Cabinet. Childers proposed
to raise the wine duties, to reduce by one-half his proposed
increase on spirits, and to limit to one year his increase on beer.
We all agreed, against Childers, to postpone any announcement of
changes for three weeks, and Childers, thinking that this meant that
we had agreed not to take his proposals, said that he would resign.'

April 24th.--'I had now received Spencer's consent to my quitting the
Viceregal Lodge, when at Dublin at Whitsuntide, for one evening, to
attend a party at Gray's, which was the virtual condition of our not
being boycotted by the Nationalists.'

Negotiations between the Irish party and both English parties were at
this time in the air, and it will be seen that this visit to Ireland
became connected with political issues quite different from its
ostensible and non-controversial object.

II.

Early in 1885 anti-Irish feeling, which to some extent had been allayed,
was again roused by dynamite outrages. One bomb was exploded in the
Tower of London, and two in the precincts of Parliament. The general
temper may be judged by an entry of February 7th:

'I remonstrated with Harcourt as to the restrictions at the House,
which he and the Speaker had agreed on, so far as they affected the
Press. I said that it was ridiculous to shut out little Lucy, the
"Toby" of _Punch_, and Harcourt gravely assured me that Lucy was a
man who would willingly bring dynamite into the House himself; after
which I had no more to say.'

It was in face of this feeling that Mr. Chamberlain had drafted a scheme
giving very large powers of self-government to an Irish popularly
elected body.

When Sir Charles was declaring for resignation, he received a
communication which made the Irish matter pressing.

'On April 22nd Cardinal Manning wrote to me that he had some
information of importance which he wished for an opportunity of
making known to me, and he begged me to come to him on my way to
Whitehall on the morrow. I had to see Lord Salisbury and Sir
Stafford Northcote as to the Seats Bill, and it was not until the
afternoon that I was able to see the Cardinal. He spoke in the name
of Croke and another Roman Catholic Irish Archbishop, and of five
Irish Roman Catholic Bishops who had been staying with him, the
latter being a deputation of five to Rome who represented "the 14
Bishops." He said that Croke had become frightened of the extreme
Nationalists. The Cardinal declared that the Roman Catholic clergy
were ready to pacify Ireland if we would pass Chamberlain's Local
Government Ireland Scheme, with a Central Board such as Chamberlain
proposed. The Bishops and clergy would be prepared to denounce, not
only separation, but also an Irish Parliament. I had reason to know
that Lord Spencer was unfavourable to any negotiation with Cardinal
Manning, but on the 24th, having that day again seen Manning, who
put the dots on the "i's" and volunteered that if the Irish Bishops
got the elective board for Ireland they would denounce as
revolutionary an Irish Parliament, I wrote to Mr. Gladstone stating
Manning's views, and suggesting that Chamberlain should see the
Cardinal on the morrow. [Footnote: See the next two pages, where
accounts of these interviews and correspondence occur.]

'I said in my letter to Mr. Gladstone: "I knew that the Pope, in
sending for the Bishops to Rome, had acted on Manning's advice. I
also knew that Manning bitterly resented Errington's visits to Rome.
This was all I knew on the subject until to-day, when Manning
suddenly proposed to me to bring about peace and good-will in
Ireland on the basis of Chamberlain's Local Government and Central
Board Scheme.... Manning has got a pledge from the Roman Catholic
Bishops, including even Archbishop Croke ... and from Davitt, to
denounce separation. He has got from the Bishops, including Croke, a
declaration against an Irish Parliament, provided they obtain the
Local Government Central Board. I suggested that he should see
Chamberlain at once, and learn secretly the details of his
proposals. He said nothing of coercion, and I, of course, avoided
the subject, as I did not know whether a coercion Bill is to be
proposed. I should suggest that Manning be encouraged to let the
Pope have Chamberlain's scheme."

'I sent this memorandum to Chamberlain and to Lord Spencer, as well
as to Mr. Gladstone, and Chamberlain wrote: "I am quite willing to
call on the Cardinal if Mr. Gladstone approves." Lord Spencer wrote:
"The question of Mr. Chamberlain's seeing the Cardinal with a view
of his scheme being made known to the Pope is for Mr. Gladstone's
decision, but I would venture to say that he should not disclose his
plan to the Cardinal unless the Cabinet agree to it." This last
memorandum from Lord Spencer is dated the 25th, but on the 24th
Chamberlain, Mr. Gladstone having consented, had seen the Cardinal.
I also saw the Cardinal again on the 25th, and he told me that in
his opinion it was essential that Dr. Walsh should be made
Archbishop of Dublin. He also told me that he was going to see
Parnell on the Chamberlain scheme. On April 30th the Cardinal saw
Parnell, and told him that the Bishops would support Chamberlain in
the Local Government of Ireland scheme. Parnell promised that he
would support it, and would not obstruct the Crimes Bill. So O'Shea
told me, and showed me a paper unsigned, which purported to be, and
which, knowing the hand, I believe was, Parnell's writing, somewhat
to this effect. On the 28th a Committee of the Cabinet had been
appointed on Chamberlain's Irish Local Government and Central
Council scheme. On May 1st the Cardinal told me of his interview
with Parnell, and of a more completely satisfactory interview
between himself and Sexton.

'The scheme was one which proposed the establishment in Ireland of a
national elective Council, to which were to be referred matters at
present in the hands of some four Boards at Dublin Castle. Mr.
Gladstone's consent to Chamberlain's interview with the Cardinal had
been given in conversation at the House of Commons on the 23rd, and
I have a letter from Mr. Gladstone stating this. I had probably, for
some reason which I forget, both written and spoken to him after my
first interview with Manning on the 22nd, and put the matter again
in a letter (possibly to go to Spencer) on the 24th. I have also a
letter from Chamberlain on the 24th, saying that his interview with
Manning "quite confirms your minute, and the position is hopeful."
With regard to the Cardinal's insisting upon Walsh, and his anger at
Errington's interference, I had a letter which I sent to Lord
Spencer, and which he kept, but returned my minute referring to the
Cardinal's letter, endorsed only "S. 25-4-85." Chamberlain also
wrote on the same day, again stating that his interview with the
Cardinal had been highly satisfactory, and adding: "Do not let Mr.
Errington meddle with the Archbishopric of Dublin." On April 26th
the Cardinal had again written to me about the Errington business
and the See of Dublin, and this second letter on the subject I kept.
The only new point in it was that contained in the following phrase:
"I have an impression that efforts have been made to represent Dr.
Walsh as a Nationalist. He is not more so than I am; and whether
that is excessive or obstructive you will judge."

'On Tuesday, April 28th, the Cardinal again spoke to me as to the
archbishopric, expressing his great vexation as to Spencer's action
through Errington. I sent a minute to Spencer which he returned,
writing, with regard to Manning's moderate opinions: "I wish it may
be so. Responsibility does wonders. Maynooth is so bad that the Pope
is now discussing it with the Bishops." Dr. Walsh, Manning's
candidate, was President of Maynooth. I sent Spencer's minute to
Chamberlain, who returned it with a strong minute of his own for
Spencer, who again wrote: "H.E. the Cardinal is wrong in his
estimate of Dr. Walsh." On April 30th Manning wrote mentioning a
further conversation with Parnell, and adding: "The result is that I
strongly advise the prompt introduction of the scheme I have in
writing. It cannot be known too soon. But both on general and on
particular reasons I hope that neither you nor your friend will
dream of the act you spoke of. Government are pledged in their first
Queen's Speech to county government in Ireland. Let them redeem
their pledge. All the rest will follow." The "act," of course, was
resignation.'

'At the Cabinet Committee of May 1st on Ireland, Carlingford and
Harcourt, in Spencer's interest, violently attacked Chamberlain's
scheme; Hartington less violently; Childers, Lefevre, and Trevelyan
supported. Spencer seeming to waver, Harcourt rather turned round,
and Mr. Gladstone afterwards told Chamberlain that Carlingford's
opposition did not matter.

'On May 1st I again saw Manning, who told me of further interviews
with Parnell and Sexton. I noted in my diary: "2nd to 6th. The Irish
row--Mr. Gladstone between Chamberlain and Spencer: the deep sea and
the devil, or the devil and the deep sea--continues."

'On May 7th the Cardinal wrote: "How can the _Standard_ have got the
Irish scheme? Nothing is secret and nobody is safe. My copy of it is
both safe and secret." On May 8th I wrote to Grant Duff:
"Chamberlain and I have a big Irish Local Government scheme on hand,
which is backed by the R. C. Bishops--which may either pacify
Ireland or break up the Government." On the 9th, Harcourt having
come over, Chamberlain's scheme received the support of all the
Commoners except Hartington, and was opposed by all the peers except
Lord Granville. Mr. Gladstone said to me in leaving the room:
"Within six years, if it pleases God to spare their lives, they will
be repenting in ashes." At night he wrote to Lord Spencer and to
Hartington that he intended to go out upon this question.

'During Sunday, May 10th, Harcourt tried hard to patch matters up on
the basis of "No Home Rule, no coercion, no remedial legislation, no
Ireland at all."'

On May 13th 'Cardinal Manning dined with me, and we further discussed
the position of Chamberlain's scheme.'

Then suddenly a new and complicating factor was introduced:

'On Friday, May 15th, there was another Cabinet, from which
Trevelyan was absent through illness. A Land Purchase Ireland Bill
was suddenly presented to us, to which I expressed strong
opposition, unless it were to be accompanied by "Chamberlain's Local
Government scheme"; and a Coercion Bill was also presented to us,
against which Chamberlain, Lefevre, and I, protested. We, however,
declared that we would yield as regards some points in the Coercion
Bill provided the Land Purchase Bill were dropped or the "Local
Government measure" introduced.' [Footnote: A Land Purchase Bill had
been proposed in the end of April, 1884, by Lord Spencer, which
after preliminary consideration by a Committee was discussed in
Cabinet.

'I opposed the whole thing. Lord Derby gave five reasons against it,
all five unanswerable, and then supported it. Northbrook agreed with
me. Childers, supported by a unanimous Cabinet committee, proposed a
scheme of Chamberlain's suggestion for advancing the whole purchase
money. Spencer proposed three-fourths. Mr. Gladstone had a scheme of
his own which nobody could understand. Spencer insisted on counting
heads. Lord Granville, who would, of course, have supported Mr.
Gladstone, had gone away. Trevelyan, who had been called in, was not
allowed to vote, and the result was that the majority pronounced
against Chamberlain's scheme; Spencer who was for three-fourths, and
I against the whole thing, voting together with Carlingford,
Northbrook, the Chancellor, Hartington, and Dodson--a scratch
lot--against Mr. Gladstone, Childers, Harcourt, Kimberley, Derby,
and Chamberlain.']