The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1

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'I was at this time in correspondence with my friend d'Estournelles,
[Footnote: Baron d'Estournelles de Constant.] who was Acting Resident
at Tunis, as to the capitulations. In the course of his letter
d'Estournelles expressed his bitter regret that France had not gone to
Egypt with us.'

When Sir Charles came back to London from France on October 20th, the
Cabinet was still vacillating as to its Egyptian policy:

'I had found on my return that nothing had been done towards setting
up such an Egyptian Army as could take the place of our own, although
Sir Charles Wilson, Colonel Valentine Baker, Baring, [Footnote: Major
Evelyn Baring, afterwards Lord Cromer, was then Financial Member of
Council in India. Sir Charles Wilson (Colonel Wilson) must not be
confounded with Sir Charles Rivers Wilson. Colonel Valentine Baker was
head of the Egyptian Gendarmerie.] and others, had written memoranda
upon the subject. Baring, in the course of his memorandum, strongly
defended the honesty, humanity, and conscience of the Khedive, and
opposed annexation and protectorate. On the whole, Baring's memorandum
was a better one than that of his relative Lord Northbrook, or that of
Lord Dufferin, which afterwards attracted much attention. Chamberlain
and I discussed on Saturday, October 21st, a letter to me from
Labouchere, in which the latter seemed to take a different view from
that recorded above. Labouchere said that the dissatisfaction with the
Egyptian policy was growing, that we seemed to be administering Egypt
mainly for the good of the bondholders. He was a bondholder, so it
could not be said that he was personally prejudiced against such a
policy. But he was sure that it would not go down.

'He went on to recommend the policy which I was in fact maintaining--
namely, that we should warn off other Powers, hand Egypt over to the
Egyptians, but, establishing our own influence over the Canal, remain
masters of the position so far as we needed to do so. Chamberlain
wrote on Labouchere's letter: "I am convinced the war was submitted to
rather than approved by Radicals, and, unless we can snub the
bondholders in our reorganization scheme, we may suffer for it. I have
written a long paper upon the subject, and sent it to Mr. G. I have
arranged for a copy to be sent you."'

A further Cabinet held on Saturday, October 21st, "decided" (so Sir
Charles noted in his Diary at the moment) "to be very civil to the French
--too civil by half, I think. They rejected a complicated scheme of Lord
Granville's, and substituted a single English (not to be so expressed)
controller (not to be so called)."

At this moment the autumn Session was approaching, in which the thorny
subject of reforming Parliamentary procedure must be disposed of, and the
Cabinet were preoccupied with this till 6 p.m. on October 23rd. They

'scamped their work on the draft despatch to Lord Lyons as to what he
was to tell the French as to Egypt, and so made a wretched job of it.
At night I pointed this out to Lord Granville, and told him that the
despatch was slipslop, and on the next day, October 24th, I managed to
get a good many changes made--one by telegraph, and the others by an
amending despatch.'

'Chamberlain's view of Lord Granville's proposals was that they were
childishly insincere. Europe would not be deceived into believing them
to be anything more than a proposal to restore the old system in its
entirety, with an English nominee as controller in place of the dual
control. Nothing, Chamberlain thought, was being done to develop
Egyptian interests or promote Egyptian liberties.

'Chamberlain was absent from some of the Cabinets at this moment,
detained at Birmingham by the gout, but his memorandum was sent round
the Cabinet. He was, however, in London on October 24th to assist me
in somewhat improving the despatch. His memoranda show the strong view
he held that, in spite of the almost unanimous approval of the Press,
the war had not been popular, but had only been accepted on the
authority of Mr. Gladstone as a disagreeable necessity; and that
dissatisfaction existed upon several points, but above all with regard
to the civil reorganization of the country. "There is great anxiety
lest after all the bondholders should be the only persons who have
profited by the war, and lest the phrases which have been used
concerning the extension of Egyptian liberties should prove to have no
practical meaning." Chamberlain thought that our first duty was to our
principles and our supporters rather than towards other Powers, and
that, if the other Powers insisted upon financial control, we should
at least put forward as our own the legitimate aspirations of Egyptian
national sentiment. Chamberlain refused to believe that an Egyptian
Chamber would repudiate the debt, inasmuch as such a course of action
would at once render them liable to interference by the Great Powers.'

'On October 27th, 1882, there was a dinner at Lord Granville's, at
which I met Lords Hartington, Kimberley, and Northbrook' (representing
India, the Colonies, and the Admiralty). 'I noted with regard to
Egypt:

'"Chamber of Notables: decided to do nothing, at which I am furious.
What do four peers know about popular feeling?"'

In view of the temper of the House of Commons, Sir Charles Dilke warned
Lord Granville by letter of the danger that the Fourth Party might carry
"the mass of the Tories" with Liberals on a cry for the "liberties of the
Egyptian people." Considerable delay was occasioned by negotiations as to
whether Arabi and his associates should or should not be represented by
European counsel at their trial, and in the interval rumours were set
afloat as to ill usage of them in prison.

'I had had in the course of this week a good deal of trouble in the
House of Commons, caused by a sensational telegram in the _Daily
News_, and a letter from a Swiss Arabist in the _Times_ containing
most ridiculous lies as to the treatment of political prisoners in
Egypt, but believed by our supporters, who were backed up by the
Fourth Party.'

These attacks involved the British Agent-General in Egypt, and Sir Edward
Malet felt the situation cruelly. He telegraphed home begging to be
relieved from the sole responsibility.

'On Sunday, October 29th, 1882, Lord Granville, with the gout, got the
French refusal of our proposals, and the bad news from the Soudan'
(where the Mahdi was laying siege to El Obeid, the capital of
Kordofan). 'He called a Cabinet, but only five Ministers were in town,
so it was decided that it was not to be called a Cabinet.'

'On Tuesday, October 31st, the Queen, who had at first approved of the
idea of Dufferin being sent to Egypt to supersede Malet, had now been
turned against him by Wolseley, who was staying with her, and, not
having seen the telegrams of the 27th, because we had made them into
private telegrams and kept them back, told us that she thought that to
send Dufferin was bad treatment of Malet. We had therefore to send her
Malet's telegrams in order to persuade her that it was necessary that
Dufferin should go.'

'On Monday, November 6th, there was held at the House of Commons, by
Lord Granville's wish, a meeting at which were present, besides Lord
Granville and myself, Hartington, Childers, Harcourt, Chamberlain, and
Dodson. We met to consider a further violent refusal by France of all
our proposals. Chamberlain and Harcourt were strong in the one sense,
and Hartington in the other, while Childers and Dodson sat meek like
mice. Hartington was fiercely for the old control, Harcourt and
Chamberlain against all control, and no one except Lord Granville in
favour of the proposals which were actually made, and Lord Granville a
man who constitutionally would always prefer a compromise to a clear
course. None of them knew what to do. I noted that I wished they would
not first agree upon some foolish course, and then call me in when it
had been taken beyond all possibility of alteration. When I was
talking to Brett afterwards, he said of his chief, Hartington, that it
was somewhat a pity that, being so violent as he always was in
Cabinet, he should frequently forget what his opinions were on
particular questions, as, for example, closure and county franchise.'

'Brett also told me that the Queen, to whom, he said, Lord Granville
had had to "crawl" for having sent Lord Dufferin to Egypt, was now
still more furious with him because the instructions to Dufferin had
been sent off on Friday, the 3rd, without her having seen them.

'Having trouble in the House with regard to the legal points connected
with the trial of Arabi, I had at the time frequent meetings with Lord
Selborne, who drew draft answers to the questions in the House of
Commons, which were ingenious, but hardly suited to the Commons
atmosphere.

'On the 8th there was a Cabinet at which Mr. Gladstone only attended
for a minute, merely to prevent his name being omitted from the list.
He was ostentatiously devoting himself to procedure only, and taking
no part with regard to Egypt.

'On Friday, the 10th, Count Munster called on me to tell me that
Prince Bismarck objected to any plan for a temporary dealing with
Egyptian finance, as he feared panic towards the end of the term
fixed; but the Ambassador said that the Chancellor attached no
importance to any form of control.

'On Monday, November 13th, I had a formal conference at the House of
Lords with the Chancellor, the Attorney-General, and Pauncefote, on
the whole of the legal questions connected with the trial of Arabi and
our position in Egypt; and I cannot but think that Lord Selborne in
all those many letters to me about the subject, which I have retained,
showed himself given rather to legal quibbles than to a broad view of
the questions raised. At three o'clock there was a Cabinet to consider
whether a day should be given to Bourke for the discussion of a
motion, but the Cabinet went on to decide to accept a suggestion by
Childers and Chamberlain that the sending of a Turkish envoy to Egypt
was to involve the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Turkey.
Six members, however, stopped after Mr. Gladstone, Chamberlain, and
Childers had gone away, and toned down the phrase to be made use of to
Musurus Pasha.

'On Tuesday, November 14th, we had a Suez Canal conference at Lord
Granville's at noon, and in the afternoon a Congo deputation. Between
the two we discussed at Lord Granville's house (Kimberley, Northbrook,
Carlingford, and Childers being present with Lord Granville and
myself) the question of the employment of Baker Pasha in Egypt as
Chief of the Staff.... Coming back to the Suez Canal question,
Childers, who wished us to obtain preponderance, made a characteristic
observation, saying: "_I would do it boldly_ by making the Khedive
say--" It struck me that some people had an odd idea of boldness.

'On November 15th we had a further meeting on the Canal question at
Mr. Gladstone's room at the House.... When all had come, there were
present Childers, Hartington, Northbrook, Kimberley, Carlingford, Lord
Granville, and myself. I found that Count Munster had not told Lord
Granville that which he had told me on November 10th. It was decided
to send my notes, based on my conversations with Ollivier, to
Dufferin. With regard to Arabi's trial, it was decided that Dufferin
should be told to consider the case against him, and to decide that
there was no proof of common crime, after which, by arrangement
between us and the Khedive, we were to put him away safely in
Ascension, Barbados, Bermuda, Ceylon; or any other island than St.
Helena, which would be ridiculous. Mr. Gladstone had written us a
letter proposing that we should make the Sultan banish Arabi, but we
did not much like the idea of his coming to England and stumping the
country between Wilfrid Lawson and Wilfrid Blunt. Childers asked leave
to arrest any Turkish envoy who might be sent to Cairo, but the matter
was left open.'

On November 16th the Cabinet again 'discussed the fate of Arabi, and
decided to let him run riot anywhere; but the decision was afterwards
reversed.'

On November 21st

'there was sent off to Lord Dufferin a personal telegram to say that
Baker was to be sent to fight in the Soudan, and that another
Englishman must be chosen for his post, that Arabi was to be interned
on some island on parole.

'I received letters at this time from Lord Dufferin on his arrival at
Cairo, asking me to keep him informed of my views on the Egyptian
situation.

'On December 4th there was a Cabinet which decided to send Arabi to
Ceylon, but after a consultation with Lord Ripon, whose advice was not
to be followed if it was hostile; and on the next day Lord Ripon
protested, as had been foreseen.

'Evelyn Wood, who was to command the Egyptian Army, asked the Cabinet
for such large figures as to startle them.'

'I heard from Dufferin also in December from Cairo, in reply to
Chamberlain's memorandum. He thought that Egyptian Members of
Parliament would many of them be tools in the hands of the Sultan or
of foreign Powers, but added that he would sooner run any risk than
wholly abandon representative institutions. "But I think we should
make a mistake if we forced upon this country premature arrangements
which we dare not apply to India, where the strength of our own
position and other circumstances afford not only better guarantees for
success, but the power of retreating if the experiment should prove a
failure."

'In a further letter Lord Dufferin confirmed a story which I had heard
as to Halim having bribed Arabi and the other Egyptian Colonels, but
most of the money stuck to the hands of the agent who was employed.'

"Two days after I had left the Foreign Office, Hartington wrote to me
to ask whether his soldiers might pay military honours to the holy
carpet on its return from Mecca--an amusing example of the kind of
question with which British Ministers are sometimes called on to
deal."

After Dilke's promotion to the Cabinet,

'On Thursday, February 15th, 1883, Parliament met, and I was very hard
worked, and on February 17th had heavy business in the House with
regard to Egypt, as revealed in the division of the previous night, in
which we only had a majority of thirty-five, although I had been
permitted distinctly to announce our intention to withdraw our troops,
and not to stay permanently in the country. This, after all, was a
mere expansion of the promise given to the Powers by Lord Granville in
his circular despatch of January 3rd, in which he said that we were
desirous of withdrawing British force as soon as the state of the
country would permit.

'In the meantime the Soudan was in a disturbed condition. On January
1st, 1883, we had heard from Cairo: "Second false prophet appeared,
hung by first;" or, as the despatch by post expanding the telegram put
it, "A second Mahdi has lately appeared, but was hung by order of the
first." The Mahdi, however, was making progress. The Foreign Office
were inclined to adopt some responsibility for the Egyptian attempt to
defeat the Mahdi, and reconquer the Soudan; but I invariably insisted
on striking out all such words from their despatches, and, so far as I
know, no dangerous language was allowed to pass. In consequence of my
observations a despatch was sent by Lord Granville to our consulate in
Egypt, pointing out that telegrams had been received from General
Hicks in relation to his military operations in the Soudan, and that
Lord Granville understood that these were messages intended for
General Baker, and only addressed to the consulate because Hicks found
it convenient to make use of the cipher which had been entrusted to
Colonel Stewart, who was acting as our Consul at Khartoum; but we
repeated that "H. M. G. are in no way responsible for the operations
in the Soudan, which have been undertaken under the authority of the
Egyptian Government, or for the appointment or actions of General
Hicks." At this time the Turkish Government were supplying the Mahdi
with money and officers in the hope that the troubles in the Soudan
would afford them an excuse for sending troops to "assist the
Khedive." As we continued to get telegrams from Hicks Pasha, Sir
Edward Malet informed the Egyptian Government by letter that we must
repeat that we had no responsibility for the operations in the Soudan.
We foresaw the failure of the Hicks expedition, and should perhaps
have done better had we more distinctly told the Egyptian Government
that they must stop it and give up the Soudan, holding Khartoum only;
but to say this is to be wise after the event. What we did was to
"offer no advice, but" point out that the Egyptian Government should
make up their minds what their policy was to be, and carefully
consider whether they could afford the cost of putting down the Mahdi.
In other words, we discouraged the expedition without forbidding it. I
fear, however, that Malet, against our wish, was a party to the
sending of reinforcements "to follow up successes already obtained";
for after his conversation with the Egyptian Prime Minister he added:
"This view seems reasonable."'

'On May 4th; 1883, I noted in my Diary, in reference to a matter which
I have named, that Colonel Hicks's telegram to Malet, about which both
Hicks and Malet would be reproved, the British Government having
nothing to do with the expedition, was to request that communications
should be made to General Baker which were, in fact, intended for Sir
Evelyn Wood. This showed how completely it had been settled in advance
that Baker should command the Egyptian Army, for Hicks in the Soudan
fully believed that Baker was in command.'

Expressions of opinion in England had, however, prevented this
appointment.

Another entry indicates that French opinion was beginning to accept the
British position in Egypt as a _fait accompli_:

'On May 2nd, 1883, d'Aunay, the French Secretary, told me that
Waddington was coming as Ambassador, and intended to ask for Syria for
the French as a compensation for our position in Egypt.'....

During the summer there was much negotiation concerning the Suez Canal,
and the proposal to cut a rival waterway.

'On July 4th there was a meeting of Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville,
Childers, Chamberlain, and myself, as to the Suez Canal, and we
decided to ask Lesseps to come over and meet us. Childers had a scheme
with regard to the Canal, to which only Chamberlain and I in the
Cabinet were opposed.

'On July 19th there was another Cabinet. Chamberlain and I tried to
get them to drop Childers's Canal scheme, but they would not. The
Cabinet was adjourned to the 23rd, and on Monday, the 23rd, they
dropped it.'

In the end, however, M. de Lesseps won. An entry of November 22nd follows
up the question of widening the Canal:

'Another matter which was active at this moment was that of the
position of Lesseps, with whom we had now made peace, and to whom we
had given our permission for the widening of the first Canal. We
supported him against the Turkish Government, who wanted to screw
money out of him for their assent, and got the opinion of the law
officers of the Crown to show that no Turkish assent was needed. On a
former occasion we had contended that his privileges must be construed
strictly, as he was a monopolist. On this occasion the law officers
took a more liberal view. The fact is that the questions referred to
the law officers for opinions by the Foreign Office have very often
much more connection with policy than with law, and their opinions are
elastic. There never were such law officers as James and Herschell.
They did their work with extraordinary promptitude and decision, and
with the highest possible skill. They never differed, and they always
gave us exactly what we wanted in the best form. Comparing their
opinions with those of law officers of other days, which I often at
the Foreign Office had to read, I should call James and Herschell
unsurpassed and unsurpassable for such a purpose. Lord Selborne, who
was, I suppose, a much greater lawyer, was nothing like so good for
matters of this kind, for he always tried to find a legal basis for
his view, which made it unintelligible to laymen.'

'On August 7th I had to set to work hard to read up all the Egyptian
papers in order to support Fitzmaurice on the 9th. In the course of
this speech I announced our intention from November, 1883, to allow
Sir Evelyn Wood to maintain order in Cairo with his Egyptian forces,
we withdrawing the British forces to Alexandria. There was a Cabinet
on the 8th, at which, after a good deal of fighting, it had been
decided, against Hartington, to allow me to make the statement with
regard to Egypt which I made upon the 9th.'

By August 22nd Lord Hartington had 'come round so fast that he told us he
would be able to evacuate Cairo even before our meeting in October.' On
August 31st Sir Charles Dilke 'received Sir Evelyn Wood, who was anxious
to assure me that he was perfectly able to hold Egypt with his Egyptians.'

The report did not wholly convince Sir Charles, and he expressed some of
his doubts to Lord Granville, with whom Sir Evelyn Wood had been staying
at Walmer.

'Lord Granville wrote: "His conversation gives one more the notion of
activity, energy, and conscientiousness, than of great ability. I
presume you were not able to slip in a question, but, on the other
hand, if you had succeeded he would not have heard it. He is in favour
of the complete evacuation of Cairo.... He has full confidence in that
half of the Egyptian Army which is officered by English officers. He
has only a negative confidence in the other half. Evelyn Baring will
find a private letter on his arrival, and a despatch by this mail,
instructing him to send us a full report. Till we get this we had
better not go beyond the declarations which have already been publicly
made." Baring had just (September, '83) reached Cairo as Consul-
General.'

Government policy shaped itself on the assumption that Sir Evelyn Wood was
right. On October 25th

'we formally decided to leave Cairo and concentrate a force of between
2,000 and 3,000 men at Alexandria. This was no new decision, but was
taken on this occasion in order that the Queen should be informed,
which had not previously been done.'

Ten days after this date the Egyptian Army of the Soudan, under General
Hicks, was destroyed by the Mahdi in Kordofan. The news only reached Cairo
on November 22nd, and the question was now raised as to what should become
of the upper valley of the Nile.

'On December 12th there was a meeting at the War Office about the
Soudan, Lord Granville, Hartington, Northbrook, Carlingford, and
myself, being present, with Wolseley in the next room, and the Duke of
Cambridge in the next but one. We again told the Egyptians that they
had better leave the Soudan and defend Egypt at Wady Halfa, and that
we would help them to defend Egypt proper. Wolseley was at one time
called in, as was Colonel Stewart, the last man who had left Khartoum.
Lord Granville told Hartington, who was starting for Windsor, what to
tell the Queen, and I noted that "the old stagers, like Lord Granville
and Mr. Gladstone, waste a great deal of their time on concocting
stories for the Queen, who is much too clever to be taken in by them,
and always ends by finding out exactly what they are doing. It is
certainly a case where honesty would be a better policy."

'I cannot but think that Malet was largely responsible for the state
of things in Egypt (Lord Granville being so far responsible that I had
much difficulty in getting him to interfere against Malet), and that
we had interfered somewhat late.... Malet left before the army
commanded by Hicks was surrounded, and it was on Baring that the blow
fell. But Baring was always strongly opposed to the attempt of the
Egyptians to reconquer the Soudan, and, moreover, thought that they
were quite unfit to govern it. Immediately after the bad news about
Hicks first came, Baring told us that Khartoum must fall, and
recommended us to tell the Egyptian Government, which we did, that
under no circumstances must they expect the assistance of British or
Indian troops in the Soudan. We even stopped their sending Wood's army
to the Soudan, and we told Baring not to encourage retired British
officers to volunteer, and told him to recommend the evacuation of the
Soudan. On December 3rd Baring sent us a most able report upon the
whole situation, and he and General Stephenson commanding the British
troops, Sir Evelyn Wood commanding the Egyptian Army, and General
Baker, were all of opinion that it was impossible to hold Khartoum,
and that the Egyptians must be made to fall back on Wady Halfa. On the
other hand, the Egyptian Government could not make up their minds to
leave Khartoum. Malet up to the last days of his stay in Egypt was
rendering himself, in fact, responsible for the Hicks expedition and
for the Soudan policy of the Egyptians, and there is one fatal
despatch of his in existence in which he relates how he interfered, at
the wish of Hicks, to suggest a change of Egyptian Governor. He was
privately censured for this, but he was publicly approved for his
whole course, and therefore we were in a sense responsible, although
we expressly repudiated this responsibility in our despatches to him,
and forced the Egyptian Government to acknowledge that they thoroughly
understood our repudiation. The only thing that could have been done
more than was done would have been to have publicly censured Malet,
and Lord Granville should have had the courage to do this.