The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1

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For Sir Charles's policy it was necessary to propitiate the ruler of
Afghanistan, and in July, 1883, it was reported that the Amir had applied
to the British Government for a new set of teeth. The application had
really been for a European dentist. When Lord Ripon persisted in refusing
Abdurrahman's proffered visit, Sir Charles tried to get civil expressions
of regret from the Government, and, failing in this, wrote in despair to
Lord Kimberley: "I hope to goodness he has got his teeth."

It was not, however, till 1885 that the tension with Russia became really
acute.

In France, Gambetta's death had been followed by a Ministerial crisis, and
in the disturbances which resulted M. Duclerc fell in February, 1883, and
after a time of confusion M. Ferry became, for a second time, Prime
Minister, having M. Challemel-Lacour, no lover of England, for his Foreign
Secretary.

"In order to distract the country's attention from internal dissensions
and the Eastern frontier," [Footnote: _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii.,
p. 313.] M. Ferry developed that "Colonial policy" of which Sir Charles
said, in 1887, that

"it greatly weakens the military position of France in Europe, and
disorganizes her finances, while it compromises the efficiency of the
only thing which really counts in modern European war, the rapidity of
mobilization of the reserves." [Footnote: _Present Position of
European Politics_, p. 101.]

Germany also was embarking on a "Colonial policy" disapproved of by
Bismarck, but to which later he had to bow. One instance of the
difficulties thus created was that of the Congo. A sketch of our proposed
treaty with Portugal has already been given; [Footnote: See Chapter XXVI.,
p. 418.] but while the negotiations were proceeding,

'de Brazza, employed by the French, had been making treaties in the
Congo district, which had been approved by the French Government and
Parliament. The King of the Belgians pulled the strings of the
Manchester Chamber of Commerce, and succeeded in arousing a good deal
of feeling against our negotiations with the Portuguese, and
ultimately the French and Germans joined the King of the Belgians in
stopping our carrying through our treaty.'

Mr. Jacob Bright became the spokesman of those who opposed the Portuguese
negotiations, and in 1883 Sir Charles, though offering to express his own
clear belief that the treaty was right, foretold to Lord Granville that
the House of Commons would not accept the arrangement, and Mr. Gladstone
avoided an adverse vote only by promising that the treaty should not be
made without the express consent of Parliament. Sir Charles's reference to
this lays down an opinion upon the relation of Parliament to the Foreign
Office which is interesting as coming from so strong a democrat:

'In the Congo debate, which took place on Tuesday, April 3rd, 1883,
Mr. Gladstone went perilously near giving up the valuable treaty-
making power of the Crown. What he said, however, applied in terms
only to this one case. To Grant Duff I wrote: "In all other countries
having parliamentary government, the Parliaments have to be consulted.
We stood alone, and it was hard to keep the special position, but it
was good for the country, I feel sure."'

In 1883 a Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with affairs on
the West Coast of Africa, and this Committee 'by its delays and
hesitations lost us the Cameroons,' where two native Kings had asked to be
taken under British protection. [Footnote: See Chapter XXVII., p. 431.] On
the East Coast there was a more serious result of procrastination in
regard to Zanzibar.

'As late as November 16th, 1882, I wrote to Lord Northbrook, "Are you
going to let Zanzibar die without a kick?" a note which applied to an
offer which had been made to us by the Sultan, that we should become
his heirs--an offer which Mr. Gladstone had wished us to decline, and
which I was in favour of accepting.'

'The Foreign Office, in a memorandum upon this subject, assigned as
the chief reason for not accepting this trust "the fear lest it should
infringe the agreement entered into with France in 1862." ... It may
be open to argument whether our acceptance of a voluntary offer by the
Sultan of the above nature would have been a breach of the agreement.
In the autumn of 1884 the Government, waking up too late, telegraphed
to our agent at Zanzibar as to the importance of our not being
forestalled by any European nation in the exercise of at least
paramount influence over the mountain districts situated near the
coast and to the north of the equator. The Foreign Office at my
suggestion pointed out at this time that "to the north of the
Portuguese dominions we are at present, but who can say for how long?
without a European rival; where the political future of the country is
of real importance to Indian and Imperial interests, where the climate
is superior, where commerce is capable of vast extension, and where
our influence could be exercised unchecked by the rivalry of Europe in
the extension of civilization and the consequent extinction of the
slave trade." The Government, however, delayed too long, and we
afterwards lost our position at Zanzibar, and had ultimately to buy
half of it back again by the cession of a British colony.'
(Heligoland).

Sir Charles was especially concerned at the heedlessness which disregarded
the interests of the great self-governing colonies, who had no authority
to deal with foreign affairs. He gives the history of the New Hebrides.
Here native chiefs had asked to be taken under British protection; New
South Wales had urged action; the French had three times declared
intention to annex, but Great Britain had done nothing. Australian anxiety
as to the French occupation extended to New Guinea, and in March, 1883,
officials of the Government of Queensland declared an annexation of half
New Guinea. They were disavowed, but their action had created a feeling
that something must be done.

'On June 12th, 1883, there was hatched a scheme for the partial
annexation of New Guinea, which had been prepared by the Chancellor,
Mr. Gladstone, and Sir Arthur Gordon, [Footnote: Sir Arthur Gordon was
one of the philanthropists who believed in making the coloured peoples
work by a labour tax. Sir Charles had met him in 1879, and described
him as one 'who invented, in the name of civilization and progress, a
new kind of slavery in Fiji.'] of Fiji and New Zealand fame. On the
13th a Cabinet decided to go slowly in this matter, and they went so
slowly that we lost half of our half of New Guinea to Germany, and
almost lost the whole of it.'

'As early as June, 1883, we had told Italy that any attempt to occupy
any portion of New Guinea without a previous agreement with the
British Government would undoubtedly "excite a violent outbreak of
public feeling in the Australian colonies." Lord Derby was a party to
this communication to the Italians, and it was absurd for the Cabinet
and Lord Derby afterwards to argue, when the Germans landed in New
Guinea, that steps ought not to have been taken in advance to have
prevented such action. The difference was that we were willing to
bully Italy, and not willing to stand up to Germany.'

The Colonial Secretary's general attitude upon these matters may be
illustrated from a correspondence which passed between him and Sir Charles
in the autumn of this year. Replying to criticisms concerning the
Australian Colonies, Lord Derby

'somewhat sneeringly observed that in order to keep out foreign
convicts "it is not necessary that they should annex every island
within a thousand miles of their coast. They cannot have at once the
protection of British connection and the pleasures of a wholly
independent foreign policy."'

On this Sir Charles comments:

'Lord Derby had lost all credit with the Conservative party about the
time of his resignation of the Secretaryship of State for Foreign
Affairs in the Conservative Administration. But he had retained
considerable weight with Liberals. During his tenure of the
Secretaryship of State for the Colonies in Mr. Gladstone's
Administration, he lost his credit with the Liberals as well, and his
influence reached a position of decline which makes it difficult even
to remember the enormous weight he had possessed in the earliest part
of his political career. For many years Lord Derby was the ideal
spokesman of the middle man not fiercely attached to either party.
Going over this diary in 1900, it is a curious reflection that the
immense weight gained by Sir Edward Grey in the period between 1890
and 1900 was similar to that which Lord Derby had enjoyed at the
earlier period. Each of them in his time appeared to express, though
far from old, the lifelong judgment of a Nestor. Each of them extorted
from the hearer or reader the feeling: "What this man says is
unanswerable. It is the dispassionate utterance of one who knows
everything, and has thought it out in the simplest but the most
convincing form." Lord Derby could sum up a discussion better,
probably, than anyone has ever done, unless it is Sir Edward Grey. Sir
Edward Grey's summing up of a discussion on a difficult problem, such
as that presented by the Chinese question, 1897-1900, was better than
was to be expected from anyone else, unless it had been the Lord
Stanley of, say, thirty-five years before.'

On May 27th

'I dined at Marlborough House at a dinner to meet a little tin soldier
cousin in white epaulettes, who was over from Germany ... and (the
German Ambassador) Count Munster told me that the French had hoisted
their flag on a reef, as he said, within cannon-shot of Jersey, as to
the British or neutral nature of which there had long been a dispute
between the two Governments.' [Footnote: The Memoir has a note upon
this episode of the Ecrehous Books, which led to the publication of
Parliamentary papers in June of that year:

'The rocks were not within three miles of the coast of Jersey at low-
water mark, and this was the limit of the reservation of the Jersey
oyster fishery, and it was upon this fact that the French went. It
afterwards appeared that the French flag never had been hoisted on the
rocks, but only on a boat which came thither for the purpose of
fishing, so that the whole matter was somewhat of a storm in a teacup.
It raised, however, another question. The Convention of 1839, which
defined the limits of the oyster fishery between Jersey and France,
also defined the limits of the exclusive French rights of fishery on
all other parts of the coast of the British islands; and some day an
Irish Parliament may find interest in Sir Edward Hertslet's
"Memorandum as to the French right of fishery upon the coast of
Ireland, printed for the Foreign Office on the 5th June, 1883."']

'On May 28th there was a Levee, at which d'Aunay, of the French
Embassy, told me that the act of the fishermen at Ecrehous was
disavowed by France. "But," he added, "there is perhaps some Challemel
in it," an admission which rather weakened the other statement, and it
again struck me that it was a pity we had been so rude to Challemel
when he was Ambassador.'

Relations with France were going from bad to worse. Not only were they
strained by the breach of 1882 over Egypt, but French colonizing
aspirations had created trouble in Madagascar. The understanding between
the two Great Powers that an "identic attitude" in regard to the Hova
people was to be maintained was broken down by France, which under various
pretexts intervened by force in Madagascar, claiming a protectorate over
certain narrow strips of territory on the north-west coast. This claim was
denounced by Lord Granville. Yet 'on October 27th, 1882, there was a
dinner at Lord Granville's, at which I met Hartington, Kimberley, and
Northbrook.' This meeting of the heads of the military and foreign
services discussed the affairs of the Congo, and also Madagascar; 'it was
decided against my strong opposition to put no difficulties in the way of
the French. 'At this time the growing tension was disagreeably felt, and
Sir Charles learnt a month later that the Cabinet of November 28th, 1882,
'had been much frightened at the prospect of trouble with France.'

At this time an Embassy from Madagascar was in Paris to protest against
the oppressive policy pursued. An ultimatum was presented which left the
envoys no option but to depart, and they came with their bitter complaint
to London, where Sir Charles Dilke very warmly espoused their cause:

'At this moment, December 1st, 1882, I was having difficulties with
Lord Granville about Madagascar, as I was seeing much of the Malagasy
envoys, and was very friendly to them; whereas Lord Granville was
frightened of the French. A deputation came to us, got up by Chesson,
Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, and introduced by
Forster; it suggested American arbitration, and Lord Granville threw
much cold water upon the scheme.'

A few days later he adds:

'I was still at this moment fighting for my Malagasy friends. Not only
did Lord Granville snub me, but Courtney wrote from the Treasury: "I
hope you will get rid of these people as soon as possible. Even the
Baby Jenkins sees the absurdity of the anti-French feeling." But
whatever "Ginx's Baby" might do, I could not see the absurdity of the
anti-French feeling with regard to Madagascar, for the French were
wantonly interfering with an interesting civilized black people in
whose country they had not even trade, for All the trade was in
American, British, or German hands.

'On December 15th, 1882, there was a fresh trouble, for Lord Granville
was furious at a speech by Lord Derby, and, indeed, I never knew him
so cross about anything at all. The difficulty was once more
Madagascar. Lord Granville _meant_ to do nothing about Madagascar, but
he did not like Lord Derby saying so in public. It spoiled his play,
by allowing his French adversary to look over his hand and see how bad
the cards were.'

The Malagasys were unique in that since 1869 they had become definitely a
Christian State, and a State Christianized by English missionaries, and
this fact was impressively brought home to Sir Charles by a scene which he
afterwards (in 1886) thus described in a public lecture:

"At Westminster Abbey there came in to the Morning Service the whole
of the members of the Madagascar Embassy, which had just come to
London from France. The two Malagasy Ambassadors were at the head of
the party. They sat very silently through the service, which the
senior Ambassador did not understand at all, and which the second
Ambassador only partly understood, until a hymn which had been given
out was sung, when, recognizing the familiar tune, the two Ambassadors
and the whole of their secretaries struck boldly in with the Malagasy
words. There could be no better instant proof, to anyone who saw the
scene, of their familiarity with the missionary teaching of England
and America, and of the extent to which, though separated from us by
language, they look upon themselves as members of the Christian
Church."

In 1882-83 Sir Charles failed to interest his colleagues in the matter,
till on August 22nd, 1883, just before Parliament was prorogued, the
Cabinet had to discuss 'what was known as the Tamatave incident, which
nearly brought England and France to war over matters growing out of the
French operations in Madagascar.'

The town of Tamatave had been bombarded and occupied by the French in
June. The matter was aggravated by the treatment of the British Consul and
of a British missionary, and difficulties were made as to adequate apology
and indemnity.

'In the course of September I had frequent interviews with Fitzmaurice
at the Foreign Office with regard to Madagascar.... Lord Granville
wrote to me, about the middle of October, that (the French Ambassador)
Waddington "professed to have a solution of the Tamatave" difficulty,
and on the 22nd a Cabinet was called with regard to the Tamatave
difficulty, Egypt, and South Africa. The French despatch from
Challemel to Waddington was most unsatisfactory.'

Another Cabinet having been summoned for October 25th, Harcourt wrote:
"I have heard nothing about its cause or object, but conjecture that
it is Granville's Cabinet for France.... It is ominous Northbrook
(First Lord of the Admiralty) being a principal assistant. I am myself
for being _stiff_ with France."

'The Cabinet was upon the two points of Tamatave and withdrawal from
Egypt, but, in the absurd way in which Cabinets behave when summoned
upon important questions, we spent most of our time in discussing a
scheme of Lefevre's for widening Parliament Street; Mr. Gladstone
wishing to widen King Street and to make a fork. A Committee was
appointed on the matter, to consist of Harcourt, Childers, Lefevre,
Northbrook, and myself. Hartington came late as usual, and on his
arrival our Tamatave despatch was discussed.'

The complete destruction of the native State and dynasty did not come at
this time, and French "protection" of Madagascar was only recognized by
Lord Salisbury's Government in 1890. But the encroachments of France led
in this year to further friction, arising from their conflict for the
possession of Tonquin. On November 17th the Cabinet discussed 'the
protection of British subjects in China in view of a French attack on the
Chinese Empire, and decided to concert measures with Germany and the
United States.' On the 19th they proposed to France mediation in the
Chinese difficulty, 'with the full expectation that it would be refused.'

'On December 7th there was a paragraph in the _Times_ in large type
intended to reassure the French, by stating that our interference in
China to protect our own subjects was not combined with Germany in
particular. The paragraph, although it may have been wanted, was
untrue. We _had_ combined our action with the Germans, and then found
it was resented by the French.'

So dissension grew at a pace which enabled Bismarck to turn his attention
from European politics, and, in one of his many meetings with Count
Herbert, Sir Charles reports that about the second week in November

'I had a conversation with H. Bismarck about his father. He said that
the Prince had turned as yellow as a guinea, and could not now work
more than an hour at a time, and that the only thing on which he
troubled himself was his workman's insurance scheme.'

CHAPTER XXXIII

EGYPT AFTER TEL-EL-KEBIR
SEPTEMBER, 1882, TO DECEMBER, 1883

'On September 19th, 1882, at noon we had a conference at the War
Office with regard to the future of Egypt, at which were present Lord
Granville, Childers, Sir Auckland Colvin, and myself, and which was
followed afterwards by a further conference, when there were admitted
to us Pauncefote for the Foreign Office and Sir Louis Mallet for the
India Office, Admiral Sir Cooper Key for the Admiralty, Sir F.
Thompson, Permanent Under-Secretary for War, and Generals Sir Andrew
Clarke and Sir Henry Norman for the War Office. In preparation for the
conference I had stirred up Lord Granville as to the volunteering of
Indian Moslem troops for the Khedive's guard. But Lord Granville in
his reply to me was more concerned with abusing my handwriting in
choice language than with answering my questions. Hartington, however,
had telegraphed to India for me on the 17th to ask the opinion of the
Indian Government on the point. Harcourt, writing from Balmoral on the
19th, said: "If you have any ideas on the settlement of Egypt, I wish
you would let me have them. I confess I am myself _in nubibus_, and I
do not find that my betters are much more enlightened. I am constantly
asked here what we are going to propose, and I do not know what to
say. I have written to Mr. G. and to Lord G. to ask for light, but I
should like to have your own personal views as to what is practicable.
I think we must cut the cord between Egypt and Turkey, but one cannot
conceal from oneself that the consequences will be serious, and may
lead to far-reaching complications. The one good thing is that
Bismarck is honestly friendly, and I believe will support us in
whatever we propose. Austria seems to be almost as nasty as Russia,
and France naturally jealous. I suppose Bismarck can and will keep
Austria in order. Please write me a real letter on these knotty
points."

'Our Egyptian conference decided upon free navigation of the Canal,
or, in other words, that ships of war were to pass at all times; on
increased influence for England on the Directorate of the Canal; and
on the destruction of the Egyptian fortresses. Childers promised to
prepare a scheme for taking over the Egyptian railroads. A paper by us
was printed for the use of the Cabinet on October 20th, in which we
stated our views about the Canal, and incidentally our decision
against a British protectorate of Egypt. The arrangement proposed by
us was pretty much that afterwards agreed upon by the Powers.'

Before this paper was issued Sir Charles had seen Emile Ollivier, who, as
a legal adviser of the Khedive, 'had great knowledge of the affairs of the
Suez Canal':

'I possess the draft of a full memorandum of Ollivier's conversation
which I sent to Lord Granville, and which represented his private
protests to Lesseps and his argument to the Khedive. Ollivier, who was
more English than French in the matter, accepted the position that by
the Khedival decree of August 14th England had been substituted for
the Khedive in all measures for the re-establishment of order in
Egypt, and that it was under this decree that we occupied the ends of
the Canal as the delegates of the Khedive; therefore there was no
violation of the neutrality, and when the Canal Company on August 19th
set up as a new Great Power, and addressed to the Khedive a diplomatic
note, their arguments became nonsensical, inasmuch as they virtually
argued that the Khedive himself had violated his own neutrality by an
internal act. Moreover, the neutrality of the Canal had never been
declared at all. The word "neutral" was indeed found in the original
concession, but it evidently meant that the Company was not to give to
one Power an advantage not given to others as regards trade and
passage. Lesseps had set up the Canal as a new Great Power, whereas it
was only an Egyptian Limited Company.

'Even, however, if the Canal had been neutral, Ollivier would have
argued against the Company that the suppression of an internal
rebellion in the Khedive's name, at his request, was not war or
violation of neutrality. It was the duty of the Khedive to suppress
rebellion, and the duty of the Canal as an Egyptian Company to aid,
and not to impede, as it had impeded, the lawful action of the
Egyptian ruler through his representatives. It had not been contended
by the Porte, as the overlord of the Khedive, that the Khedive had not
power to delegate authority to England to suppress Arabi's rebellion.
The Porte had delegated to France power to suppress the rebellion in
Syria in 1860 in its name. Lesseps seemed to think that it was within
the power of the Khedive to delegate to him sovereignty over the
Canal, and not in his power to delegate to anybody else the
suppression of a rebellion.'

A casual reference at this point recalls the fact that the Khedive's
dethroned predecessor was still moving about the world and capable of
causing trouble. Sir Charles went abroad for his autumn vacation:

'In Paris' (in the middle of October) 'I found a letter from Lord
Granville as to a visit which the ex-Khedive Ismail proposed to pay to
London. Lord Granville said that the Government could not object to
his "coming to this country. But at this moment his arrival would be
misunderstood, and any civilities, which in other circumstances they
would be desirous to show to His Highness, would lead to
misconstruction."' [Footnote: 'In November, 1883, the ex-Khedive had
come to London, and when asked to see him, at his wish, I at first
refused, but as, after he clearly understood that I knew him to be a
rascal, he wished to see me "all the same," I saw him privately at
Lady Marian Alford's house in Kensington; but he had little to say,
and seemed very stupid.' ]