The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1

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'On July 5th there was a Cabinet as to the sending forward of troops,
at which it was decided to somewhat "strengthen our garrisons in the
Mediterranean." Chamberlain afterwards told me that before this
Cabinet Lord Granville had begged his colleagues to remember who Mr.
Gladstone was, and not push him too hard. On this day, however, Mr.
Bright, Lord Granville, and Mr. Gladstone stood alone against the rest
of the Cabinet in supporting a let-alone policy.'

On the 7th, as has been told in the last chapter, Mr. Gladstone, under the
combined irritation of Irish and Egyptian difficulties, used words in
debate which indicated his intention to resign, and "the two
representative Radicals," Dilke and Chamberlain, had to consider what
their course would be if he went out.

They agreed, as has been seen, to go with Mr. Gladstone and Bright; to
refuse to join a new Administration should Mr. Gladstone be outside it; to
reconsider their position if--Mr. Gladstone going to the Lords or quitting
political life--they were satisfied with the new Government's programme;
but the storm blew over. [Footnote: The full diary dealing with the
difficulties of this moment has been given in the chapter on Ireland of
this date (see supra. Chapter XXVIII., pp. 446, 447).]

'On Monday, the 10th, it again seemed probable that Mr. Gladstone would
resign,' but this time it was in consequence of the loudly expressed
intention of the Lords to throw out the Arrears Bill.

Mr. Gladstone, however, decided not to go; the majority prevailed, and Sir
Charles was able to write on Monday, July 10th:

'I had now given the reply which informed the House exactly of the
steps which would be taken. Guns having been again mounted on the 9th,
the Admiral told the Commander of the troops at daylight on July 10th
of his intention to open fire on the forts at daylight on July 11th.
Exactly one month after the Alexandria riots reparation for those
riots was tardily exacted at the same spot.'

Sir Charles's personal attitude cost him some friends in France. His
brother Ashton wrote to him from La Bourboule a letter (received on July
9th), in which he said: "To judge by the French newspapers, you are as
popular in France as Pitt at the height of the great war." A note from the
Memoir renders this state of feeling explicable: [Footnote: A very
different current in French opinion from that of the newspapers found
outlet in this letter from M. Emile Ollivier:

"SAINT TROPEZ,
"_4 Aout_, 1882.

"MON CHER MONSIEUR,

"Vous avez ete si aimable lorsque j'ai eu la bonne fortune de faire
votre connaissance, que vous ne pouvez douter de l'interet sympathique
avec lequel j'ai suivi le brillant developpement de votre carriere
politique. Aujourd'hui je tiens a sortir de mon adhesion muette et a
vous exprimer combien j'admire et combien j'approuve la politique
actuelle de votre gouvernement en Egypte. Commissaire du gouvernement
egyptien aupres de la compagnie de Suez depuis pres de vingt ans, j'ai
etudie de pres ce qui se passait sur le Nil, et je ne crois pas ceder
a un mouvement d'amitie pour le Khedive, en pensant que c'est de son
cote que se trouvent le Droit, la justice, la civilisation. Apres
l'avoir intronise, lui avoir promis de l'appui; l'avoir pousse contre
Arabi, le laisser entre les mains d'une grossiere soldatesque, ce
serait une felonie doublee d'une sottise, car on perdrait ainsi ce qui
a ete gagne sur la barbarie par les efforts de plusieurs generations.
Aucune paix ne vaut qu'on l'achete aussi cher. Votre pays s'honore et
se grandit en le comprenant, et sa victoire sera celle de la
civilisation autant que la sienne propre. En se separant de vous, nos
seuls amis, en ce moment, en abandonnant le Khedive malgre tant
d'engagements repetes, les personnages qui nous gouvernent consomment
la premiere des consequences qu'il etait dans la logique de leurs
idees d'attirer sur nous--l'aneantissement a l'exterieur. Les autres
suivront. Nous ferons une fois de plus la triste experience qu'on ne
supprime pas impunement de l'ame d'une nation l'idee de sacrifice, de
devouement, d'heroisme, pour reduire son ideal aux jouissances de la
vie materielle et a l'amour bestial des gras paturages. Vous etes bien
heureux de n'en etre pas la.

"Je vous felicite chaleureusement de la part que vous avez prise aux
males resolutions de votre gouvernement, et je vous prie de croire a
mes sentiments les plus sincerement cordiaux.

"Emile Ollivier."]

'The French Government having ordered their ships to leave Alexandria
in the event of a bombardment of the forts, I suggested that our
sailors ought to pursue them with ironical cheers, such as those with
which in the House of Commons we were given to pursue those who walked
out to avoid a division.'

III.

From July 11th it was clear that France had decided to do nothing.
England's course of action was still undecided.

'Although reparation at Alexandria was being virtually exacted by the
bombardment, in spite of this having been put only on the safety of
the fleet and the defiance of Beauchamp Seymour's orders, yet it had
not, on account of Mr. Gladstone's opposition, up to this time been
settled that we should land troops. There was now no hope that the
threat which the French had proposed to us, and which we had accepted
in January, declaring that "the dangers to which the Government of the
Khedive might be exposed ... would certainly find England and France
united to oppose them," would be acted upon; but there was still some
idea that Turkish troops might be landed under strict safeguards for
supervision. On July 11th Chamberlain suggested to Lord Granville that
Lord Ampthill should be sent to Varzin to see Bismarck, and ask him
what intervention would be best if Turkish failed. This suggestion was
not accepted, but Lord Granville wrote to the German Ambassador to the
same effect.

'Mr. Gladstone was in a fighting humour on the next day, July 12th. I
have the notes on which he made his speech, which give all the heads,
and are interesting to compare with the speech as it stands in
Hansard. He put our defence upon "the safety of the fleet" and "safety
of Europeans throughout the East." He was indignant, in reply to
Gourley, about the bondholders, and, in reply to Lawson, about our
"drifting into war," and he certainly believed, as I believed at that
moment, that the Alexandria massacres had been the work of Arabi, for
one of his notes is: "International atrocity. Wholesale massacre of
the people, to overrule the people of that country." [Footnote: Sir
Charles, as has been said, did not adhere to his view concerning
Arabi's responsibility.]

'On July 13th the Foreign Office prepared a most elaborate despatch
from Lord Granville to Lord Dufferin, explaining the whole position of
affairs in Egypt. The despatch was much knocked about by Chamberlain
and myself. It had recited how an officer and two men of our fleet had
been killed, another officer wounded, the British Consul dragged out
of his carriage and severely injured; six British-born subjects
killed, and the Greek Consul-General beaten; but it had omitted the
important fact that a French Consular-Dragoman, and one, if not two
men of the French fleet, and several other French subjects had been
killed. The chief alterations, however, which we made, or tried to
make, in the despatch were in the direction of omitting all reference
to the financial engagements of Egypt, which we were most unwilling to
take upon ourselves in any manner. I actively pursued the question of
the outrages upon British subjects at Alexandria and of compensation.
We went into the case of Marshal Haynau, that of Don Pacifico,
[Footnote: Both cases furnished precedents for dealing with an
instance in which foreigners had been maltreated when visiting or
residing in another country. Marshal Haynau, the Austrian General
infamous for his brutalities in Italy (especially at Brescia) and in
Hungary in 1848, came to England on a private visit in 1850, went to
see Barclay and Perkins' brewery in Southwark, and was mobbed by the
employees. The Queen, in response to indignant remonstrance by the
Austrian Government, pressed the sending of a note of apology and
regret for this maltreatment of "a distinguished foreigner." Lord
Palmerston, then Foreign Minister in Lord John Russell's Ministry,
sent the Note, but added a paragraph which indicated that, in his
personal opinion, the brewery men were justified in their action, and
that Haynau had acted improperly in coming to this country at all,
knowing the feeling against him here.

Don Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew who had settled in Athens, was, as a
native of Gibraltar, a British subject. Having had his house pillaged
by a Greek mob, he appealed to the Home Government, and Lord
Palmerston sent the Fleet to the Piraeus to enforce his demand for
settlement of the claim put in. Greece appealed to Russia and France,
and part of Don Pacifico's claim was referred to arbitration by a
Convention of the Powers signed in London. Our Minister at Athens
continued to take measures which resulted in the Greek Government
giving way, and, in consequence, the French Ambassador was recalled,
while Russia threatened to recall Baron Brunnow. It was in the Don
Pacifico debate that Lord Palmerston made his great speech of five
hours, containing the famous _Civis Romanus sum_, which turned the
House of Commons in his favour, and saved him from defeat by a
majority of forty-six.] and others mentioned in a memorandum printed
for the use of the Foreign Office in August, 1877; but the inquiry
afterwards held broke down our case.

'On July 14th the Admiralty and War Office fell out; the Admiralty
maintaining that they could put down all the trouble in Egypt by the
employment of a few marines commanded by an Admiral, whereas the War
Office had set their hearts upon a great expedition under Wolseley.

'On July 16th the German Ambassador complained of my having stated in
the House of Commons that Germany approved our action, not denying the
fact that she did, but saying that such "announcements made
confidential communications impossible," and I had to reply that,
while Austria had approved and Germany not disapproved, I was not
justified in stating that Germany had approved, although there had
been "circumstances calculated to make me believe that such had been
the case." On July 16th Wolff wrote to me from the country: "I suppose
Bright has resigned. _Si sic omnes_ except yourself." Bright had
resigned, and there were some who were anxious that I should be put
into the Cabinet in his place, but I was not one of them. On July 17th
Wilfrid Blunt was at the window of the St. James's Club in Piccadilly,
and, seeing me pass, cried out to Lord Blandford and others who were
with him: "There's Dilke that has done it all." That seemed to me to
be an answer to those who wanted me put in in the place of Bright.
"The great peace man goes out, and they want-Mr. Gladstone to put in a
man who is looked upon as a war man, although he thinks he is not and
thinks he is right." ...

'On July 18th I received a letter from Labouchere which was
characteristic: "Dear Dilke,--I am one of those who regretted that the
late Government did not seize Egypt.... Many on our side--being fools
--regret that we ever interfered in Egypt.... Personally I think ...
unless you seize upon the opportunity ... to establish yourselves
permanently in Egypt, you all deserve to be turned out of office.
Success is everything. This is the 'moral law' as understood by the
English nation. Bombard any place, but show a _quid pro quo_." There
was, however, no member of the Government, unless it was Lord
Hartington, who held these views, and not one who at this moment even
contemplated a permanent occupation, though I was fearful that unless
the matter was fairly faced, in advance, upon the lines which I had
suggested, a permanent occupation would be set on foot.

'Late on July 18th there was a Cabinet to discuss a proposal from me
to tell Dufferin in a "personal" telegram that we should not object to
Italy being third with England and France; which was afterwards
expanded into a direct invitation, upon my suggestion, for Italy to go
with us without France, which Italy declined. [Footnote: The reason
for Italy's refusal will be found explained in the Appendix to this
chapter (p. 477) in a letter from Baron Blanc, who was Italian
Ambassador at Constantinople.]

'After the sitting Lord Granville told me that Mr. Gladstone's letter
to Bright about his resignation was far from pleasant in tone, and had
put an end to a very long friendship. Morley, in his _Life of
Gladstone_, states the contrary, but he is wrong. [Footnote: _Life of
Gladstone_, iii. 83-90.]

'On July 19th I suggested that Arabi had probably told the people in
Cairo that he had defeated us at Alexandria, and that it would be well
to inform the Khedive, and through him the Governor of Cairo, that
intervention was about to take place on a scale which would make
resistance ridiculous, and Lord Granville asked Sinadino to do this.

'On July 20th the German first secretary came to me about Bismarck's
complaint of my speech, and Lord Granville wrote back in reply to my
report of the conversation: "I do not think much of Stumm's
observations.... There is something in Bob Lowe's maxim, never to
admit anything; but if you do, I have always found it better to shut
the admission against any rejoinder." After all, Count Munster
admitted that we had the "moral support" of Germany, and I could not
myself see much difference between "moral support" and "approval."
Lord Granville even reported in writing that we had Bismarck's "good
wishes, good will, and moral support," and I certainly could not see
that I was wrong. The last position of all of Bismarck was that we
were not justified in saying even "moral support," but that we had his
"best wishes," I think he must have had a touch of gout at the moment
when he read my speech.

'A Cabinet was to have been held early on July 20th to decide to send
out an army corps; Mr. Gladstone forgot to call it, and it had to be
brought together suddenly (some members being absent), and agreed to
the proposal for a vote of credit. Mr. Gladstone informed his
colleagues that he should not meet Parliament again in February, but
should leave the House of Commons after the Autumn Session, if not
before it. Late at night there came the news that Arabi had turned the
salt water from the Lake into the great fresh--water canal, and I had
to go to inform Mr. Gladstone and Childers in their rooms. Their
replies were full of character. Mr. Gladstone dramatically shivered,
and said with a grimace: "What a wicked wretch!" Childers said: "How
clever!"

'Early in the afternoon of Saturday, July 22nd, when the House of
Commons sat, I was two hours in Mr. Gladstone's room with Lord
Granville, Northbrook, and Childers. There had been a mistake in the
vote of credit, really a blunder of L1,300,000; not of L1,000,000
only, as was afterwards pretended, for the estimate had been cut down
in the meantime. It was entirely Northbrook's fault, ... but Childers,
like a good-natured fellow, in spite of their many quarrels, let it
rest upon his shoulders, where the public put it. In the course of our
conversation it came out that Childers was in hot water with the
Queen, and had sent her a letter of apology on the Friday night, Mr.
Gladstone writing at the same time that he himself had nothing to add
to what Childers said. Childers broke out against the Duke of
Cambridge, who "went chattering about the place, refused to behave as
a subordinate, and wrote direct to the Queen." I guessed that the
trouble had been either about the employment of the Duke of Connaught
or about the sending of the Household Cavalry; both of which had been
decided. The Queen likes the Duke of Connaught to be employed, but
never to run the slightest risk; and in dealing with soldiers this is
a little awkward. The Duke of Cambridge was always a great source of
trouble to Governments, Liberal or Conservative, for even Conservative
Governments have, from the necessity of the case, to desire military
reform. He is essentially not a grandson, as history tells us, but a
son of King George III., just such a man as the royal Dukes whose
oaths and jollity fill the memoirs of the time of the great war. But
the Duke of Cambridge ... knows how to stop all army reform without
incurring personal responsibility or personal unpopularity with the
public. A distinguished General once said to me: "When we are invaded
and the mob storm the War Office, the Duke of Cambridge will address
them from the balcony, and, amid tumultuous cheering, shout, 'This is
what those clever chaps who have always been talking about army reform
and brains have brought us to,' and lead them on to hang the Secretary
of State for War."

'On Monday, July 24th, there was a Cabinet to consider the obstruction
of the French, who were trying to prevent our intervention. I was not
called in, but I believe that my suggestion as to Italy was again
mentioned, for on Tuesday, the 25th, Lord Granville told me that he
had been intending to ask the Italians to go with us, but that the
Queen had objected and caused the loss of a day, and that he thought
he should be able to ask them on the morrow.

'On July 25th I made a speech which was much liked by the House, and
Northcote congratulated me quite as warmly as did our own people. When
Mr. Gladstone was finishing his letter to the Queen late at night,
Chamberlain asked him to let him look at it, which I never had the
"cheek" to do. The phrase about me was "answered the hostile
criticisms with marked ability and with the general assent of the
House," and there was no praise of Chamberlain's own speech, which had
been spoilt by mine. On this occasion, as in the great Zulu debate in
the previous Parliament, when he had been my seconder, it so happened
that I took all Chamberlain's points beforehand, and in almost the
very words in which he had meant to take them. On the other hand, on
occasions when he spoke before me and I had to follow, as, for
example, in the famous debate with Randolph Churchill about the Aston
riots, [Footnote: At the height of Mr. Chamberlain's influence in
Birmingham Lord Randolph Churchill proposed to stand against him, and
held a meeting at Aston. Lord Randolph accused Mr. Chamberlain in the
House of Commons of having hired roughs to break up this meeting.] the
converse occurred. This was, of course, the inevitable result of our
habit of very free and continual conversation.

'When we sounded Paget in advance as to our invitation to the Italians
on this evening, he replied that "if we pressed her, swearing she
would ne'er consent, she _would_ consent." But, although I afterwards
thought and said that I had been amazed at her refusal, my notes of
the moment show that I had anticipated it.

'On July 27th a new element of disturbance was introduced by the
Prince of Wales applying to the Government for leave to take a
military command in Egypt. The Queen at once interfered to stop it;
some members of the Cabinet consulted together at a sudden meeting in
the Cabinet room at Downing Street, to which I was called in,
Childers, Northbrook, and Mr. Gladstone being present, and it was
decided to back the Queen's refusal. It was agreed between Lord
Northbrook, Childers, and myself that for the future I should see all
the Admiralty and War Office telegrams.

'At 5.30 there was a regular Cabinet to consider the tardy consent of
the Turks to send troops at once. They were informed that
circumstances had changed, and that we must go on with our
intervention; but that they would be allowed to occupy forts not at
Alexandria.

'One of the first Admiralty telegrams that were brought to me was one
which directed the Admiral to inform the Khedive that we were going to
restore his authority, which was the most emphatic thing which I had
seen.'

On July 29th M. de Freycinet's Government was defeated on a vote of credit
for money to send ships to protect the Suez Canal, [Footnote: A new
Ministry was formed under M. Duclerc.] and so terminated all possibility
of France's partnership in the enterprise. On the same day General
Menabrea politely refused an invitation that Italy should co-operate.

But the Turks were still disposed to assist, on their own terms, and these
did not yet make it clear what, if they landed, would be their attitude
towards Arabi and his partisans. Accordingly,

'On Monday, July 31st, we had to tell the Turks that if they insisted
on going to Alexandria we should sink them, and matters began to look
like a second Navarino.

'On Thursday, August 3rd, the Cabinet approved our previous proposals
to send instructions to the Admiral not to allow the Turks to land in
Egypt until they agreed to all our terms.

'On Tuesday, August 8th, Childers insisted that if Turks landed in
Egypt they should not be treated as allied forces, but as a portion of
our forces under our General. Lord Granville, Hartington, and
Northbrook thought this too strong, and it was left to the Cabinet to
decide, and on the next day, Wednesday, the 9th, Harcourt expressed
his concurrence with the majority.'

'About this time I had a letter from Dufferin, describing how he had
tried to frighten the Sultan by the bogey of an Arab caliph. But
Dufferin was at this moment in despair; the face of politics changed
too rapidly for Turkish diplomacy, and just as he had succeeded in
getting the Turks to send troops to Egypt, as he had been told to do,
it was so much too late that we had to tell them that we should sink
them if they went--so doubtless the Turks were a little confused in
their minds as to what we really wanted.'

The Memoir now carries the story down to the close of the expedition by
which Sir Garnet Wolseley destroyed Arabi's power in the Battle of Tel-el-
Kebir.

'_August 10th_.--At this moment the Prince of Wales being most anxious
as to what was going on in Egypt, and having again failed to obtain
the telegrams, I promised that I would write to him daily, or whenever
there was anything of importance, and keep him informed, and this I
did.

'On August 16th there was a debate in which we defended the general
policy of the expedition, and I again have Mr. Gladstone's notes for
his reply to Sir Wilfrid Lawson, in which he again asserted that the
supporters of Arabi Pasha were not only rebels, but criminals as well,
accusing them of misuse of a flag of truce, and of deliberately
setting fire to the town of Alexandria.

'On August 17th I had a visit from a brother of the Khedive, Ibrahim
Pasha, who said: "I want to go to Egypt. I should be very glad to go
as a Sub-Lieutenant, although there may be a little difficulty, for I
am a Field-Marshal in the Turkish Army." This modest youth, who looked
like the full moon, had been trained at Woolwich, spoke English well,
and was a devout Mohammedan, thought that he would be of use to us,
but his brother would no more let him land in Egypt than he would any
of the other and abler brothers.'

Parliament was prorogued on August 27th.

'On August 28th Mr. Gladstone thought that we should refuse to make a
Convention with the Turks, which they had now agreed to. But Lord
Granville and I thought that we had better make it for the sake of the
effect in Egypt, and Mr. Gladstone half yielding, our willingness was
telegraphed. On September 5th, however, Lord Granville told me at
Walmer that the Queen was strongly opposed to the Convention, and I
noted that this was the first time when I had ever known the Queen and
Mr. Gladstone to be agreed upon any subject.