The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1

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'On the 26th Lord Granville informed me that at the Cabinet of the
previous day my Egyptian "Mandatories" proposal had been considered,
and had been opposed by Lord Kimberley, but had received pretty
general support.'

On January 26th an event happened which destroyed the chances of joint
intervention. Gambetta fell. The policy of joint intervention in support
of any menace to the established order in Egypt, to which both Powers were
committed by the Joint Note of January 6th, now passed into the hands of
Lord Granville and of M. de Freycinet, concerning whom Sir Charles wrote
on March 9th, 1882:

'I noted that Freycinet had begun his official career by doing what he
had done when in office before--namely, asking Bismarck's consent to
every act. He was so anxious to stop the Turks from going to Egypt
that he was willing at this moment to agree even to Italian
intervention in the name of Europe; and he was personally anxious for
reconciliation with Italy.'

Meanwhile in Egypt there had been a new ministerial crisis. Cherif Pasha
was deposed from the Presidency of the Council, and Arabi was made the
Minister for War. The control, according to Sir Edward Malet, "existed
only in name." In the provinces there was anarchy. Either the order of
things established in Egypt must disappear, or intervention in some shape
was inevitable.

'On February 1st there was a Cabinet upon the Egyptian Question. Lord
Granville wrote to me before it met to say that the Cabinet had
complained that we had not told them anything about Egypt, to which he
had replied that they had received the telegrams if they had not read
them.... At this day's Cabinet Hartington alone was in favour of
Anglo-French intervention, and he fell out with Lord Granville over
it, and they were on bad terms for some time. Some of the Cabinet
wanted English intervention, and some wanted Anglo-French-Turkish
intervention....

'On March 4th there was a Cabinet, at which Hartington made a great
fight against all his colleagues, who were unanimous against him upon
the question of Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

'On March 20th the new French Ambassador Tissot came. I had previously
known him when he was the Agent of the Government of National Defence
inhabiting the London Embassy, virtually as Ambassador but without a
staff. On this occasion he immediately startled us out of our senses
by proposing that we should depose the Khedive and set up Prince
Halim. He had converted Freycinet to this madcap view.'

Halim, the heir by Mohammedan law, was Arabi's candidate for sovereignty.
During Sir Charles's visit to France in the middle of April this
suggestion became fully official, as he learnt on returning.

'France had proposed to us to depose the Khedive and set up Halim, and
we had refused on the ground of breach of faith. On April 20th the
Cabinet decided absolutely and unanimously against any suggestion with
regard to Halim.'

Since the policy of united intervention in the name of Europe, to which
Sir Charles had sought to fix the Powers, had no longer any support in
France, and since the French proposal of a new Khedive had been rejected,
the plan of Turkish intervention which Lord Granville had always
preferred, as being the least bad, was now formally put forward.

'On April 23rd Lord Granville invented a plan of sending three
Generals to Egypt, because the French had told him that we had refused
their plan without having one of our own. The idea was that a Turkish
General should go with full powers, and accompanied by a French and an
English General, the full powers not to be used by the Turk unless his
French and English colleagues should agree.

'On Friday, May 12th, I noted in my diary that the French had suddenly
"caved in" to us about Egypt, and declared that a Turkish intervention
at the request of England and France would not be Turkish
intervention; and on Saturday, May 13th, I found Lord Granville ten
years younger than on the 12th in consequence. But the French
afterwards not only got out of this, but pretended that they had never
done anything of the kind.'

The decision to call in Turkey was not publicly announced, and the
situation at Cairo grew daily more threatening. Sir Edward Malet
telegraphed that a fanatical feeling against foreigners was being
sedulously fostered. The Governments then, says Lord Cromer, "authorized
their Consuls-General to take whatever steps they considered possible to
insure the departure from Egypt of Arabi and his principal partisans, and
the nomination of Cherif Pasha to be President of the Council." [Footnote:
Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_, vol. i., chap, xv., p. 273.] Acting on this
instruction, Sir Edward Malet and his French colleague, on May 25th, 1882,
handed in an official Note to the President of the Council, which
demanded, first, the temporary withdrawal of Arabi from Egypt, and,
secondly, the resignation of the Ministry. On May 26th the Egyptian
Ministry resigned. Thereupon the French Government decided that the need
for Turkish intervention had passed.

'Late on Tuesday afternoon, May 23rd, Lord Granville was in such a
hurry to adjourn the House of Lords, and bolt out of town for
Whitsuntide, that he let the French send off our Identic Note to the
Powers in a form in which it would do much harm, although this was
afterwards slightly altered. On the next day, Wednesday, the 24th, Mr.
Gladstone brought Lord Granville up to town again, and stopped his
going to the Derby, and at 1.30 p.m. they decided to call for
immediate Turkish intervention in Egypt. The necessity for it had been
caused by the childish folly of the French in trying to conceal the
fact that they had proposed in writing to us, through Tissot on the
12th, to send six ships to Alexandria, and that if in addition troops
must be employed on shore, they should be Turkish. The agreement
between England and France was useless unless it was to be known, but
if known, would have prevented the need for intervention. The most
foolish course possible was that adopted by the French in first
agreeing, and then concealing. On May 24th, at night, we proposed to
the French to call in the Turks at once, and Freycinet went to bed to
avoid answering.

'On Friday, the 26th, Tissot wrote to Lord Granville, "M. de Freycinet
telegraphs to me that he is better, and will call the Cabinet together
for to-morrow to submit to it your proposal"; and on Saturday, May
27th, accordingly, the French completely sold us, and we once more
realized the fact that they are not pleasant people to go tiger-
hunting with.'

He quotes from his diary of the moment the comment:

'"The French tried to throw us (and themselves) over as to Turkish
intervention. I wanted to say so in the House. Lord Granville
agreed."'

'On May 30th I strongly urged that we should tell the truth and say
so, and a Cabinet was called for the next day, and on the 31st decided
that we were not to say so; but Hartington agreed with me, and made
himself very disagreeable to Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone, who
held the opposite opinion.'

Sir Charles's entry of the moment was--"Lord G. and Hartington fell out
even rather more than usual."

'On June 1st, in the House of Commons, I half said what I meant, but
Mr. Gladstone spoilt the whole debate. I noted in my diary: "When Mr.
Gladstone begins to talk on foreign affairs it is impossible to tell
what he will say--witness his revelations of a cock-and-bull telegram
of Malet's to-day as to the immediate proclamation of Prince Halim by
Arabi." On the same day, it having been decided on the previous day
that we should send ships to Egypt, Tenterden and I sent off a
telegram _en clair_ to Lord Lyons about it in order that the French
should know what we were doing....

'The Parliamentary difficulties of the Government upon the Egyptian
Question at this moment were considerable, as the Opposition were
taking with much vigour two inconsistent lines; Wolff and Chaplin
violently attacking us upon Jingo grounds because we did not intervene
by force in Egypt, and Bourke threatening us at every sign of
intervention.'

Meanwhile the Khedive had failed to form another Ministry, and on May 28th
Arabi had been reinstated, with the result that his supporters redoubled
their confidence and that panic was general among the European residents.

'On June 13th we received full information with regard to the riots
which had happened in Alexandria on the 11th' (there being a British
and a French fleet there), 'in which several British subjects had been
assaulted and our Consul severely beaten. I formed a clear opinion
that it was impossible for us not to take active steps in intervention
after this, [Footnote: A private letter of this date gives the
estimate that "there is an overwhelming public opinion here for very
strong measures; that the great majority of the Cabinet share that
view; that France is most unpopular; and that Lord Granville, Mr.
Gladstone, and Mr. Bright will apparently bow to the storm."] as we
had been acting strictly within our rights along with France and
representing joint control. If the French would not go with us in
restoring order or allow the Turks to do so, I felt that we must do it
for ourselves, but I was clearly of opinion, and have always remained
so, that it was undesirable to embark upon a prolonged occupation of
Egypt. I thought, and still think, that anarchy could have been put
down, and a fairly stable state of things set up, without any
necessity for a British occupation. The riots, however, were the cause
on my part of a considerable error. I believed on the information
furnished me from Alexandria and Cairo that they were the work of the
revolutionary leaders in the capital. A long time afterwards I
gradually came to think that this had not been so, and that they had
been purely local and spontaneous. This does not, however, affect my
judgment upon the need for intervention.

'On Wednesday, June 14th ... brought me a telegram from Wilfrid Blunt
to Arabi ... "Praise God for victory." This abominable telegram
naturally had much to do with exciting the suspicions that I have just
mentioned as to Arabi having organized the riots. But I now believe
that the English sympathizer was more extreme than the Egyptian
revolutionist. In my diaries I wrote: "Our side in the Commons are
very Jingo about Egypt. They badly want to kill somebody. They don't
know who. Mr. G., who does not like the Stock Exchange, sent 'Egypts'
up 3 1/2 per cent. by a word in his speech." [Footnote: Mr. Gladstone
on June 14th: "... The ends we have in view ... are well known to
consist in the general maintenance of all established rights in Egypt,
whether they be those of the Sultan, those of the Khedive, those of
the people of Egypt, or _those of the foreign bondholders_."] At 6.30
in the afternoon there was a Cabinet on Egypt, Chamberlain and
Hartington pressing for action, and I being most anxious that action
should take place. As there was now to be a conference at
Constantinople upon Egyptian affairs, I urged without success that
Rivers Wilson should be sent out to assist Lord Dufferin, on account
of his incomparable knowledge of Egyptian affairs, Lord Granville
refusing on the ground that "there's great jealousy of him among the
Egyptian English. He is under the charm of that arch-intriguer Nubar."
But we needed Nubar to get us out of our difficulties, and had
ultimately to call him in as Prime Minister.

'On June 15th the French Ambassador came to fence at my house at ten,
and I reported to Lord Granville: "He volunteered the statement that
Freycinet was 'an old woman'; in fact, talked in the sort of way in
which Bourke used to talk of Lord Derby in '77-'78."

'In the evening I met Musurus Bey at the French Embassy, and had a
conversation with him, which I reported and he afterwards denied, but
I don't think much importance was attached to his denial. I need not
discuss the matter, as the despatches were laid before Parliament.

'On the next day I wrote to Lord Granville: "The one thing we have to
fear is the murder of Malet or of the Khedive. If the Khedive obeys
the Sultan and returns to Cairo, it is very difficult to keep Malet at
Alexandria. I think we ought to tell the Sultan that we are sorry to
hear of the direction given to the Khedive to return to Cairo, and
tell the Khedive and Malet that we have said so. Also privately tell
the Khedive not to move." This I think was done.

'On June 17th I decided that I would resign if no steps were taken
with regard to the Alexandria massacre; but in the evening Lord
Granville telegraphed to Lord Ampthill: [Footnote: Lord Odo Russell
had become Lord Ampthill, and was still Ambassador at Berlin.] "No.
130 ... it is impossible that the present state of things should be
allowed to continue, and if the Sultan is unwilling to do anything,
some other means must be found." On the 18th, after much pressure and
a threat of resignation from me, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord
Ampthill: "No. 131. Intimate to Prince Bismarck ... that sharing as he
does the strong wish of H. M. G. to avoid unnecessary complications,
he must feel that, even if H. M. G. did not object, as they do, public
opinion would prevent them permanently acquiescing in any arrangements
in Egypt, especially after the late massacres at Alexandria, which
would destroy not only the prestige of this country, but also of
Europe, in the East...."

'The French having, according to Count Hatzfeldt, stated to the
Germans, as reported by Lord Ampthill in his No. 214, "that to
sanction Turkish intervention in Egypt would be to commit suicide," I
proposed that we should direct Lord Ampthill to read to him Tissot's
communication of May 12th. in which the French had agreed to the use
of Turkish troops. Lord Granville assented. On June 19th Lord
Granville repeated, through Lord Ampthill, to Prince Bismarck, "the
strong warning contained in my 131 of yesterday." I afterwards found
out, however, that at the last moment, on June 17th, Lord Granville
had telegraphed withdrawing the word "must" in his No. 130, and
substituting the word "should." He afterwards telegraphed again,
resubstituting "must," and wrote to me: "I have let the word stand, as
Hartington and you attached importance to it, and as it had been
already sent." There was great trouble about this change afterwards,
for Lord Granville was not exact in saying that he had let the word
"stand." What he had done was, as I say, first to withdraw it, and
then to resubstitute it upon our strong pressure.

'On June 19th there were two meetings of the Cabinet about Egypt, to
which I was called in; one at two, and another at six o'clock. I
simply said, like the servants when they fall out: "Either Arabi must
go or I will."

'On June 20th another meeting of the Cabinet took place at half-past
three. Lord Hartington called attention to the fact that Lord
Granville had altered "must" into "should" in No. 130, for the
telegram had after all been printed for the Cabinet and the Embassies
with the word "should." The Cabinet sat for four hours, and then
adjourned to the next day, on a proposal by Northbrook and Childers to
ask the French whether they would go halves with us in sending 15,000
men to guard the Canal. On June 21st I came down a little from my
position of the previous day, and stated that I would go out with
Hartington if he liked, but that if he would not, and I stood alone,
then I would swallow Arabi on the ground that the oath to take him out
was sworn by England and France together, and that if France would not
do her half, we could not do both halves, provided that they gave me
(1) protection of the Canal, (2) a startling reparation for the
murders and the insult to our Consul at Alexandria.

'At two o'clock the Cabinet met again. Lord Granville had in the
meantime written me a letter ... as to the leaving out of "must" and
inserting "should." He said that if we changed our minds or had to
adopt palliatives, such as the defence of the Canal and reparation at
Alexandria, "our nose would be rubbed in 'must.'" I wrote back that
our position was not the same, inasmuch as he was evidently looking
forward to having to defend in Parliament a complete surrender, which
I was determined I would not do. On the same day, however, we
exchanged very pleasant letters about an accident to Lady Granville,
of which Lord Granville wrote: "It frightened me out of my wits."

'The Cabinet decided on the instructions to Dufferin for the
Conference, adopting proposals with regard to them which were made by
Chamberlain, and which were, in fact, mine. Lord Granville refused to
take them from Chamberlain, but Mr. Gladstone, with some slight
changes, made them his own, and then Lord Granville took them
directly. Northbrook went off delighted to continue his transport
preparations. Hartington warned Indian troops without consulting his
colleagues, but escaped censure. On June 23rd I suggested that
somebody should be appointed to assess damages to property at
Alexandria by the riots, as a ground for a claim against the
revolutionary Government, and suggested Lord Charles Beresford for the
work; but Lord Granville refused the man though he accepted the thing.
I obtained his consent to telegraph that we should insist on payment
of money to the relatives of the eight British subjects killed, of
money for the men hurt, of damages for the destruction of property, on
the execution of the murderers, on a salute to our flag at Alexandria,
and a salute to our flag at Cairo.

'On Saturday, June 24th, as I was only getting my way from day to day
upon these points by continually threatening resignation, Lord
Granville wrote to me in solemn reproof: "Nothing should be so sacred
as a threat of resignation." But I cannot see, and never could, why if
one intends to resign if one does not get one's way about a point
which one thinks vital, one should not say frankly exactly what one
means. I never blustered, and never threatened resignation except when
I fully meant it.

'On Sunday, June 25th, there came a curious telegram from Dufferin,
stating that the Sultan was "quite prepared to hand over to us the
exclusive control and administration of Egypt, reserving to himself
only those rights of suzerainty which he now possessed. In fact, what
he offered was an Egyptian convention on the lines of the Cyprus
convention." Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone took upon themselves to
decline this offer without laying it before the Cabinet, and on
Tuesday, the 27th, the Queen sent to Hartington to express her anger
that the Sultan's offer of Sunday should have been declined without
consultation with her. I certainly think that a Cabinet ought to have
been called, but the Cabinet would have backed the refusal, though
they afterwards regretted it.

'On June 28th I was again sent for to the Cabinet, which discussed a
proposal from the Sultan to send troops.

'On June 30th I dined with the German Ambassador, who told me that
Musurus had said to him exactly what he had said to me at the French
Embassy, and that he had placed the conversation upon record. On the
same day two additional British gunboats were ordered to the Canal.

'On July 1st I had one of the most difficult tasks to perform that
were ever laid upon me. I had wanted to get off the Cobden Club dinner
fixed for that day; but, Lesseps having come over as a flaming Arabist
for the express purpose of making a ferocious Arabi speech at this
banquet, I had to go in order to propose his health, to sit next him
at the dinner, to frighten him out of making his speech, and to make
such a speech myself that he could not without provoking his audience
mention Egypt at all. In all this I succeeded. I told him privately
that, after the massacre of eight British subjects at Alexandria and
the promise by England and France that they would jointly keep order
in Egypt, if he introduced the subject I would speak again after him
and raise the audience against him. The old gentleman was very angry,
but he made a different speech, and the matter passed off
successfully. Lord Derby was in the chair, and gave me great
assistance, because, through Lord Granville, he allowed me to inform
Lesseps that if he began to deliver the speech which he had in his
pocket, he should rise and tell him that it was contrary to the rule
of the Club to introduce controversial topics likely to lead to
violent discussion, and, in fact, make him sit down. Lesseps brought
me a telegram from his son, who was at Ismailia, stating that there
could be no danger in Egypt unless there were an armed intervention,
and threatening us with the destruction of the Canal if intervention
should take place.

'On July 3rd there was a Cabinet on a proposal by Italy for the free
navigation of the Canal. This was most unnecessary, as a virtual
neutralization in practice existed, but the Italians wanted to do
something, and after an enormous deal of discussion they ultimately
got their way upon this unimportant point.

'On Monday, July 3rd, I received from Bourke, my predecessor, the
first warning of strong Tory opposition to British intervention in
Egypt.

'On the 4th Mr. Gladstone, Hartington, and Childers met to decide
whether the reserves should be called out and the troops sent forward,
but just before their meeting I saw Lesseps come past my door and go
to Mr. Gladstone's room at the House of Commons, which was next to
mine, and going in afterwards to Mr. Gladstone I saw the effect that
Lesseps had produced. Lesseps had a promise from Arabi to let him make
a fresh-water irrigation canal without payment for the concession, as
I afterwards discovered.

'On this day I wrote a memorandum on the subject of intervention (I
have an impression that it was based on Chamberlain's views, but I am
not sure). I pointed out that many Liberals thought that intervention
was only contemplated on account of financial interests--that if we
intervened to protect the Canal and to exact reparation due to us for
the Alexandria outrages, this feeling need not be taken into account;
but that if we were going to Cairo, we ought to make our position
clear. As far as Arabi personally was concerned, his use of the phrase
"national party" was a mere prostitution of the term. But there was in
Egypt a very real desire to see Egyptians in office, and a certain
amount of real national sentiment, and that sentiment we might
conciliate. I thought that if we intervened by ourselves the control
might be considered dead. The intervention must be placed on the
ground either of the need for settled government at Cairo, in order to
make the Canal safe and our route to India free, or else on that of
the probable complicity of the revolutionary party in the Alexandria
massacres, or on both. But in the event of such an intervention I was
of opinion that we should say that the recommendations of the Notables
for the revision of existing institutions would be favourably
considered, with the proviso, however, that the army should be either
disbanded or diminished, the only military force necessary in Egypt
being one for the Soudan and a bodyguard for the Khedive. To these
views I have always adhered, and while I strongly supported an
intervention of this kind, I was always opposed to an intervention
which made us in the least responsible for Egyptian finance, or to an
intervention followed by an occupation.

'Late on this afternoon of July 4th I secretly informed the Khedive,
through Rivers Wilson, of the instructions that had been given to
Beauchamp Seymour to bombard the Alexandria forts if the construction
of new earthworks erected against our ships were not discontinued; for
I felt that the man's life was in danger. I had been refused leave to
tell him, and I did it without leave. When I saw Wilson he told me
that Lesseps had officially informed him--Wilson being one of the
British directors of the Suez Canal, and Lesseps Chairman of the
Company--that we by our action were endangering the Canal. This was
evidently a French menace on behalf of Arabi, and I took upon myself
not to report it, as it would have only further weakened the minds of
men already weak. Lesseps was not truthful. He told Mr. Gladstone that
the Khedive had informed him that he was satisfied with the existing
situation. We immediately telegraphed to the Khedive, through
Sinadino, his Greek banker, who was representing him in London, to
ask him whether this was true, and the Khedive answered by sending us
all that had passed between him and Lesseps, from which it was quite
clear that it was not true....