The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1

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In France, the greatest of French statesmen had been turned out of office
on January 26th. [Footnote: The Gambetta Ministry fell by a vote on
Scrutin de Liste on January 26th. The Freycinet Ministry succeeded to
office on January 31st. On January 31st, 1882, Sir Charles wrote to Mr.
Frank Hill: "No member of the new French Government is taken from the
majority that overthrew Gambetta. All who are deputies voted in the
Minority. All who are senators would have so voted."] But already people
were saying that Gambetta must be President, and that by 1886, the date of
the next Presidential election, he would have recovered all his
popularity--or lost it for ever. 'The alternative of death,' says Dilke,
'had not occurred to them; yet it was death, coupled with popularity, that
came.'

The friends had not met since Gambetta's fall, but

'Gambetta found time to write and thank me for my speech, as well as
for what I had said to him about his fall. He again promised a visit
to London in one of these letters.'

"PARIS,
"_Le 31 Janvier_, 1882.

"MON CHER AMI,

"Je vous remercie de votre bonne et forte parole. Elle me plait par-
dessus tout venant de vous, qui etes bon juge en fait de dignite et
d'autorite politique.

"Je ne regrette en partant qu'une seule chose--de n'avoir pu terminer
le traite. Mais j'ai grand espoir d'avoir porte les choses assez loin
pour empecher les successeurs de reculer.

"Quand vous reverrai-je? Je compte bien que ce sera e Londres, qui
sera toujours en beau quand vous y serez.

"Bien cordialement,

"LEON GAMBETTA."

'But the visit was destined never to take place,' though for years it had
been continually talked of between them. About August, 1876, when it was
almost settled, Sir Charles had noted:

'Gambetta never came to England in his life but once (about 1869), and
that was on a curious mission, considering what the future was to
bring forth; for he came under the Empire as the representative of the
Republicans to enter into consultation with the Orleans Princes for
the overthrow of Louis Napoleon. This interview would no doubt be
denied if mentioned by many of Gambetta's friends, but he told me of
it himself.'

On April 16th, 1882, Sir Charles, on his way back from spending the Easter
recess at Toulon, breakfasted with Gambetta, who told his friend 'that he
was "unique among fallen Ministers, for others, once fallen, are
forgiven," whereas he was "worse hated and more attacked than when in
power."'

He was none the less witty. There was talk of reforms in Russia--reforms
that had been suddenly obliterated by the murder of the reforming Tsar.
"What did Russia want with a 'Parlement'?" (Gambetta asked). "She has two
Generals who provide her with it. Skobelef, _Parle_; et Ignatief, _Ment._"

'On the 21st January, 1882, Alfred de Rothschild came to see me to
tell me that Bontoux had been to "Alphonse" [Footnote: The head of the
Paris house.] to ask him to help the Union Generale, which had been a
Catholic alliance against the Jews, and was now on its last legs. On
the next day Alphonse de Rothschild decided that he would not, as was
indeed to be expected, unless he had very strong, purely financial,
reasons the other way. He ultimately helped enough to save the
brokers, but not enough to save Bontoux or the rest. I found that,
ever since the Battle of Waterloo, the Rothschilds in London and in
Paris have been in the habit of writing to one another long letters
every day, and from time to time I saw these letters from Alphonse
when they bore upon political affairs.'

Sir Charles was not impressed by the political insight of those documents,
which seemed to him 'extraordinarily uninteresting,' expressing old-
fashioned Conservative ideas, though 'the Rothschilds all think they are
Liberals.'

The jottings end with a definition of diplomacy:

'On the 24th January, 1882, I dined at the French Embassy, where Baron
Solvyns, the Belgian Minister, amused me with the saying that diplomacy
meant "to pass one's life a expliquer les choses sans les comprendre."'
[Footnote: Adapted from Beaumarchais, who thus describes "la politique" in
'Le Mariage de Figaro,' Act III., Scene ii.]

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE PHOENIX PARK MURDERS

I.

Ireland and Egypt fill the most important places in the history of 1882.
That was the year, in Ireland, of the Kilmainham Treaty, the resignation
of Mr. Forster, and the Phoenix Park murders; in Egypt, of the riots in
Alexandria, followed by the bombardment, which caused Mr. Bright's
resignation, and the battle of Tel-el-Kebir.

They had their roots far back in preceding years. But the abrupt
development of the trouble in Egypt was due to an accident; that of the
Irish question was of no sudden or casual growth. The Parliamentary
difficulty as to procedure of the House was only part of Parnell's
deliberate design to paralyze legislature and executive alike. [Footnote:
Sir Charles notes: 'In 1890, when I wrote out these diaries, I showed them
to Chamberlain, and gave him a copy of some part, notably that relating to
the Kilmainham Treaty and that relating to Egypt (1882). His remembrance
of events agreed with the notes made by me at the time.']

Government, for the moment, was trying to suppress Parnell and his
associates. The Irish leader himself had been in gaol since October 12th,
1881; Mr. Dillon, Mr. Sexton, Mr. Davitt, and many hundreds of lesser men,
had been imprisoned without sentence or form of trial. Sir Charles Dilke,
whom nobody believed to be an adviser of coercion, experienced as a member
of the Government manifestations of Irish displeasure.

'On January 31st I addressed my constituents. The Irish attacked the
meeting, and one East-Ender came at my private secretary with a chair,
howling Mr. Bright's phrase: "Force is no remedy!" As a very violent
breach of the peace had been committed, the police came in and cleared
the room, and after that our people came back again, and I was able to
make my speech quietly.... Congratulations upon my speech on all hands
were warm, especially those of Chamberlain and Lord Granville.
Chamberlain had written to me before the meeting to recommend a free
resort to "chuckers-out," and on my informing him of the use made of
Bright's maxim, he amused himself by communicating it to Bright, who
was only grim upon the subject.'

Irish discontent could count on sympathy and support from the rulers of
America. On March 31st, 1882, the Memoir notes: 'It was settled to tell
the Americans that those suspects who would leave the United Kingdom and
engage not to return might go.'

'On April 20th I had to point out to Lord Granville the fact that the
Irish had shown on the previous day that they had got hold of the
condition which we had attempted to make with the Americans as to the
liberation of American suspects, a condition which the Americans had
indignantly refused.'

All these things affected public opinion in Great Britain. At this moment
the Radical wing was demanding a change of policy in Ireland, while Mr.
Forster was pressing hard for renewal of the Coercion Act, which, having
been passed in 1881 for a year only, was now expiring. The Radicals won,
and the change of policy was inaugurated by the so-called Kilmainham
Treaty.

'At this moment' (April, 1882) 'Parnell was let out of prison, at Mr.
Gladstone's wish, to go to Paris to attend a funeral, but he was away
from prison, also at Mr. Gladstone's wish, unnecessarily long, and,
staying in London with Captain and Mrs. O'Shea, was seen by
Chamberlain at the wish of Mr. Gladstone (expressed on April 20th),
with the view that Chamberlain should offer him leave of absence from
prison with the view of concocting some arrangement (for his release
and for the pacification of Ireland) between him and the Government.
On the 21st Chamberlain and I met and decided that we would resign if
it was proposed to renew the Coercion Act, or the power of arbitrary
arrest in its then naked form.

'On April 22nd, 1882, Chamberlain obtained from the Cabinet, by a
majority, Mr. Gladstone being strongly with him, his own way in the
Irish Question, with full leave to enter into negotiations with
Parnell through O'Shea, but to be disavowed if he failed. Mr.
Gladstone reported the Cabinet of the 22nd to the Queen, stating that
the decision of the Cabinet was to the effect that it was wise "to
strengthen the law in Ireland." This was one way of putting it. What
the Cabinet really decided on April 22nd was to let out Parnell and
his friends, and to drop arbitrary arrest, although they did decide to
have a new Coercion Bill on minor points, to which Coercion Bill
Parnell himself was favourable. The statement that Parnell was
favourable would be denied, but O'Shea showed me a draft Bill, which
was, so he said, in Parnell's writing. I knew the hand, and it seemed
to be so.

'On April 25th Chamberlain reported to the Cabinet the result of his
interviews. Lord Cowper had already resigned the Lord-Lieutenancy, but
Forster's resignation (for some reason which I have never understood)
was kept back for a little. It is a curious fact that the Duchess of
Manchester told me in the middle of March that Lord Spencer was to
succeed Lord Cowper; but the first the Cabinet heard of it was on
April 25th.

'On April 26th, Parnell having returned to gaol, leave was given to
Captain O'Shea to go and see him at Kilmainham with full powers, but
nothing in writing. On the same day a letter, which was sent me by
Chamberlain, after Forster had seen it and sent it on to him, shows
that Forster was still acting, or at all events being treated by Mr.
Gladstone as though he was going forward with his policy. But on the
28th Chamberlain told me that Forster would resign. In my diary I say:
"The Chancellor and Lord Kimberley may go with him. In this case the
Irish Secretaryship would be offered to Shaw" (member for Limerick,
Mr. Butt's successor as leader of the moderate Home Rulers), "but he
would refuse because he could not get his county to return him. Then
it must come either to Chamberlain or to myself. I said I should wish
in this event that he should take it and I succeed him at the Board of
Trade. He said that my appointment would make less row than his. I
admitted this, but said that his would be the best for the public
service. Besides, my opinion in favour of Home Rule would form a grave
difficulty in my way." It will be seen that it never occurred for a
moment to either Chamberlain or myself that the Irish Secretaryship
would be offered without a seat in the Cabinet; but we counted without
remembering Mr. Gladstone's affection for Lord Spencer.... It will
also be seen that I did not count Chamberlain as being a Home Ruler
like myself.

'On the 29th Forster told Harcourt at the banquet of the Royal Academy
that he should resign "if it is decided to let out the men." It is
necessary to be careful about one's history of this moment, for no
authorities are to be trusted. My diary was written at the time from
information chiefly supplied by Chamberlain, and Chamberlain has since
seen and agreed to this record (1906). On Sunday, April 30th, the
_Observer_ gave an account of what had passed at a Cabinet of the
previous day; but no such Cabinet was held, and on May 1st the _Times_
also gave an account of what passed at "Saturday's Cabinet"!

'On May 1st I saw Chamberlain before the Cabinet. Parnell had written
to Justin McCarthy to promise that if let out he was ready to advise
payment of rent and cessation of outrages, but McCarthy would not
allow the letters to be made public. Forster insisted that he should
give a public promise. I suggested to Chamberlain that to call on
Parnell to give a public promise was to recognize Parnell as the
Government of Ireland. Chamberlain agreed to argue that the promise
should be a private one so far as Parnell was concerned, but that the
Government should state that such a promise had been made. After the
Cabinet Chamberlain told me that at the Cabinet of the next day
Forster would resign; but he thought that the Chancellor, who was
restive about the remedial legislation proposed in the shape of an
Arrears Bill, would "go" too. I fancy the Chancellor had promised to
resign, but he didn't.'

This reference to Lord Selborne is supplemented by the Memoir for 1893,
where Sir Charles has a detached note:

'Our former Chancellor at eighty-two is "not less" prosy in the Lords
than he used to be, for he was always "slow." When W. E. Forster
resigned in 1882, Lord Granville left the Cabinet room to go down to
tell the Queen. Then, and then only, Lord Selborne said: "But I agree
with him, and must resign also." "It is too late," said Harcourt, "it
would not now be respectful to the Queen as Granville has started." So
the Chancellor did not resign.'

The Memoir continues: 'On May 3rd Chamberlain, who had decided to take
the Irish Secretaryship if offered to him, was astonished at having
received no offer. At 11.30 p.m. on the same day, the 3rd, I found
that the appointment had been offered to and declined by Hartington;
but the offer to, and acceptance by, his brother, Lord Frederick
Cavendish, came as a complete surprise both to me and to Chamberlain.

'In the night between May 4th and 5th the Queen telegraphed to
Harcourt: "I can scarcely believe that Davitt, one of the most
dangerous traitors, has been released without my having been
consulted, as I was in the case of the three members." The fact was
that Harcourt had so impressed upon the Queen the wickedness of
Davitt, at the time when he withdrew Davitt's ticket-of-leave, that it
was rather difficult for him to explain to the Queen his very sudden
change of front.

'On the 5th I had an interview with Mr. Gladstone as to royal grants.
I carefully abstained from giving any pledge as to future action, and
at the Cabinet of the 8th' (after Lord Frederick Cavendish's murder),
'when the question of my being offered the Chief Secretaryship with
the Cabinet came up, Mr. Gladstone stated to the Cabinet that I
remained unpledged.

'On May 6th I heard from Brett and from the Duchess of Manchester that
Hartington had proposed me in the Cabinet for Chief Secretary, with a
seat in the Cabinet, and that both Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville
had said: "Dilke won't do." The Duchess asked me what this meant, and
I said that it was the Queen's objection on account of the Leopold
grant, which it was; but Mr. Gladstone was glad to give Spencer his
own way without a Chief Secretary in the Cabinet.'

At half-past six that afternoon, May 6th, Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr.
Burke, the permanent Under-Secretary, were murdered in the Phoenix Park,
within sight of the Viceregal Lodge.

'On the night of May 6th the scene at the party at the Admiralty was
most dramatic. Mrs. Gladstone had come there from a dinner party at
the Austrian Embassy, not knowing of the murder, while everybody else
in the room knew. At last she was sent for suddenly to Downing Street
to be told, and went away under the impression that the Queen had been
shot, for she was assured that it was very dreadful, but "nothing
about Mr. Gladstone."

'Early on Sunday morning, the 7th, Parnell came to see me with Justin
McCarthy. He was white and apparently terror-stricken. He thought the
blow was aimed at him, and that if people kept their heads, and the
new policy prevailed, he himself would be the next victim of the
secret societies. [Footnote: In the letters of Justin McCarthy to Mrs.
Campbell Praed (_Our Book of Memoirs_, p. 97) there is an account of
what happened in London on that Sunday. There was a gathering of Irish
leaders at Parnell's rooms.

"Then Parnell and I talked together, and we thought the best thing for
us--we two--was to go and consult some of our English friends. We
started out, and went first to see Sir Charles Dilke. Our impression
was that either Dilke or Chamberlain would be asked to take the post
of Irish Secretary. Indeed, the general impression was that either one
man or the other would have been asked at the time when Lord Frederick
Cavendish was appointed.... We saw Dilke. He was perfectly composed
and cool. He said that if Gladstone offered him the post of Irish
Secretary, nothing that had happened lately would in the least deter
him from accepting it....

"He went on to say that he was a Home Ruler _quand meme_; that he
would be inclined to press Home Rule on the Irish people, even if they
were not wholly inclined for it, because he so fully believed in the
principle, whereas Chamberlain would only give Home Rule if the Irish
people refused to accept anything less. But on the other hand,
Chamberlain was an optimist in the matter, and thought he could do
great good as Irish Secretary; and he (Dilke) was not so certain,
seeing the difficulty of dealing with the Castle and the permanent
officials, and therefore they agreed that as far as they were
concerned it was better Chamberlain should go.

"He said, 'If Chamberlain goes, he'll go to smash things'--meaning the
Dublin Castle system.

"Then we went to Chamberlain and had a long talk with him. We found
him perfectly willing to go to Ireland, but he said he must have his
own way there and he would either make or mar--by which we understood
the Castle system...."]

'On this day, May 8th, I noted that I thought it most unlikely that
Mr. Gladstone would send Chamberlain to Ireland, inasmuch as to do so
would be to admit that he had been wrong in not sending him in the
previous week. To Grant Duff I sent the reason for Mr. G.'s decision:
"Spencer wishes the policy to be _his_ policy, and does not want his
Chief Secretary in the Cabinet." At three o'clock Chamberlain sent a
note across to me from the Cabinet: "Prepare for an offer." I was
somewhat surprised at this, because Chamberlain knew that I would not
take it without the Cabinet, and that I would take it with the
Cabinet, whereas his note seemed to imply a doubt. At four he came
across himself, and the first difference that had ever occurred
between us took place, because although he knew that I would not
accept, he urged acceptance of the post without the Cabinet. He argued
that it carried with it the Privy Council, that it established great
personal claims upon the party, and that it afforded a means of
getting over the difficulty with the Queen. I declined, however,
without hesitation and with some anger. It was obvious that I could
not consent to be "a mere mouthpiece." Mr. Gladstone and Lord
Carlingford then sent back to say, personally from each of them, that
I was to be present at the Cabinet at every discussion of Irish
affairs; and I then asked: "Why, then, should I not be in the
Cabinet?" Carlingford came back to the Foreign Office again and again,
and cried over it to me; and Lord Granville came in twice, and
threatened me with loss of prestige by my refusal, by which I
certainly felt that I had lost Mr. Gladstone's confidence. I was angry
with Chamberlain at having placed me in this position.... Had he acted
on this occasion with the steadiness with which he acted on every
other, he would have told the Cabinet that the offer would be an
insult, because he knew that this was my view. The ground on which the
refusal of the Cabinet was put to me was the impossibility of having
both myself and Spencer in the Cabinet. Lord Granville came in
finally, and said in his sweetest manner (which is a very disagreeable
one) that he had vast experience, and had "never known a man stand on
his extreme rights and gain by it." This I felt to be a monstrous
perversion of the case, and I was glad on the morning of the 9th to
find that my reasons were very fairly stated in the _Standard_, the
_Telegraph_, and the _Daily News_. Chamberlain had seen Escott of the
_Standard_, and Lawson of the _Telegraph_, and I had seen Hill of the
_Daily News_.

'That the Cabinet position towards me was dishonest is shown by the
fact that they had given Lord Spencer Cowper's place when they had
still reason to suppose that Forster was going to continue in the
Irish Secretaryship and in the Cabinet, and had afterwards asked
Hartington to take the Chief Secretaryship.

'An honourable (I trust) defence of myself is in a letter in the
possession of Grant Duff under date "May 5th, closed on 11th."

The letter to Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff, which has separate brief
jottings on May 5th, 6th, and 7th, has so far been reproduced almost
textually from Sir Charles's Memoir. The rest runs as follows:

"_8th_.--Mr. Gladstone is determined not to send Chamberlain to
Ireland, and does not want a Chief Secretary in the Cabinet, and to
send Chamberlain and so have a Chief Secretary in the Cabinet would be
to admit that the decision of last week was wrong. I, of course,
refused to go. I should have had to defend any policy that Spencer
chose to adopt without having a voice in it. Acceptance would not have
been only a personal mistake; it would have been a political blunder.
Outside the Cabinet I should not have had the public confidence, and
rightly so, because I could not have had a strong hand. I should have
inherited accumulated blunders, and I was under no kind of obligation
to do so, for I have never touched the Irish Question. Never have I
spoken of it from first to last. Many of the measures rendered
necessary by the situation are condemned by my whole past attitude;
but they have really been made inevitable by blunders for which I had
no responsibility and which I should not have been allowed to condemn.

"Yours ever,"

"CHS. W. D."

"Closed on 11th."

He wrote also this month in a letter to Mrs. Pattison:

"In a matter of this sort it is essential to have the look of the
thing in view, when a question of personal courage is involved. Of
course, I know that I have personal courage, but the public can only
judge from the look of things. The reason why Chamberlain even doubted
if I ought not after the murder to go--though I was not to have gone
before it--lay in the doubt as to how the public would take the look
of it. It has turned out right, but it might have turned out wrong. If
the public had gone the other way, I should have said I ought to have
taken it, and resigned."

But, as Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff pointed out when replying to the letter
of May 11th, in the state of things then existing in Ireland a Minister
could hardly have resigned without the gravest embarrassment to the
Government, and he cordially approved Sir Charles's refusal: "You could
not have accepted the Secretaryship without a seat in the Cabinet." That
refusal was also approved and understood by the heir to the Throne:

'On the 8th the Prince of Wales wrote to me through Knollys to ask me
as to the Chief Secretaryship, and on my informing him how matters
stood, replied: "If you had accepted the post without a seat in the
Cabinet, your position, especially at the present moment, would be a
very unsatisfactory one. If the policy, whatever it is, prove a
success, I doubt whether _you_ would have obtained much credit for it;
and if it turned out a failure, you may be quite sure that a great
deal of the blame would fall upon you without your having been
responsible for the initiation of the steps that were adopted."'

The Phoenix Park murders having immediately followed the appointment of
Lord Frederick Cavendish, those who had always pressed for further powers
of police now asserted themselves with vehemence. Sir William Harcourt
spoke strongly on Ireland and the necessity for coercion in the House of
Commons. Mr. Gladstone, in whom the Radicals had always found a mainstay
against these tendencies, was broken in spirit and suddenly aged. All
relations in the Cabinet were jarred and embittered, as the successive
entries in this Memoir show:

'In the night between May 11th and 12th the Irish, although angry at
Harcourt's coercion speech, sent O'Shea to Chamberlain at 3 a.m. with
the olive-branch again.