The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1

S >> Stephen Gwynn >> The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50

Chronicling another talk with Gladstone, in which the latter spoke of
Northcote's "shiftiness," Sir Charles says:

'I had a high opinion of Sir Stafford, but in face of Churchill he was
not a free agent....

'The Cabinet rejected Chamberlain's proposal to accompany coercion by
a provision against ejectments in the sense of the Compensation Bill
of 1880. In my diary I add: "By a majority they decided that there
should be no declaration of the nature of the Land Bill as yet; but,
as Gladstone was in the minority on this point, we shall probably not
wait long for the declaration. The Land Bill was finally settled. It
really gives the 'three F's,' applied by a Court, but so wrapped up
that nobody will find them."'

Mr. Forster's Coercion Bill was introduced as the first business of the
Session, and was met by obstruction which more than realized the forecast.
From Monday, January 31st, through the whole of Tuesday, February 1st, the
debate was prolonged in a House possessing no recognized authority to
check it; and at nine on the Wednesday morning Speaker Brand adopted the
course which had been advocated by Lord Hartington. Acting in the exercise
of his own discretion, he ordered the question to be put. The Irish
members, having refused to submit, were removed one by one, technically by
force. In face of these circumstances the Cabinet met on the Wednesday
afternoon.

'The Cabinet decided not to have general closure in the form in which
Chamberlain had asked for it in my name as well as in his. Gladstone
wanted to have a special closure for Irish coercion, but Chamberlain
presented our ultimatum against that, and won. When Chamberlain and I
talked over the whole situation, I told him that I thought we had been
too popular up to now for it to last. We were now unpopular with our
own people in the constituencies on account of coercion, but, holding
their opinions, were not really trusted by the moderates. I thought
this position inevitable. The holding of strongly patriotic and
national opinions in foreign affairs combined with extreme Radical
opinions upon internal matters made it difficult to act with anybody
for long without being attacked by some section with which it was
necessary to act at other times, and made it difficult to form a solid
party.'

When Dilke and Chamberlain, neither of whom was averse from the idea of
closure in itself, resisted a proposal which meant treating the Irish
members in a category apart from the rest of the House of Commons, they
took a course which now seems simple and inevitable. But there is some
difficulty in realizing to-day how Irishmen, and more especially Irish
members, were viewed in England through the early eighties. Something of
the public feeling towards them may be gathered from a string of extracts
dealing with another source of dissension in this Cabinet. Sir William
Harcourt, as Home Secretary, had adopted determined views of what may be
conceded to the exigencies or the demands of detectives. Sir Charles
writes on February 5th:

'It was at this moment that I first had to do with dynamite. Lord
Granville had instructed me to deal with such matters at once myself
without their passing through the Office; and receiving despatches
from Washington (containing despatches from our Consul at Philadelphia
offering information as to plots), and having missed Harcourt, I took
them to Mr. Gladstone. I said that I had no doubt a sharp Yankee was
trying to get a couple of hundred pounds out of us.'

But Sir William Harcourt wished for the information, and Sir Charles adds:

'The result of this policy undoubtedly was the fabrication of plots,
as exposed by Michael Davitt in the _Labour World_ in 1890.'

Later Harcourt modified his view, but 'this was like shutting the stable
door when the steed was stolen.'

'On February 16th I noted in my diary my dissatisfaction with regard
to the Secret Service money. In 1880 I had walked out instead of
voting for it, and I proposed this year to follow the same course. I
knew of nothing on which was spent the L15,000, except one sum of L40
for a service not secret at all in its nature, "and L200 spent in
America on a ... panic of Harcourt's." I believe that as a fact most
of the money was spent in the United States, but as I was not trusted
with the information, I again walked out.'

On February 12th 'there was a great row between Fawcett and Harcourt.'

'Harcourt and Fawcett had been opening the letters of the Irish
members, and when the Irishmen found it out Fawcett wanted to admit
it, and Harcourt insisted on a blank refusal of information. My
brother came to me with this question from the Radicals: "What is the
use of having a blind Postmaster-General if he reads our letters?"'

The matter came up in the Cabinet along with a discussion on the Arms Act,
which prohibited the possession of firearms in Ireland without licence
from a Magistrate, and authorized the police to search. This Act had been
in force before, but had been dropped by the Government on coming into
office, and was now proposed as a supplement to Mr. Forster's "Protection
of Property" measure.

'On February 12th Mr. Gladstone, with Bright and Chamberlain, fought
hard against the Arms Bill. Harcourt, however, said that "coercion was
like caviare: unpleasant at first to the palate, it becomes agreeable
with use"; and, led by Harcourt, the majority insisted on having more
coercion, and it was settled that the second Bill should go on. At
dinner at Lord and Lady Cork's in the evening I was astonished to see
in what excellent spirits Mr. Gladstone was, although he had been
entirely overruled in his own Cabinet in the afternoon.'

Meanwhile the Home Secretary's activity was making trouble for the Foreign
Office.

'It having been stated in the House of Commons by Parnell that he had
been watched and followed in Paris by persons connected with the
Embassy, Lord Lyons telegraphed to me to ask me to contradict the
statement. On February 19th he telegraphed again: "No one known to or
in communication with the Embassy followed Parnell or watched him in
any way in Paris, and nobody reported to the Embassy about him." I
wrote to Harcourt and told him that Lord Lyons wished a contradiction
made, and that Lord Granville wished me to make the contradiction "if
Harcourt sees no objection." I afterwards wrote to Harcourt, "From
what you said, I imagine that you do see objection; but if we can, it
is better to keep the Embassies out of police matters." Harcourt,
however, would not allow a contradiction to be given; and the fact was
that Parnell had been watched, but watched by the Home Office, through
the police, without the knowledge of the Embassy. Through this
watching of the Irish leaders, Parnell's relations with Mrs. O'Shea
were known to some of those who afterwards professed to be amazed by
the discovery.'

Another subject produced open symptoms of a "split." On January 21st,
1881, during the debate on the Address, Mr. Rylands proposed a resolution
condemning the annexation of the Transvaal as impolitic and unjustifiable,
which was tantamount to declaring that the Boers had been justified in
their revolt.

'After my dinner party on the 21st, I went down to the House of
Commons and deliberately walked out on the Transvaal division, as did
three other members of the Government--Bright, Chamberlain, and
Courtney. We had all along been opposed to the annexation.'

This was only the beginning. In South Africa difficulties accumulated for
the British Government. General Colley was repulsed at Laing's Nek on
January 28th, and on February 8th at the Ingogo River. But in this war
there was a real anxiety on both sides to negotiate, and President Kruger
despatched an offer to submit the whole dispute to an English Royal
Commission if troops were withdrawn from the Transvaal. On Wednesday,
February 16th, Sir Charles learnt from Mr. Chamberlain that there had been
a special Cabinet that afternoon 'to consider proposals from President
Kruger of the Transvaal, which Mr. Gladstone was most anxious to accept.'

On the 18th 'the Transvaal question came up again on a Dutch petition
brought over by delegates, as to which Lord Granville wrote to me: "I
suppose it would not be right for you or me to see them. We shall probably
bear with fortitude the sacrifice."' But the Government were trying to
meet Kruger's advances in a reasonable spirit, and they instructed Colley
by telegram to suspend hostilities if the Boers abandoned armed
opposition. Colley telegraphed back for more precise instructions. The
Boers hold Laing's Nek, which was in Natal territory. Was he to insist on
their evacuating it--and thus opening the pass into the Transvaal--before
he suspended hostilities? The answer sent back on February 19th was that
he should forward to the Boers the British proposal, and fix a reasonable
time within which they must reply. During that time he was not to attempt
to occupy Laing's Nek. Sir Charles's Memoir makes it plain that the
decision to negotiate with the Boers was due to Mr. Gladstone and Mr.
Chamberlain:

'At the Cabinet of Saturday, February 19th, Mr. Gladstone and
Chamberlain, for a wonder, were in the majority, and it was decided to
drop the Arms Bill and to negotiate with the Boers; but at a further
Cabinet on the 26th, Mr. Gladstone being in bed... the decision of the
previous week was reversed, and it was decided to go forward with the
Arms Bill.'

No reply came from the Boers within the time appointed, and on the night
of February 26th Colley seized the height of Majuba, which commanded
Laing's Nek. By noon on the 27th he was a dead man, and his force
defeated. The stated time had expired, and Colley did his duty as a
soldier. [Footnote: See an article in the _Nineteenth Century_ (March,
1904) by Lady Pomeroy Colley (Lady Allendale) in reply to some points in
the account of these events in the _Life of Gladstone_, iii., pp. 36-38.]
But it is none the less true that the Boers, even after the action, still
believed themselves to be in negotiation. On the 28th Kruger, ignorant of
what had befallen, was writing a grateful acknowledgment of the proposal
to suspend hostilities, and was suggesting a meeting of representatives
from both sides.

It was urged, of course, that a disgrace to the British Army must be wiped
out before there could be any further talk of parleying. Yet in Mr.
Gladstone's Government there had been from the first an element which
plainly thought the war unjustified, and with that element Mr. Gladstone
had some sympathy. The Radicals now asserted themselves.

'On Wednesday, March 2nd, after a long interview between me and
Chamberlain on the state of affairs, Chamberlain had an hour and a
half with Bright, and got him to write a strong letter to Gladstone
about the Transvaal, which we put forward as the ground for a proposed
resignation, although of course the strength of the Coercion measures,
the weakness of the Land measures, and the predominance of the Whigs
in the Cabinet were the reasons which weighed chiefly with Chamberlain
and myself. In the Transvaal matter, however, we should not be two,
but four, for Bright and Courtney must go out with us, and Lefevre
might do so. On the other hand, we had reason to think that if the
Whigs yielded to us on the Transvaal, Kimberley would go. On the next
day, Thursday the 3rd, Bright was sent for by Mr. Gladstone on his
letter. Bright found him in entire harmony with our views. Kimberley
at once gave in, and telegraphed what he was told; so the difficulty
was over before the Cabinet was able to meet, and we as far from
resignation as ever.

'On March 5th, I noted in my diary that the Land Bill was
unsatisfactory. Chamberlain told me of a scene between Bright and
Dodson which amused me much. Says Bright to Dodson: "You were put into
the Cabinet to vote with Gladstone. Surely you ought not to oppose
him." Says Dodson indignantly, "A man may have an opinion." "But why
express it?" said the old Quaker.'

In the middle of March

'Things looked bad again at this moment, for on the 14th I wrote a
draft address to the electors of Chelsea, prepared in view of my
resignation along with Bright and Chamberlain. I alluded in it to "the
non-reversal in the Transvaal of an act of high-handed aggression,
which at the time of its inception I had condemned by vote and
speech," and also condemned the resort to coercive measures for
Ireland.'

So far as the Transvaal was concerned, the sympathies of Chamberlain and
Dilke with the Boers prevailed; negotiations proceeded, and a Commission
was named, which finally recommended a reversal of the annexation. The
selection of Chamberlain--whose department had no connection with South
Africa--to justify this step in debate indicated how strong was his
opinion in favour of the Boers. But the Duke of Argyll, who was leaving
the Government from disapproval of their Irish Land Bill, nevertheless on
this matter defended the action of his former colleagues.

The situation was summed up by an observation of the Queen's to Lord
Spencer, which, says Sir Charles, amused the Cabinet on March 26th. The
Queen's Speech on January 7th had contained this curt phrase: "A rising in
the Transvaal has imposed upon me the duty of taking military measures
with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority." To this the Queen
replied: "I cannot see how my 'authority' has been 'vindicated' in the
Transvaal." "There was nothing else to be done, Ma'am," says Spencer. "I
quite understand that," says Her Majesty, "but still I do not see how my
'authority' has been 'vindicated.'"

Mr. Gladstone was meanwhile doing the right thing in Ireland with his Land
Bill, but Mr. Forster, Sir Charles thought, was destroying the effect by
the free use of his new measure, which, having become law by the end of
February, enabled the Irish Government to put any man into gaol on a mere
suspicion and without form of trial. Members of Parliament were not at
first attacked, but the officials of the Land League were seized. Mr.
Davitt had been general manager; his ticket-of-leave, as an ex-Fenian
prisoner, was recalled by Sir William Harcourt, and he was re-arrested.
Mr. Dillon took Davitt's place. Sir Charles writes on Saturday, April
30th, 1881:

'At the Cabinet, which I think was on the previous night, but of which
I heard the details on this day, it was decided to arrest Dillon.
Spencer and Granville, who were both of them away, for it was not, I
think, a regular Cabinet, were both against it rather than for it;
Harcourt was really neutral, though Gladstone counted him for it;
Kimberley, Hartington, and the Chancellor alone supported Gladstone
and Forster. Bright, Chamberlain, Childers, and, wonderful to relate,
Carlingford (who was present, though the newspapers said he was
absent), Northbrook, and Dodson opposed the arrest. Gladstone declared
that it was six to six, and gave himself a casting vote. A few days
later Lord Granville spoke to me warmly against the decision of the
Cabinet. He said he never knew numbers counted in the Cabinet before,
and that it was absurd to count heads in assemblies in which there was
such a difference in the contents of the heads. This criticism,
however, goes too far, and strikes at the root of the decisions of
Parliament itself.'

Meanwhile the Land Bill had reached its second reading. But the Irish
executive was constantly appealed to for constabulary to assist in
carrying out sentences of eviction, while, on the other hand, tenants were
fighting landlords by a general strike against rents.

'At the Cabinet on May 4th the chief topic discussed was the
possibility of checking evictions in Ireland without preventing the
payment of rent by tenants perfectly able to pay.'

In addition to the Irish trouble in Ireland, there was the Irish trouble
in the House of Commons, in no way settled by the Speaker's one arbitrary
imposition of closure at his own discretion. That Mr. Gladstone's mind was
working towards another solution is evident from the following note:

'On June 8th I went to The Durdans to lunch with the Roseberys, and
walked with Mr. Gladstone. We marched round the Derby course, and Mr.
Gladstone said that the first business after the Irish Land Bill must
be procedure, and that this must be the business of next year. He
said, "there must no doubt be some repression by the closure, but
there must also be still more delegation."'

The discussion of the Land Bill was long almost beyond precedent, but by
August it left the Commons, and Lord Salisbury, though furious in his
invective, declined to advise its total rejection. The Irish landlords had
their will of it in Committee, and sent it back unrecognizable. The Lords'
amendments were then reviewed by Mr. Gladstone, and, broadly speaking,
rejected. There was the usual threat of a collision between the Houses.
Sir Charles's first note, in his diary of August 12th, indicates how
completely Mr. Gladstone controlled this situation:

'"Harcourt is very violent against the Lords, more so than either
Bright or Chamberlain, but the decision, whatever it may be, of the
Cabinet, will on this occasion be Mr. Gladstone's."

'On the 14th I noted, "The claim of Lord Salisbury to force us to
'consult the country' is a claim for annual Parliaments when we are in
office, and septennial Parliaments when they are in office." I did
not, however, believe in this particular crisis. On the 14th Lord
Houghton wrote complaining that we did not meet so often as we used to
do. "This is a penalty one pays for having one's friends in power. I
fear there is no hope of their ceasing to be so by the instrumentality
of the House of Lords." On the 15th Lady Lytton's sister told me that
Lytton had "enjoyed the fighting attitude of the Lords. It seemed more
worthy than talking so much and doing so little." But she added:
"After it was all over they were in a most horrid fright."'

Lord Ripon wrote from India of the proceedings in the House of Lords that
he thought Lord Salisbury "would succeed in blowing the institution to
pieces before long."

With a Cabinet so divided, rumour of changes was certain to be rife.

'On August 17th there occurred the Ministerial fish dinner at
Greenwich, which was then a yearly institution. Rosebery was in the
chair--for on these occasions the Chairman is arbitrarily chosen,
generally from among the very youngest members of the Government, and
is a sort of lord of misrule. [Footnote: Lord Rosebery was Under-
Secretary at the Home Office.]

'Harcourt told Chamberlain at the dinner that Mr. Gladstone had made
up his mind to put Lord Frederick Cavendish into the Cabinet, as
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chamberlain arguing that he ought not to
be put in over my head.

'On the way home Harcourt told me that there were other changes to be
made besides putting in Cavendish, and that one of them was that he
should become Lord Chancellor.... I did not myself believe any of
these reports, but confined myself to urging that Chamberlain should
be Chancellor of the Exchequer.'

This assumed continuance in office, but a little later Mr. Chamberlain,
writing to Sir Charles, entered the domain of prophecy, with some hint of
the 'unauthorized programme.' He thought that the Liberals would be beaten
at the next election, and that their business was to try to get the
farmers over to their side.

"What is the good of bothering about Bankruptcy or Local Government
when our real business is to outbid Chaplin and Co. with the farmers?
But, then, what will our Whig friends say to Radical proposals as to
tenant right, improvements, rating, etc.?"

While Sir Charles was in Paris Mr. Chamberlain wrote on October 4th:

"I am very uneasy about the Irish business. It does not look as if the
Land Bill would do much, and meanwhile 'outrages,' exaggerated
probably by the Press, are forming a large part of the information
supplied by the papers for the autumn season. It is the history of
last October over again, and I expect every day to hear of some
proposal for further coercion. I am clear that we were right in
resisting coercion last year, and I even wish we had gone further and
gone out upon it. But what is to be done now? Can we go on drifting
without a policy? We cannot go back. It is too late to release the
'suspects,' and, if we were to do so, the experience of the past few
weeks shows that this would not make things smoother with Parnell and
Co., while it would bring down a storm of denunciation from the other
side. Then, can we go further in the direction of coercion? I doubt if
the House of Commons would stand it. To put down the Land League would
involve so many questions affecting public agitation in this country
that the Radicals would surely be up in arms. It is possible the
Tories might do it if they were in office, which I wish to God they
were. But can the Liberals do it, and, above all, can you and I be
parties to any more of such work? I should not have a moment's
hesitation in saying 'No,' if I could find any alternative, but it is
evident that Parnell has now got beyond us. He asks for 'No Rent,' and
Separation, and I am not prepared to say that the refusal of such
terms as these constitutes an Irish grievance. I should like to stand
aside and let the Coercionists and Parnell fight it out together, but
I fear this is not now possible. Altogether it is a horrible
imbroglio, and for the moment I do not see my way out of the fog. I
wish I could talk it all over with you."

A little later, however, he wrote:

"'The resources of civilization'--see Mr. G.'s speech--will mean
immediate and greatly extended use of the Protection Act. There will
be a miraculous draught of fishes directly. In for a penny, in for a
pound. I hope it will be a clean sweep. The electors will better stand
a crushing blow than coercion by driblets. There is no other
alternative except new legislation--and from that may Heaven defend
us."

On October 12th, 1881, Mr. Parnell was arrested and put into gaol. On
October 17th, Sir Charles, then in the South of France, wrote to Sir M.
Grant Duff--who had become Governor of Madras--that "Bright and
Chamberlain supported the proposed general _razzia_ on the Land League
leaders in order to avoid fresh coercive legislation." Fresh legislation
would have meant trouble in the House of Commons. But the arrest of Mr.
Parnell, which "folly" Sir Charles had tried to prevent, led to greater
trouble.

The British Government now endeavoured to back up the policy of force by
dividing the opposition. Ever since the trouble generated by the rejection
of the Compensation for Disturbance Bill, Dublin Castle had been (not for
the first time) seeking to enlist on its side the spiritual power of Rome.
There were two lines of approach, of which the first is indicated in a
note under November 22nd, 1880:

'Lord Granville was engaged at this moment in trying, through Cardinal
Newman, to induce the Pope to bully the Irish Bishops; but the Irish
Bishops told the Pope, in reply to his remonstrances, that if he
adopted a policy of compromise in Italy which was unpopular with the
Church, he must leave them alone with Irish affairs.'

The "policy of compromise" was not likely to be adopted. Cardinal Manning,
talking to Sir Charles on July 15th, 1880, on his return from Rome,
expressed his belief that the Vatican was badly advised in its hostile
attitude towards the Italian Monarchy, which he personally would be
prepared to support against the Revolutionary Party, since its fall would
probably bring about an anti-clerical republic.

Far more continuous were the negotiations, with a view to influencing the
Irish Church, carried on through Mr. George Errington, a gentleman of old
Roman Catholic family, who had sat since 1874 as a moderate Home Rule
member for County Longford. [Footnote: The historic difficulties in the
way of an Embassy to the Vatican, fully given by Lord Fitzmaurice in the
_Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., chap, viii., pp. 281-282, had been
surmounted "by the practice of allowing a Secretary of Legation, nominally
appointed to the Grand Ducal court of Tuscany, to reside at Rome, where he
was regarded as _de facto_ Minister to the Vatican." Lord Derby had,
however, withdrawn Mr. Jervoise, the last representative, and no other
appointment had been made.]