The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1

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On the other hand, since the Convention existed, Sir Charles held that by
abrogating it they 'might appear to invite the Russians to invade Armenia,
which Russia might proceed to do in the name of humanity.' So far as
Turkey was concerned, it was considered likely that the Porte would wish
to see the Convention annulled, because it could then sell Cyprus to Great
Britain for cash instead of leasing it in return for the Asiatic
guarantee; and Turkish Pashas would be free from any interference about
reforms in Asia Minor. Ultimately the fear of letting Russia in outweighed
the other considerations, and the Convention was recognized, leaving
England with a heavy burden of moral responsibility for all that
subsequently occurred in Armenia under the protection of what Mr.
Gladstone himself had not unjustly called this "insane covenant."

Meanwhile, Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, was complaining to Lord
Granville that 'the Sultan had assented to the Convention under a false
impression, not knowing that a portion of his dominions would be given
over to Austrian control, an alienation not contemplated by the Treaty of
San Stefano.' He complained, moreover, that the arrangement went, in
reality, beyond temporary occupation of provinces. 'We (Lord Salisbury)
had given Bosnia and Herzegovina secretly to Austria without reserve.'

The whole Eastern situation was ill-defined and full of difficulties. Mr.
Goschen, before he left England on his mission, came to Dilke to 'bewail
the unwillingness of Gladstone and of Lord Granville to make up their
minds how far they were going in the direction of coercion of Turkey.' On
May 26th--

'Looking about to see how Turkey was to be coerced with regard to the
Greek and Montenegrin questions, I discovered that all reinforcements
and officials were sent, and all money received by the Constantinople
Government, by the sea route, so that a blockade of the Dardanelles
would cut their Empire in two until they came to terms.'

Sir Charles's aim throughout all these frontier negotiations was to
support the claims of Greece, left indefinite by the Berlin Treaty. At
Great Britain's instance, the Greeks had refrained from attacking Turkey
when Turkey was engaged with Russia; but the Treaty of Berlin had only
promised to Greece in general terms "a rectification of frontier." On the
other hand, the Treaty had awarded to Montenegro certain districts of
Albania, which, as already stated; showed great repugnance to accept
Montenegrin rule. Sir Charles now conceived a plan--

"for combining Albanian autonomy with personal union with Greece,
finding that the Albanians were willing to accept the King of the
Hellenes, provided they succeeded in obtaining securities or
privileges for the Roman Catholic Church, to which great numbers of
them belonged."

On May 28th he learnt from the Greek Charge d'Affaires that proposals for
such a personal union had been made to the King of Greece, directly and
very secretly, "on the part of a Turkish statesman." The Southern
Albanians, wrote M. Gennadius, are to all intents and purposes Greeks.
But, the latter added, "the initiative ought to proceed from the
Albanians." A few days later Mr. Goschen wrote from Constantinople that
the proposed union would be a solution "very valuable for Europe," but
that the Turks would struggle hard to outbid the Greeks, and the Albanians
were very strong in the Palace, and were trusted all over the Empire.
Still, autonomy, Mr. Goschen thought, the Albanians "would and must have
in some shape." [Footnote: See also _Life of Goschen_, vol. ii., pp. 215,
216.]

In their attempt to reverse the Beaconsfield policy there was one
influence steadily opposed to the Government.

'On June 11th there went out a despatch, which had been for several
days on the stocks, as to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. It had come
back on the 10th from the Queen, who had written by the side of our
words: "The acquisition of Cyprus is, in their view, of no advantage
to the country either in a military or political sense." "I do not in
the least agree in this.--V.R.I." But we sent it, all the same.'

The King of Greece had come to London, and on June 4th Sir Charles went by
his wish to Marlborough House, and had an hour's conversation, 'chiefly
upon the question of personal union with Albania, but partly with regard
to the past, as to which I received his thanks.' 'I thought him a very
able man, an opinion which I have never changed.' All Europe confirmed
this judgment when the King of the Hellenes was struck down more than
thirty years later in the very achievement of his long-planned schemes. In
1880 the note of disparagement was widespread; but Sir Charles was not
alone in his estimate:

'Dizzy was once, after this date, talking to me and the Duchess of
Manchester about him, and the Duchess said to me: "How you Liberals
have deceived that poor little King!" Whereupon Dizzy replied: "It
would take a very clever Government to deceive that youth."'

Elsewhere Sir Charles wrote that the King was a "good talker, but
academic," and, dining at Marlborough House on June 6th, he heard an
estimate of him as the too industrious apprentice:

'A big aide-de-camp of the King of Greece took more champagne than was
good for him, and was extremely funny. Pointing to his King, he said:
"Now, there is my King. He is a good little King; but he is not what I
call a fashionable King." And then, pointing to the Prince of Wales,
he said: "Now, that is what I call a fashionable Prince--_un Prince
vraiment 'chic.'_ He goes to bed late, it is true, but he gets up--
well, never. That is what I call a really fashionable Prince. My King
gets up at six!"'

Sir Charles met the King repeatedly during the next fortnight, to follow
out, with the maps, the military details of the proposed new frontier. As
soon as the French and Austrian Governments had accepted the British
proposal for a Conference at Berlin to settle the question of the
frontiers, and Bismarck had consented to call it, Lord Odo Russell wrote
that he would have to "act on the Greek Frontier Commission, in which
Dilke was better versed than anyone," and begged Sir Charles to "lend him
his lights," 'which,' says the Memoir, 'I had to proceed to do' by an
exhaustive letter.

A naval demonstration in the Adriatic now followed, generally known as
'the Dulcigno demonstration,' carried out by ships of the concerted
Powers, under command of the senior Admiral present, and acting under a
_protocole de desinteressement_. It was imposing rather than formidable,
since France and Italy both instructed their officers in no case to fire a
shot. But it was powerfully reinforced by the threat of independent
British action, on the lines which Sir Charles Dilke suggested, and, so
helped, it did its work, so far as the Montenegrin question was concerned.
The Greek question still remained for settlement.

Phases in the development of this situation are thus chronicled:

'On June 23rd I went to the State Ball, and had a good deal of talk
with Musurus, to try and find out about a curious business which I
noted in my diary as follows: "The Russians and Turks are working
together. The Russians came yesterday to propose to send 20,000
Russian men in English ships to coerce Turkey, and the Turks tell us
to-day that they will yield to an occupation by a European force, but
not to a mere naval demonstration. Both want to raise the difficulties
which this will cause, and to fish in troubled waters."

'On Wednesday, June 30th, at three o'clock, an interview took place
between Lord Granville, Lord Northbrook' (First Lord of the
Admiralty), 'Childers' (Secretary of State for War), 'Sir John Adye'
(Childers' adviser), 'and myself at the Foreign Office as to the means
of coercing Turkey. The War Office wished to place an army corps in
Greece, which, if they were to send a full complement of guns, would
take a month. I suggested the far cheaper plan of a naval occupation
of the port of Smyrna, and the collection and stoppage of customs and
dues. Mr. Gladstone came in a little late, and took up my idea. But,
preferring his Montenegrins to my Greeks, he insisted that we should
first deal by the fleet with the Montenegrin question at Dulcigno.
Both ideas went forward. The Dulcigno demonstration took place, and
produced the cession of territory to the Montenegrins; and we
afterwards let out to the Turks our intentions with regard to Smyrna,
and produced by this means the cession of territory to Greece.
[Footnote: _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 231.]

'On Thursday, July 1st, we had a further interview with the Admiralty
to arrange our naval demonstrations. On this day there came to see me
Professor Panarietoff, a secret agent of the Prince of Bulgaria. He
informed me that his Government intended to press on a union between
Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. They did not see any reason why they
should wait. It might suit the English Liberal Cabinet that they
should wait; but from their point of view, why wait? At a party in the
evening I met Borthwick, who playfully assured me that he knew that
our policy was to send one army corps to Greece to support the Greeks
against the Turks, and another to Eastern Roumelia to support the
Turks in maintaining the Treaty of Berlin. The two, after each of them
had accomplished its mission, would probably, he thought, come into
hostilities with one another in Macedonia.'

On July 5th the Austrian Ambassador, Count Karolyi, told Sir Charles that
the Turkish representative at Vienna had been solemnly warned to reckon no
longer upon the possibility of disagreement among the Powers, and to
consider 'the danger which would result if the Powers became convinced
that the Porte had no respect either for their pledges or its own.' This
Dilke hailed as 'a great step in advance on Austria's part,' and on July
7th he called at the Austrian Embassy, at the wish of the Ambassador, who
explained the views of his Government:

'It would send two ships to meet two ships of each Power that chose to
send any, to watch the Montenegro coast with a view to carrying out
the Dulcigno proposal if the Porte would not give effect to the Corti
compromise within three weeks.' Count Karolyi 'then went on to speak
warmly in favour of the future of Greece, and to say that as regarded
the Greek frontier Austria would be willing even to send troops.'

Public feeling in Austria, it appeared, was willing to sanction much
stronger measures in support of Greece than it would tolerate on behalf of
Montenegro. The British Foreign Office now proceeded to utilize the
position of vantage which had been gained.

'On July 16th I noted that, Lord Granville having urged the Queen to
write an autograph letter to the Sultan of a nature to induce him to
give in, the Queen very naturally refused, on the ground that she
dissented from every proposition in the draft sent her. She offered to
write a mild word of advice or recommendation to him to yield without
bloodshed, and this proposal was accepted by the Government. A
telegram based on it was despatched on the 17th, and it asked in the
name of united Europe for a complete fulfilment of the conditions of
the Treaty of Berlin. The Sultan had at this moment despatched a
secret agent, a French advocate at Constantinople, to Gambetta, who
assured him that it was because France was interested in the
maintenance of the Ottoman Empire that it was absolutely necessary to
force Turkey to allow herself to be saved.

'The attitude of the French Government had begun to embarrass us a
good deal. On July 28th I wrote to Gambetta that we could not
understand the hesitations of the French Government, which was
continually putting in reserves. All this was known at Constantinople,
and augmented the resistance of the Porte; the Prime Minister's paper
was attacking us, and Gambetta's paper (the _Republique Francaise_)
giving us no support.... In his telegraphic reply Gambetta used words
of encouragement with regard to the attitude of his Government, as to
which, no doubt, he was himself finding a good deal of trouble. A
little later he sent over one of his private secretaries with a fuller
letter.'

A conversation with Gambetta would have been valuable to Sir Charles at
this moment, and he regretted having to forgo an opportunity which
offered. He had procured invitations for--

'the Brasseys and Samuelson to the Cherbourg banquet, [Footnote: This
banquet was the occasion of Gambetta's famous Cherbourg speech, a
passage from which is inscribed on his monument in Paris.] which was
to be given to the President of the Republic and the Presidents of the
two Chambers (that is, Grevy, Gambetta, and Leon Say). Brassey asked
me to go with him in the _Sunbeam_. Although I should like to have
gone, I was under engagements in London; and I spent the Sunday
dismally ... instead of at Cherbourg with Gambetta.'

But he sent him messages by Mr. Bernhard Samuelson [Footnote: M.P. for
Banbury; afterwards Sir Bernhard Samuelson.] which were quickly effective.

Also, although public opinion in Austria favoured Greece, Sir Charles had
ground for believing that Italian Ministers kept the Turks perfectly
informed, and that even while advising concession upon Montenegro, they
did so with the suggestion that the Greek claims might be the more easily
resisted. Austria's concern was, of course, with the northern part of the
Illyrian coast; Italy's with the southern. As he noted later in the year,
'the European Concert was about as easy to manage as six horses to drive
tandem.' Nevertheless, by the first week in August, 1880, he was able to
write:

'A collective note had now been presented by the Powers to the Porte,
so that we had carried the Powers with us as fully in our Montenegrin
policy, represented by the collective note, as in our Greek policy,
represented by the previous Identic note--a most considerable success,
contrasting strongly with the failure which our foreign policy met
with two or three years later.'

These impressions were shared by Lord Ripon, who followed European and
domestic affairs keenly, from India. He wrote on August 17th:

"I rejoice to see that the F.O. seems to be distancing all competitors
in the race of success, ... which" (he added) "in regard to some
parliamentary proceedings is not very high praise, you will be perhaps
inclined to say."

II.

Even after the collective note had been presented, the European situation
remained delicate and difficult through the mutual distrust of the Powers.
On August 9th Lord Granville, who through all these negotiations was
exerting his greatest diplomatic skill in keeping Germany in the Concert,
expressed to Sir Charles his conviction that 'Bismarck had spies in the
Queen's household, and knew everything that went on.' On the side of
France matters improved. [Footnote: See _Life of Granville_, vol. ii.,
chapter vi.]

'On the 8th I received, at last, a reply from Gambetta to my letters--
a reply in which he showed that he fully agreed with me, but that he
was not as a fact all-powerful with the Prime Minister (Freycinet).
The same post, however, brought me a letter from Lord Houghton, who
was at Vichy, and who complained that it was an unhealthy state of
things that Gambetta (who had talked freely to him while in Paris)
"should exercise so much irresponsible power." ... The result of my
attempts to stir up Gambetta upon our side was seen in the report by
Bernhard Samuelson of Gambetta's conversation with him at Cherbourg on
Monday, August 9th, and in an article which appeared on Wednesday,
August 11th, and another on Friday, the 13th, in Gambetta's paper on
the coercion of the Turks. These articles were from the pen of
Barrere, who had been over in the previous week to see me, and were
written at the personal direction of Gambetta; and Adams (Secretary to
the Embassy) wrote from Paris on the 13th that the tone of the French
Government had correspondingly improved.'

But even while France assisted in one direction, she introduced fresh
complications in another by her quickly maturing designs on Tunis--which
had been mentioned to Sir Charles by the French Ambassador, M. Leon Say,
as early as June 8th. French diplomatists claimed an authorization from
Lord Salisbury. [Footnote: See Crispi's _Memoirs_, vol. ii., pp. 98-109
and 121; _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 215, 270, 436, as to Tunis and
Tripoli.] "How can you," he was reported to have said, during the
conversations which attended the Congress of Berlin, "leave Carthage to
the barbarians?"

'It was on this day (June 8th, 1880) that I became fully aware of the
terms of Lord Salisbury's offer of Tunis to France, as to which he
misled the public, Lord Salisbury having, when reminded of the
statement, said privately that it was "a private conversation," and
publicly that there was "no foundation for the statement."'

Later Sir Charles made inquiries of M. Say, who gave the dates of the two
conversations as July 21st and 26th, 1878.

'Lord Salisbury made a denial which is on record at the Foreign Office
in his own handwriting in red ink, but this denial is dated July 16th
--_i.e._, before the conversations.'

The trouble developed rapidly. By August 14th, 1880, Italy was threatening
to withdraw her Ambassador from Paris, 'on account of the receipt of
information showing that the French intended to occupy Tunis under Lord
Salisbury's permission.'

At this moment Sir Charles's health broke down. Two notes from his chief,
Lord Granville, are preserved, the first evidently sent across in the
office:

"MY DEAR DILKE,

"Please don't be a d--d fool. Go home and do exactly what your doctor
tells you.

"Yrs. G."

And again on August 18th Lord Granville wrote:

"I must formally request you not to leave the house till you send me
the doctor's written statement that he has advised you to do so. I
consider myself an honorary member of the gouty faction, and entitled
to speak with weight on the folly of trying to bully the disorder."

To this friendly dictation the patient submitted till the 23rd, when he
insisted on going to the House to answer questions, but returned to bed,
and next morning underwent an operation. [Footnote: He worked hard during
his enforced confinement to the house, and one of his visitors was M.
Joseph Arnaud, one of Gambetta's secretaries, who was sent by his friend
to reassure him as to the pressure he was using in the Frontier Question.
It is of M. Arnaud that Sir Charles tells a Gambetta story: 'G. was jovial
to-day, November 12th, 1880. Arnaud having said that all the people to
whom tickets were given for the presidential tribune were grateful to
Gambetta, and all who were angry were angry with him--Arnaud--the reply
was: "Tu ne comprends donc pas que tu es institue pour ca?"'] In a few
days he was again in Parliament, where the peace party, headed by Sir
Wilfrid Lawson, had begun to denounce the naval demonstration against
Turkey. In this they were backed by the Fourth Party, who spoke of it as
"the combined filibustering." However, on September 7th, the general
question was raised on the motion for adjournment of the House, and Sir
Charles, 'replying to the peace party on the one hand, and on the other to
Cowen, who attacked them in the name of Albanian nationality,' drew from
Lord Granville this compliment:

"My mother once said that Clarendon--with a slight headache--was the
pleasantest man she knew. I will not say that an operation makes you
speak better, but it certainly does not prevent your speaking as well
as usual."

The Fourth Party [Footnote: Dilke dates the birth of the Fourth Party at
the beginning of the Gladstone Ministry, and says: 'Gorst was its real
brain, the other two members (for Arthur Balfour hardly belonged to it)
contributing "brass."'] were also busy in denunciation of the Government's
policy in Afghanistan, which had been finally determined on August 7th,
when--

'the Cabinet directed Lord Hartington and Lord Ripon to retire from
Kandahar, although we had now heard of the intention of the Russians
to occupy Merv, a step on their part which was certain to make our
retirement from Kandahar unpopular with those who did not know its
necessity.'

Another circumstance even more certain to add to the unpopularity of the
retirement was not then known to the Home Government. On July 26th, Lord
Ripon, writing to Sir Charles, complained of the "embarrassing
engagements" with which "Lytton's reckless proceedings" had hampered him.
One of these engagements bound him to maintain Shere Ali as Wali of
Kandahar; and on July 27th, Ayub Khan, Shere Ali's rival, defeated at
Maiwand the force under General Burrows which was supporting Great
Britains' nominee. The policy of evacuation met with resistance in a
quarter where such policies were always opposed. On September 7th Sir
Charles left London to stay with Lord Granville at Walmer Castle, and Lord
Hartington joined them on the 9th.

'The Queen had written for the second time to Hartington urging with
great warmth that we should retain Kandahar, although, as Hartington
said, this meant, to India, an expenditure of four millions sterling a
year, on local troops, for no military return.... The Queen ... at
this moment was not only protesting strongly with regard to Kandahar,
but also, in cipher telegrams, against the naval demonstration....

'On September 20th Lord Granville, just starting for Balmoral, came to
see me. He told me that he thought of sending Dufferin to
Constantinople at the end of Goschen's special mission, and Paget to
Petersburg, and Layard to Rome if he could not get a pension out of
the Treasury for Layard.'

The Queen conceived the interests of England as Lord Beaconsfield had
presented them. But Mr. Gladstone did not conceive of English interests as
bound up with Turkish success, and wrote on September 21st:

"If Turkey befools Europe at Dulcigno, we may as well shut up shop
altogether."

About the same time Chamberlain expressed his mind on questions of foreign
policy in their bearing on party politics:

"Kandahar will have to be given up.... I only hope Hartington will
have the pluck to do it at once and before we get into some fresh
scrape. I observe the papers generally speak well of the session, the
Government, and especially of the Radicals. So far so good. We have
scored very well up to this time."

'In another letter Chamberlain added:

'"What about the Concert of Europe? Will it last through a bombardment
of Dulcigno? I don't much like concerts. Our party of two, with
Dillwyn as chorus, was about as numerous as is consistent with
harmony, and I fear five great Powers are too many to make a happy
family."'

In France the great ally of the Sultan's Fabian policy had fallen. M. de
Freycinet found himself forced to resign on September 19th:

'On September 9th I recorded that Gambetta means to turn out
Freycinet. He foretold all this when Freycinet took office, and said
to me at that time: "He will do well enough until he tries to fly. But
one of these days he will set off flying." Gambetta turned out
Freycinet on this occasion, but the day was to come when Freycinet
would turn out Gambetta.'

On the 23rd Sir Charles 'heard from Paris that the fallen Minister "had
been discovered to have been negotiating with the Vatican for months,
without the knowledge even of his own colleagues."'

In the new Ministry, with Jules Ferry as Prime Minister, the Foreign
Office fell to Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, [Footnote: M. Barthelemy Saint-
Hilaire, born in 1805, the well-known philosophical writer and translator
of Aristotle, was now seventy-five years of age. He entered the Chamber of
Deputies in 1848 as a member of the Left, and became a member of the
Senate in 1876. He was the first Secretaire-General de la Presidence de la
Republique.] and Lord Houghton said: "Think of the old Aristotelian
Barthelemy having the F.O.! Without pretension, I think at my age I am
just as fit for the English one." This was a view in which Sir Charles
inclined to agree, although M. Barrere wrote: "Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire's
tendencies are excellent. He is in complete accord with _us_, and his
views are wholly ours."

Lord Houghton also spoke of an interview with Moltke, who had told him
that 'Russia was the cause of the necessity for the immense arming of
Europe, not France, which at present might be trusted to keep quiet.'