The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1

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'On Sunday, March 10th, in coming back from the Grosvenor Gallery, I
passed a great mob, who were going to howl at Mr. Gladstone--at this time
the ordinary Sunday afternoon diversion of the London rough.'

Schouvalof, the Russian Ambassador, had on March 4th summed up the
situation in an epigram: "England has challenged Russia to a duel, and has
chosen for her weapon swords at fifteen paces" (_l'epee a quinze pas_).
But the preparations for this combat were menacing.

'On March 29th the Eastern Question blazed up again with Lord Derby's
resignation, the discussion of which enlivened a party at Lady
Waldegrave's, there being before us a Queen's Message alleging the
existence of imminent national danger and great emergency as a reason
for calling out the reserves. On Saturday the 30th Trevelyan ...
informed me of a resolution which had been prepared by Lubbock on
behalf of those Whigs who had not gone with Gladstone, but wished to
make some movement of their own. Later in the evening I saw Childers,
who proposed a better motion in the form of an addition to the Message
in the sense of a strong desire for peace. The object of both
suggestions, of course, was by a moderate middle course to prevent a
division for and against the Message in which Gladstone and Bright and
eighty others would vote No, while eighty would follow Hartington in
voting Yes, and the majority of the party run away, thus destroying
the Liberal party, as it was destroyed in the time of Pitt and the war
with France. Later, again, in the evening I saw Montgelas (who told me
that Russia had held different language to Austria and to England, and
that she had drawn back and did not mean war) [Footnote: 'On February
9th I went to a party at the Austrian Embassy "to meet the Archduke
Rudolf." Beust was gone away and Montgelas was host. ... On February
12th I met again the Crown Prince of Austria.'] and Randolph
Churchill, who made an appointment to come to me on Sunday about the
papers, which he agreed with me in thinking damaging to the
Government, and full of evidence of their total isolation. When he
came, we decided only that the Government ought to be asked for
further papers.'

This demand Sir Charles accordingly made on April 1st. His position was at
this point extremely difficult. He was not prepared to acquiesce in the
aggrandisement of Russia, and therefore could not go with his habitual
associates, who had formed a Committee upon the Eastern Question. On the
other hand, he was determined to join with them in opposing the calling
out of the reserves, because this step implied that England would go to
war alone, and he did not believe either that England was likely to do so,
or that she ought, as a member of the European Concert, to take such a
step.

'There was a moment after the fall of Lord Derby when I became a
supporter of the Government in their Eastern policy, for they appeared
to me to adopt my own, but it did not last long. "Lord Salisbury's
circular" (so-called, but written by Lord Cairns), issued upon the
accession of Lord Salisbury to the Foreign Office, contained the
statement of this policy. ... Speaking in the House on April 9th ...,
I repudiated the defence which came from some on the Liberal side, of
the conduct of Russia, and, looking upon the Government despatch as a
vindication primarily of general European interests, and, in the
second place, of Hellenic interests, against Russian violence and
universal Slav dominion throughout the Levant, I separated myself from
my party and praised the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. I was
afterwards bitterly disappointed at finding the policy of the April
circular abandoned by its authors in the Congress of Berlin. ...

'On April 4th Gennadius, the Greek Charge d'Affaires (afterwards
Minister), the American Minister, Matthew Arnold, W. E. Forster, Grant
Duff, Lubbock, George Sheffield (Lord Lyons' factotum), Tom Hughes,
and my old friend Sir David Wedderburn dined with me. And in this Whig
and Hellenic party a general agreement with my views was met with; but
the same was not the case amongst my brother Radicals of "Mr.
Dillwyn's Committee upon the Eastern Question."'

This Radical organization got into difficulties of its own while
contemplating a motion to condemn explicitly the calling out of the
reserves.

'On April 5th Dillwyn's Committee had had before it a letter from Lord
Hartington, saying that Mr. Gladstone on Monday wished to speak next
after Sir Stafford Northcote, and to deprecate the moving of an
amendment. It was in consequence resolved by a majority that no
amendment should be moved. Courtney then said that the intimation of
Mr. Gladstone's opinion had been obtained from him by gross pressure,
and that he himself should move an amendment if no one else did.
Wilfrid Lawson then said that he would move; and there were seven in
favour of an amendment. This broke up the Committee, and on Dillwyn
reporting to Hartington its dissolution, the latter said: "Well, Mr.
Dillwyn, you see it is not so easy to lead."

'On Sunday, April 7th, there dined with me, among others, Hartington,
Harcourt, Goschen, Lord Granville, and Lord Ripon, and we discussed
the position, on which Lord Ripon was far from agreement with me. I
warmly supported to them the Government circular (issued by Lord
Salisbury), as putting British action on European rather than on
British-interests grounds, and only differed from the policy of
calling out the reserves because this was an action of isolation.'

When Sir Wilfrid Lawson's amendment was moved, Sir Charles voted with the
Radical minority of sixty-four against calling out the reserves, but
'differed from every word in which the Radical speakers supported their
view.'

The pith of his speech was a powerful plea for allowing Greece to secure
the emancipation of Greek populations, then under a Turkish rule heavy as
that from which Russia claimed to liberate the Slavs of Bulgaria.

So far, the action of the Government had not united the Liberal party in
any concentrated attitude of resistance. But during the Easter recess,
which Sir Charles spent in France, meeting Gambetta, politics took a more
dramatic turn.

'When Parliament adjourned for the holidays, not one word had been
said of an act long previously determined, which was announced the
next day. The fact that Parliament was allowed to learn from the
newspapers that it was intended by the Government for the first time
to employ Indian troops within the European dominions of the Crown in
time of peace, without the previous consent of Parliament, [Footnote:
By despatching 7,000 Sepoys to Malta.] was a singular commentary upon
the Government declaration at the beginning of the Session that
Parliament had been called together at an unusually early date in
order that under circumstances of delicacy the Ministry might have the
advantage of its advice.... Public feeling, I found from Chamberlain,
had gone round a good deal during my absence, and to satisfy the
opinion of our Radicals he was determined to move something. I
suggested to him (on May 6th) a resolution condemning "the policy of
menace and warlike demonstration which has been pursued by the
Government," and expressing the belief "that an honourable and
peaceful settlement of existing difficulties will be best promoted by
their consenting to state frankly the changes in the Treaty of San
Stefano which they consider necessary for the general good of Europe
and the interests of this country."'

But already the Government were in secret negotiation with Russia, and had
entered into an agreement as to the modification of the provisions of the
Treaty of San Stefano. Amongst other changes it was proposed to curtail
the limits of Bulgaria by a division severing South from North, and to
allow Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

'On Tuesday, May 7th, after the Radical Club, at a party at the
Harcourts', I learned what the Government intended to do at the
Conference or Congress--namely, limit Bulgaria on the south by the
Balkans. But I was informed at the same time that they would
themselves propose to give Thessaly and Epirus to Greece, an
undertaking which I think they did give to the King of Greece, but
from which, if so, they afterwards departed. The Greek Patriarch from
Constantinople came over at this time, as did the Armenian Patriarch
shortly afterwards, and I met both, although conversation with these
dignitaries was not easy, for their French was about as feeble as my
Greek; but through Gennadius I, of course, knew the views of the
Greeks, and in the Armenian question I took no special part.'

The question of employing the Indian troops was debated on May 20th. Lord
Hartington opened; and Sir Charles replied to Sir Michael Hicks Beach, who
followed Lord Hartington. Concerning the discussion, he says:

'The technical point which we argued was a narrow one. Had Cyprus been
in Asia, our arguments would not have applied to Cyprus; and it is
very likely that the Government thought Cyprus was in Asia, and did
not like to say that they had made a mistake, and having first ordered
the troops to Cyprus, and then ordered them to Malta (which was
undoubtedly in Europe), had forgotten the distinction. The real
objection to the bringing of the Sepoys was the same as the objection
to the calling out of the reserves--that it was isolated action, and
that these military measures and the expenditure which they involved
were mere bunkum, and mere waste if the Government intended to give
up, as they were secretly telling Russia they did intend to give up,
the main points of dispute. Moreover, Russia could do us hurt in
India, and Indian troops could not touch her at all....

'The Government were said to have only "conquered by giving way," for
they agreed to put the number of men into the Estimate, and thus avoid
making a precedent, according to our contention, absolutely
unconstitutional. On the other hand, Lord Beaconsfield's speech in the
House of Lords was defiant in the extreme, and Holker's [Footnote: The
Attorney-General.] in the Lower House was an assertion of higher
prerogative doctrine than had been heard in Parliament since the days
of Elizabeth.'

'On May 30th I dined with Baron Ferdinand de Rothschild, and met Lord
Northbrook (the former Viceroy of India) and his daughter, Lady Emma
Baring, Lord Rosebery, Lord and Lady Napier (he a most distinguished
man, the best of Ambassadors to Russia and the best of Governors of
Madras, too little known),[Footnote: Baron Napier and Ettrick.] Lord
Macduff (afterwards Duke of Fife), and Monty Corry, afterwards Lord
Rowton, Lord Beaconsfield's private secretary.' Corry 'told me what
was at the moment a startling secret--that Lord Beaconsfield was going
to the Congress himself. "Can he speak French?" I asked with wonder,
to which he shook his head.'

On the day after the meeting of the Congress a sensational disclosure
revealed to the world that it met; only to register foregone conclusions.

'At the end of the month (May) the secret agreement was signed with
Russia, and revealed to us by the _Globe_ [Footnote: The Globe
disclosure came from Mr. Marvin, a civil servant in temporary employ.
Dilke noted: "Besides the 'Marvin Memorandum' and an annex, there was
a curious stipulation insisted on by Russia, that the annex should
never be published, even if No. 1--that is, the 'Marvin Memorandum'--
should become public; and this looks very much as though Marvin was
really the Russian Government, which I have always suspected. They had
this to gain by publishing the Memorandum--that they showed themselves
the real victors in the Congress of Berlin, in spite of all our
bluster, and they damaged Lord Beaconsfield, who was their enemy.
Marvin could never have got a copy, and always pretended that he had
learned the whole document by heart, which, considering its length and
the total absence in the copy published in the _Globe_ of the
slightest error, even of punctuation, is incredible. The annex, which
was dated May 31st, only said that the Russians had no intention of
extending their conquests in Asiatic Turkey: 'The Emperor of Russia
... not having the intention of extending Ids conquests in Asia ...
the Imperial Government does not refuse to conclude with the British
Government a secret engagement for the purpose of reassuring it upon
this point.'"] on June 14th; and it then appeared that the military
preparations of the country must have been intended to keep up the
spirits of the Jingoes while their cherished principles were being
sacrificed behind their backs. The _Daily Telegraph_, which was the
Jingo organ, said: "If _such_ a compact has been concluded, this
country has fatally descended from the lofty position occupied by the
Salisbury despatch." Not only was the compact authentic, but there
were two other secret compacts of the same date which did not come
out. What the Government had done was to give up all the points for
which they had made their enthusiastic followers believe that they
would fight, and at the same time in the Anglo-Turkish Convention to
declare that their successors should fight for what was left. This may
have been a prudent policy, but it was not a policy which carried with
it the necessity for bringing Indian troops to Europe or spending
eight or nine millions sterling upon apparent preparations for
immediate war. The third agreement, in addition to the Salisbury-
Schouvalof agreement and the Anglo-Turkish Convention, the first of
which came out by chance and the second of which was ultimately
published by the Government, was an Anglo-Austrian secret agreement
which has never been printed, the character of which is revealed by
the fact that the English plenipotentiaries themselves proposed at
Berlin, in spite of the strong dissent of Turkey, to make to Austria
the gift of Bosnia and Herzegovina.'

To this note, written in 1890, there is added in the margin of the
manuscript: 'There was also a secret supplementary agreement with Russia,
of which later.' And also this: "The compact giving Bosnia and Herzegovina
to Austria is now (1908) known to Lucien Wolf." [Footnote: See Thomas
Erskine Holland, _The European Concert in the Eastern Question_, 292,
293.]

Before the Berlin Congress met, Sir Charles had pressed by way of
questions to secure if possible a representation for Greece at the
Congress, and failed; and the speech which he made in the debate (opened
on July 29th) on the Treaty of Berlin was mainly a censure on Great
Britain for having failed to support the Hellenic claims. He dwelt
specially on Crete, the government of which by Turkey was, he said, "a
perpetual menace to European peace."

Replying in the debate for the Liberal party to Mr. David Plunket
(afterwards Lord Rathmore), he notes that he

'spoke, and spoke well, making the best of my debating speeches, but
was overshadowed by one speech which would have caused better speeches
than mine to have been easily forgotten. Mr. Gladstone's speech on
this occasion, like all his speeches, does not read; but it was the
finest that I ever heard him make with one exception--the Bradlaugh
speech in the next Parliament.'

CHAPTER XVII

POLITICS AND PERSONS

I.

Sir Charles Dilke's first concern was with foreign affairs, but he was
also of high authority in whatever related to the business and management
of the House of Commons; and at this period the question of remodelling
forms which lent themselves to the arts of delay began to be urgent, and
threatened to become paramount. Here, early in 1878, is the first
considerable mention of the man whose relentless use of obstruction has
affected parliamentary procedure all over the world:

'On February 20th I was asked by Lord Hartington to serve upon the
Government Select Committee on the business and forms of the House,
upon which Parnell was asked to represent the obstructive element. It
was somewhat a distinction, as I was to be the sole representative of
the English independent members, and in consequence I gave up the
Standing Committee on Commons, upon which I asked Fitzmaurice to
replace me. The proceedings of Sir Stafford Northcote's Committee, as
the Committee on Public Business was called, presented only one
singularity--namely, the examination of the Speaker--a prolonged one--
by Parnell. Both of them were in a way able men; but both were
extraordinarily slow of intellect--that is, slow in appreciating a
point or catching a new idea--and Mr. Brand (as he then was) and
Parnell used to face one another in inarticulate despair in the
attempt to understand each the other's meaning. There were a good many
fairly stupid men on the Committee, but there was not a single member
of it who did not understand what Parnell meant by a question more
quickly than could the Speaker, and not a man who could not understand
what the Speaker meant by a reply more quickly than Parnell.'

'With Speaker Brand I afterwards had a singular connection.

'At the time when the President of the Free State, whose name was also
Brand, had rendered important services to the British Government, I
made one of the briefest of my brief minutes and put it in a box, and
sent it round the Cabinet: "I think Brand should be knighted.--Ch's W.
D." Nearly all the members of the Cabinet having added their initials
in approval, Brand was knighted, but the wrong Brand, for they gave
the G.C.B. to the Speaker, and it was only some time afterwards that
the G.C.M.G. was conferred on the South African statesman. I had not
thought of the Speaker, and Mr. Gladstone or his private secretary,
Edward Hamilton, had forgotten the Free State. What may have been the
frame of mind of the various members of the Cabinet who approved my
suggestion I do not know, but some probably meant the one and some
probably meant the other, and no one remembered that there were two.'

Concerning the proposals which Sir Stafford Northcote was contemplating as
the result of the Committee on Public Business, but not in exact
accordance with its decisions, Sir Charles notes, under June 25th, that he
was not in agreement with the mass of the Liberal party.

'Our men were inclined to oppose all proposals for closure by
majorities, and for investing the Speaker with large powers, while I
was beginning to feel as strongly favourable to such proposals as I
afterwards became. My "record" upon this subject constituted,
therefore, almost as "sharp a curve" as that of others. As a rule I
have not greatly changed my mind upon political subjects, but upon
this one (as upon Africa [Footnote: See Chapter XVI., p. 238, and also
Chapter XLVIII, (Vol. II., pp. 251-2).]) I undoubtedly turned round,
and did so in consequence of the full consideration which I had to
give it in the course of this single year.'

In the same year Sir Charles had secured support of Tory metropolitan
members, whose constituents were affected, for his Bill to extend the
hours of polling in London; and it passed before the end of January as an
agreed measure. Then came another advance:

'On February 27th, at the most important sitting of my Committee on
the Registration Bills, which had three Bills before it, mine being
one; and Martin, who had charge of the Conservative Bill, being in the
Chair, with a Conservative majority on the Committee, Martin's Bill
was rejected, and mine adopted by the Committee on a division as a
base for its proceedings. I at once decided that I would hand over my
Bill to Martin, so as to let him have charge of it, as Chairman of the
Committee, as the Bill of the Committee.'

This was designed not so much to insure the passage of his own Bill as 'to
prevent Martin from carrying a mere bit of a Bill with some of the things
in it which we wanted.' But, 'to the amazement of everyone,' Sir Charles's
measure, under its new sponsorship, actually passed, and 'became law in
1878, and ultimately added an enormous number of voters to the franchise
rolls.'

By June 7th the Registration Bill was read a third time, and

'My Hours of Polling Bill had now become "Dilke's Act," and I felt as
though I was making such progress towards the political reforms I had
long advocated that there might be some faint chance that one day
redistribution itself might be accomplished.'

Six years later he himself carried out redistribution and extension of the
suffrage on a scale hardly dreamed of by politicians in 1878. Already, in
the debate of February 22nd, when Sir Charles, as usual, seconded Mr.
Trevelyan's annual motion on the equalization of voting power, the
division was better than ever before, and the _Annual Register_, which a
few years earlier had known nothing but contempt and aversion for this
Radical group, devoted considerable space to the arguments by which reform
was supported, with full reference to Sir Charles's speech. Mr. Goschen
and Mr. Lowe were the only Liberals of note who opposed the motion--if,
indeed, Mr. Lowe could still be called a Liberal--and Lord Hartington
spoke for it.

One of Sir Charles's preoccupations at this moment was the choice of a
Liberal candidate to stand for Chelsea with him, and the matter presented
difficulties.

'Horace Davey ... was wishful to stand with us, and I had asked him to
a dinner at which he met some of the leading men, and later he called
on me to see whether he would "do." In the meantime I had sounded our
best people, and found that he would not.... I told him at once that
he must vote against fresh dowries to the Royal Family until a Civil
List inquiry had been held, which ... sent him away.'

Another lawyer followed, and was shown off at several dinners, but 'the
borough did not seem inclined to welcome Queen's Counsel,' and ultimately
settled, very much to its own satisfaction and Sir Charles's, on a great
friend, Mr. Firth.

The campaign in defence of open spaces was actively carried on this year,
and in March Sir Charles was fighting on behalf of the Commons
Preservation Society to resist the erection of a new cottage with an
enclosure for the Deputy Ranger in Hyde Park. The cottage was erected, but
Sir Charles and his allies 'were ultimately able to get back a large part
of the land which had been enclosed near it.' Another encroachment was
resisted more successfully, and by other means. In Fulham 'the
Ecclesiastical Commissioners had made an enclosure shutting out the public
from Eelbrook Common, the use of which it had enjoyed for many years.'

'I went to a meeting at Beaufort House, and made, as I thought, a
moderate speech recommending abstention from acts of violence, but one
at the close of which the meeting went off to the place, pulled down
the fence, and burnt it in a large bonfire. The enclosure was never
reasserted, and the ground was ultimately handed over to the
Metropolitan Board of Works to be managed as an open space, and is
open now for ever.... In Lord Eversley's _Commons_, revised edition of
1910, he names my services to the "cause," but not _this_ one.'

At the close of the Session

'On September 4th I addressed my constituents, and received an ovation
in consequence of the passing of the Hours of Polling Bill (letting
them vote till eight in the evening instead of four) and of my
Registration Bill. Vast numbers of electors had been disfranchised by
the former hours, who were able now to record their votes. My
Registration Act was only to come into force in the course of the
following year, and was to affect the next registration and revision.

'Turning to foreign affairs, I pointed out the absolute impossibility
of the fulfilment of the promises which the Government had made to
give to Asiatic Turkey "rest from the heavy weight of military
service, rest from the uncertainty of unjust Judges and persons placed
in command." I went on to discuss the Greek question, which I had to
do somewhat fully, because the Greek Committee was at present only
operating in the dark, and had not made known its constitution to the
public. [Footnote: He made in this year the acquaintance of
'Delyannis, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was a very inferior
man to his great rival, Tricoupis.']