The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1
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Stephen Gwynn >> The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1
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'the dinner of six members, which assembled democratically without
dressing in order to suit Burt's habits, was not graced by that copy
of the Queen's Speech which is sent by Government to the leaders of
the regular Opposition.'
The "New Party" of 1876-77 differed notably in one respect from the other
small and influential group of which it was the forerunner. It had no
leader.
'On Saturday, February 17th, Chamberlain dined with the Prince of
Wales. In noting the invitation in my diary I put down: "The Prince of
Wales has asked Chamberlain to dinner for Saturday. I call this
'nobbling my party.'" But the possessive pronoun with regard to the
party was not according to my custom. We always said that the party
consisted of three in all--two leaders and a follower--and Dillwyn
acknowledged Chamberlain and myself as equal leaders.'
'On July 4th I drove Dillwyn down to Chiswick to the Duke of
Devonshire's garden party. The Prince of Wales was there, and gave
Dillwyn a very friendly bow, whereupon I asked Dillwyn how he came to
know him so well, to which "the party" answered that he had shot
pigeons with him; and on my reproaching my old friend for indulging in
such sport, he said that he not only shot pigeons, but that the Prince
had been so struck with his shooting that he had asked who the old
gentleman was "who looked like a Methodist parson and shot like an
angel."'
At the beginning of 1877, when they were still six, division existed even
in that small group on the burning question of the hour. Mr. Cowen was
strongly influenced by his intercourse with a settlement of Poles at
Newcastle, and--
'although his anti-Russian views were only the same as my own, yet he
allowed them, as I think, without reason, to drive him into a position
of support of the Government which from this time forward separated
him from the Liberal party.'
None of Sir Charles's other colleagues approached the Eastern Question
entirely on its own merits as distinct from party. His study of foreign
politics had, however, forced him to understand the issues, and thus his
position was rendered difficult: 'I was anti-Russian, and in this with
Hartington. On the other hand, I was for avowed intervention in the East,
and in this more extreme than Mr. Gladstone.' But at the same time his
exceptional competence in the discussion brought him steadily to the
front. Without any sacrifice of independent judgment he found himself
increasingly consulted.
His Memoir gives, therefore, an interesting picture of the movement of
opinion in the Liberal party. At the beginning of the Session, when it was
known that Lord Salisbury had advocated active interference in the name of
Europe, Sir Charles found that 'only Harcourt and the Duke of Argyll were
for strong action in the sense of coercion of Turkey.' The Duke, however,
soon made two converts, and Dilke wrote to his brother on January 6th,
1877:
"Lord Granville and Lord Hartington will, I am delighted to say, speak
for concerted intervention. The only man who strongly opposed their
doing so was Mr. Gladstone, who ran away from his own views." Against
this Sir Charles notes later: 'Both at the meeting of Parliament in
1877, and also later on in the Session in the case of his own
memorable resolutions.'
'Mr. Gladstone had in private conversation told Harcourt that such a
course as European intervention to coerce Turkey "should only be
resolved upon after much deliberation." To this Harcourt had retorted:
"Well, Mr. Gladstone, if people outside knew what you were saying,
they might reflect it was you that hung the bag of powder on the
door."'
On February 11th Sir Charles noted, 'Harcourt has got frightened and has
gone back,' fearing a division in the House of Commons on which Henry
Richard and the peace men would either support the Government or abstain
from voting, lest intervention should mean war.
Thus party feeling fluctuated. On February 16th, 1877, Sir Charles's diary
recorded that 'the popular name for our Front Bench with the London mob is
"Bag and baggage Billy and his long-eared crew."' This showed that 'in the
popular mind the personality of Mr. Gladstone had finally triumphed over
that of Hartington.'
At this moment Sir Charles's views coincided with those of Lord Hartington
to the extent of being anti-Russian, and, as already seen, he was more
drawn by personal feeling to him than to any of the various leaders. Mr.
Forster and Mr. Goschen seemed to him inclined to what a letter of
Harcourt's called "the old facing-both-ways style," and the magic of Mr.
Gladstone's personality never exercised its spell on Dilke. But he liked
Lord Hartington personally, and liked also Lord Hartington's ally, the
Duchess of Manchester, who, he says--
'used to try very hard to pick up political information for Lord
Hartington; but her own strong Conservative prejudices and her want of
clearness of head made her by no means a useful guide, and in fact the
wonder to me always was to see how Hartington's strong common sense
kept him from making the mistakes into which she always tried by her
influence to press him.'
That was written after an interview which Sir Charles had with her, at her
request, on January 8th, 1877. The Duchess had read a report of a speech
of his, in which 'I lectured on the Franco-German War, and condemned the
taking of territory as bound to lead to further wars.' On February 10th he
met her again to discuss the difficulties which were beginning to spring
up, since Mr. Gladstone's sudden access of activity, as to the leadership
of the party. In this matter Sir Charles kept himself 'absolutely
independent, going now with one and now with the other, with mere regard
to the opinions which they put forward.... I had a full knowledge of what
was going on behind the scenes,' although, because he was not in complete
agreement with either party among the Liberal leaders, he 'had not the
complete confidence of either side.'
This detachment of attitude adds the more weight to the judgment which is
passed in the following detailed review of the situation as it was in the
spring of 1877:
'At this moment' (February 18th, 1877) 'London was a centre of
intrigue. But my interest in the Eastern Question had nothing to do
with persons, and was an honest one, and I found myself able to act
only with those who had no candidate of their own for the leadership
of the party, or who, like Lord Granville, were brought to a similar
position by the conflict between party loyalty and a personal
affection for Mr. Gladstone, and I was able therefore at this moment
to act more steadily with Lord Granville than with any other leading
member of the Liberal party. He was jealous of Lord Hartington, but he
was loyal to him as the party chief. Towards Mr. Gladstone he was
affectionate, but not blind.' [Footnote: Sir Charles summarises here a
memorandum he drew for Lord Granville for the debate on February 19th,
used then and on several other occasions. He pointed out that the
Government policy, since the failure of the Conference, of leaving
things alone, was safe for the moment, but it did nothing for the
Eastern Christians, gave no satisfaction to the demands made in the
name of the Queen by Lord Derby on September 21st, 1876, offered no
bridge to Russia for the avoidance of war, and therefore left the
Turkish Empire and British interests exposed to the gravest danger.
Concerted action was the course Liberals desired.]
'There can be no doubt that many were making use of the Eastern
Question for the purpose of advancing their particular views as to the
leadership of the party. When men have to use other men as tools for
the execution of any plan, it is difficult for them to refrain from
that tricky handling of them which is best for the immediate end, but
debases both the user and the used. To sway men by knowledge of their
weaknesses is the task of a charlatan rather than of a statesman. Mr.
Gladstone, with all his inconsistency upon the Eastern Question, and
in spite of the fact that he had only just seen evils which had always
been there, had that which the others lacked, moral conviction, and
Hartington was infected with moral indifferentism. The Conservatives
no doubt thought that Mr. Gladstone's attitude was mere emotional
facility, a mere exhibition of spasmodic power of transient
enthusiasm, an effect rather of temperament than of conviction, and
unlikely therefore to produce a continued consequence of action
sustained at a high level. The public, however, saw more clearly.
Power over the moral fibre of other natures is not given to those
whose own nature is wanting in this moral force, and Mr. Gladstone's
attitude on the Eastern Question, in spite of his contradictions and
of his occasional running away from the consequences of his own acts,
was appreciated with accuracy by that large section of the public
which ultimately followed him.'
To this estimate should be added the record of a talk which passed in June
of the same year at a dinner party, where Sir Charles, 'along with Matthew
Arnold, Bowen, afterwards Lord of Appeal, and Frederick Pollock,'
discussed 'what is known as moral force':
'I upheld the view that to me Gathorne Hardy (although I never agreed
in a word which the future Lord Cranbrook said) possessed moral force
in the highest degree, but that this moral force was one which I felt
had only prejudice behind it. Still to me the intense conviction of
the man gave him immense strength, and made him the most really
eloquent Englishman to whom I had ever listened. Gladstone, I thought,
had moral force, because he believed in the particular thing of which
he was speaking at the particular moment at which he spoke. I somewhat
differed from the others with regard to Bright, thinking that he was
seldom really in earnest, although I admitted that no man gave more
strongly the impression of earnestness to his hearers, and therefore
no man had "moral force" in a higher degree.... Courtney (who had come
in during the autumn of 1876) and Fawcett both have "moral force."'
In March, 1877, the last stage was reached in those long-drawn
negotiations by which the statesmen of Europe endeavoured to avoid war,
and the declaration which Lord Derby attached in the name of England to
the Protocol of London was virtually a refusal to assent to coercion of
Turkey. Acting as leader of the Opposition, Lord Hartington asked Dilke to
'sketch a vote of censure on the declaration.' In the debate which took
place on April 13th (the day after Russia declared war against Turkey)--
'I spoke at great length, but too late for good reports, and by my
"gospel of selfishness" and other similar phrases raised ringing
cheers and counter-cheers, which for some time stopped my going on. I
felt after this day no longer afraid to stand up to anyone upon the
other side, but I noted that if Mr. Disraeli had been still in the
House I should not have hoped to have escaped as I did, after saying
all I had said of his colleagues in a full house, and coining such a
phrase of their proceedings as "gospel of selfishness"; but that which
struck me most in the whole debate was above all the want of
statesmanlike suggestion.'
A week after the declaration of war it seemed all but certain that Great
Britain must be drawn into the conflict; and Sir Charles--
'prepared (on April 20th, 1877) a resolution, which put on record my
opinions, and stated that the House regretted the failure of the
policy of the Government either to improve the position of Christian
subjects of the Porte or to avert war. It also regretted their
unwillingness to co-operate with any other of the European Powers.'
But the Liberal party as a whole was not able to formulate any such clear
conclusion. Within a week Mr. Gladstone had determined to break away from
the "upper official circles of Liberalism," and to move a series of
Resolutions, which were actually drafted on April 26th, but the existence
of which did not become generally known till the 29th.
'_29th April_.--Took Chamberlain to a party at Lord Houghton's, where
Lord and Lady Salisbury were leading figures, and where was Harcourt,
boiling over with rage at Mr. Gladstone, whose Resolutions had just
been heard of. Gladstone will very probably split the Liberal party
into two factions, but I do not see that he could have avoided doing
as he has done. Chamberlain and I and Fawcett must vote with him.
Cowen will vote against him, although if principles and not persons
were in question he must vote the other way. Gladstone will move a
string of resolutions, of which only one will touch the past--namely,
one to condemn the Turks for not carrying out the sentences on their
officers employed in the Bulgarian massacres. The main one, which
touches the future, will, I believe, bind over the Government not to
give aid to Turkey. His speech will be very fine.'
The "upper official circles" met, and in full conclave decided to separate
themselves publicly from Mr. Gladstone.
More serious still, this decision to oppose their colleague and quondam
leader was communicated to the Press. But on May 5th reconciliation was
effected. Concerning this Lord Morley says:
"What was asked was that he (Mr. Gladstone) should consent to an
amended form of his second resolution, declaring more simply and
categorically that the Turk by his misgovernment had lost his claims."
Gladstone himself wrote that the change was "little more than nominal."
But Sir Charles's Memoir of the time shows at once how far the schism had
gone, and also how different a view was taken of the alteration by some of
Mr. Gladstone's supporters:
'On May 3rd I noted in my diary: "The Liberal party will next week
cease to exist. I have already eighty-eight names of men who will vote
with Gladstone, and, the Front Bench having foolishly decided to
support the previous question, the party will be equally divided, and
Hartington will resign. Gladstone will, I think, refuse to lead.
Hartington will be asked to come back, but Goschen's friends may spoil
the absolute unanimity of the request, and Hartington then refusing,
Goschen would succeed. This seems to be the Goschen intrigue. I am
sincerely sorry. The Front Bench people might perfectly well have
voted against the 'previous question' on the ground that they support
the first resolution, and yet have spoken against Gladstone's later
resolutions."' He added later: 'I have still in my possession (1890)
the list of the party as made up by me, showing who would have voted
with Mr. Gladstone, who would have voted with Lord Hartington, ... and
who had stated that they would abstain. The analysis is of interest,
as the facts have never been made known.' [Footnote: For analysis see
Appendix at end of this chapter, p. 223.]
The outcome was a day in which Mr. Gladstone had to sustain singlehanded
from half-past four to seven a Parliamentary wrangle of the most
embarrassing kind, concerning the alteration of the form (and possibly the
substance) of his original motion, and then to speak for another two hours
and a half.[Footnote: See _Life of Gladstone_, vol. ii., chap, iv., p.
565.]
'At the last moment Mr. Gladstone executed a sudden change of front,
which prevented a break-up of the party, but made his own position
somewhat foolish. I was lunching with old Mrs. Duncan Stewart to meet
Mrs. Grote and Lady Aberdare, the wife of Mr. Gladstone's former
colleague (Bruce, the Home Secretary), when I heard what was to
happen. But publicity was only given to the change at the last moment.
'On May 8th I recorded in my diary that "Gladstone's noble delivery of
his peroration last night saved the evening from being a complete
fiasco, but only just saved it. The Duke of Westminster, who was to
have presided at the meeting at St. James's Hall, absented himself on
account of the change of front; but the meeting was not told that the
third and fourth resolutions were to be withdrawn. Both Gladstone and
also the rest of the Front Bench people are in the wrong--he for
moving at all in a sense hostile to Lord Hartington unless he meant to
go through with the thing, and they for not finding a better way out.
Such a way was clear last night. If Hartington had given notice of a
direct vote of censure on the new reply to Russia published yesterday,
as he might have done consistently with his views, Gladstone could
have withdrawn in face of it."'
A general note on his personal difficulties follows later:
'In August (1877) I was again embarrassed by my attitude upon the
Eastern Question. The fact that, being responsible, we had neglected
to be humane, or to be politic, during the previous one-and-twenty
years in which we might have taken the lead--might have insisted upon
reform in Turkey and fostered the possibilities of self-government in
the dependent States--made it difficult to approve the sudden activity
which the conduct of the Turks in their straits called forth on the
part of many Liberal politicians. Action might doubtless have been
taken by us at any time between the Crimean War and the outbreak of
the Russo-Turkish War, but, as the opportunity had been neglected, it
was difficult to inaugurate such a policy under pressure of the
atrocities agitation....
'The new position of the Eastern Question, although it did not unite
me with Mr. Gladstone, made a political breach between myself and
Hartington. He fell more and more under the somewhat stupid influence
of his surroundings, and I, holding a position between the two wings
of the party, found few with whom I myself agreed. Randolph
Churchill... made advances towards me which led to joint action, as
will be seen, in 1878. But in the autumn of '77 I was isolated, for
Chamberlain went, although with moderation, with Mr. Gladstone's
agitation.'
APPENDIX
'The division of the party was a very singular one. The Whigs were
divided; the Radicals were divided; the wild Irish were divided, for the
wild Irish at this particular moment were receiving the Liberal whip, and
were, accordingly, on the party lists. On the whole, out of 296 members
who were at this moment receiving the Liberal whip, about 110 had
pronounced for Mr. Gladstone, and about 110 for Lord Hartington against
Mr. Gladstone, the remainder, who included a majority of the Irish, having
announced their intention of walking out, or having refused to take
sides.... With Lord Hartington and against Mr. Gladstone were, of course,
nearly all the Front Bench, even those who at first promised to support
Mr. Gladstone having seen fit to change under pressure. One curious fact
about my list is the large number of persons at first marked with a single
line, as having promised Mr. Gladstone, and afterwards altered to crosses
as having yielded under Front-Bench pressure. The Basses were with Lord
Hartington; Sir Thomas Bazley, leader of the middle-class Lancashire
Whigs, who at first had gone with Mr. Gladstone, had gone over to Lord
Hartington. The Beaumonts were with Lord Hartington, as were the Brasseys.
The two Brights, John and Jacob, who at first had been expected to support
Mr. Gladstone, had finally decided, under peace influences, to support
Lord Hartington, on the ground that his policy was less likely than that
of Mr. Gladstone to bring about an armed intervention. Campbell-Bannerman
was frankly with Lord Hartington from the first; and Lord Frederick and
Lord Edward Cavendish went with their brother, although Lord Frederick
Cavendish was one of Mr. Gladstone's dearest friends. Childers knew no
doubts, but Joe Cowen's support of Hartington was more peculiar. Peace
men, like Sir Wilfrid Lawson, who disapproved the Crimean War, were
perhaps in their right place in supporting Lord Hartington's opposition to
Mr. Gladstone's resolutions; but Cowen and his set, such as Norwood and
Leatham, went with Lord Hartington chiefly, I think, on account of their
bitter personal hatred for Mr. Gladstone. J. K. Cross, afterwards to be
Under-Secretary of State for India, went with Hartington, against our
expectation; but the joint weight of Devonshire influence and the Brights
was too much for Lancashire. Cowper Temple, de Grey (afterwards lady
Ripon), and Grant Duff were with Lord Hartington, as was to be expected.
Ellice, and Evans of Derbyshire, representative Whigs, separated
themselves from such other ordinary Whigs as Leveson-Gower and Young, and
went with Hartington. Fitzmaurice separated himself from Fawcett and me
and Chamberlain and Courtney, and pronounced, after some hesitation, for
Hartington. W. E. Forster, the two Goldsmids, Goschen, Harcourt, and
Hayter, were, of course, with Hartington, as was also Herschell. Sir Henry
James could no more be expected to separate himself from Hartington than
could Nigel Kingscote, Knatchbull-Hugessen, or Lord Kensington, the Second
Whip.... Stansfeld supported Hartington, as did very naturally Sir N. de
Rothschild (afterwards Lord Rothschild), the Marquis of Stafford, Lord
Tavistock, and Mr. Roebuck (who, oddly enough, received our whip, though
he never voted with us unless we went wrong). Trevelyan went with
Hartington--a thing which had been less expected than the support of
Hartington by Mr. Villiers, by Mr. Whitbread, and by Walter of the
_Times_.... Mr. Biggar characteristically stated to various people that he
should vote against Hartington, for Hartington, and not at all.... Mr.
Butt from the first declared that he should not compromise his party by
taking part in the division.... Parnell, like Butt, from the first said
that he should abstain.... P. J. Smyth, the orator of the Irish party, or
who might perhaps rather be described as forming a party in himself, for
he was not a Home Ruler, but a Repealer, also, after at first intending to
support Mr. Gladstone, decided not to vote.'
CHAPTER XV
HOME POLITICS AND PERSONAL SURROUNDINGS
In a week spent in Paris at the end of 1876 Sir Charles stayed with
Gambetta, and took occasion to bring about a meeting between him and Sir
William and Lady Harcourt, who were also in Paris. With Sir William
Harcourt was his son and inseparable companion Mr. Lewis Harcourt, who
recalls a day when Sir Charles said to him: "Now, Loulou, I want you to
come and have lunch with me by yourself; I'm not asking your father and
mother to-day." He remembers his pride in going off to the Cafe Anglais,
where they were met by a man with a big black beard. "This, Loulou, is
Monsieur Gambetta." The two men talked, and the boy listened, as he was
well used to do, for in those days he constantly "ran about beside his
father like a little dog." After lunch they went for a drive, and still
the men talked, and Gambetta pointed to the window from which he had
proclaimed the Republic, and Dilke showed where he had lain for half a day
while the French troops were besieging the French of Paris. The boy
listened eagerly--to understand, years after, how the whole drive had been
planned for his edification and delight.
Since August, 1876, Gambetta had been talking of a visit, proposing, says
Sir Charles, to "come to me in town, and probably bring Challemel-Lacour
also to 76, Sloane Street." The visit was to be purely private and social;
"he will receive no deputations, no addresses, and will visit no
provincial towns."
'It was in 1876 that he sent to me a certain Gerard, who became French
reader to the Empress Augusta of Germany, and it is supposed that the
somewhat brilliant volume called _The Society of Berlin_, long
afterwards published under the name of _Count Paul Vasili_ by Madame
Adam (although not the later volumes of the same series, which were by
Vandam), was from Gerard's pen. Gambetta, when he came to power as
Prime Minister, appointed Gerard, who was then in the Legation at
Washington, his private secretary, Georges Pallain being the second,
and Joseph Reinach the third. But Pallain and Reinach, in fact,
exercised the functions, because Gambetta fell before Gerard arrived.
Gerard is now (1909) an Ambassador.'
Just before Dilke's visit to Gambetta in the spring of 1877 another
indication of his popularity in France occurred. 'Gavard had come to me
from the French Embassy to ask me whether I should like to go to Paris
with Sir Louis Mallet to arrange a new French Treaty, as "his Government
would like me."' The proposal fell through. As Sir Charles said, 'the
Government could not well, I think, have sent two Liberals at the head of
the Commission.' Mallet
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