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Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

On the Genesis of Species

S >> St. George Mivart >> On the Genesis of Species

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Again, the singular facts of "homology" are capable of a similar
explanation. "Homology" is the name applied to the investigation of those
profound resemblances which have so often been found to underlie
superficial differences between animals of very different form and habit.
Thus man, the horse, the whale, and the bat, all have the pectoral limb,
whether it be the arm, or fore-leg, or paddle, or wing, formed on
essentially the same type, though the number and proportion of parts may{8}
more or less differ. Again, the butterfly and the shrimp, different as they
are in appearance and mode of life, are yet constructed on the same common
plan, of which they constitute diverging manifestations. No _a priori_
reason is conceivable why such similarities should be necessary, but they
are readily explicable on the assumption of a genetic relationship and
affinity between the animals in question, assuming, that is, that they are
the modified descendants of some ancient form--their common ancestor.

That remarkable series of changes which animals undergo before they attain
their adult condition, which is called their process of development, and
during which they more or less closely resemble other animals during the
early stages of the same process, has also great light thrown on it from
the same source. The question as to the singularly complex resemblances
borne by every adult animal and plant to a certain number of other animals
and plants--resemblances by means of which the adopted zoological and
botanical systems of classification have been possible--finds its solution
in a similar manner, classification becoming the expression of a
genealogical relationship. Finally, by this theory--and as yet by this
alone--can any explanation be given of that extraordinary phenomenon which
is metaphorically termed _mimicry_. Mimicry is a close and striking, yet
superficial resemblance borne by some animal or plant to some other,
perhaps very different, animal or plant. The "walking leaf" (an insect
belonging to the grasshopper and cricket order) is a well-known and
conspicuous instance of the assumption by an animal of the appearance of a
vegetable structure (see illustration on p. 35); and the bee, fly, and
spider orchids are familiar examples of a converse resemblance. Birds,
butterflies, reptiles, and even fish, seem to bear in certain instances a
similarly striking resemblance to other birds, butterflies, reptiles, and
fish, of altogether distinct kinds. The explanation of this matter which
"Natural Selection" offers, as to animals, is that certain varieties of {9}
one kind have found exemption from persecution in consequence of an
accidental resemblance which such varieties have exhibited to animals of
another kind, or to plants; and that they were thus preserved, and the
degree of resemblance was continually augmented in their descendants. As to
plants, the explanation offered by this theory might perhaps be that
varieties of plants which presented a certain superficial resemblance in
their flowers to insects, have thereby been helped to propagate their kind,
the visit of certain insects being useful or indispensable to the
fertilization of many flowers.

We have thus a whole series of important facts which "Natural Selection"
helps us to understand and co-ordinate. And not only are all these diverse
facts strung together, as it were, by the theory in question; not only does
it explain the development of the complex instincts of the beaver, the
cuckoo, the bee, and the ant, as also the dazzling brilliancy of the
humming-bird, the glowing tail and neck of the peacock, and the melody of
the nightingale; the perfume of the rose and the violet, the brilliancy of
the tulip and the sweetness of the nectar of flowers; not only does it help
us to understand all these, but serves as a basis of future research and of
inference from the known to the unknown, and it guides the investigator to
the discovery of new facts which, when ascertained, it seems also able to
co-ordinate.[6] Nay, "Natural Selection" seems capable of application not
only to the building up of the smallest and most insignificant organisms,
but even of extension beyond the biological domain altogether, so as
possibly to have relation to the stable equilibrium of the solar system{10}
itself, and even of the whole sidereal universe. Thus, whether this theory
be true or false, all lovers of natural science should acknowledge a deep
debt of gratitude to Messrs. Darwin and Wallace, on account of its
practical utility. But the utility of a theory by no means implies its
truth. What do we not owe, for example, to the labours of the Alchemists?
The emission theory of light, again, has been pregnant with valuable
results, as still is the Atomic theory, and others which will readily
suggest themselves.

With regard to Mr. Darwin (with whose name, on account of the noble
self-abnegation of Mr. Wallace, the theory is in general exclusively
associated), his friends may heartily congratulate him on the fact that he
is one of the few exceptions to the rule respecting the non-appreciation of
a prophet in his own country. It would be difficult to name another living
labourer in the field of physical science who has excited an interest so
widespread, and given rise to so much praise, gathering round him, as he
has done, a chorus of more or less completely acquiescing disciples,
themselves masters in science, and each the representative of a crowd of
enthusiastic followers.

Such is the Darwinian theory of "Natural Selection," such are the more
remarkable facts which it is potent to explain, and such is the reception
it has met with in the world. A few words now as to the reasons for the
very widespread interest it has awakened, and the keenness with which the
theory has been both advocated and combated.

The important bearing it has on such an extensive range of scientific
facts, its utility, and the vast knowledge and great ingenuity of its
promulgator, are enough to account for the heartiness of its reception by
those learned in natural history. But quite other causes have concurred to
produce the general and higher degree of interest felt in the theory beside
the readiness with which it harmonizes with biological facts. These latter
could only be appreciated by physiologists, zoologists, and botanists;
whereas the Darwinian theory, so novel and so startling, has found a {11}
cloud of advocates and opponents beyond and outside the world of physical
science.

In the first place, it was inevitable that a great crowd of half-educated
men and shallow thinkers should accept with eagerness the theory of
"Natural Selection," or rather what they think to be such (for few things
are more remarkable than the way in which it has been misunderstood), on
account of a certain characteristic it has in common with other theories;
which should not be mentioned in the same breath with it, except, as now,
with the accompaniment of protest and apology. We refer to its remarkable
simplicity, and the ready way in which phenomena the most complex appear
explicable by a cause for the comprehension of which laborious and
persevering efforts are not required, but which may be represented by the
simple phrase "survival of the fittest." With nothing more than this, can,
on the Darwinian theory, all the most intricate facts of distribution and
affinity, form, and colour, be accounted for; as well the most complex
instincts and the most admirable adjustments, such as those of the human
eye and ear. It is in great measure then, owing to this supposed
simplicity, and to a belief in its being yet easier and more simple than it
is, that Darwinism, however imperfectly understood, has become a subject
for general conversation, and has been able thus widely to increase a
certain knowledge of biological matters; and this excitation of interest in
quarters where otherwise it would have been entirely wanting, is an
additional motive for gratitude on the part of naturalists to the authors
of the new theory. At the same time it must be admitted that a similar
"simplicity"--the apparently easy explanation of complex phenomena--also
constitutes the charm of such matters as hydropathy and phrenology, in the
eyes of the unlearned or half-educated public. It is indeed _the_ charm of
all those seeming "short cuts" to knowledge, by which the labour of
mastering scientific details is spared to those who yet believe that {12}
without such labour they can attain all the most valuable results of
scientific research. It is not, of course, for a moment meant to imply that
its "simplicity" tells at all against "Natural Selection," but only that
the actual or supposed possession of that quality is a strong reason for
the wide and somewhat hasty acceptance of the theory, whether it be true or
not.

In the second place, it was inevitable that a theory appearing to have very
grave relations with questions of the last importance and interest to man,
that is, with questions of religious belief, should call up an army of
assailants and defenders. Nor have the supporters of the theory much
reason, in many cases, to blame the more or less unskilful and hasty
attacks of adversaries, seeing that those attacks have been in great part
due to the unskilful and perverse advocacy of the cause on the part of some
of its adherents. If the _odium theologicum_ has inspired some of its
opponents, it is undeniable that the _odium antitheologicum_ has possessed
not a few of its supporters. It is true (and in appreciating some of Mr.
Darwin's expressions it should never be forgotten) that the theory has been
both at its first promulgation and since vehemently attacked and denounced
as unchristian, nay, as necessarily atheistic; but it is not less true that
it has been made use of as a weapon of offence by irreligious writers, and
has been again and again, especially in continental Europe, thrown, as it
were, in the face of believers, with sneers and contumely. When we
recollect the warmth with which what he thought was Darwinism was advocated
by such a writer as Professor Vogt, one cause of his zeal was not far to
seek--a zeal, by the way, certainly not "according to knowledge;" for few
conceptions could have been more conflicting with true Darwinism than the
theory he formerly maintained, but has since abandoned, viz. that the men
of the Old World were descended from African and Asiatic apes, while,
similarly, the American apes were the progenitors of the human beings of
the New World. The cause of this palpable error in a too eager disciple{13}
one might hope was not anxiety to snatch up all or any arms available
against Christianity, were it not for the tone unhappily adopted by this
author. But it is unfortunately quite impossible to mistake his meaning and
intention, for he is a writer whose offensiveness is gross, while it is
sometimes almost surpassed by an amazing shallowness. Of course, as might
fully be expected, he adopts and reproduces the absurdly trivial objections
to absolute morality drawn from differences in national customs.[7] And he
seems to have as little conception of the distinction between "formally"
moral actions and those which are only "materially" moral, as of that
between the _verbum mentale_ and the _verbum oris_. As an example of his
onesidedness, it may be remarked that he compares the skulls of the
American monkeys (_Cebus apella_ and _C. albifrons_) with the intention of
showing that man is of several distinct species, because skulls of
different men are less alike than are those of these two monkeys; and he
does this regardless of how the skulls of domestic animals (with which it
is far more legitimate to compare races of men than with wild kinds),
_e.g._ of different dogs or pigeons, tell precisely in the opposite
direction. Regardless also of the fact that perhaps no genus of monkeys is
in a more unsatisfactory state as to the determination of its different
kinds than the genus chosen by him for illustration. This is so much the
case that J. A. Wagner (in his supplement to Schreber's great work on
Beasts) at first included all the kinds in a single species.

As to the strength of his prejudice and his regretable coarseness, one
quotation will be enough to display both. Speaking of certain early
Christian missionaries, he says,[8] "It is not so very improbable that the
new religion, before which the flourishing Roman civilization relapsed into
a state of barbarism, should have been introduced by people in whose {14}
skulls the anatomist finds simious characters so well developed, and in
which the phrenologist finds the organ of veneration so much enlarged. I
shall, in the meanwhile, call these simious narrow skulls of Switzerland
'Apostle skulls,' as I imagine that in life they must have resembled the
type of Peter, the Apostle, as represented in Byzantine-Nazarene art."

In face of such a spirit, can it be wondered at that disputants have grown
warm? Moreover, in estimating the vehemence of the opposition which has
been offered, it should be borne in mind that the views defended by
religious writers are, or should be, all-important in their eyes. They
could not be expected to view with equanimity the destruction in many minds
of "theology, natural and revealed, psychology, and metaphysics;" nor to
weigh with calm and frigid impartiality arguments which seemed to them to
be fraught with results of the highest moment to mankind, and, therefore,
imposing on their consciences strenuous opposition as a first duty. Cool
judicial impartiality in them would have been a sign perhaps of
intellectual gifts, but also of a more important deficiency of generous
emotion.

It is easy to complain of the onesidedness of many of those who oppose
Darwinism in the interest of orthodoxy; but not at all less patent is the
intolerance and narrow-mindedness of some of those who advocate it,
avowedly or covertly, in the interest of heterodoxy. This hastiness of
rejection or acceptance, determined by ulterior consequences believed to
attach to "Natural Selection," is unfortunately in part to be accounted for
by some expressions and a certain tone to be found in Mr. Darwin's
writings. That his expressions, however, are not always to be construed
literally is manifest. His frequent use metaphorically of the expressions,
"contrivance," for example, and "purpose," has elicited, from the Duke of
Argyll and others, criticisms which fail to tell against their {15}
opponent, because such expressions are, in Mr. Darwin's writings, merely
figurative--metaphors, and nothing more.

It may be hoped, then, that a similar looseness of expression will account
for passages of a directly opposite tendency to that of his theistic
metaphors.

Moreover, it must not be forgotten that he frequently uses that absolutely
theological term, "the Creator," and that he has retained in all the
editions of his "Origin of Species" an expression which has been much
criticised. He speaks "of life, with its several powers, having been
originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms, or into one."[9] This
is merely mentioned in justice to Mr. Darwin, and by no means because it is
a position which this book is intended to support. For, from Mr. Darwin's
usual mode of speaking, it appears that by such divine action he means a
supernatural intervention, whereas it is here contended that throughout the
whole process of physical evolution--the first manifestation of life
included--_supernatural_ action is assuredly not to be looked for.

Again, in justice to Mr. Darwin, it may be observed that he is addressing
the general public, and opposing the ordinary and common objections of
popular religionists, who have inveighed against "Evolution" and "Natural
Selection" as atheistic, impious, and directly conflicting with the dogma
of creation.

Still, in so important a matter, it is to be regretted that he did not take
the trouble to distinguish between such merely popular views and those
which repose upon some more venerable authority. Mr. John Stuart Mill has
replied to similar critics, and shown that the assertion that his
philosophy is irreconcilable with theism is unfounded; and it would have
been better if Mr. Darwin had dealt in the same manner with some of his
assailants, and shown the futility of certain of their objections when {16}
viewed from a more elevated religious standpoint. Instead of so doing, he
seems to adopt the narrowest notions of his opponents, and, far from
endeavouring to expand them, appears to wish to endorse them, and to lend
to them the weight of his authority. It is thus that Mr. Darwin seems to
admit and assume that the idea of "creation" necessitates a belief in an
interference with, or dispensation of, natural laws, and that "creation"
must be accompanied by arbitrary and unorderly phenomena. None but the
crudest conceptions are placed by him to the credit of supporters of the
dogma of creation, and it is constantly asserted that they, to be
consistent, must offer "creative fiats" as explanations of physical
phenomena, and be guilty of numerous other such absurdities. It is
impossible, therefore, to acquit Mr. Darwin of at least a certain
carelessness in this matter; and the result is, he has the appearance of
opposing ideas which he gives no clear evidence of having ever fully
appreciated. He is far from being alone in this, and perhaps merely takes
up and reiterates, without much consideration, assertions previously
assumed by others. Nothing could be further from Mr. Darwin's mind than
any, however small, intentional misrepresentation; and it is therefore the
more unfortunate that he should not have shown any appreciation of a
position opposed to his own other than that gross and crude one which he
combats so superfluously--that he should appear, even for a moment, to be
one of those, of whom there are far too many, who first misrepresent their
adversary's view, and then elaborately refute it; who, in fact, erect a
doll utterly incapable of self-defence and then, with a flourish of
trumpets and many vigorous strokes, overthrow the helpless dummy they had
previously raised.

This is what many do who more or less distinctly oppose theism in the
interests, as they believe, of physical science; and they often represent,
amongst other things, a gross and narrow anthropomorphism as the necessary
consequence of views opposed to those which they themselves advocate. {17}
Mr. Darwin and others may perhaps be excused if they have not devoted much
time to the study of Christian philosophy; but they have no right to assume
or accept, without careful examination, as an unquestioned fact, that in
that philosophy there is a necessary antagonism between the two ideas,
"creation" and "evolution," as applied to organic forms.

It is notorious and patent to all who choose to seek, that many
distinguished Christian thinkers have accepted and do accept both ideas,
_i.e._ both "creation" and "evolution."

As much as ten years ago, an eminently Christian writer observed: "The
creationist theory does not necessitate the perpetual search after
manifestations of miraculous powers and perpetual 'catastrophes.' Creation
is not a miraculous interference with the laws of nature, but the very
institution of those laws. Law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention,
was the patristic ideal of creation. With this notion, they admitted
without difficulty the most surprising origin of living creatures, provided
it took place by _law_. They held that when God said, 'Let the waters
produce,' 'Let the earth produce,' He conferred forces on the elements of
earth and water, which enabled them naturally to produce the various
species of organic beings. This power, they thought, remains attached to
the elements throughout all time."[10] The same writer quotes St. Augustine
and St. Thomas Aquinas, to the effect that, "in the institution of nature
we do not look for miracles, but for the laws of nature."[11] And, again,
St. Basil,[12] speaks of the continued operation of natural laws in the
production of all organisms. [Page 18]

So much for writers of early and mediaeval times. As to the present day, the
Author can confidently affirm that there are many as well versed in
theology as Mr. Darwin is in his own department of natural knowledge, who
would not be disturbed by the thorough demonstration of his theory. Nay,
they would not even be in the least painfully affected at witnessing the
generation of animals of complex organization by the skilful artificial
arrangement of natural forces, and the production, in the future, of a
fish, by means analogous to those by which we now produce urea.

And this because they know that the possibility of such phenomena, though
by no means actually foreseen, has yet been fully provided for in the old
philosophy centuries before Darwin, or even before Bacon, and that their
place in the system can be at once assigned them without even disturbing
its order or marring its harmony.

Moreover, the old tradition in this respect has never been abandoned,
however much it may have been ignored or neglected by some modern writers.
In proof of this it may be observed that perhaps no post-mediaeval
theologian has a wider reception amongst Christians throughout the world
than Suarez, who has a separate section[13] in opposition to those who
maintain the distinct creation of the various kinds--or substantial
forms--of organic life.

But the consideration of this matter must be deferred for the present, and
the question of evolution, whether Darwinian or other, be first gone into.
It is proposed, after that has been done, to return to this subject (here
merely alluded to), and to consider at some length the bearing of
"Evolution," whether Darwinian or non-Darwinian, upon "Creation and
Theism."

Now we will revert simply to the consideration of the theory of "Natural
Selection" itself.

{19}
Whatever may have hitherto been the amount of acceptance that this theory
has met with, all, I think, anticipated that the appearance of Mr. Darwin's
large and careful work on "Animals and Plants under Domestication" could
but further increase that acceptance. It is, however, somewhat
problematical how far such anticipations will be realized. The newer book
seems to add after all but little in support of the theory, and to leave
most, if not all, its difficulties exactly where they were. It is a
question, also, whether the hypothesis of "Pangenesis"[14] may not be found
rather to encumber than to support the theory it was intended to subserve.
However, the work in question treats only of domestic animals, and probably
the next instalment will address itself more vigorously and directly to the
difficulties which seem to us yet to bar the way to a complete acceptance
of the doctrine.

If the theory of Natural Selection can be shown to be quite insufficient to
explain any considerable number of important phenomena connected with the
origin of species, that theory, as _the_ explanation, must be considered as
provisionally discredited.

If other causes than Natural (including sexual) Selection can be proved to
have acted--if variation can in any cases be proved to be subject to
certain determinations in special directions by other means than Natural
Selection, it then becomes probable _a priori_ that it is so in others, and
that Natural Selection depends upon, and only supplements, such means, {20}
which conception is opposed to the pure Darwinian position.

Now it is certain, _a priori_, that variation is obedient to some law and
therefore that "Natural Selection" itself must be capable of being subsumed
into some higher law; and it is evident, I believe, _a posteriori_, that
Natural Selection is, at the very least, aided and supplemented by some
other agency.

Admitting, then, organic and other evolution, and that new forms of animals
and plants (new species, genera, &c.) have from time to time been evolved
from preceding animals and plants, it follows, if the views here advocated
are true, that this evolution has not taken place by the action of "Natural
Selection" _alone_, but through it (amongst other influences) aided by the
concurrent action of some other natural law or laws, at present
undiscovered; and probably that the genesis of species takes place partly,
perhaps mainly, through laws which may be most conveniently spoken of as
special powers and tendencies existing in each organism; and partly through
influences exerted on each by surrounding conditions and agencies organic
and inorganic, terrestrial and cosmical, among which the "survival of the
fittest" plays a certain but subordinate part.

The theory of "Natural Selection" may (though it need not) be taken in such
a way as to lead men to regard the present organic world as formed, so to
speak, _accidentally_, beautiful and wonderful as is confessedly the
hap-hazard result. The same may perhaps be said with regard to the system
advocated by Mr. Herbert Spencer, who, however, also relegates "Natural
Selection" to a subordinate _role_. The view here advocated, on the other
hand, regards the whole organic world as arising and going forward in one
harmonious development similar to that which displays itself in the growth
and action of each separate individual organism. It also regards each such
separate organism as the expression of powers and tendencies not to be {21}
accounted for by "Natural Selection" alone, or even by that together with
merely the direct influence of surrounding conditions.

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