On the Genesis of Species

S >> St. George Mivart >> On the Genesis of Species

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The view of evolution maintained in this work, though arrived at in
complete independence, yet seems to agree in many respects with the views
advocated by Professor Owen in the last volume of his "Anatomy of
Vertebrates," under the term "derivation." He says:[244] "Derivation holds
that every species changes in time, by virtue of inherent tendencies
thereto. 'Natural Selection' holds that no such change can take place
without the influence of altered external circumstances.[245] {239}
'Derivation' sees among the effects of the innate tendency to change
irrespective of altered circumstances, a manifestation of creative power in
the variety and beauty of the results; and, in the ultimate forthcoming of
a being susceptible of appreciating such beauty, evidence of the
pre-ordaining of such relation of power to the appreciation. 'Natural
Selection' acknowledges that if ornament or beauty, in itself, should be a
purpose in creation, it would be absolutely fatal to it as a hypothesis."

"'Natural Selection' sees grandeur in the view of life, with its several
powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or
into one. 'Derivation' sees therein a narrow invocation of a special
miracle and an unworthy limitation of creative power, the grandeur of which
is manifested daily, hourly, in calling into life many forms, by conversion
of physical and chemical into vital modes of force, under as many
diversified conditions of the requisite elements to be so combined."

The view propounded in this work allows, however, a greater and more
important part to the share of external influences, it being believed by
the Author, however, that these external influences equally with the
internal ones are the results of one harmonious action underlying the whole
of nature, organic and inorganic, cosmical, physical, chemical,
terrestrial, vital, and social.

According to this view, an internal law presides over the actions of every
part of every individual, and of every organism as a unit, and of the
entire organic world as a whole. It is believed that this conception of an
internal innate force will ever remain necessary, however much its
subordinate processes and actions may become explicable:

That by such a force, from time to time, new species are manifested by
ordinary generation just as _Pavo nigripennis_ appeared suddenly, these new
forms not being monstrosities but harmonious self-consistent wholes. That
thus, as specific distinctness is manifested by obscure sexual {240}
conditions, so in obscure sexual modifications specific distinctions arise.

That these "jumps" are considerable in comparison with the minute
variations of "Natural Selection"--are in fact sensible steps, such as
discriminate species from species.

That the latent tendency which exists to these sudden evolutions is
determined to action by the stimulus of external conditions.

That "Natural Selection" rigorously destroys monstrosities, and abortive
and feeble attempts at the performance of the evolutionary process.

That "Natural Selection" removes the antecedent species rapidly when the
new one evolved is more in harmony with surrounding conditions.

That "Natural Selection" favours and develops useful variations, though it
is impotent to originate them or to erect the physiological barrier which
seems to exist between species.

By some such conception as this, the difficulties here enumerated, which
beset the theory of "Natural Selection" pure and simple, are to be got
over.

Thus, for example, the difficulties discussed in the first chapter--namely,
those as to the origins and first beginnings of certain structures--are
completely evaded.

Again, as to the independent origin of closely similar structures, such as
the eyes of the Vertebrata and cuttle-fishes, the difficulty is removed if
we may adopt the conception of an innate force similarly directed in each
case, and assisted by favourable external conditions.

Specific stability, limitation to variability, and the facts of reversion,
all harmonize with the view here put forward. The same may be said with
regard to the significant facts of homology, and of organic symmetry; and
our consideration of the hypothesis of Pangenesis in Chapter X., has seemed
to result in a view as to innate powers which accords well with what is
here advocated. [Page 241]

The evolutionary hypothesis here advocated also serves to explain all those
remarkable facts which were stated in the first chapter to be explicable by
the theory of Natural Selection, namely, the relation of existing to recent
faunas and floras; the phenomena of homology and of rudimentary structures;
also the processes gone through in development; and lastly, the wonderful
facts of mimicry.

Finally, the view adopted is the synthesis of many distinct and, at first
sight, conflicting conceptions, each of which contains elements of truth,
and all of which it appears to be able more or less to harmonize.

Thus it has been seen that "Natural Selection" is accepted. It acts and
must act, though alone it does not appear capable of fulfilling the task
assigned to it by Mr. Darwin.

Pangenesis has probably also much truth in it, and has certainly afforded
valuable and pregnant suggestions, but unaided and alone it seems
inadequate to explain the evolution of the individual organism.

Those three conceptions of the organic world which may be spoken of as the
teleological, the typical, and the transmutationist, have often been
regarded as mutually antagonistic and conflicting.

The genesis of species as here conceived, however, accepts, locates, and
harmonizes all the three.

Teleology concerns the ends for which organisms were designed. The
recognition, therefore, that their formation took place by an evolution not
fortuitous, in no way invalidates the acknowledgment of their final causes
if on other grounds there are reasons for believing that such final causes
exist.

Conformity to type, or the creation of species according to certain "divine
ideas," is in no way interfered with by such a process of evolution as is
here advocated. Such "divine ideas" must be accepted or declined upon quite
other grounds than the mode of their realization, and of their
manifestation in the world of sensible phenomena. [Page 242]

Transmutationism (an old name for the evolutionary hypothesis), which was
conceived at one time to be the very antithesis to the two preceding
conceptions, harmonizes well with them if the evolution be conceived to be
orderly and designed. It will in the next chapter be shown to be completely
in harmony with conceptions, upon the acceptance of which "final causes"
and "divine ideal archetypes" alike depend.

Thus then, if the cumulative argument put forward in this book is valid, we
must admit the insufficiency of Natural Selection both on account of the
residuary phenomena it fails to explain, and on account of certain other
phenomena which seem actually to conflict with that theory. We have seen
that though the laws of nature are constant, yet some of the conditions
which determine specific change may be exceptionally absent at the present
epoch of the world's history; also that it is not only possible, but highly
probable, that an internal power or tendency is an important if not the
main agent in evoking the manifestation of new species on the scene of
realized existence, and that in any case, from the facts of homology,
innate internal powers to the full as mysterious must anyhow be accepted,
whether they act in specific origination or not. Besides all this, we have
seen that it is probable that the action of this innate power is
stimulated, evoked, and determined by external conditions, and also that
the same external conditions, in the shape of "Natural Selection," play an
important part in the evolutionary process: and finally, it has been
affirmed that the view here advocated, while it is supported by the facts
on which Darwinism rests, is not open to the objections and difficulties
which oppose themselves to the reception of "Natural Selection," as the
exclusive or even as the main agent in the successive and orderly evolution
of organic forms in the _genesis of species_. [Page 243]

* * * * *

CHAPTER XII.

THEOLOGY AND EVOLUTION.

Prejudiced opinions on the subject.--"Creation" sometimes denied from
prejudice.---The unknowable.--Mr. Herbert Spencer's objections to
theism; to creation.--Meanings of term "creation."--Confusion from not
distinguishing between "primary" and "derivative" creation.--Mr.
Darwin's objections.--Bearing of Christianity on the theory of
evolution.--Supposed opposition, the result of a
misconception.--Theological authority not opposed to evolution.--St.
Augustin.--St. Thomas Aquinas.--Certain consequences of want of
flexibility of mind.--Reason and imagination.--The first cause and
demonstration.--Parallel between Christianity and natural
theology.--What evolution of species is.--Professor Agassiz.--Innate
powers must be recognized.--Bearing of evolution on religious
belief.--Professor Huxley.--Professor Owen.--Mr. Wallace.--Mr.
Darwin.--_A priori_ conception of Divine action.--Origin of
man.--Absolute creation and dogma.--Mr. Wallace's view.--A supernatural
origin for man's body not necessary.--Two orders of being in man.--Two
modes of origin.--Harmony of the physical, hyperphysical, and
supernatural.--Reconciliation of science and religion as regards
evolution.--Conclusion.

The special "Darwinian Theory" and that of an evolutionary process neither
excessively minute nor fortuitous, having now been considered, it is time
to turn to the important question, whether both or either of these
conceptions may have any bearing, and if any, what, upon Christian belief?

Some readers will consider such an inquiry to be a work of supererogation.
Seeing clearly themselves the absurdity of prevalent popular views, and the
shallowness of popular objections, they may be impatient of any discussion,
on the subject. But it is submitted that there are many minds worthy {244}
of the highest esteem and of every consideration, which have regarded the
subject hitherto almost exclusively from one point of view; that there are
some persons who are opposed to the progress (in their own minds or in that
of their children or dependents) of physical scientific truth--the natural
revelation--through a mistaken estimate of its religious bearings, while
there are others who are zealous in its promotion from a precisely similar
error. For the sake of both these then the Author may perhaps be pardoned
for entering slightly on very elementary matters relating to the question,
whether evolution or Darwinism have any, and if any, what, bearing on
theology?

There are at least two classes of men who will certainly assert that they
have a very important and highly significant bearing upon it.

One of these classes consists of persons zealous for religion indeed, but
who identify orthodoxy with their own private interpretation of Scripture
or with narrow opinions in which they have been brought up--opinions
doubtless widely spread, but at the same time destitute of any distinct and
authoritative sanction on the part of the Christian Church.

The other class is made up of men hostile to religion, and who are glad to
make use of any and every argument which they think may possibly be
available against it.

Some individuals within this latter class may not believe in the existence
of God, but may yet abstain from publicly avowing this absence of belief,
contenting themselves with denials of "creation" and "design," though these
denials are really consequences of their attitude of mind respecting the
most important and fundamental of all beliefs.

Without a distinct belief in a personal God it is impossible to have any
religion worthy of the name, and no one can at the same time accept the
Christian religion and deny the dogma of creation. [Page 245]

"I believe in God," "the Creator of Heaven and Earth," the very first
clauses of the Apostles' Creed, formally commit those who accept them to
the assertion of this belief. If, therefore, any theory of physical science
really conflicts with such an authoritative statement, its importance to
Christians is unquestionable.

As, however, "creation" forms a part of "revelation," and as "revelation"
appeals for its acceptance to "reason" which has to prepare a basis for it
by an intelligent acceptance of theism on _purely rational grounds_, it is
necessary to start with a few words as to the reasonableness of belief in
God, which indeed are less superfluous than some readers may perhaps
imagine; "a few words," because this is not the place where the argument
can be drawn out, but only one or two hints given in reply to certain
modern objections.

No better example perhaps can be taken, as a type of these objections, than
a passage in Mr. Herbert Spencer's First Principles.[246] This author
constantly speaks of the "ultimate cause of things" as "the Unknowable," a
term singularly unfortunate, and as Mr. James Martineau has pointed
out,[247] even self-contradictory: for that entity, the knowledge of {246}
the existence of which presses itself ever more and more upon the
cultivated intellect, cannot be the unknown, still less _the unknowable_,
because we certainly know it, in that we know for certain that it exists.
Nay more, to predicate incognoscibility of it, is even a certain knowledge
of the mode of its existence. Mr. H. Spencer says:[248] "The consciousness
of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena has been
growing ever clearer; and must eventually be freed from its imperfections.
The certainty that on the one hand such a Power exists, while on the other
hand its nature transcends intuition, and is beyond imagination, is the
certainty towards which intelligence has from the first been progressing."
One would think then that the familiar and accepted word "the Inscrutable"
(which is in this passage actually employed, and to which no theologian
would object) would be an indefinitely better term than "the unknowable."
The above extract has, however, such a theistic aspect that some readers
may think the opposition here offered superfluous; it may be well,
therefore, to quote two other sentences. In another place he observes,[249]
"Passing over the consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to
that of conceivability, we see that atheism, pantheism, and theism, when
rigorously analysed, severally prove to be absolutely unthinkable;" and
speaking of "every form of religion," he adds,[250] "The analysis of every
possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient but
that no hypothesis is even thinkable." The unknowable is admitted to be a
power which cannot be regarded as having sympathy with us, but as one to
which no emotion whatever can be ascribed, and we are expressly {247}
forbidden "by _duty_," to affirm personality of God as much as to deny it
of Him. How such a being can be presented as an object on which to exercise
religious emotion it is difficult indeed to understand.[251] Aspiration,
love, devotion to be poured forth upon what we can never know, upon what we
can never affirm to know, or care for, us, our thoughts or actions, or to
possess the attributes of wisdom and goodness! The worship offered in such
a religion must be, as Professor Huxley says,[252] "for the most part of
the silent sort"--silent not only as to the spoken word, but silent as to
the mental conception also. It will be difficult to distinguish the
follower of this religion from the follower of none, and the man who
declines either to assert or to deny the existence of God, is practically
in the position of an atheist. For theism enjoins the cultivation of
sentiments of love and devotion to God, and the practice of their external
expression. Atheism forbids both, while the simply non-theist abstains in
conformity with the prohibition of the atheist and thus practically sides
with him. Moreover, since man cannot imagine that of which he has no
experience in any way whatever, and since he has experience only of _human_
perfections and of the powers and properties of _inferior_ existences; if
he be required to deny human perfections and to abstain from making use of
such conceptions, he is thereby necessarily reduced to others of an
inferior order. Mr. H. Spencer says,[253] "Those who espouse this {248}
alternative position, make the erroneous assumption that the choice is
between personality and something lower than personality; whereas the
choice is rather between personality and something higher. Is it not just
possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence
and will, as these transcend mechanical motion?"

"It is true we are totally unable to conceive any such higher mode of
being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather
the reverse." "May we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to the
'ultimate cause' any attributes whatever, on the ground that such
attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not
elevations but degradations?" The way however to arrive at the object aimed
at (_i.e_. to obtain the best attainable conception of the First Cause) is
not to refrain from _the only conceptions possible to us_, but to seek the
very highest of these, and then declare their utter inadequacy; and this is
precisely the course which has been pursued by theologians. It is to be
regretted that before writing on this matter Mr. Spencer did not more
thoroughly acquaint himself with the ordinary doctrine on the subject. It
is always taught in the Church schools of divinity, that nothing, not even
_existence_, is to be predicated _univocally_ of "God" and "creatures;"
that after exhausting ingenuity to arrive at the loftiest possible
conceptions, we must declare them to be _utterly inadequate_; that, after
all, they are but accommodations to human infirmity; that they are in a
sense objectively false (because of their inadequacy), though subjectively
and very practically true. But the difference between this mode of
treatment and that adopted by Mr. Spencer is wide indeed; for the practical
result of the mode inculcated by the Church is that each one may freely
affirm and act upon the highest human conceptions he can attain of the{249}
power, wisdom, and goodness of God, His watchful care, His loving
providence for every man, at every moment and in every need; for the
Christian knows that the falseness of his conceptions lies only in their
_inadequacy_; he may therefore strengthen and refresh himself, may rejoice
and revel in conceptions of the goodness of God, drawn from the tenderest
human images of fatherly care and love, or he may chasten and abase himself
by consideration of the awful holiness and unapproachable majesty of the
Divinity derived from analogous sources, knowing that no thought of man can
ever be _true enough_, can ever attain the incomprehensible reality, which
nevertheless really _is_ all that can be conceived, _plus_ an inconceivable
infinity beyond.

A good illustration of what is here meant, and of the difference between
the theistic position and Mr. Spencer's, may be supplied by an example he
has himself proposed. Thus,[254] he imagines an intelligent watch
speculating as to its maker, and conceiving of him in terms of watch-being,
and figuring him as furnished with springs, escapements, cogged wheels,
&c., his motions facilitated by oil--in a word, like himself. It is assumed
by Mr. Spencer that this necessary watch conception would be completely
false, and the illustration is made use of to show "the presumption of
theologians"--the absurdity and unreasonableness of those men who figure
the incomprehensible cause of all phenomena as a Being in some way
comparable with man. Now, putting aside for the moment all other
considerations, and accepting the illustration, surely the example
demonstrates rather the unreasonableness of the _objector himself_! It is
true, indeed, that a man is an organism indefinitely more complex and
perfect than any watch; but if the watch could only conceive of its maker
in watch terms, or else in terms altogether inferior, the watch would
plainly be right in speaking of its maker as a, to it, inconceivably {250}
perfect kind of watch, acknowledging at the same time, that this, its
conception of him, was _utterly inadequate_, although the best its inferior
nature allowed it to form. For if, instead of so conceiving of its maker,
it refused to make use of these relative perfections as a makeshift, and so
necessarily thought of him as amorphous metal, or mere oil, or by the help
of any other inferior conception which a watch might be imagined capable of
entertaining, that watch would he wrong indeed. For man can much more
properly be compared with, and has much more affinity to, a perfect watch
in full activity than to a mere piece of metal, or drop of oil. But the
watch is even more in the right still, for its maker, man, virtually _has_
the cogged wheels, springs, escapements, oil, &c., which the watch's
conception has been supposed to attribute to him; inasmuch as all these
parts must have existed as distinct ideas in the human watchmaker's mind
before he could actually construct the clock formed by him. Nor is even
this all, for, by the hypothesis, the watch _thinks_. It must, therefore,
think of its maker as "a thinking being," and in this it is _absolutely and
completely right_.[255] Either, therefore, the hypothesis is _absurd_ or it
actually _demonstrates the very position it was chosen to refute_.
Unquestionably, then, on the mere ground taken by Mr. Herbert Spencer
himself, if we are compelled to think of the First Cause either in human
terms (but with human imperfections abstracted and human perfections
carried to the highest conceivable degree), or, on the other hand, in terms
decidedly inferior, such as those are driven to who think of Him, but
decline to accept as a help the term "personality;" there can be no
question but that the first conception is immeasurably nearer the truth
than the second. Yet the latter is the one put forward and advocated by
that author in spite of its unreasonableness, and in spite also of its{251}
conflicting with the whole moral nature of man and all his noblest
aspirations.

Again, Mr. Herbert Spencer objects to the conception of God as "first
cause," on the ground that "when our symbolic conceptions are such that no
cumulative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that
there are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made whose
fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and illusive,
and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions."[256]

Now, it is quite true that "symbolic conceptions," which are not to be
justified either (1) by presentations of sense, or (2) by intuitions, are
invalid as representations of real truth. Yet the conception of God
referred to _is_ justified by our primary intuitions, and we can assure
ourselves that it _does_ stand for an actuality by comparing it with (1)
our intuitions of free-will and causation, and (2) our intuitions of
morality and responsibility. That we _have_ these intuitions is a point on
which the Author joins issue with Mr. Spencer, and confidently affirms that
they cannot logically be denied without at the same time complete and
absolute scepticism resulting from such denial--scepticism wherein vanishes
any certainty as to the existence both of Mr. Spencer and his critic, and
by which it is equally impossible to have a thought free from doubt, or to
go so far as to affirm the existence of that very doubt or of the doubter
who doubts it.

It may not be amiss here to protest against the intolerable assumption of a
certain school, who are continually talking in lofty terms of "science,"
but who actually speak of primary religious conceptions as "unscientific,"
and habitually employ the word "science," when they should limit it by the
prefix "physical." This is the more amazing as not a few of this school
adopt the idealist philosophy, and affirm that "matter and force" are but
names for certain "modes of consciousness." It might be expected of them at
least to admit that opinions which repose on primary and fundamental {252}
intuitions, are especially and _par excellence_ scientific.

Such are some of the objections to the Christian conception of God. We may
now turn to those which are directed against God as the Creator, _i.e._ as
the absolute originator of the universe, without the employment of any
pre-existing means or material. This is again considered by Mr. Spencer as
a thoroughly illegitimate symbolic conception, as much so as the atheistic
one--the difficulty as to a _self-existent Creator_ being in his opinion
equal to that of a _self-existent universe_. To this it may be replied that
both are of course equally _unimaginable_, but that it is not a question of
facility of conception--not which is easiest to conceive, but which best
accounts for, and accords with, psychological facts; namely, with the
above-mentioned intuitions. It is contended that _we have_ these primary
intuitions, and that with these the conception of a self-existent Creator
is perfectly harmonious. On the other hand, the notion of a self-existent
universe--that there is no real distinction between the finite and the
infinite--that the universe and ourselves are one and the same things with
the infinite and the self-existent; these assertions, in _addition to_
being unimaginable, _contradict_ our primary intuitions.

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