On the Genesis of Species

S >> St. George Mivart >> On the Genesis of Species

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Mr. Wallace's observations and opinions on this head seem hardly to meet
with due appreciation in Sir John Lubbock's recent work on Primitive
Man.[212] But considering the acute powers of observation and the industry
of Mr. Wallace, and especially considering the years he passed in familiar
and uninterrupted intercourse with natives, his opinion and testimony
should surely carry with it great weight. He has informed the Author that
he found a strongly marked and widely diffused modesty, in sexual matters,
amongst all the tribes with which he came in contact. In the same way Mr.
Bonwick, in his work on the Tasmanians, testifies to the modesty exhibited
by the naked females of that race, who by the decorum of their postures
gave evidence of the possession in germ of what under circumstances would
become the highest chastity and refinement.

Hasty and incomplete observations and inductions are prejudicial enough to
physical science, but when their effect is to degrade untruthfully our
common humanity, there is an additional motive to regret them. A hurried
visit to a tribe, whose language, traditions and customs are unknown, is
sometimes deemed sufficient for "smart" remarks as to "ape characters,"
&c., which are as untrue as irrelevant. It should not be forgotten how
extremely difficult it is to enter into the ideas and feelings of an alien
race. If in the nineteenth century a French theatrical audience can witness
with acquiescent approval, as a type of English manners and ideas, the
representation of a marquis who sells his wife at Smithfield, &c. &c., it
is surely no wonder if the ideas of a tribe of newly visited savages {199}
should be more or less misunderstood. To enter into such ideas requires
long and familiar intimacy, like that experienced by the explorer of the
Malay Archipelago. From him, and others, we have abundant evidence that
moral ideas exist, at least in germ, in savage races of men, while they
sometimes attain even a highly developed state. No amount of evidence as to
acts of moral depravity is to the point, as the object here aimed at is to
establish that moral intuitions _exist_ in savages, not that their actions
are good.

Objections, however, are sometimes drawn from the different notions as to
the moral value of certain acts, entertained by men of various countries or
of different epochs; also from the difficulty of knowing what particular
actions in certain cases are the right ones, and from the effects which
prejudice, interest, passion, habit, or even, indirectly, physical
conditions, may have upon our moral perceptions. Thus Sir John Lubbock
speaks[213] of certain Feejeeans, who, according to the testimony of Mr.
Hunt,[214] have the custom of piously choking their parents under certain
circumstances, in order to insure their happiness in a future life. Should
any one take such facts as telling _against_ the belief in an absolute
morality, he would show a complete misapprehension of the point in dispute;
for such facts tell in _favour_ of it.

Were it asserted that man possesses a distinct innate power and faculty by
which he is made intuitively aware what acts considered in and by
themselves are right and what wrong,--an infallible and universal internal
code,--the illustration would be to the point. But all that need be
contended for is that the intellect perceives not only truth, but also a
quality of "higher" which ought to be followed, and of "lower" which ought
to be avoided; when two lines of conduct are presented to the will for
choice, the intellect so acting being the conscience.

{200}
This has been well put by Mr. James Martineau in his excellent essay on
Whewell's Morality. He says,[215] "If moral good were a quality resident in
each action, as whiteness in snow, or sweetness in fruits; and if the moral
faculty was our appointed instrument for detecting its presence; many
consequences would ensue which are at variance with fact. The wide range of
differences observable in the ethical judgments of men would not exist; and
even if they did, could no more be reduced and modified by discussion than
constitutional differences of hearing or of vision. And, as the quality of
moral good either must or must not exist in every important operation of
the will, we should discern its presence or absence separately in each; and
even though we never had the conception of more than one insulated action,
we should be able to pronounce upon its character. This, however, we have
plainly no power to do. Every moral judgment is relative, and involves a
comparison of two terms. When we praise what _has been_ done, it is with
the coexistent conception of something _else_ that _might have been_ done;
and when we resolve on a course as right, it is to the exclusion of some
other that is wrong. This fact, that every ethical decision is in truth a
_preference_, an election of one act as higher than another, appears of
fundamental importance in the analysis of the moral sentiments."

From this point of view it is plain how trifling are arguments drawn from
the acts of a savage, since an action highly immoral in us might be one
exceedingly virtuous in him--being the highest presented to his choice in
his degraded intellectual condition and peculiar circumstances.

It need only be contended, then, that there _is_ a perception of "right"
incapable of further analysis; not that there is any infallible internal
guide as to all the complex actions which present themselves for {201}
choice. The _principle_ is given in our nature, the _application_ of the
principle is the result of a thousand educational influences.

It is no wonder, then, that, in complex "cases of conscience," it is
sometimes a matter of exceeding difficulty to determine which of two
courses of action is the less objectionable. This no more invalidates the
truth of moral principles than does the difficulty of a mathematical
problem cast doubt on mathematical principles. Habit, education, and
intellectual gifts facilitate the correct application of both.

Again, if our moral insight is intensified or blunted by our habitual
wishes or, indirectly, by our physical condition, the same may be said of
our perception of the true relations of physical facts one to another. An
eager wish for marriage has led many a man to exaggerate the powers of a
limited income, and a fit of dyspepsia has given an unreasonably gloomy
aspect to more than one balance-sheet.

Considering that moral intuitions have to do with _insensible_ matters,
they cannot be expected to be more clear than the perception of physical
facts. And if the latter perceptions may be influenced by volition, desire,
or health, our moral views may also be expected to be so influenced, and
this in a higher degree because they so often run counter to our desires. A
bottle or two of wine may make a sensible object appear double; what
wonder, then, if our moral perceptions are sometimes warped and distorted
by such powerful agencies as an evil education or an habitual absence of
self-restraint. In neither case does occasional distortion invalidate the
accuracy of normal and habitual perception.

The distinctness here and now of the ideas of "right" and "useful" is
however, as before said, fully conceded by Mr. Herbert Spencer, although he
contends that these conceptions are one in root and origin.

His utilitarian Genesis of Morals, however, has been recently combated{202}
by Mr. Richard Holt Hutton in a paper which appeared in _Macmillan's
Magazine_.[216]

This writer aptly objects an _argumentum ad hominem_, applying to morals
the same argument that has been applied in this work to our sense of
musical harmony, and by Mr. Wallace to the vocal organs of man.

Mr. Herbert Spencer's notions on the subject are thus expressed by himself:
"To make my position fully understood, it seems needful to add that,
corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed moral science,
there have been, and still are developing in the race certain fundamental
moral intuitions; and that, though these moral intuitions are the result of
accumulated experiences of utility gradually organized and inherited, they
have come to be quite independent of conscious experience. Just in the same
way that I believe the intuition of space possessed by any living
individual to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of
all antecedent individuals, who bequeathed to him their slowly developed
nervous organizations; just as I believe that this intuition, requiring
only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences, has
practically become a form of thought quite independent of experience;--so
do I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated
through all past generations of the human race, have been producing
corresponding nervous modifications which, by continued transmissions and
accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition,
active emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no
apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility. I also hold that,
just as the space intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of
geometry, and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them,
so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of moral science,
and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them."

{203}
Against this view of Mr. Herbert Spencer, Mr. Hutton objects--"1. That even
as regards Mr. Spencer's illustration from geometrical intuitions, his
process would be totally inadequate, since you could not deduce the
necessary space intuition of which he speaks from any possible
accumulations of familiarity with space relations.... We cannot _inherit_
more than our fathers _had_: no amount of experience of facts, however
universal, can give rise to that particular characteristic of intuitions
and _a priori_ ideas, which compels us to deny the possibility that in any
other world, however otherwise different, our experience (as to space
relations) could be otherwise.

"2. That the case of moral intuitions is very much stronger.

"3. That if Mr. Spencer's theory accounts for anything, it accounts not for
the deepening of a sense of utility and inutility into right and wrong, but
for the drying up of the sense of utility and inutility into mere inherent
tendencies, which would exercise over us not _more_ authority but _less_,
than a rational sense of utilitarian issues.

"4. That Mr. Spencer's theory could not account for the intuitional
sacredness now attached to _individual_ moral rules and principles, without
accounting _a fortiori_ for the general claim of the greatest happiness
principle over us as the final moral intuition---which is conspicuously
contrary to the fact, as not even the utilitarians themselves plead any
instinctive or intuitive sanction for their great principle.

"5. That there is no trace of positive evidence of any single instance of
the transformation of a utilitarian rule of right into an intuition, since
we find no utilitarian principle of the most ancient times which is now an
accepted moral intuition, nor any moral intuition, however sacred, which
has not been promulgated thousands of years ago, and which has not
constantly had to stop the tide of utilitarian _objections_ to its
authority--and this age after age, in our own day quite as much as in days
gone by.... Surely, if anything is remarkable in the history of {204}
morality, it is the _anticipatory_ character, if I may use the expression,
of moral principles--the intensity and absoluteness with which they are
laid down ages before the world has approximated to the ideal thus
asserted."

Sir John Lubbock, in his work on Primitive Man before referred to, abandons
Mr. Spencer's explanation of the genesis of morals while referring to Mr.
Hutton's criticisms on the subject. Sir John proposes to substitute
"deference to authority" instead of "sense of interest" as the origin of
our conception of "duty," saying that what has been found to be beneficial
has been traditionally inculcated on the young, and thus has become to be
dissociated from "interest" in the mind, though the inculcation itself
originally sprung from that source. This, however, when analysed, turns out
to be a distinction without a difference. It is nothing but utilitarianism,
pure and simple, after all. For it can never be intended that authority is
obeyed because of an intuition that it _should be deferred to_, for that
would be to admit the very principle of absolute morality which Sir John
combats. It must be meant, then, that authority is obeyed through fear of
the consequences of disobedience, or through pleasure felt in obeying the
authority which commands. In the latter case we have "pleasure" as the end
and no rudiment of the conception "duty." In the former we have fear of
punishment, which appeals directly to the sense of "utility to the
individual," and no amount of such a sense will produce the least germ of
"ought" which is a conception different _in kind_, and in which the notion
of "punishment" has no place. Thus, Sir John Lubbock's explanation only
concerns a _mode_ in which the sense of "duty" may be stimulated or
appealed to, and makes no approximation to an explanation of its origin.

Could the views of Mr. Herbert Spencer, of Mr. Mill, or of Mr. Darwin on
this subject be maintained, or should they come to be generally accepted,
the consequences would be disastrous indeed! Were it really the case that
virtue was a _mere kind of "retrieving,"_ then certainly we should {205}
have to view with apprehension the spread of intellectual cultivation,
which would lead the human "retrievers" to regard from a new point of view
their fetching and carrying. We should be logically compelled to acquiesce
in the vociferations of some continental utilitarians, who would banish
altogether the senseless words "duty" and "merit;" and then, one important
influence which has aided human progress being withdrawn, we should be
reduced to hope that in this case the maxim _cessante causa cessat ipse
effectus_ might through some incalculable accident fail to apply.

It is true that Mr. Spencer tries to erect a safeguard against such moral
disruption, by asserting that for every immoral act, word, or thought, each
man during this life receives minute and exact retribution, and that thus a
regard for individual self-interest will effectually prevent any moral
catastrophe. But by what means will he enforce the acceptance of a dogma
which is not only incapable of proof, but is opposed to the commonly
received opinion of mankind in all ages? Ancient literature, sacred and
profane, teems with protests against the successful evil-doer, and
certainly, as Mr. Hutton observes,[217] "Honesty must have been associated
by our ancestors with many unhappy as well as many happy consequences, and
we know that in ancient Greece dishonesty was openly and actually
associated with happy consequences.... When the concentrated experience of
previous generations was held, _not_ indeed to justify, but to excuse by
utilitarian considerations, craft, dissimulation, sensuality, selfishness."

This dogma is opposed to the moral consciousness of many as to the events
of their own lives; and the Author, for one, believes that it is absolutely
contrary to fact.

History affords multitudes of instances, but an example may be selected
from one of the most critical periods of modern times. Let it be {206}
granted that Lewis the Sixteenth of France and his queen had all the
defects attributed to them by the most hostile of serious historians; let
all the excuses possible be made for his predecessor, Lewis the Fifteenth,
and also for Madame de Pompadour, can it be pretended that there are
grounds for affirming that the vices of the two former so far exceeded
those of the latter, that their respective fates were plainly and evidently
just? that while the two former died in their beds, after a life of the
most extreme luxury, the others merited to stand forth through coming time
as examples of the most appalling and calamitous tragedy?

This theme, however, is too foreign to the immediate matter in hand to be
further pursued, tempting as it is. But a passing protest against a
superstitious and deluding dogma may stand,--a dogma which may, like any
other dogma, be vehemently asserted and maintained, but which is remarkable
for being destitute, at one and the same time, of both authoritative
sanction and the support of reason and observation.

To return to the bearing of moral conceptions on "Natural Selection," it
seems that, from the reasons given in this chapter, we may safely
affirm--1. That "Natural Selection" could not have produced, from the
sensations of pleasure and pain experienced by brutes, a higher degree of
morality than was useful; therefore it could have produced any amount of
"beneficial habits," but not abhorrence of certain acts as impure and
sinful.

2. That it could not have developed that high esteem for acts of care and
tenderness to the aged and infirm which actually exists, but would rather
have perpetuated certain low social conditions which obtain in some savage
localities.

3. That it could not have evolved from ape sensations the noble virtue of a
Marcus Aurelius, or the loving but manly devotion of a St. Lewis.

4. That, alone, it could not have given rise to the maxim _fiat justitia,
ruat coelum_. [Page 207]

5. That the interval between material and formal morality is one altogether
beyond its power to traverse.

Also, that the anticipatory character of moral principles is a fatal bar to
that explanation of their origin which is offered to us by Mr. Herbert
Spencer. And, finally, that the solution of that origin proposed recently
by Sir John Lubbock is a mere version of simple utilitarianism, appealing
to the pleasure or safety of the individual, and therefore utterly
incapable of solving the riddle it attacks.

Such appearing to be the case as to the power of "Natural Selection," we,
nevertheless, find moral conceptions--_formally_ moral ideas--not only
spread over the civilized world, but manifesting themselves unmistakeably
(in however rudimentary a condition, and however misapplied) amongst the
lowest and most degraded of savages. If from amongst these, individuals can
be brought forward who seem to be destitute of any moral conception,
similar cases also may easily be found in highly civilized communities.
Such cases tell no more against moral intuitions than do cases of
colour-blindness or idiotism tell against sight and reason. We have thus a
most important and conspicuous fact, the existence of which is fatal to the
theory of "Natural Selection," as put forward of late by Mr. Darwin and his
most ardent followers. It must be remarked, however, that whatever force
this fact may have against a belief in the origination of man from brutes
by minute, fortuitous variations, it has no force whatever against the
conception of the orderly evolution and successive manifestation of
specific forms by ordinary natural law--even if we include amongst such the
upright frame, the ready hand and massive brain of man himself. [Page 208]

* * * * *

CHAPTER X.

PANGENESIS.

A provisional hypothesis supplementing "Natural Selection."--Statement
of the hypothesis.--Difficulty as to multitude of gemmules.--As to
certain modes of reproduction.--As to formations without the requisite
gemmules.--Mr. Lewes and Professor Delpino.--Difficulty as to
developmental force of gemmules.--As to their spontaneous
fission.--Pangenesis and Vitalism.--Paradoxical reality.--Pangenesis
scarcely superior to anterior hypotheses.--Buffon.--Owen.--Herbert
Spencer.--"Gemmules" as mysterious as "physiological
units."--Conclusion.

In addition to the theory of "Natural Selection," by which it has been
attempted to account for the origin of species, Mr. Darwin has also put
forward what he modestly terms "a provisional hypothesis" (that of
_Pangenesis_), by which to account for the origin of each and every
individual form.

Now, though the hypothesis of Pangenesis is no necessary part of "Natural
Selection," still any treatise on specific origination would be incomplete
if it did not take into consideration this last speculation of Mr. Darwin.
The hypothesis in question may be stated as follows: That each living
organism is ultimately made up of an almost infinite number of minute
particles, or organic atoms, termed "gemmules," each of which has the power
of reproducing its kind. Moreover, that these particles circulate freely
about the organism which is made up of them, and are derived from all the
parts of all the organs of the less remote ancestors of each such {209}
organism during all the states and stages of such several ancestors'
existence; and therefore of the several states of each of such ancestors'
organs. That such a complete collection of gemmules is aggregated in each
ovum and spermatozoon in most animals, and in each part capable of
reproducing by gemmation (budding) in the lowest animals and in plants.
Therefore in many of such lower organisms such a congeries of ancestral
gemmules must exist in every part of their bodies, since in them every part
is capable of reproducing by gemmation. Mr. Darwin must evidently admit
this, since he says: "It has often been said by naturalists that each cell
of a plant has the actual or potential capacity of reproducing the whole
plant; but it has this power only in virtue of containing gemmules _derived
from every part_."[218]

Moreover, these gemmules are supposed to tend to aggregate themselves, and
to reproduce in certain definite relations to other gemmules. Thus, when
the foot of an eft is cut off, its reproduction is explained by Mr. Darwin
as resulting from the aggregation of those floating gemmules which come
next in order to those of the cut surface, and the successive aggregations
of the other kinds of gemmules which come after in regular order. Also, the
most ordinary processes of repair are similarly accounted for, and the
successive development of similar parts and organs in creatures in which
such complex evolutions occur is explained in the same way, by the
independent action of separate gemmules.

In order that each living creature may be thus furnished, the number of
such gemmules in each must be inconceivably great. Mr. Darwin says:[219]
"In a highly organized and complex animal, the gemmules thrown off from
each different cell or unit throughout the body must be inconceivably
numerous and minute. Each unit of each part, as it changes during
development--and we know that some insects undergo at least twenty {210}
metamorphoses--must throw off its gemmules. All organic beings, moreover,
include many dormant gemmules derived from their grandparents and more
remote progenitors, but not from all their progenitors. These _almost
infinitely numerous_ and minute gemmules must be included in each bud,
ovule, spermatozoon, and pollen grain." We have seen also that in certain
cases a similar multitude of gemmules must be included also in every
considerable part of the whole body of each organism, but where are we to
stop? There must be gemmules not only from every organ, but from every
component part of such organ, from every subdivision of such component
part, and from every cell, thread, or fibre entering into the composition
of such subdivision. Moreover, not only from all these, but from each and
every successive stage of the evolution and development of such
successively more and more elementary parts. At the first glance this new
atomic theory has charms from its apparent simplicity, but the attempt thus
to follow it out into its ultimate limits and extreme consequences seems to
indicate that it is at once insufficient and cumbrous.

Mr. Darwin himself is, of course, fully aware that there must be _some_
limit to this aggregation of gemmules. He says:[220] "Excessively minute
and numerous as they are believed to be, an infinite number derived, during
a long course of modification and descent, from each cell of each
progenitor, could not be supported and nourished by the organism."

But apart from these matters, which will be more fully considered further
on, the hypothesis not only does not appear to account for certain
phenomena which, in order to be a valid theory, it ought to account for;
but it seems absolutely to conflict with patent and notorious facts.

How, for example, does it explain the peculiar reproduction which is {211}
found to take place in certain marine worms--certain annelids?

[Illustration: AN ANNELID DIVIDING SPONTANEOUSLY.
(A new head having been formed towards the hinder end of the body of the
parent.)]

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