The Writings of Samuel Adams, volume II (1770 1773)

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The grand design of our adversaries is to lull us into security,
and make us easy while the acts remain in force, which would prove
fatal to us.

I have written in great haste, and am sincerely your friend and
humble servant,

1 R. H. Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, vol. i., pp. 215-219.

ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."

[Boston Gazette, January 20, 1772.]

Messieurs EDES & GILL,

IN the Massachusetts-Gazette of the 9th instant, Chronus attempts
to prove that "the Parliament's laying duties upon trade, for the
express purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to and
subversive of our constitution." In defence of this proposition,
he proceeds to consider the nation as commercial, and from thence
to show the necessity of laws for the regulation of trade. - In
the nation he includes Great-Britain and all the Colonies, and
infers that these acts for the regulation of trade, "should extend
to all the British dominions, to prevent one part of the national
body from injuring another." And, says he, "If laws for the
regulation of trade are necessary, who so proper to enact them,
&c. as the British parliament, or to dispose of the fines &
forfeitures arising from the breach of such acts?" And then he tells
us, that as a number of preventive officers will hereupon become
necessary, the parliament have thought proper to assign to his
Majesty's revenue "the profits arising on the duties of importation
for the payment of those officers ". This is Chronus's "method of
reasoning ", to prove that because it is necessary that the parliament
should enact laws for the regulation of trade, about which there has
as yet been no dispute that I know of, and because it is proper that
such preventive officers as shall be found needful to carry those
laws into execution, should be paid out of the fines and
forfeitures arising from the breach of them, Therefore, the
parliament hath a right to make laws imposing duties or taxes, for
the express purpose of raising a revenue in the colonies without
their consent; and that this is not (as is alledg'd by our
Patriots ") "repugnant to or subversive of our constitution ".
Every one may easily see how Chronus evades the matter in dispute,
and aims at amusing his readers according to his usual manner, by
endeavouring, and that without a shadow of argument, to prove one
point, instead of another which is quite distinct from it, and
which he ought to prove, but cannot. He is indeed sensible that
his artifice is seen through; that it will be urged that "he has
evaded the chief difficulties," and that "the objection doth not
lie against the regulation of trade, but against the imposing
duties for the express purpose of raising a revenue." And he is
full ready to remove this objection. But how? Why, by asking a
question, which he often substitutes in the room of argument. Are
we not, says he, "fellow-subjects with our brethren at home, and
consequently bound to bear a part according to our ability, in
supporting the honor & dignity of the crown?" It is allow'd that
we are the subjects of the same prince with our brethren at home,
and are in duty bound, as far as we are able, to support the honor
and dignity of our Sovereign, while he affords us his protection.
But does Chronus from thence infer an obligation on us to yield
obedience to the acts of the British parliament imposing taxes
upon us with the express intention of raising a revenue, to be
appropriated for such purposes as that legislative thinks proper,
without our consent? 0, says he, "there is good reason for this."
What is the good reason? Why "if we will not consent to do
anything ourselves ", "our money will be taken from us without our
consent." This is conclusive argument indeed. And then he, as it
were, imperceptibly glides into that which has ever appeared to be
his favorite topick, however impertinent to the present point,
viz, an independent support for the governor. He boldly affirms,
what is a notorious untruth, that "we are unwilling to pay his
Majesty's substitute in such a manner as should leave him that
freedom and independency which is necessary to his station, and
with which he is vested by the constitution:" And therefore the
parliament hath a right to enable his Majesty to pay his
substitute, out of a revenue extorted from us against our consent.
If his premises were well grounded, his conclusion would not
follow: And the question would still remain, to which Chronus has
not attempted to give any rational answer, namely, By what
authority doth the parliament these things, and who gave them this
authority? Thus we still continue to dispute the authority of the
parliament to lay duties and taxes upon us, with the express
purpose of raising a revenue, as "repugnant to, and subversive of
our constitution;" and for a reason which I dare say Chronus will
never get over, namely, because as he himself allows," we are not
represented in it." -

The English constitution, says Baron Montesquieu, has Liberty for
its direct object: And the constitution of this province, as our
own historian,1 informs us, is an epitome of the British
constitution; and it undoubtedly has the same end for its object:
Whatever laws therefore are made for our government, either in a
manner, or for purposes subversive of Liberty, must be subversive
of the end of the constitution, and consequently of the
constitution itself. - No free people, as the Pennsylvania Farmer
has observed, ever existed, or ever can exist without, to use a
common but strong expression, keeping the purse-strings in their
hands: But the parliament's laying taxes on the Colonies for the
express purpose of raising a revenue, takes the purse strings out
of their hands, and consequently it is "repugnant to, and
subversive of (the end of) our constitution "-Liberty. Mr. Locke
says, that the security of property is the end for which men enter
into society; and I believe Chronus will not deny it: Whatever
laws therefore are made in any society, tending to render property
insecure, must be subversive of the end for which men prefer
society to the state of nature; and consequently must be
subversive of society itself:

But the parliament in which the Colonies have no voice, taking as
much of their money as it pleases, and appropriating it to such
purposes as it pleases, even against their consent, and as they
think repugnant to their safety, renders all their property
precarious, and therefore it is subversive of the end for which
men enter into society and repugnant to every free constitution. -
Mr. Hooker in his ecclesiastical polity, as quoted by Mr. Locke,
affirms that "Laws they are not, which the public approbation hath
not made so." This seems to be the language of nature and common
sense; for if the public are bound to yield obedience to the laws,
to which they cannot give their approbation, they are slaves to
those who make such laws and enforce them: But the acts of
parliament imposing duties, with the express purpose of raising a
revenue in the colonies, have received every mark of the public
disapprobation in every colony; and yet they are enforced in all,
and in some with the utmost rigour. The British constitution
having liberty for its object, is so framed, as that every man who
is to be bound by any law about to be made, may be present by his
representative in parliament, who may employ the whole force of
his objections against it, if he cannot approve of it: If after
fair debate, it is approv'd of by the majority of the whole
representative body of the nation, the minority, by a rule
essential in society, and without which it could not subsist, is
bound to submit to it: But the colonies had no voice in parliament
when the revenue acts were made; nay, though they had no
representatives there, their petitions were rejected, because they
were against duties to be laid on; and they have been called factious,
for the objections they made, not only against their being taxed
without their consent, which was a sufficient objection, but against
the appropriation of the money when rais'd to purposes which as the
Farmer has made to appear, will supersede the authority in our
respective assemblies, which is most essential to liberty.
Representation and Legislation, as well as taxation, are inseparable,
according to the spirit of our constitution; and of all others that
are free. Human foresight is incapable of providing against every
accident. A small part of the nation may be "at sea, as Chronus tells
us, when writs are issued out for the election of members of
parliament"; and to admit that they, after their return "should be
exempt from any acts of parliament, the members of which were chosen
in their absence ", would be attended with greater evil to the
community, the safety and welfare of which is the end of all
legislation, than the misfortune of their voluntary absence, if it
should prove one, could be to them. I say, if it should prove a
misfortune to them; for those acts being made by the consent of
representatives chosen by all the rest of the nation, it is presum'd
they are calculated for the good of the whole, of which they, as a
part, must necessarily partake: But the supposed case of these persons
is far different from that of the colonists; who are, not by a
voluntary choice of their own, but through necessity, not by mere
accident, but by means of the local distance of their constant
residence, excluded from being present by representation in the
British legislature. Chronus allows that by means of their distance,
"they are become incapable of exercising their original right of
choosing representatives for the British parliament." If so, they
cannot without subversion of the end of the British constitution, be
bound to obedience, against their own consent, to such laws as are
there made; especially such laws as tend to render precarious their
property, the security of which is the end of men's entering into
society. If they are thus bound, they are slaves and not free men: But
slavery must certainly be "repugnant to the constitution" which has
liberty for its direct object. If the supreme legislative of Great
Britain, cannot consistently with the British constitution or the
essential liberty of the colonies, make laws binding upon them, and
Chronus for ought I can see, has not attempted to make it rationally
appear that it can, it is dangerous for the colonies to admit any
of its laws. For however upright some may think the present
parliament to be, in intention, they may ruin us through mistake
arising from an incurable ignorance of our circumstances; and
though Chronus may be so singular as to judge the present revenue
acts of parliament binding upon the colonies, to be salutary, the
time may perhaps come, when even he may be convinced, that future
ones may be oppressive and tyrannical, not only in their
execution, but in the very intention of those that may make them.

Chronus says, that "he has all along taken it for granted, that
the kingdom and the colonies are one dominion." If so he must
allow the colonies to take it for granted that they have an equal
share with the inhabitants of Britain in the rights belonging to
this one dominion, and particularly in the cardinal right of being
represented in the supreme legislature. But that right, he says,
they are "incapable of exercising," by reason of their distance.
We all agree in this, and it is not their fault? Why then should
they not have the right of legislating for themselves, as well as
that other part of this one dominion? Why truly, we have "a right
of choosing an assembly, which with the concurrence of his
Majesty's Governor, hath a power of enacting local statutes,
establishing taxes, &c. - Yet still in subordination to the
general laws of the empire, reserving the full right of supremacy
& dominion, which are in themselves unalienable." If I understand
his meaning in this dark expression, it is this, we have a right
of choosing an assembly, but this assembly is controulable in all
its acts, by another assembly which we have no right to choose,
and which has this right of controul in itself unalienable. But
the question still recurs, How came this right to be in the
British parliament? Chronus says that "admitting that we are all
one dominion, there is, and must be, a supreme, irresistible,
absolute, uncontrouled authority, in which must reside the power
of making and establishing laws," "and all others must conform to
it, and be govern'd by it". But if we are all one dominion; or if
I understand him, the members of one state, tho' so remotely
situated, the kingdom from the Colonies, as that we cannot all
partake of the rights of the supreme Legislature, why may not this
"irresistible, absolute, uncontrouled," and controuling
"authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of the
government reside", be established in America, or in Ireland, as well
as in Britain. Is there any thing in nature, or has Ireland or America
consented that the part of this one dominion called Britain shall
be thus distinguished? Or are we to infer her authority from her
power? But it must be, and Chronus gives us no other reason for it
than his bare affirmation, that "the King, Lords and Commons of
Great-Britain form the supreme Legislature of the British
dominions". And he adds, "to say that each of the Colonies had
within itself a supreme independent Legislature, and that
nevertheless the kingdom and the Colonies are all one dominion, is
a solecism:" Let him then view the Kingdom and the Colonies in
another light, and see whether there will be a solecism in
considering them as more dominions than one, or separate states.
It is certainly more concordant with the great law of nature and
reason, which the most powerful nation may not violate and cannot
alter, to suppose that the Colonies are separate independent and
free, than to suppose that they must be one with Great-Britain and
slaves. And slaves they must be, notwithstanding all which Chronus
has said to the contrary, if Great Britain may make all laws
whatsoever binding upon them, especially laws to take from them
what portions of their property she pleases, without and against
their consent.

I shall make further remarks upon Chronus, when I shall be at
leisure.

CANDIDUS.

1 Mr. Hutchinson.

ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."

[Boston Gazette, January 27, 1772; a complete draft of this article
is in the Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library.]

Messieurs EDES & GILL,

I have observed from Baron Montesquieu, that the British
constitution has liberty for its direct object and that the
constitution of this province, according to Mr. Hutchinson, is an
epitome of the British constitution: That the right of
representation in the body that legislates, is essential to the
British constitution, without which there cannot be liberty; and
Chronus himself acknowledges, that the Americans are "incapable of
exercising this right": Let him draw what conclusion he pleases.
All I insist upon is, that the conclusion cannot be just, that
"the parliament's laying duties upon trade with the express
purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to or subversive of
our constitution." This doctrine, tho' long exploded by the best
writers on both sides of the atlantic, he now urges; and he is
reduced to this necessity, in order to justify or give coloring to
his frequent bold assertions, that "no one has attempted even to
infringe our liberties," and to his ungenerous reflections upon
those who declare themselves of a different mind, as "pretended
patriots," "overzealous," "intemperate politicians," "men of no
property," who "expect to find their account" in perpetually
keeping up the ball of contention. But after all that Chronus and
his associates have said, or can say, the people of America have
just "grounds still to complain" that their rights are violated.
There seems to be a system of "tyranny and oppression" already
begun. It is therefore the duty of every honest man, to alarm his
fellow-citizens and countrymen, and awaken in them the utmost
vigilance and circumspection. Jealousy, especially at such a time,
is a political virtue: Nay, I will say, it is a moral virtue; for
we are under all obligations to do what in us lies to save our
country." Tyrants alone, says the great Vatel, will treat as
seditious, those brave and resolute citizens, who exhort the
people to preserve themselves from oppression, in vindication of
their rights and privileges: A good prince, says he, will commend
such virtuous patriots" and will "mistrust the selfish suggestions
of a minister, who represents to him as rebels, all those citizens
who do not hold out their hands to chains, who refuse lamely to
suffer the strokes of arbitrary power."

I cannot help observing how artfully Chronus expresses his
position, that the "parliament's laying duties upon trade with
the express purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to our
constitution." It has not been made a question, that I know of,
whether the parliament hath a right to make laws for the
regulation of the trade of the colonies. Power she undoubtedly has
to enforce her acts of trade: And the strongest maritime power
caeteris paribus, will always make the most advantageous treaties,
and give laws of trade to other nations, for whom there can be no
pretence to the right of legislation. The matter however should be
considered equitably, if it should ever be considered at all: If
the trade of the Colonies is protected by the British navy, there
may possibly be from thence inferr'd a just right in the
parliament of Great Britain to restrain them from carrying on
their trade to the injury of the trade of Great Britain. But this
being granted, it is very different from the right to make laws in
all cases whatever binding upon the Colonies, and especially for
laying duties upon trade for the express purpose of raising a
revenue. In the one case it may be the wisdom of the Colonies,
under present circumstances to acquiesce in reasonable
restrictions, rather than lose their whole trade by means of the
depredations of a foreign power: In the other, it is a duty they
owe themselves and their posterity, by no means to acquiesce;
because it involves them in a state of perfect slavery. I say
perfect slavery: For, as political liberty in its perfection
consists in the people's consenting by themselves or their
representatives, to all laws which they are bound to obey, so
perfect political slavery consists in their being bound to obey
any laws for taxing them, to which they cannot consent. If a
people can be deprived of their property by another person or
nation, it is evident that such a people cannot be free. Whether
it be by a nation or a monarch, is not material: The masters
indeed are different, but the government is equally despotic; and
tho' the despotism may be mild, from principles of policy, it is
not the less a despotism.

Chronus talks of Magna Charta as though it were of no greater
consequence than an act of parliament for the establishment of a
corporation of buttonmakers. Whatever low ideas he may entertain
of that Great Charter, and such ideas he must entertain of it to
support the cause he hath espous'd, it is affirm'd by Lord Coke,
to be declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws
and liberties of England. "It is called Charta Libertatum Regni,
the Charter of the Liberties of the kingdom, upon great reason,
says that sage of the law, because liberos facit, it makes and
preserves the people free." Those therefore who would make the
people slaves, would fain have them look upon this charter, in a
light of indifference, which so often affirms sua jura, suas
libertates, their own rights, their own liberties: But if it be
declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws and
liberties of England, it cannot be altered in any of its essential
parts, without altering the constitution. Whatever Chronus may
have adopted from Mr. Hume, Vatel tells us plainly and without
hesitation, that "the supreme legislative cannot change the
constitution," "that their authority does not extend so far," &
"that they ought to consider the fundamental laws as sacred, if
the nation has not, in very express terms, given them power to
change them." And he gives a reason for it solid and weighty; for,
says he, "the constitution of the state ought to be fixed." Mr.
Hume, as quoted by Chronus, says, the only rule of government is
the established practice of the age, upon maxims universally
assented to. If then any deviation is made from the maxims upon
which the established practice of the age is founded, it must be
by universal assent. "The fundamental laws," says Vatel, "are
excepted from their (legislators) commission," "nothing leads us
to think that the nation was willing to submit the constitution
itself to their pleasure." "They derive their authority from the
constitution, how then can they change it without destroying the
foundation of their own authority?" If then according to Lord
Coke, Magna Charta is declaratory of the principal grounds of the
fundamental laws and liberties of the people, and Vatel is right
in his opinion, that the supreme legislative cannot change the
constitution, I think it follows, whether Lord Coke has expressly
asserted it or not, that an act of parliament made against Magna
Charta in violation of its essential parts, is void. - "By the
fundamental laws of England, says Vatel, the two houses of
parliament in concert with the King, exercise the legislative
power: But if the two houses should resolve to suppress
themselves, and to invest the King with the full and absolute
government, certainly the nation would not suffer it, "although it
was done by a solemn act of parliament. But such doctrine is
directly the reverse of that which Chronus holds; which amounts to
this, that if the two houses should give up to the King, any, the
most essential rights of the people declared in Magna Charta, the
nation has not a power either de jura or de facto to prevent it. I
may hereafter quote for his serious perusal, the reasoning of the
immortal Locke upon this important subject, and am, in the mean time,

Your's,
CANDIDUS.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS TO THE GOVERNOR,
APRIL 10, 1772.

[Massachusetts State Papers, pp. 315, 316; a draft, is in the
Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library.]

May it please your Excellency.

The House of Representatives have duly considered your speech1 to
both Houses, at the opening of this session. Your Excellency is
pleased to acquaint us, that, "if we had desired you to carry the
Court to Boston, because it is the most convenient place; and the
prerogative of the Crown to instruct the Governor to convene the
Court at such place as his Majesty may think proper, had not been
denied; you should have obtained leave to meet us in Boston, at
this time; but that you shall not be at liberty to do so, whilst
this denial is persisted in."

We have maturely considered this point; and are still firmly in
opinion, that such instruction is repugnant to the royal charter,
wherein the Governor is vested with the full power of adjournment,
proroguing and dissolving the General Assembly, as he shall judge
necessary. Nothing in the charter, appears to us to afford the
least grounds to conclude, that a right is reserved to his Majesty
of controling the Governor, in thus exercising this full power.
Nor indeed does it seem reasonable that there should for, it being
impossible that any one, at the distance of three thousand miles,
should be able to foresee the most convenient time or place of holding
the Assembly, it is necessary that such discretionary power should be
lodged with the Governor, who is, by Charter, constantly to reside
within the Province.

We are still earnestly desirous of the removal of this Assembly to
the Court House, in Boston; and we are sorry that your
Excellency's determination thereon, depends upon our disavowing
these principles; because we cannot do it consistently with the
duty we owe our constituents. We are constrained to be explicit at
this time; for if we should be silent, after your Excellency has
recommended it to us, as a necessary preliminary, to desist from
saying any thing upon this head, while we request your Excellency
for a removal of the Assembly, for reasons of convenience only, it
might be construed as tacitly conceding to a doctrine injurious to
the constitution, and in effect, as rescinding our own record, of
which we still deliberately approve.

The power of adjourning and proroguing the General Assembly, is a
power in trust, to be exercised for the good of the province; this
House have a right to judge for themselves, whether it was thus
exercised. We cannot avoid taking this occasion, freely to declare
to your Excellency, that the holding of the Assembly in this
place, without any good reason which we can conceive of, under the
many and great inconveniences which this, and former Houses, have
so fully set forth to your Excellency, is, in our opinion, an
undue exercise of power; and a very great grievance, which we
still hope will soon be fully redressed.

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