Procopius

P >> Procopius >> Procopius

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17

So the Goths, finding the city at the harbour unguarded, captured it at
the first onset and slew many of the Romans who lived there, and so took
possession of the harbour as well as the city. And they established a
thousand of their number there as guards, while the remainder returned
to the camps. In consequence of this move it was impossible for the
besieged to bring in the goods which came by sea, except by way of
Ostia, a route which naturally involved great labour and danger besides.
For the Roman ships were not even able to put in there any longer, but
they anchored at Anthium,[133] a day's journey distant from Ostia. And
they found great difficulty in carrying the cargoes thence to Rome, the
reason for this being the scarcity of men. For Belisarius, fearing for
the fortifications of Rome, had been unable to strengthen the harbour
with any garrison at all, though I think that if even three hundred men
had been on guard there, the barbarians would never have made an attempt
on the place, which is exceedingly strong.

FOOTNOTES:

[131] The northern mouth.

[132] The Emperor Claudius cut the northern channel for the river, in
order to prevent inundations of Rome, and made the "Portus Claudii,"
opening to the sea, near its mouth; a second enclosed harbour, adjoining
that of Claudius, was built by Trajan.

[133] _i.e._ Antium.

XXVII

This exploit, then, was accomplished by the Goths on the third day after
they were repulsed in the assault on the wall. But twenty days after the
city and harbour of Portus were captured, Martinus and Valerian arrived,
bringing with them sixteen hundred horsemen, the most of whom were Huns
and Sclaveni[134] and Antae,[135] who are settled above the Ister River
not far from its banks. And Belisarius was pleased by their coming and
thought that thenceforth his army ought to carry the war against the
enemy. On the following day, accordingly, he commanded one of his own
bodyguards, Trajan by name, an impetuous and active fighter, to take two
hundred horsemen of the guards and go straight towards the enemy, and as
soon as they came near the camps to go up on a high hill (which he
pointed out to him) and remain quietly there. And if the enemy should
come against them, he was not to allow the battle to come to close
quarters, nor to touch sword or spear in any case, but to use bows only,
and as soon as he should find that his quiver had no more arrows in it,
he was to flee as hard as he could with no thought of shame and retire
to the fortifications on the run. Having given these instructions, he
held in readiness both the engines for shooting arrows and the men
skilled in their use. Then Trajan with the two hundred men went out from
the Salarian Gate against the camp of the enemy. And they, being filled
with amazement at the suddenness of the thing, rushed out from the
camps, each man equipping himself as well as he could. But the men under
Trajan galloped to the top of the hill which Belisarius had shewn them,
and from there began to ward off the barbarians with missiles. And since
their shafts fell among a dense throng, they were for the most part
successful in hitting a man or a horse. But when all their missiles had
at last failed them, they rode off to the rear with all speed, and the
Goths kept pressing upon them in pursuit. But when they came near the
fortifications, the operators of the engines began to shoot arrows from
them, and the barbarians became terrified and abandoned the pursuit. And
it is said that not less than one thousand Goths perished in this
action. A few days later Belisarius sent Mundilas, another of his own
bodyguard, and Diogenes, both exceptionally capable warriors, with three
hundred guardsmen, commanding them to do the same thing as the others
had done before. And they acted according to his instructions. Then,
when the enemy confronted them, the result of the encounter was that no
fewer than in the former action, perhaps even more, perished in the same
way. And sending even a third time the guardsman Oilas with three
hundred horsemen, with instructions to handle the enemy in the same way,
he accomplished the same result. So in making these three sallies, in
the manner told by me, Belisarius destroyed about four thousand of his
antagonists.

But Vittigis, failing to take into account the difference between the
two armies in point of equipment of arms and of practice in warlike
deeds, thought that he too would most easily inflict grave losses upon
the enemy, if only he should make his attack upon them with a small
force. He therefore sent five hundred horsemen, commanding them to go
close to the fortifications, and to make a demonstration against the
whole army of the enemy of the very same tactics as had time and again
been used against them, to their sorrow, by small bands of the foe. And
so, when they came to a high place not far from the city, but just
beyond the range of missiles, they took their stand there. But
Belisarius selected a thousand men, putting Bessas in command, and
ordered them to engage with the enemy. And this force, by forming a
circle around the enemy and always shooting at them from behind, killed
a large number, and by pressing hard upon the rest compelled them to
descend into the plain. There a hand-to-hand battle took place between
forces not evenly matched in strength, and most of the Goths were
destroyed, though some few with difficulty made their escape and
returned to their own camp. And Vittigis reviled these men, insisting
that cowardice had been the cause of their defeat, and undertaking to
find another set of men to retrieve the loss after no long time, he
remained quiet for the present; but three days later he selected men
from all the camps, five hundred in number, and bade them make a display
of valorous deeds against the enemy. Now as soon as Belisarius saw that
these men had come rather near, he sent out against them fifteen hundred
men under the commanders Martinus and Valerian. And a cavalry battle
taking place immediately, the Romans, being greatly superior to the
enemy in numbers, routed them without any trouble and destroyed
practically all of them.

And to the enemy it seemed in every way a dreadful thing and a proof
that fortune stood against them, if, when they were many and the enemy
who came against them were few, they were defeated, and when, on the
other hand, they in turn went in small numbers against their enemy, they
were likewise destroyed. Belisarius, however, received a public vote of
praise from the Romans for his wisdom, at which they not unnaturally
marvelled greatly, but in private his friends asked him on what he had
based his judgment on that day when he had escaped from the enemy after
being so completely defeated,[136] and why he had been confident that he
would overcome them decisively in the war. And he said that in engaging
with them at the first with only a few men he had noticed just what the
difference was between the two armies, so that if he should fight his
battles with them with a force which was in strength proportionate to
theirs,[137] the multitudes of the enemy could inflict no injury upon
the Romans by reason of the smallness of their numbers. And the
difference was this, that practically all the Romans and their allies,
the Huns, are good mounted bowmen, but not a man among the Goths has had
practice in this branch, for their horsemen are accustomed to use only
spears and swords, while their bowmen enter battle on foot and under
cover of the heavy-armed men. So the horsemen, unless the engagement is
at close quarters, have no means of defending themselves against
opponents who use the bow, and therefore can easily be reached by the
arrows and destroyed; and as for the foot-soldiers, they can never be
strong enough to make sallies against men on horseback. It was for these
reasons, Belisarius declared, that the barbarians had been defeated by
the Romans in these last engagements. And the Goths, remembering the
unexpected outcome of their own experiences, desisted thereafter from
assaulting the fortifications of Rome in small numbers and also from
pursuing the enemy when harassed by them, except only so far as to drive
them back from their own camps.

FOOTNOTES:

[134] _i.e._ Slavonians, described in Book VI. xxvi. and Book VII. xiv.
ff.

[135] A Slavic people, described in Book VII. xiv.

[136] Referring to the battle described in chap. xviii.

[137] _i.e._ smaller, but equal in strength.

XXVIII

But later on the Romans, elated by the good fortune they had already
enjoyed, were with one accord eager to do battle with the whole Gothic
army and thought that they should make war in the open field.
Belisarius, however, considering that the difference in size of the two
armies was still very great, continued to be reluctant to risk a
decisive battle with his whole army; and so he busied himself still more
with his sallies and kept planning them against the enemy. But when at
last he yielded his point because of the abuse heaped upon him by the
army and the Romans in general, though he was willing to fight with the
whole army, yet nevertheless he wished to open the engagement by a
sudden sally. And many times he was frustrated when he was on the point
of doing this, and was compelled to put off the attack to the following
day, because he found to his surprise that the enemy had been previously
informed by deserters as to what was to be done and were unexpectedly
ready for him. For this reason, then, he was now willing to fight a
decisive battle even in the open field, and the barbarians gladly came
forth for the encounter. And when both sides had been made ready for the
conflict as well as might be, Belisarius gathered his whole army and
exhorted them as follows:

"It is not because I detected any cowardice on your part,
fellow-soldiers, nor because I was terrified at the strength of the
enemy, that I have shrunk from the engagement with them, but I saw that
while we were carrying on the war by making sudden sallies matters stood
well with us, and consequently I thought that we ought to adhere
permanently to the tactics which were responsible for our success. For I
think that when one's present affairs are going to one's satisfaction,
it is inexpedient to change to another course of action. But since I see
that you are eager for this danger, I am filled with confidence and
shall never oppose your ardour. For I know that the greatest factor in
the decision of war is always the attitude of the fighting men, and it
is generally by their enthusiasm that successes are won. Now, therefore,
the fact that a few men drawn up for battle with valour on their side
are able to overcome a multitude of the enemy, is well known by every
man of you, not by hearsay, but by daily experience of fighting. And it
will rest with you not to bring shame upon the former glories of my
career as general, nor upon the hope which this enthusiasm of yours
inspires. For the whole of what has already been accomplished by us in
this war must of necessity be judged in accordance with the issue of the
present day. And I see that the present moment is also in our favour,
for it will, in all probability, make it easier for us to gain the
mastery over the enemy, because their spirit has been enslaved by what
has gone before. For when men have often met with misfortune, their
hearts are no longer wont to thrill even slightly with manly valour. And
let no one of you spare horse or bow or any weapon. For I will
immediately provide you with others in place of all that are destroyed
in the battle."

After speaking these words of exhortation, Belisarius led out his army
through the small Pincian Gate and the Salarian Gate, and commanded some
few men to go through the Aurelian Gate into the Plain of Nero. These he
put under the command of Valentinus, a commander of a cavalry
detachment, and he directed him not to begin any fighting, or to go too
close to the camp of the enemy, but constantly to give the appearance of
being about to attack immediately, so that none of the enemy in that
quarter might be able to cross the neighbouring bridge and come to the
assistance of the soldiers from the other camps. For since, as I have
previously stated,[138] the barbarians encamped in the Plain of Nero
were many, it seemed to him sufficient if these should all be prevented
from taking part in the engagement and be kept separated from the rest
of the army. And when some of the Roman populace took up arms and
followed as volunteers, he would not allow them to be drawn up for
battle along with the regular troops, fearing lest, when they came to
actual fighting, they should become terrified at the danger and throw
the entire army into confusion, since they were labouring men and
altogether unpractised in war. But outside the Pancratian Gate, which is
beyond the Tiber River, he ordered them to form a phalanx and remain
quiet until he himself should give the signal, reasoning, as actually
proved to be the case, that if the enemy in the Plain of Nero should see
both them and the men under Valentinus, they would never dare leave
their camp and enter battle with the rest of the Gothic army against his
own forces. And he considered it a stroke of good luck and a very
important advantage that such a large number of men should be kept apart
from the army of his opponents.

Such being the situation, he wished on that day to engage in a cavalry
battle only; and indeed most of the regular infantry were now unwilling
to remain in their accustomed condition, but, since they had captured
horses as booty from the enemy and had become not unpractised in
horsemanship, they were now mounted. And since the infantry were few in
number and unable even to make a phalanx of any consequence, and had
never had the courage to engage with the barbarians, but always turned
to flight at the first onset, he considered it unsafe to draw them up at
a distance from the fortifications, but thought it best that they should
remain in position where they were, close by the moat, his purpose being
that, if it should so happen that the Roman horsemen were routed, they
should be able to receive the fugitives and, as a fresh body of men,
help them to ward off the enemy.

But there were two men among his bodyguards, a certain Principius, who
was a man of note and a Pisidian by birth, and Tarmutus, an Isaurian,
brother of Ennes who was commander of the Isaurians. These men came
before Belisarius and spoke as follows: "Most excellent of generals, we
beg you neither to decide that your army, small as it is and about to
fight with many tens of thousands of barbarians, be cut off from the
phalanx of the infantry, nor to think that one ought to treat with
contumely the infantry of the Romans, by means of which, as we hear, the
power of the ancient Romans was brought to its present greatness. For if
it so happens that they have done nothing of consequence in this war,
this is no evidence of the cowardice of the soldiers, but it is the
commanders of the infantry who would justly bear the blame, for they
alone ride on horseback in the battle-line and are not willing to
consider the fortunes of war as shared by all, but as a general thing
each one of them by himself takes to flight before the struggle begins.
But do you keep all the commanders of infantry, since you see that they
have become cavalry and that they are quite unwilling to take their
stand beside their subordinates, and include them with the rest of the
cavalry and so enter this battle, but permit us to lead the infantry
into the combat. For since we also are unmounted, as are these troops,
we shall do our part in helping them to support the attack of the
multitude of barbarians, full of hope that we shall inflict upon the
enemy whatever chastisement God shall permit."

When Belisarius heard this request, at first he did not assent to it;
for he was exceedingly fond of these two men, who were fighters of
marked excellence, and he was unwilling to have a small body of infantry
take such a risk. But finally, overborne by the eagerness of the men, he
consented to leave only a small number of their soldiers, in company
with the Roman populace, to man the gates and the battlement along the
top of the wall where the engines of war were, and to put the rest under
command of Principius and Tarmutus, ordering them to take position in
the rear in regular formation. His purpose in this was, in the first
place, to keep these troops from throwing the rest of the army into
confusion if they themselves should become panic-stricken at the danger,
and, in the second place, in case any division of the cavalry should be
routed at any time, to prevent the retreat from extending to an
indefinite distance, but to allow the cavalry simply to fall back upon
the infantry and make it possible for them, with the infantry's help, to
ward off the pursuers.

FOOTNOTE:

[138] Chap. xix. 12, xiii. 15.

XXIX

In this fashion the Romans had made their preparations for the
encounter. As for Vittigis, he had armed all the Goths, leaving not a
man behind in the camps, except those unfit for fighting. And he
commanded the men under Marcias to remain in the Plain of Nero, and to
attend to the guarding of the bridge, that the enemy might not attack
his men from that direction. He himself then called together the rest of
the army and spoke as follows:

"It may perhaps seem to some of you that I am fearful about my
sovereignty, and that this is the motive which has led me, in the past,
to shew a friendly spirit toward you and, on the present occasion, to
address you with seductive words in order to inspire you with courage.
And such reasoning is not out of accord with the ways of men. For
unenlightened men are accustomed to shew gentleness toward those whom
they want to make use of, even though these happen to be in a much
humbler station than they, but to be difficult of access to others whose
assistance they do not desire. As for me, however, I care neither for
the end of life nor for the loss of power. Nay, I should even pray that
I might put off this purple to-day, if a Goth were to put it on. And I
have always regarded the end of Theodatus as one of the most fortunate,
in that he was privileged to lose both his sovereignty and his life at
the hands of men of his own nation. For a calamity which falls upon an
individual without involving his nation also in destruction does not
lack an element of consolation, in the view, at least, of men who are
not wanting in wisdom. But when I reflect upon the fate of the Vandals
and the end of Gelimer, the thoughts which come to my mind are of no
ordinary kind; nay, I seem to see the Goths and their children reduced
to slavery, your wives ministering in the most shameful of all ways to
the most hateful of men, and myself and the granddaughter[139] of
Theoderic led wherever it suits the pleasure of those who are now our
enemies; and I would have you also enter this battle fearing lest this
fate befall us. For if you do this, on the field of battle you will
count the end of life as more to be desired than safety after defeat.
For noble men consider that there is only one misfortune--to survive
defeat at the hands of their enemy. But as for death, and especially
death which comes quickly, it always brings happiness to those who were
before not blest by fortune. It is very clear that if you keep these
thoughts in mind as you go through the present engagement, you will not
only conquer your opponents most easily, few as they are and
Greeks,[140] but will also punish them forthwith for the injustice and
insolence with which they, without provocation, have treated us. For
although we boast that we are their superiors in valour, in numbers, and
in every other respect, the boldness which they feel in confronting us
is due merely to elation at our misfortunes; and the only asset they
have is the indifference we have shewn. For their self-confidence is fed
by their undeserved good fortune."

With these words of exhortation Vittigis proceeded to array his army for
battle, stationing the infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the two
wings. He did not, however, draw up his phalanx far from the camps, but
very near them, in order that, as soon as the rout should take place,
the enemy might easily be overtaken and killed, there being abundance of
room for the pursuit. For he expected that if the struggle should become
a pitched battle in the plain, they would not withstand him even a short
time; since he judged by the great disparity of numbers that the army of
the enemy was no match for his own.

So the soldiers on both sides, beginning in the early morning, opened
battle; and Vittigis and Belisarius were in the rear urging on both
armies and inciting them to fortitude. And at first the Roman arms
prevailed, and the barbarians kept falling in great numbers before their
archery, but no pursuit of them was made. For since the Gothic cavalry
stood in dense masses, other men very easily stepped into the places of
those who were killed, and so the loss of those who fell among them was
in no way apparent. And the Romans evidently were satisfied, in view of
their very small number, that the struggle should have such a result for
them. So after they had by midday carried the battle as far as the camps
of their opponents, and had already slain many of the enemy, they were
anxious to return to the city if any pretext should present itself to
them. In this part of the action three among the Romans proved
themselves brave men above all others, Athenodorus, an Isaurian, a man
of fair fame among the guards of Belisarius, and Theodoriscus and
George, spearmen of Martinus and Cappadocians by birth. For they
constantly kept going out beyond the front of the phalanx, and there
despatched many of the barbarians with their spears. Such was the
course of events here.

But in the Plain of Nero the two armies remained for a long time facing
one another, and the Moors, by making constant sallies and hurling their
javelins among the enemy, kept harrying the Goths. For the Goths were
quite unwilling to go out against them through fear of the forces of the
Roman populace which were not far away, thinking, of course, that they
were soldiers and were remaining quiet because they had in mind some
sort of an ambush against themselves with the object of getting in their
rear, exposing them to attack on both sides, and thus destroying them.
But when it was now the middle of the day, the Roman army suddenly made
a rush against the enemy, and the Goths were unexpectedly routed, being
paralyzed by the suddenness of the attack. And they did not succeed even
in fleeing to their camp, but climbed the hills near by and remained
quiet. Now the Romans, though many in number, were not all soldiers, but
were for the most part a throng of men without defensive armour. For
inasmuch as the general was elsewhere, many sailors and servants in the
Roman camp, in their eagerness to have a share in the war, mingled with
that part of the army. And although by their mere numbers they did fill
the barbarians with consternation and turn them to flight, as has been
said, yet by reason of their lack of order they lost the day for the
Romans. For the intermixture of the above-mentioned men caused the
soldiers to be thrown into great disorder, and although Valentinus kept
constantly shouting orders to them, they could not hear his commands at
all. For this reason they did not even follow up the fugitives or kill
a man, but allowed them to stand at rest on the hills and in security to
view what was going on. Nor did they take thought to destroy the bridge
there, and thus prevent the city from being afterwards besieged on both
sides; for, had they done so, the barbarians would have been unable to
encamp any longer on the farther side of the Tiber River. Furthermore,
they did not even cross the bridge and get in the rear of their
opponents who were fighting there with the troops of Belisarius. And if
this had been done, the Goths, I think, would no longer have thought of
resistance, but they would have turned instantly to flight, each man as
he could. But as it was, they took possession of the enemy's camp and
turned to plundering his goods, and they set to work carrying thence
many vessels of silver and many other valuables. Meanwhile the
barbarians for some time remained quietly where they were and observed
what was going on, but finally by common consent they advanced against
their opponents with great fury and shouting. And finding men in
complete disorder engaged in plundering their property, they slew many
and quickly drove out the rest. For all who were caught inside the camp
and escaped slaughter were glad to cast their plunder from their
shoulders and take to flight.

While these things were taking place in the Plain of Nero, meantime the
rest of the barbarian army stayed very near their camps and, protecting
themselves with their shields, vigorously warded off their opponents,
destroying many men and a much larger number of horses. But on the Roman
side, when those who had been wounded and those whose horses had been
killed left the ranks, then, in an army which had been small even
before, the smallness of their numbers was still more evident, and the
difference between them and the Gothic host was manifestly great.
Finally the horsemen of the barbarians who were on the right wing,
taking note of this, advanced at a gallop against the enemy opposite
them. And the Romans there, unable to withstand their spears, rushed off
in flight and came to the infantry phalanx. However, the infantry also
were unable to hold their ground against the oncoming horsemen, and most
of them began to join the cavalry in flight. And immediately the rest of
the Roman army also began to retire, the enemy pressing upon their
heels, and the rout became decisive. But Principius and Tarmutus with
some few of the infantry of their command made a display of valorous
deeds against the Goths. For as they continued to fight and disdained to
turn to flight with the others, most of the Goths were so amazed that
they halted. And consequently the rest of the infantry and most of the
horsemen made their escape in greater security. Now Principius fell
where he stood, his whole body hacked to pieces, and around him fell
forty-two foot-soldiers. But Tarmutus, holding two Isaurian javelins,
one in each hand, continued to thrust them into his assailants as he
turned from side to side, until, finally, he desisted because his body
was covered with wounds; but when his brother Ennes came to the rescue
with a detachment of cavalry, he revived, and running swiftly, covered
as he was with gore and wounds, he made for the fortifications without
throwing down either of his javelins. And being fleet of foot by
nature, he succeeded in making his escape, in spite of the plight of
his body, and did not fall until he had just reached the Pincian Gate.
And some of his comrades, supposing him to be dead, lifted him on a
shield and carried him. But he lived on two days before he died, leaving
a high reputation both among the Isaurians and in the rest of the army.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17