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Editorial
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

A General History for Colleges and High Schools

P >> P. V. N. Myers >> A General History for Colleges and High Schools

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In one respect only had events disappointed Hannibal's expectations. He
had thought that all the states of Italy were, like the Gauls, ready to
revolt from Rome at the first opportunity that might offer itself. But not
a single city had thus far proved unfaithful to her.

FABIUS "THE DELAYER."--The fate of Rome was now in the hands of Fabius.
Should he risk a battle and lose it, the destiny of the capital would be
sealed. He determined to adopt a more prudent policy--to follow and annoy
the Carthaginian army, but to refuse all proffers of battle. Thus time
might be gained for raising a new army and perfecting measures for the
public defence. In every possible way Hannibal endeavored to draw his
enemy into an engagement. He ravaged the fields far and wide and fired the
homesteads of the Italians, in order to force Fabius to fight in their
defence. The soldiers of the dictator began to murmur. They called him
_Cunctator_, or "the Delayer." They even accused him of treachery to
the cause of Rome. But nothing moved him from the steady pursuit of the
policy which he clearly saw was the only prudent one to follow.

THE BATTLE OF CANNAE.--The time gained by Fabius enabled the Romans to
raise and discipline an army that might hope successfully to combat the
Carthaginian forces. Early in the summer of the year 216 B.C. these new
levies, numbering 80,000 men, confronted the army of Hannibal, amounting
to not more than half that number, at Cannae, in Apulia. It was the largest
army the Romans had ever gathered on any battle-field. But it had been
collected only to meet the most overwhelming defeat that ever befell the
forces of the republic. Through the skilful manoeuvres of Hannibal, the
Romans were completely surrounded, and huddled together in a helpless mass
upon the field, and then for eight hours were cut down by the Numidian
cavalry. From fifty to seventy thousand were slain; a few thousand were
taken prisoners; only the merest handful escaped, including one of the
consuls. The slaughter was so great that, according to Livy, when Mago, a
brother of Hannibal, carried the news of the victory to Carthage, he, in
confirmation of the intelligence, poured down in the porch of the Senate-
house, nearly a peck of gold rings taken from the fingers of Roman
knights.

EVENTS AFTER THE BATTLE OF CANNAE.--The awful news flew to Rome.
Consternation and despair seized the people. The city would have been
emptied of its population had not the Senate ordered the gates to be
closed. Never did that body display greater calmness, wisdom, prudence,
and resolution. By word and act they bade the people never to despair of
the republic. Little by little the panic was allayed. Measures were
concerted for the defence of the capital, as it was expected that Hannibal
would immediately march upon Rome. Swift horsemen were sent out along the
Appian Way to gather information of the conqueror's movements, and to
learn, as Livy expresses it, "if the immortal gods, out of pity to the
empire, had left any remnant of the Roman name."

The leader of the Numidian cavalry, Maharbal, urged Hannibal to follow up
his victory closely, "Let me advance with the cavalry," said he, "and in
five days thou shalt dine in the capital." But Hannibal refused to adopt
the counsel of his impetuous general. Maharbal turned away, and, with
mingled reproach and impatience, exclaimed, "Alas! thou knowest how to
gain a victory, but not how to use one." The great commander, while he
knew he was invincible in the open field, did not think it prudent to
fight the Romans behind their walls.

Hannibal now sent an embassy to Rome to offer terms of peace. The Senate,
true to the Appian policy never to treat with a victorious enemy (see p.
245), would not even permit the ambassadors to enter the gates. Not less
disappointed was Hannibal in the temper of the Roman allies. For the most
part they adhered to the cause of Rome with unshaken loyalty through all
these trying times. Some tribes in the South of Italy, however, among
which were the Lucanians, the Apulians, and the Bruttians, went over to
the Carthaginians. Hannibal marched into Campania and quartered his army
for the winter in the luxurious city of Capua, which had opened its gates
to him. Here he rested and sent urgent messages to Carthage for re-
inforcements, while Rome exhausted every resource in raising and equipping
new levies, to take the place of the legions lost at Cannae. For several
years there was an ominous lull in the war, while both parties were
gathering strength for a renewal of the struggle.

THE FALL OF SYRACUSE AND OF CAPUA.--In the year 216 B.C., Hiero, King of
Syracuse, who loved to call himself the friend and ally of the Roman
people, died, and the government fell into the hands of a party unfriendly
to the republic. An alliance was formed with Carthage, and a large part of
Sicily was carried over to the side of the enemies of Rome. The
distinguished Roman general, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, called "the Sword
of Rome," was intrusted with the task of reconquering the island. After
reducing many towns, he at last laid siege to Syracuse.

This noted capital was then one of the largest and richest cities of the
Grecian world. For three years it held out against the Roman forces. It is
said that Archimedes (see p. 213), the great mathematician, rendered
valuable aid to the besieged with curious and powerful engines contrived
by his genius. But the city fell at last, and was given over to sack and
pillage. Rome was adorned with the rare works of Grecian art--paintings
and sculptures--which for centuries had been accumulating in this the
oldest and most renowned of the colonies of ancient Hellas. Syracuse never
recovered from the blow inflicted upon her at this time by the relentless
Romans.

[Illustration: MARCELLUS, "The sword of Rome."]

Capua must next be punished for opening her gates and extending her
hospitalities to the enemies of Rome. A line of circumvallation was drawn
about the devoted city, and two Roman armies held it in close siege.
Hannibal, ever faithful to his allies and friends, hastened to the relief
of the Capuans. Unable to break the enemy's lines, he marched directly
upon Rome, as if to make an attack upon that city, hoping thus to draw off
the legions about Capua to the defence of the capital. The "dread
Hannibal" himself rode alongside the walls of the hated city, and,
tradition says, even hurled a defiant spear over the defences. The Romans
certainly were trembling with fear; yet Livy tells how they manifested
their confidence in their affairs by selling at public auction the land
upon which Hannibal was encamped. He in turn, in the same manner, disposed
of the shops fronting the Forum. The story is that there were eager
purchasers in both cases.

Failing to draw the legions from Capua as he had hoped, Hannibal now
retired from before Rome, and, retreating into the southern part of Italy,
abandoned Capua to its fate. It soon fell, and paid the penalty that Rome
never failed to inflict upon an unfaithful ally. The chief men in the city
were put to death, and a large part of the inhabitants sold as slaves.
Capua had aspired to the first place among the cities of Italy: scarcely
more than the name of the ambitious capital now remained.

Hasdrubal attempts to carry Aid to his Brother.--During all the years
Hannibal was waging war in Italy, his brother Hasdrubal was carrying on a
desperate struggle with the Roman armies in Spain. At length he determined
to leave the conduct of the war in that country to others, and go to the
relief of his brother, who was sadly in need of aid. Like Pyrrhus,
Hannibal had been brought to realize that even constant victories won at
the cost of soldiers that could not be replaced, meant final defeat.

Hasdrubal followed the same route that had been taken by his brother
Hannibal, and in the year 207 B.C. descended from the Alps upon the plains
of Northern Italy. Thence he advanced southward, while Hannibal moved
northward from Bruttium to meet him. Rome made a last great effort to
prevent the junction of the armies of the two brothers. At the river
Metaurus, Hasdrubal's march was withstood by a large Roman army. Here his
forces were cut to pieces, and he himself was slain (207 B.C.). His head
was severed from his body and sent to Hannibal. Upon recognizing the
features of his brother, Hannibal exclaimed sadly, "Carthage, I see thy
fate."

WAR IN AFRICA: BATTLE OF ZAMA.--The defeat and death of Hasdrubal gave a
different aspect to the war. Hannibal now drew back into the rocky
peninsula of Bruttium, the southernmost point of Italy. There he faced the
Romans like a lion at bay. No one dared attack him. It was resolved to
carry the war into Africa, in hopes that the Carthaginians would be forced
to call their great commander out of Italy to the defence of Carthage.
Publius Cornelius Scipio, who after the departure of Hasdrubal from Spain
had quickly brought the peninsula under the power of Rome, led the army of
invasion. He had not been long in Africa before the Carthaginian Senate
sent for Hannibal to conduct the war. At Zama, not far from Carthage, the
hostile armies came face to face. Fortune had deserted Hannibal; he was
fighting [Footnote: Son of the consul mentioned on page 259.] against
fate. He here met his first and final defeat. His army, in which were many
of the veterans that had served through all the Italian campaigns, was
almost annihilated (202 B.C.). Scipio was accorded a splendid triumph at
Rome, and given the surname Africanus in honor of his achievements.
[Footnote: Some time after the close of the Second Punic War, the Romans,
persuading themselves that Hannibal was preparing Carthage for another
war, demanded his surrender of the Carthaginians. He fled to Syria, and
thence to Asia Minor, where, to avoid falling into the hands of his
implacable foes, he committed suicide by means of poison (183 B.C.).]

[Illustration: PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO (Africanus).]

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR.--Carthage was now completely exhausted, and sued for
peace. Even Hannibal himself could no longer counsel war. The terms of the
treaty were much severer than those imposed upon the city at the end of
the First Punic War. She was required to give up all claims to Spain and
the islands of the Mediterranean; to surrender her war elephants, and all
her ships of war save ten galleys; to pay an indemnity of five thousand
talents at once, and two hundred and fifty talents annually for fifty
years; and not to engage in any war without the consent of Rome. Five
hundred of the costly Phoenician war galleys were towed out of the harbor
of Carthage and burned in the sight of the citizens.

Such was the end of the Second Punic, or Hannibalic War, as called by the
Romans, the most desperate struggle ever maintained by rival powers for
empire.




CHAPTER XXVI.

THE THIRD PUNIC WAR.
(149-146 B.C.)


EVENTS BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THE THIRD PUNIC WAR.

The terms imposed upon Carthage at the end of the Second Punic War left
Rome mistress of the Western Mediterranean. During the fifty eventful
years that elapsed between the close of that struggle and the breaking-out
of the last Punic war, her authority became supreme also in the Eastern
seas. In a preceding chapter (see p. 170), while narrating the fortunes of
the most important states into which the great empire of Alexander was
broken at his death, we followed them until one after another they fell
beneath the arms of Rome, and were successively absorbed into her growing
kingdom. We shall therefore speak of them here only in the briefest
manner, simply indicating the connection of their several histories with
the series of events which mark the advance of Rome to universal empire.

THE BATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALAE (197 B.C.).--During the Hannibalic War, Philip
V. (III.) of Macedonia had aided the Carthaginians, or at least had
entered into an alliance with them. He was now troubling the Greek cities
which were under the protection of Rome. For these things the Roman Senate
determined to punish him. An army under Flamininus was sent into Greece,
and on the plains of Cynoscephalae, in Thessaly, the Roman legion
demonstrated its superiority over the unwieldy Macedonian phalanx by
subjecting Philip to a most disastrous defeat (197 B.C.). The king was
forced to give up all his conquests, and Rome extended her protectorate
over Greece.

THE BATTLE OF MAGNESIA (190 B.C.).--Antiochus the Great of Syria had at
this time not only overrun all Asia Minor, but had crossed the Hellespont
into Europe, and was intent upon the conquest of Thrace and Greece. Rome,
that could not entertain the idea of a rival empire upon the southern
shores of the Mediterranean, could much less tolerate the establishment in
the East of such a colossal kingdom as the ambition of Antiochus proposed
to itself. Just as soon as intelligence was carried to Italy that the
Syrian king was leading his army into Greece, the legions of the republic
were set in motion. Some reverses caused Antiochus to retreat in haste
across the Hellespont into Asia, whither he was followed by the Romans,
led by Scipio, a brother of Africanus.

At Magnesia, Antiochus was overthrown, and a large part of Asia Minor fell
into the hands of the Romans. Not yet prepared to maintain provinces so
distant from the Tiber, the Senate conferred the new territory, with the
exception of Lycia and Caria, which were given to the Rhodians, upon their
friend and ally Eumenes, King of Pergamus (see p. 171). This "Kingdom of
Asia," as it was called, was really nothing more than a dependency of
Rome, and its nominal ruler only a puppet-king in the hands of the Roman
Senate.

Scipio enjoyed a magnificent triumph at Rome, and, in accordance with a
custom that had now become popular with successful generals, erected a
memorial of his deeds in his name by assuming the title of Asiaticus.

[Illustration: PERSEUS, of Macedonia.]

THE BATTLE OF PYDNA (168 B.C.).--In a few years Macedonia, under the
leadership of Perseus, son of Philip V., was again in arms and offering
defiance to Rome; but in the year 168 B.C. the Roman consul AEmilius Paulus
crushed the Macedonian power forever upon the memorable field of Pydna.
This was one of the decisive battles fought by the Romans in their
struggle for the dominion of the world. The last great power in the East
was here broken. The Roman Senate was henceforth recognized by the whole
civilized world as the source and fountain of supreme political wisdom and
power. We shall have yet to record many campaigns of the Roman legions;
but these were efforts to suppress revolt among dependent or semi-vassal
states, or were struggles with barbarian tribes that skirted the Roman
dominions.

THE DESTRUCTION OF CORINTH (146 B.C.).--Barely twenty years had passed
after the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy before the cities and
states that formed the Achaean League (see p. 175) were goaded to revolt by
the injustice of their Roman protectors. In the year 146 B.C. the consul
Mummius signalized the suppression of the rebellion by the complete
destruction of the brilliant city of Corinth, the "eye of Hellas," as the
ancient poets were fond of calling it. This fair capital, the most
beautiful and renowned of all the cities of Greece after the fall of
Athens, was sacked, and razed to the ground. Much of the booty was sold on
the spot at public auction. Numerous works of art,--rare paintings and
sculptures,--with which the city was crowded, were carried off to Italy.
"Never before or after," says Long, "was such a display of the wonders of
Grecian art carried in triumphal procession through the streets of Rome."


THE THIRD PUNIC WAR.

"CARTHAGE MUST BE DESTROYED."--The same year that Rome destroyed Corinth
(146 B.C.), she also blotted her great rival Carthage from the face of the
earth. It will be recalled that one of the conditions imposed upon the
last-named city at the close of the Second Punic War was that she should,
under no circumstances, engage in any war without the permission of the
Roman Senate. Taking advantage of the helpless condition of Carthage,
Masinissa, King of Numidia, began to make depredations upon her
territories. She appealed to Rome for protection. The envoys sent to
Africa by the Senate to settle the dispute, unfairly adjudged every case
in favor of the robber Masinissa. In this way Carthage was deprived of her
lands and towns.

Chief of one of the embassies sent out was Marcus Cato the Censor. When he
saw the prosperity of Carthage,--her immense trade, which crowded her
harbor with ships, and the country for miles back of the city a beautiful
landscape of gardens and villas,--he was amazed at the growing power and
wealth of the city, and returned home convinced that the safety of Rome
demanded the destruction of her rival. Never afterwards did he address the
Romans, no matter upon what subject, but he always ended with the words,
"Carthage must be destroyed" (_delenda est Carthago_).

ROMAN PERFIDY.--A pretext for the accomplishment of the hateful work was
not long wanting. In 150 B.C. the Carthaginians, when Masinissa made
another attack upon their territory, instead of calling upon Rome, from
which source the past had convinced them they could hope for neither aid
nor justice, gathered an army, and resolved to defend themselves. Their
forces, however, were defeated by the Numidians, and sent beneath the
yoke.

In entering upon this war without the consent of Rome, Carthage had broken
the conditions of the last treaty. The Carthaginian Senate, in great
anxiety, now sent an embassy to Italy to offer any reparation the Romans
might demand. They were told that if they would give three hundred
hostages, members of the noblest Carthaginian families, the independence
of their city should be respected. They eagerly complied with this demand.
But no sooner were these in the hands of the Romans than the consular
armies, numbering eighty thousand men, secured against attack by the
hostages so perfidiously drawn from the Carthaginians, crossed from Sicily
into Africa, and disembarked at Utica, only ten miles from Carthage.

The Carthaginians were now commanded to give up all their arms; still
hoping to win their enemy to clemency, they complied with this demand
also. Then the consuls made known the final decree of the Roman Senate--
"That Carthage must be destroyed, but that the inhabitants might build a
new city, provided it were located ten miles from the coast."

When this resolution of the Senate was announced to the Carthaginians, and
they realized the baseness and perfidy of their enemy, a cry of
indignation and despair burst from the betrayed city.

THE CARTHAGINIANS PREPARE TO DEFEND THEIR CITY.--It was resolved to resist
to the bitter end the execution of the cruel decree. The gates of the city
were closed. Men, women, and children set to work and labored day and
night manufacturing arms. The entire city was converted into one great
workshop. The utensils of the home and the sacred vessels of the temples,
statues, and vases were melted down for weapons. Material was torn from
the buildings of the city for the construction of military engines. The
women cut off their hair and braided it into strings for the catapults. By
such labor, and through such means, the city was soon put in a state to
withstand a siege.

When the Romans advanced to take possession of the place, they were
astonished to find the people they had just treacherously disarmed, with
weapons in their hands, manning the walls of their capital, and ready to
bid them defiance.

THE DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE.--It is impossible for us here to give the
circumstances of the siege of Carthage. For four years the city held out
against the Roman army. At length the consul Scipio AEmilianus succeeded in
taking it by storm. When resistance ceased, only 50,000 men, women, and
children, out of a population of 700,000, remained to be made prisoners.
The city was fired, and for seventeen days the space within the walls was
a sea of flames. Every trace of building which the fire could not destroy
was levelled, a plough was driven over the site, and a dreadful curse
invoked upon any one who should dare attempt to rebuild the city.

Such was the hard fate of Carthage. It is said that Scipio, as he gazed
upon the smouldering ruins, seemed to read in them the fate of Rome, and,
bursting into tears, sadly repeated the lines of Homer:

"The day shall come in which our sacred Troy,
And Priam, and the people over whom
Spear-bearing Priam rules, shall perish all."

The Carthaginian territory in Africa was made into a Roman province, with
Utica as the leading city; and Roman civilization was spread rapidly, by
means of traders and settlers, throughout the regions that lie between the
ranges of the Atlas and the sea.


WAR IN SPAIN.

SIEGE OF NUMANTIA.--It is fitting that the same chapter which narrates the
destruction of Corinth in Greece, and the blotting-out of Carthage in
Africa, should tell the story of the destruction of Numantia in Spain.

The expulsion of the Carthaginians from the Spanish peninsula really gave
Rome the control of only a small part of that country. The war-like native
tribes--the Celtiberians and Lusitanians--of the North and the West were
ready stubbornly to dispute with the new-comers the possession of the
soil.

The war gathered about Numantia, the siege of which was brought to a close
by Scipio AEmilianus, the conqueror of Carthage. Before the surrender of
the place, almost all the inhabitants had met death, either in defence of
the walls, or by deliberate suicide. The miserable remnant which the
ravages of battle, famine, pestilence, and despair had left alive were
sold into slavery, and the city was levelled to the ground (133 B.C.).

The capture of Numantia was considered quite as great an achievement as
the taking of Carthage. Scipio celebrated another triumph at Rome, and to
his surname Africanus, which he had received for his achievements in
Africa, added that of Numantinus. Spain became a favorite resort of Roman
merchants, and many colonies were established in different parts of the
country. As a result of this great influx of Italians, the laws, manners,
customs, language, and religion of the conquerors were introduced
everywhere, and the peninsula became rapidly Romanized.




CHAPTER XXVII.

THE LAST CENTURY OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.
(133-31 B.C.)


We have now traced the growth of the power of republican Rome, as through
two centuries and more of conquest she has extended her authority, first
throughout Italy, and then over almost all the countries that border upon
the Mediterranean. It must be our less pleasant task now to follow the
declining fortunes of the republic through the last century of its
existence. We shall here learn that wars waged for spoils and dominion are
in the end more ruinous, if possible, to the conqueror than to the
conquered.

THE SERVILE WAR IN SICILY (134-132 B.C.).--With the opening of this period
we find a terrible struggle going on in Sicily between masters and slaves
--or what is known as "The First Servile War." The condition of affairs in
that island was the legitimate result of the Roman system of slavery. The
captives taken in war were usually sold into servitude. The great number
of prisoners furnished by the numerous conquests of the Romans caused
slaves to become a drug in the slave-markets of the Roman world. They were
so cheap that masters found it more profitable to wear their slaves out by
a few years of unmercifully hard labor, and then to buy others, than to
preserve their lives for a longer period by more humane treatment. In case
of sickness, they were left to die without attention, as the expense of
nursing exceeded the cost of new purchases. Some Sicilian estates were
worked by as many as 20,000 slaves. That each owner might know his own,
the poor creatures were branded like cattle. What makes all this the more
revolting is the fact that many of these slaves were in every way the
peers of their owners, and often were their superiors. The fortunes of war
alone had made one servant and the other master.

The wretched condition of these slaves and the cruelty of their masters at
last drove them to revolt. The insurrection spread throughout the island,
until 200,000 slaves were in arms, and in possession of many of the
strongholds of the country. They defeated four Roman armies sent against
them, and for three years defied the power of Rome. Finally, however, in
the year 132 B.C., the revolt was crushed, and peace was restored to the
distracted island. [Footnote: In the year 102 B.C. another insurrection of
the slaves broke out in the island, which it required three years to
quell. This last revolt is known as "The Second Servile War."]

THE PUBLIC LANDS.--In Italy itself affairs were in a scarcely less
wretched condition than in Sicily. When the different states of the
peninsula were subjugated, large portions of the conquered territory had
become public land (_ager publicus_); for upon the subjugation of a
state Rome never left to the conquered people more than two-thirds of
their lands, and often not so much as this. The land appropriated was
disposed of at public sale, leased at low rentals, allotted to discharged
soldiers, or allowed to lie unused. [Footnote: These land matters may be
made plain by a reference to the public lands of the United States. The
troubles in Ireland between the land-owners and their tenants will also
serve to illustrate the agrarian disturbances in ancient Rome.]

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