Robert Bloomfield - "The Farmer's Boy"

James Russell Lowell - "Among My Books"

John Esten Cooke - "Mohun, or, The Last Days of Lee"

Mark Lemon - "The Jest Book"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Current History, A Monthly Magazine

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"In spite of this I thought I had to insist again upon the necessity
of knowing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to
regulate the railway transportation for every day.

"The English Military Attache conversed with me about several other
questions, namely:

"(1) The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding
strict secrecy from the press;

"(2) The advantages which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer
to each English General Staff, one interpreter to each commanding
officer, and gendarmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the
British police troops....

"In the course of another interview Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and I
studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German
offensive with Antwerp as its object and under the hypothesis of the
German troops marching through our country in order to reach the
French Ardennes.

"In this question, the Colonel said he quite agreed with the plan
which I had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval
of Gen. Grierson, Chief of the English General Staff.

"Other secondary questions which were likewise settled had particular
reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps,
photographs of the uniforms, special copies, translated into English,
of some Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the import
duties on English provisions, to the accommodation of the wounded of
the allied armies, &c. Nothing was resolved on as regards the activity
which the Government or the military authorities might exert on the
press....

"During the final meetings which I had with the British Attache, he
informed me about the numbers of troops which would be daily
disembarked at Boulogne, Calais, and Cherbourg. The distance of the
last place, which is necessary for technical considerations, will
involve a certain delay. The first corps would be disembarked on the
tenth day, and the second on the fifteenth day. Our railways would
carry out the transportation so that the arrival of the first corps,
either in the direction of Brussels-Louvain or of Namur-Dinant, would
be assured on the eleventh day, and that of the second on the
sixteenth day.

"I again, for a last time, and as emphatically as I could, insisted on
the necessity of hastening the sea transports so that the English
troops could be with us between the eleventh and twelfth day. The
happiest and most favorable results can be reached by a convergent and
simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that co-operation
should not take place, the failure would be most serious. Col.
Barnardiston assured me that everything serving to this end would be
done....

"In the course of our conversations, I had occasion to convince the
British Military Attache that we were willing, so far as possible, to
thwart the movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp
from the beginning.

"Lieut. Col. Barnardiston on his part told me that, at the time, he
had little hope for any support or intervention on the part of
Holland. At the same time he informed me that his Government intended
to transfer the basis of the British commissariat from the French
coast to Antwerp as soon as all German ships were swept off the North
Sea....

"In all our conversations the Colonel regularly informed me about the
secret news which he had concerning the military circumstances and the
situation of our eastern neighbors, &c. At the same time he emphasized
that Belgium was under the imperative necessity to keep herself
constantly informed of the happenings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I
had to admit that with us the surveillance service abroad was, in
times of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, as our
legations had no Military Attaches. But I was careful not to admit
that I did not know whether the espionage service which is prescribed
in our regulations was in working order or not. But I consider it my
duty to point out this position which places us in a state of evident
inferiority to our neighbors, our presumable enemies.

"Major General, Chief of the General Staff. (Initials of Gen.
Ducarme.)

"Note.--When I met Gen. Grierson at Compiegne, during the manoeuvres
of 1906, he assured me the result of the reorganization of the English
Army would be that the landing of 150,000 would be assured and, that,
moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has
been assumed above.

"Concluded September, 1906."

(Initials of Gen. Ducarme.)


DOCUMENT NO. 2

Minutes of a Conference Between the Belgian Chief of the General
Staff, Gen. Jungbluth, and the British Military Attache Lieut. Col.
Bridges

(Lieut. Col. Barnardiston, British Military Attache in Brussels, was
succeeded in his office by Lieut. Col. Bridges. Likewise, Gen. Ducarme
was succeeded, as Chief of the Belgian Staff, by Gen. Jungbluth. A
conversation between Col. Bridges and Gen. Jungbluth was committed to
writing, and that writing was also found at the Belgian Foreign
Office. The document, which is dated April 23 and is presumed to
belong to the year 1912, is marked "confidentielle" in the handwriting
of Graf v.d. Straaten, the Belgian Foreign Secretary. This is the
translation:)

"_Confidential._

"The British Military Attache asked to see Gen. Jungbluth. The two
gentlemen met on April 23.

"Lieut. Col. Bridges told the General that England had at her disposal
an army which could be sent to the Continent, composed of six
divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry--together 160,000
troops. She has also everything which is necessary for her to defend
her insular territory. Everything is ready.

"At the time of the recent events the British Government would have
immediately effected a disembarkment in Belgium (chez nous) even if we
had not asked for assistance.

"The General objected that for that our consent was necessary.

"The Military Attache answered that he knew this, but that--since we
were not able to prevent the Germans from passing through our
country--England would have landed her troops in Belgium under all
circumstances (en tout etat de cause).

"As for the place of landing, the Military Attache did not make a
precise statement; he said that the coast was rather long, but the
General knows that Mr. Bridges, during Easter, has paid daily visits
to Zeebrugge from Ostend.

"The General added that we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent
the Germans from passing through."


DOCUMENT NO. 3

Report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs


[On the 23d of December, 1911, Baron Greindl, then and for many years
Belgian Minister in Berlin, made a report to the Belgian Minister of
Foreign Affairs. There was found in Brussels a copy of this report.
Although a copy, the official character of this third document found
in Brussels is evident from the official imprint on the paper on which
the copy stands. The first page reads:]

....... SECTION
No. ...........
..... ENCLOSURE COPY

Reply to No.
General department
Office of ........

BERLIN, Dec. 23, 1911.

Belgian Legation,
No. 3,022--1,626.

Strictly Confidential.

What is Belgium to do in case of war?

Mr. Minister:

I have had the honor to receive the dispatch of the 27th November
last, P without docket number, registration number 1,108....

[Baron Greindl's report is an extremely long one. Extracts from it
were published in The North German Gazette of Oct. 13. A facsimile has
been made of the first page only of the document, because of its great
length.

The writer reveals with great astuteness the ulterior motives
underlying the English proposal and draws attention to the danger of
the situation in which Belgium had become involved by a one-sided
partisanship in favor of the powers of the Entente. In this very
detailed report, dated Dec. 23, 1911, Baron Greindl explains that the
plan of the General Army Staff for the defense of Belgian neutrality
in a Franco-German war as communicated to him only concerned the
question as to what military measures should be adopted in case
Germany violated Belgian neutrality. The hypothesis of a French attack
on Germany through Belgium had, however, just as much probability in
itself. The diplomat then goes on in the following manner:]

"From the French side danger threatens not only in the south of
Luxemburg, it threatens us on our entire joint frontier. We are not
reduced to conjectures for this assertion. We have positive evidence
of it.

"Evidently the project of an outflanking movement from the north forms
part of the scheme of the entente cordiale. If that were not the case,
then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such
an outburst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished that the
Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly concealed by them. Their
aim was to be able to transport an English garrison, unhindered, to
Antwerp, which means to establish in our country a basis of operation
for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia,
and then to make us throw our lot in with them, which would not be
difficult, for, after the surrender of our national centre of refuge,
we would, through our own fault, renounce every possibility of
opposing the demands of our doubtful protectors after having been so
unwise as to permit their entrance into our country. Col.
Barnardiston's announcements at the time of the conclusion of the
entente cordiale, which were just as perfidious as they were naive,
have shown us plainly the true meaning of things. When it became
evident that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by the
pretended danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not
entirely abandoned, but modified in so far as the British Army was not
to land on the Belgian coast, but at the nearest French harbors.

"The revelations of Capt. Faber, which were denied as little as the
newspaper reports by which they were confirmed or completed in several
respects, also testify to this. This British Army, at Calais and
Dunkirk, would by no means march along our frontier to Longwy in order
to reach Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from the northwest.
That would give it the advantage of being able to begin operations
immediately, to encounter the Belgian Army in a region where we could
not depend on any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle.
Moreover, that would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich
in all kinds of resources and, at any rate, to prevent our
mobilization or only to permit it after we had formally pledged
ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the exclusive advantage of
England and her allies.

"It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle for the
Belgian Army also for that possibility. This is necessary in the
interest of our military defense as well as for the sake of the
direction of our foreign policy, in case of war between Germany and
France."

[The text of the documents presented above is not disputed
by the Belgian Government. Instead it is made the basis of
the Belgian reply, beginning on the next page.]

* * * * *

THE BELGIAN BATTLEGROUND

By the HON. WILLIAM H. TAFT.

[From King Albert's Book.]

The heart of the world should go out to the poor people of Belgium.
Without being in any respect a party to the controversies of the war,
their country has been made the battleground of the greatest and in
some respects the most destructive war in history. Any movement to
relieve their distress has my profound sympathy.

* * * * *

[The following letter from the Belgian Legation at
Washington certifies the official character of the documents
presented below.--EDITOR.]

LEGATION DE BELGIQUE,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Jan. 25, 1915.

_To the Editor of The New York Times Current History:_

In accordance with the request, in your letter of December
10th addressed to the Belgian Minister, for official
documents published by the Legation, I have the pleasure of
sending you, herewith, by the Minister's instructions, a
copy of a pamphlet entitled "The Innocence of Belgium,"
dealing with the Military Documents published recently in
THE NEW YORK TIMES.

I also take this opportunity to transmit you a copy of a
pamphlet entitled "Why Belgium Was Devastated," containing
translations of the German Proclamations issued in Belgium.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

JAMES GUSTAVUS WHITELEY.


[BELGIAN LEGATION ARTICLE NO. 1.]

"INNOCENCE OF BELGIUM"

"Reply to Publication of Military Documents by Germany"

The German Government has at last decided to publish the documents
which it says were found in Brussels, and which it claims prove that
Belgium violated her neutrality.

As a matter of fact these documents are the clearest proof of the
innocence of Belgium.

Document No. 1 refers to a conversation between Major Gen. Ducarme and
the English Military Attache, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston.

The English Military Attache _went to call_ on the Belgian General and
told him of the anxiety on the part of the English General Staff in
regard to the general political situation and the possibility of war.
"_In case Belgium should be attacked_, the sending of about 100,000
troops was provided for."

He (the British Military Attache) proceeded in the following terms:

"The landing of the British troops would take place on the French
coast.... The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only
_after the violation of our (Belgian) neutrality by Germany_."

It almost seems as if Col. Barnardiston had foreseen the future.

The document continues as follows: "My visitor laid emphasis on the
following fact: that it (the conversation) was not binding on his
Government ... and that he did not know whether the opinion of his
Sovereign had been consulted." It was thus clearly shown by the
British Military Attache that his communication was simply a
conversation; it is, moreover, perfectly well known that Military
Attaches have no power to make conventional agreements.

The document further continues: "In the course of another interview,
Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take
place in the event of a _German offensive_, with Antwerp as its
object, _and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching
through our (Belgian) country_, in order to reach the French
Ardennes"--an additional proof that the object of the conversation was
solely to prevent a violation of Belgian neutrality.

Document No. 2 refers to a conversation between the British Military
Attache and Gen. Jungbluth, in which the former said that the British
troops would effect a landing "even if we (the Belgians) did not ask
for assistance." This is an additional proof that no agreement or
convention had been made.

To this the Belgian General replied that "our (Belgium's) consent was
necessary," and he added that "we (the Belgians) were, moreover,
perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium,"
thus showing his anxiety to preserve the neutrality of Belgium.

Dr. B. Dernburg claims that England would have sent troops into
Belgium in any event, even if Germany had not invaded Belgium.
Affirmations which are not based upon any evidence cannot destroy the
text itself of the documents.

In a letter of Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of
England, addressed to the British Minister to Belgium, on the 7th of
April, 1913, the British statesman declares in the most formal way,
that: "As long as Belgium's neutrality was not violated by any other
power, we (the British) should certainly not send troops ourselves
into their territory."

The full text of this important letter is as follows:

In speaking to the Belgian Minister today I said, speaking
unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that
there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the
first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that
apprehension could have come from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk,
from a British source which he could not name, of the
landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to
anticipate a possible dispatch of German troops through
Belgium to France.

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the
first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not
believe that any British Government would be the first to do
so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What
we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing
question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for
us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if
Belgian neutrality was violated by any power. For us to be
the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium
would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for
sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the
case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was
that their neutrality should be respected, and, as long as
it was not violated by any other power, we would certainly
not send troops ourselves into their territory. I am, &c.,

(Signed) E. GREY.

Document No. 3 contains, according to Dr. B. Dernburg, the personal
views of the Belgian Minister in Berlin, but it does not, in any way,
indicate the existence of an agreement between Belgium and England
against Germany.

It is impossible to say that these documents constitute a proof of an
agreement between England and Belgium against Germany, unless one
accepts the idea that Germany had a right to violate Belgium's
neutrality and that all measures taken as a precaution against
violation of neutrality must therefore have been taken against
Germany.

The documents contain merely conversations between military officers
in regard to a possible future co-operation of their armies in the
event of violation of Belgian territory by Germany. They never even
resulted in an agreement between those Governments; Military Attaches
have no authority to make such agreements.

The events that happened last August and the sudden invasion of
Belgium by Germany show that the British Government was fully
justified in fearing the violation of Belgian territory by Germany. It
seems incredible, after what has passed, that the German Government
should denounce the British Government for approaching Belgian
military officers and taking precautions against the very thing which
eventually happened.

If further proof should be necessary, the documents published in the
"Gray Book" show as clearly as possible that, when the war broke out,
Belgium had no such agreement with any of the powers.

On July 24 the following letter was sent by the Belgian Minister for
Foreign Affairs to the various Belgian Legations concerned, with
instructions to communicate the same to the powers as soon as said
Legations should have received telegraphic orders to do so:

Mr. Minister:

The international situation is serious; the eventuality of a
conflict between several powers cannot be set aside from the
anxieties of the Government of the King.

Belgium has observed with the most scrupulous exactness the
duties of a neutral State which are imposed on her by the
Treaties of April 19, 1839. These duties, whatever the
circumstances may be, _will be resolutely fulfilled by her_.

The friendly disposition of the powers toward her has been
so often affirmed that Belgium has the confidence that her
territory will be untouched by any attack if hostilities
should break out on her frontiers.

All the necessary measures have nevertheless been taken, in
order to assure the observance of her neutrality.... It is
scarcely necessary to insist upon their character.... These
measures _are not and can not have been inspired by a design
to participate in an armed struggle of the powers, nor by
any sentiment of defiance toward any one of them_.

Belgium declared that she would not fail to fulfill all of her duties,
that she had not a single agreement of alliance with any one, and that
she wanted to remain absolutely neutral.

Seven days later the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated
to the Belgian Legations his answer to the question which Sir Edward
Grey had asked Belgium in the name of England:

"Mr. Minister:

"The British Minister requested to see me very urgently and
communicated to me the following:

"'Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments,
separately, whether each of them was prepared to respect the
neutrality of Belgium.

"'In view of the existing treaties, I am also instructed to inform the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium that _Sir Edward Grey presumes
that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality_.'

"I immediately thanked Sir Francis Villiers for this communication,
which the Belgian Government appreciates very highly, and I added that
Great Britain and the other nations, guarantors of our independence,
might be sure that we would neglect no effort to maintain our
neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other powers, in view
of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which we have
always enjoyed with them, would observe and maintain this neutrality."

At the decisive moment, the attitude of Belgium was thus
irreproachable. She was not bound to any other nation; she had her
hands free. She declared that she was ready to make the necessary
sacrifices to defend her neutrality and to resist any aggression from
whatever source, and she added that, trusting in her friendly
relations with the powers, she was unwilling to believe that any of
them would violate her neutrality.

On Aug. 3, at 7 A.M., after having received the ultimatum from
Germany, Belgium declared that she refused to repudiate her
engagements.

The next day, the 4th of August, at 3 P.M., the Belgian Minister for
Foreign Affairs received from Sir F. Villiers, Minister of England in
Brussels, the following note:

BRUSSELS, Aug. 4, 1914.

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if
Germany exercises pressure for the purpose of compelling
Belgium to abandon her position of a neutral country, the
Government of his Britannic Majesty expects Belgium to
resist by every possible means. The Government of his
Britannic Majesty is ready, in that event, to join with
Russia and France, _if desired by Belgium_, to offer to the
Belgian Government, at once, common action for the purpose
of resisting the use of force by Germany against Belgium,
and at the same time to offer a guarantee to maintain the
independence and the integrity of Belgium in the future.

England offered her help _but did not impose it_. She did not intend
to send troops into Belgian territory as a preventive measure. She
expressly subordinated her assistance _to the desire of Belgium_.

It was only on the 4th of August, during the evening, after having
vainly hoped and waited for a change in the attitude of Germany, that
Belgium called England, France, and Russia to co-operate, as guarantor
powers, in the defense of her territory.

In the preface published by Dr. B. Dernburg, with the documents, it is
said that "only the prompt action at Liege that put this important
railway centre, commanding the railway connections to France and
Germany, into German hands, prevented the English landing and invading
Belgium."

It is impossible to conceive how the taking of Liege prevented the
English from landing and invading Belgium. That statement is hardly a
compliment to the intelligence or the geographical knowledge of the
American people. The fact is that Liege was taken a long time before
the British troops landed at Calais, and it is still today in the
hands of the Germans without in the least interfering with the arrival
of British reinforcements in France and in the territory still left in
the possession of Belgium. The fact is that Liege was not taken to
prevent the British from entering Belgium, but because it was part of
the plan of the German General Staff to invade Belgium at once, to
march across her territory, to crush the army of France as soon as
possible, and then to turn and attack the Russians on the east.

It is interesting to recall here the famous conversation held between
the British Ambassador in Berlin, on one side, and the Chancellor of
the Empire, Mr. Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. von Jagow, on the other side, at the time of the invasion
of Belgium by the German troops. These conversations prove,
indisputably, the premeditated intention of Germany to violate
Belgium's neutrality:

To the request of Sir Edward Goschen, the English Ambassador
in Berlin, to be allowed to know if Germany would pledge
herself to respect the neutrality of Belgium, the German
Secretary of State replied that "this neutrality had already
been violated by Germany." Herr von Jagow went again into
the "reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to
take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France
by the quickest and easiest way so as to be able to get well
ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some
decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life
and death to them, for, if they had gone by the more
southern route, they could not have hoped, in view of the
paucity of the roads and the strength of the fortresses, to
have got through without formidable opposition entailing
great loss of time. This loss of time would mean time gained
by the Russians for the bringing up of their troops to the
German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German
asset, while that of Russia was the inexhaustible supply of
troops." (Official report of the British Ambassador in
Berlin to the British Government.)

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