Jean de La Fontaine - "The Fables of La Fontaine"

Harris Dickson - "The Black Wolf's Breed"

Stella M. Francis - "Campfire Girls at Twin Lakes"

Charles Kingsley - "Out of the Deep"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Current History, A Monthly Magazine

N >> New York Times >> Current History, A Monthly Magazine




BRITISH LION: "Please don't look at me like that, Sam. _You_'re not
the eagle I'm up against."]




Kultur

[Illustration: (_From The Sketch, London._)

Making the German Officers' Mess a Success.]




Homers

[Illustration: (_From The Sketch, London._)

THE POLICEMAN: "What have you got there? Pigeons?"

THE ENGLISHMAN (_naturalized_): "No; they vos singing-birds."

THE POLICEMAN: "What song do they sing?"

THE ENGLISHMAN (_naturalized_): "Home, sveet home."]




The New Year's Present That We Are Wishing For

[Illustration: (_From La Vie Parisienne, Paris._)

A Million English Soldiers to Help Us Drive the Germans from France
and Belgium.]




"His" Christmas Sabots

[Illustration: (_From La Vie Parisienne, Paris._)

(The conspicuous place taken by children's stockings at Christmas time
in English-speaking countries is usurped by the youngsters' shoes in
France.)]




"Sire, Your Soup's Getting Cold"

[Illustration: (_From La Vie Parisienne, Paris._)

How about that famous dinner that the Kaiser ordered in one of the big
Paris hotels! Isn't the bill of fare a trifle out of season by this
time?]




Chaffing the French Censor

(_From La Vie Parisienne, Paris._)

[Illustration: "At the same instant, happily, a furious gallop
resounded along the road from ----, and, full of joy, our Colonel
cried: 'They are the ----.' They were, as a matter of fact, the
----."]

[Illustration: "Despite this reinforcement, it was hot work. Capt.
---- of the ---- Company of the ---- Regiment especially distinguished
himself, leading his men in an irresistible charge. We lost ---- men,
but the enemy left ---- dead in the ruins of the village of ----."]

[Illustration: "At the end of the ---- ---- victory ---- ---- ----
important strategic point ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----. 'I am very
pleased with you,' said our General to us."]




The Under-Study

[Illustration: (_From Numero, Turin._)

The Triple Alliance Revised and Corrected.]




A Substitute for Belgian Blocks

[Illustration: (_From Numero, Turin._)

A New Form of Paving for French and Belgian Cities.]




What Italy Thinks of "Guglielmo"

(A SERIES OF ITALIAN POSTCARDS.)

[Illustration: HIMSELF TO GOD: "If I were not afraid of Thee I would
declare war upon Thee also!"]

[Illustration: GUGLIELMO'S DREAM. The map bears the inscription, "The
Great German Empire."]

[Illustration: "Isn't there somebody else to declare war upon?"

"There's the Republic of San Marino, your Majesty."]

[Illustration: GUGLIELMO (bearing the European war): "Heavens! It's
beginning to get heavy."]




You Can't Bluff the Turk

(_From Simplicissimus, Munich._)

[Illustration: "Will you restore the capitulations immediately?"]

[Illustration: "No."]

[Illustration: "Will you give up the Goeben and the Breslau
immediately?"]

[Illustration: "No."]

[Illustration: "In respect to the Dardanelles, will you immediately
----?"

"No. And now suppose you just put up that revolver."]

[Illustration: "With pleasure! The thing wasn't loaded at all!"]




The Mistress of the Sea

(_From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._)

[Illustration: Behold, O World, How I Stand Here!

Look Out, Britannia!]




The "Prize-Taker"

[Illustration: (_From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._)

"How long will you allow this brute to tread on your corns?"

[The allusion is to England's attitude toward neutral shipping.]]




The Face at the Window

[Illustration: (_From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._)]




Novel Coastwise Scenery

[Illustration: (_From Jugend, Munich._)

Since it was given out that the German barbarians were refusing to
fire on cathedrals, England has worked out a jolly little plan for
coast defense.]




The Dancers

[Illustration: (_From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._)

How the Germans Conduct the English Ballet.]




The English Spider

[Illustration: (_From Jugend, Munich._)]




The Jap-Infested British Lion

[Illustration: (_From Simplicissimus, Munich._)

"Goddam! What kind of fleas have I got in my mane anyway!"]




The Englishman and His Globe

[Illustration: (_From Simplicissimus, Munich._)

"Curses! Blood is more slippery than water!"

[The original was in black and red and vividly represented a dripping
globe.]]




The German Watch in Kiao-Chau

[Illustration: (_From Simplicissimus, Munich._)

[A superb cartoon published before the fall of the German stronghold
in China.]]




GERMANY vs. BELGIUM

_Case of the Secret Military Documents Presented by Both Sides_

[The Belgo-British plot alleged by Germany is thoroughly
aired in the following communications. The text of the
secret documents, which, according to the German contention,
prove that the Allies did not intend to respect Belgian
neutrality--that Belgium herself conspired with England to
break it--was discovered in the archives of the Belgian
Government after the German occupation of Brussels, and is
embodied on Pages 1105 to 1109 in the subjoined article,
published in behalf of Germany by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg.

The article, called by Dr. Dernburg "The Case of Belgium,"
as reproduced below, and published between gray covers like
the Belgian "Gray Book," prompted publications in rejoinder
by the Belgian Legation at Washington. The first of these,
entitled "The Innocence of Belgium," appears on Page 1110;
it states that the secret documents show in their own
statements the "clearest proof of the innocence of Belgium."
The second Belgian article, headed "Why Belgium Was
Devastated," and appearing on Page 1115, embodies the German
proclamations establishing military rule in the violated
territory.--EDITOR.]


"THE CASE OF BELGIUM"

"In the Light of Official Reports Found in the Secret Archives of the
Belgian Government after the Occupation of Brussels"

Remarks Introductory to the Secret Documents

By Dr. Bernhard Dernburg

Herewith are published facsimiles of papers found among the documents
of the Belgian General Staff at Brussels, referring to arrangements
between the English Military Attache and the Belgian Minister of War
regarding British intervention in Belgium.

It will be remembered from the British "White Book" that in November,
1912, a correspondence passed between Sir Edward Grey and the French
Minister in London, in which it was stated that British and French
military and naval experts had consulted together from time to time as
to plans to be followed in case of war, and it was stated in this
correspondence that in accordance with such prearranged plans the
French fleet would stay in the Mediterranean to safeguard the joint
interests there, whereas the British fleet would safeguard their
interests in the north. Of this correspondence the members of the
British Cabinet remained ignorant until the Cabinet meeting
immediately preceding the written statement by Great Britain on Aug. 2
that in case a German fleet attacked the French coast or passed into
the Channel, England would give all the assistance in her power,
(British "White Papers," No. 148,) and it was also, of course,
concealed from the British public until the speech of Sir Edward Grey
on Aug. 3. It will be remembered that in consequence of this
revelation the British Minister of Commerce, Mr. John Burns, and two
other members, Lord Morley and Mr. Trevelyan, left the British Cabinet
under protest; that the leader of the British Labor Party, Mr. Ramsey
Macdonald, resigned from the leadership and that Mr. Arthur Ponsonby
in his famous letter denounced Sir Edward Grey's practices.

Mr. Ponsonby said that time and again they had been assured that there
were no obligations whatsoever on the part of Great Britain to come to
France's assistance and yet they found themselves now so hopelessly
entangled that as a matter of fact the British Government could not
back out.

The fact of these consultations, by which, of course, all the plans of
mobilization of both the British and French armies were disclosed to
the two allies and which include the landing of English troops in
France, is now fully established by the annexed documents. They show
that these conversations were also held with Belgium, that plans had
been concerted to invade Belgium with an army of 100,000 men by way of
three French ports--viz., Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne--and that the
British plans even considered a landing by way of the Scheldt, thus
violating also Dutch neutrality.

The documents, giving all the details as translated and showing that
Belgian railway cars were to be sent to the named French ports in
order to transport the British troops into Belgium, are dated from
1906.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, a well-known Belgian
patriot, protested to his Government. The heading of his protest is
also given in facsimile. In it he said that it was not quite safe to
trust to the British and French to keep the Belgian neutrality, that
it was not wise to take all measures only against a German infraction
of Belgian neutrality and that the British spirit was clearly shown by
the words of Col. Barnardiston that the Scheldt might be used for
transporting troops into Belgium.

Furthermore, it will be remembered that the British and French
Governments violently protested when the plans were made public that
the Dutch Government intended to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt in
1906. But in 1912, when the Balkan crisis became acute, the British
went one step further. When Col. Bridges, in a conversation with Gen.
Jungbluth, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, said that England
was ready to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed and that
they would land them as soon as any European conflict should break
out, Gen. Jungbluth protested that for such a step the permission of
Belgium was necessary. The cool reply was that the English knew it,
but thought that, as Belgium was not strong enough alone to protect
herself, England would land troops anyway. Gen. Jungbluth answered
that Belgium felt strong enough to protect herself, which is in
keeping with her declaration to France, when she offered to protect
Belgium by five army corps, as reported in the British "White Book."
The position of England was therefore that, while in 1906 they had
already concerted plans for a joint action, in 1912 England intended
action in any case, should a European conflagration break out.

Now, it must be recollected that as early as July 28, 1914, Sir Edward
Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky, as mentioned in his communication to
Sir E. Goschen: "The situation was very grave. While it was restricted
to the issues at present actually involved, we had not thought of
interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it and then
France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European
interests, and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of
our conversation--which I hoped would continue--into thinking that we
should stand aside." (British "White Papers," No. 89.)

This was at a time when the Belgian issue had not been raised at all.
It only came about by Sir Edward Grey's notes written on July 31. Thus
the British entanglement with France, as evidenced by the British
"White Book," prevented England taking the same attitude in 1914 which
she had taken in 1870, when she made a treaty with France as against
the German invasion of Belgium and with Germany as against the French
invasion of Belgium. A similar agreement was suggested by Prince
Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey on Aug. 1, 1914, as reported in the
English "White Book," No. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey
whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality
England would engage to remain neutral, upon which Grey replied that
he could not say that.

It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of
a German war, that was sure to be brought about by Russia's
mobilization against Germany, England would go to war against Germany,
and it has been proved that the English assurance to that effect has
strengthened the hands of the Russian war party, which thereupon got
the upper hand and forced the Russian Czar into the war, (see report
of Belgian Charge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs at Brussels, July 30.)

In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without
Belgium's will, to land her troops, in violation of Belgium's
neutrality, in Belgium, irrespective of whether German troops were
marching through Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been
made in 1912 or any time thereafter until Aug. 4 in the German
Reichstag. It is further evident that as soon as Russia mobilized,
Germany would have to fight Russia as well as France and England, and
that in such a fight she was forced to draw quickly when she saw her
enemies reaching for their hip pockets. And only the prompt action at
Liege that put this important railway centre commanding the railway
connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the
English landing and invading Belgium.

The guilt of the Belgian Government in this matter consists, in the
first place, in making and concerting plans with the English and
French Governments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of
the French mobilization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be
presumed that the conference between British and French experts was
unknown to the British Military Attache in Brussels. It is furthermore
impossible to believe that the French railway for the shipping of
British troops from Calais, Dunkirk, and Boulogne into Belgium in
Belgian cars could have been used without the knowledge of the French
authorities. Secondly, that Belgium did not heed the advice of Baron
Greindl and did not try to insure her independence in the same way by
approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This
disposes of the contention that the Belgian conversation had a purely
defensive character as against all comers. It shows the one-sidedness
of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the placing of all
Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier.

The Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that
Germany demanded that the Belgian forces should fight with the Germans
against the French and the English, and the truth had become known
only three full months later, when the Belgian "Gray Book" was
published. Then Belgium was practically occupied territory. While
Belgium pretended neutrality and friendship toward Germany, it was
secretly planning for her defeat in a war which was considered
unavoidable. The poor Belgian people, however, must suffer because of
the large ambitions of King Leopold of Congo fame and of a broken-down
diplomacy.

The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof
that if Germany did not march through Belgium, her enemies would. This
proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the
Chancellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he
had no regret that it violated international law. This law of
necessity has been recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent
statesman, including Gladstone, and by all teachers of international
law, even by the United States Supreme Court's decision, Vol. 130,
Page 601, stating in regard to the treaty with China concerning
Chinese immigration into the United States: "It will not be presumed
that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass
laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country, but that
circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in
disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the
country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected
events may call for a change in the policy of the country." And to
strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered
in 1908, may be cited, stating that, "while it would be a matter of
the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the
power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived
without deeply affecting its independence."

We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves.


Summary of the Secret Documents

I. The first document is a report of the Chief of the Belgian General
Staff, Major Gen. Ducarme, to the Minister of War, reporting a series
of conversations which he had had with the Military Attache of the
British Legation, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston, in Brussels. It discloses
that, as early as January, 1906, the Belgian Government was in
consultation with the British Government over steps to be taken by
Belgium, Great Britain, and France against Germany. A plan had been
fully elaborated for the landing of two British army corps in French
ports to be transferred to the point in Belgium necessary for
operations against the Germans. Throughout the conversation the
British and Belgian forces were spoken of as "allied armies"; the
British Military Attache insisted on discussing the question of the
chief command; and he urged the establishment, in the meantime, of a
Belgian spy system in Germany.

II. When in the year 1912 Lieut. Col. Barnardiston had been succeeded
by Lieut. Col. Bridges as British Military Attache in Brussels, and
the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major Gen. Ducarme, had been
succeeded by Gen. Jungbluth as Chief of the Belgian General Staff, the
conversations proceeded between the two latter officials. That is to
say, these were not casual conversations between individuals, but a
series of official conversations between representatives of their
respective Governments, in pursuance of a well-considered policy on
the part of both Governments.

III. The above documents are given additional significance by a report
made in 1911 by Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to the
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, from which it appears that this
representative of the Belgian Government in Berlin was familiar with
the plans above set forth and protested against them, asking why like
preparations had not been made with Germany to repel invasion by the
French and English.

Taken together, these documents show that _the British Government had
the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, of sending troops into
Belgium immediately--that is, of doing the very thing which, done by
Germany, was used by England as a pretext for declaring war on
Germany_.

They show also that the Belgian Government took, in agreement with the
English General Staff, military precautions against a hypothetical
German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Government
never made the slightest attempt to take, in agreement with the German
Government, military precautions against an Anglo-French invasion of
Belgium, though fully informed that it was the purpose of the British
Government to land and dispatch, across French territory into Belgium,
160,000 troops, without asking Belgium's permission, on the first
outbreak of the European war. _This clearly demonstrates that the
Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join Germany's
enemies._

[Illustration: MR. AND MRS. WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL

A Recent Photograph of the Head of the British Admiralty.]

[Illustration: QUARTERMASTER GENERAL VON STEIN

Germany's Official War News Is Issued Through the Office of the
Quartermaster General.

(_Photo from Brown Bros._)]


DOCUMENT NO. 1

Report of Gen. Ducarme, Chief of the Belgian General Staff, to the
Belgian Minister of War

"_Confidential_
Letter to the Minister
Concerning the Confidential Conversations.

"BRUSSELS, April 10, 1906.

"Mr. Minister:

"I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations
which I had with Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and which have already been
the subject of my oral communications.

"The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston
referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with
regard to the general political situation, and because of the
possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be
attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.

"The Lieutenant Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded
by us. I answered him, that from a military point of view it could not
be but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as
much a matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it
was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it.

"Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in Brussels would speak
about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English
troops would take place at the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk
and Calais, so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The
entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the
violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing in Antwerp would
take much more time, because larger transports would be needed, and
because, on the other hand, the safety would be less complete.

"This admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such
as railway transportation, the question of requisitions which the
English army could make, the question concerning the chief command of
the allied forces.

"He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the
defense of the country during the crossing and the transportation of
the English troops--which he estimated to last about ten days.

"I answered him that the places Namur and Liege were protected from a
coup de main and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable
of intervention within four days.

"After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanations, my
visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) That our
conversation was entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on
his Government; (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he
and I were, up to the present, the only ones[1] informed about the
matter; (4) that he did not know whether the opinion of his sovereign
had been consulted....

[Footnote 1: This is similar to the manner in which the English
entente with France was arranged. The British Parliament and the
British Cabinet were kept in ignorance of the fact that English and
French naval experts were consulting together. The British Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, repeatedly assured the country
that Great Britain's hands were free. Yet, when the crisis came, this
quite unofficial exchange of military views and plans, this mere
gentleman's agreement, revealed itself, of course, as a binding
obligation. Nations do not reveal their military secrets to each other
except on the clear understanding that an alliance is in force.]

"In a following discussion Lieut. Col. Barnardiston assured me that he
had never received confidential reports of the other Military Attaches
about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English
forces; we could depend on it, that in twelve or thirteen days two
army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of horse infantry
would be landed.

"He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to
that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised
to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the
landing army.

"He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our
field army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from
this army to Namur and Liege, because these places were provided with
garrisons of sufficient strength.

"He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the
English Army the advantages which the regulations concerning the
military requisitions provided for. Finally he insisted upon the
question of the chief command.

"I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last
point and promised him that I would study the other questions
carefully....

"Later on the English Military Attache confirmed his former
calculations: twelve days would at least be necessary to carry out the
landing at the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time
(1 to 2-1/2 months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp.

"Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of
the landing in order to begin with the railway transportations, and
that it would be better to proceed with these when the troops arrived
at the coast, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston promised to give me exact data
as to the number of troops that could be landed daily.

"As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this
question could be easily regulated....

"The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the
clearer became the details of the problem. The Colonel assured me that
one-half of the English Army could be landed within eight days; the
rest at the conclusion of the twelfth or thirteenth day, with the
exception of the horse infantry, which could not be counted upon until
later.

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