Current History, A Monthly Magazine

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Our concentration had to be flexible enough to enable us to bring our
chief effort to bear upon the spot where the enemy would prove most
active. The violation of Belgium made us acquainted with the
intentions of the German staff--the great conflict would take place in
the north.

As we were obliged, before engaging in it, to wait for the coming into
line of the English army, which was to take place only on Aug. 20, we
at once took measures to retain the greatest possible number of German
troops in Alsace and in Lorraine.

In Alsace, our first attack, which was badly conducted, took us to
Muelhausen, but we could not hold the city (Aug. 7.)

A second attack, led by General Pau, brought us back there. On Aug. 20
we held the road to Colmar through the Vosges and the plain. The enemy
had sustained great losses.

But from that time the unfortunate events in Lorraine and Belgium
forced us to limit the field of operations in Alsace as well as the
intensity of our efforts (Aug. 20.)

In Lorraine our offensive had first been brilliantly successful. On
Aug. 19 we had reached Sarrebourg, Les Etangs, Dieuze, Morhange,
Delme, and Chateau-Salins.

But on the 20th the enemy, strongly intrenched on thoroughly fortified
territory, resumed the offensive.

On the 22d, 23d, and 24th we were compelled to fall back on
Grand-Courenne de Nancy and south of Luneville.

On the 25th simultaneous counterattacks from the armies of Gens.
Dubail and Castelnau greatly strengthened our positions.

But seven or eight German army corps and four divisions of cavalry had
overcome the magnificent resistance of Liege. Every one knows of the
conditions under which the French took the offensive in Belgium with
the armies of Gens. Ruffey and Langle de Cary.

As soon as the English Army was ready in the region of Mons we took
the offensive in Belgian Luxemburg with the armies of Gens. Ruffey and
Langle de Cary. This offensive was at once checked, with great losses
on our side.

Here again the ground had been strongly fortified by the enemy. There
was also, in some of our army corps, a failure to transmit and carry
out orders (Aug. 21-23.)

On the left of these two armies and in conjunction with the English
army Gen. Lanrezac's army, anxious for its right wing, then fell back
(Aug. 24) on the line that stretches between Beaumont and Givet.

On the 25th and 26th the English army, kept in check at Landrecies and
Le Cateau, withdrew toward the Marne.

These days were marked by bloody contests. The enemy lost heavily, but
constantly gained ground.

At that time we either had to hold the ground under the perilous
conditions resulting from the retreat of our left wing or else retreat
along the whole front until it were possible to resume the offensive
under favorable conditions.

The Commander in Chief decided upon the latter alternative.

_The first object to attain was withdrawing in good order while
weakening and delaying the enemy by constant attacks. Several of these
attacks were brilliantly conducted, especially those of Lanrezac's
army at Saint-Quentin and Guise, of Langle's army on the Meuse, and of
Ruffey's army further east. They were supported from Nancy to the
Vosges by Castelnau's and Dubail's armies. In order to prepare for the
offensive a new army had been formed, that of Gen. Maunoury. It was
to be concentrated in the last days of August in the vicinity of
Amiens._

But the advance of the enemy, by stages of forty-five kilometers a
day, was so swift that Gen. Joffre, in order to realize his plan for
the offensive, had to order the retreat to be continued.

The army should withdraw to the Aube, and as far as the Seine if
necessary; everything should be subordinated to preparing a successful
offensive.

On Sept. 5 the conditions which the General in Chief sought to realize
were fulfilled--our left wing (Maunoury's army, the English Army, the
army of Lanrezac which was now d'Esperay's army) was no longer in
danger of being cut off.

On the contrary, the German right, (Gen. von Kluck,) marching to the
south toward Meaux and Coulommiers, was exposing its right wing to
Maunoury's army.

On the evening of the 5th the General in Chief ordered a general
advance, adding: "The hour has come to advance at any cost and to die
rather than fall back."

VICTORY OF THE MARNE.

As early as Sept. 8 the menace directed by Gen. Maunoury against the
German right was beginning to tell.

The enemy brought back from the south to the north two army corps and
wheeled about facing west.

Thus it presented a weak point to the English Army, which, having
advanced from the line stretching from Rozoy to Lagny, (on the 6th,)
straightened its line toward the north, crossed the Marne on the 9th,
thus flanking the German Army already battling with Gen. Maunoury.

On the right of the British d'Esperay's army also crossed the Marne,
forcing the enemy to retreat, and at the same time supporting the
action of its neighbors, that is to say, the English Army on the left
and Foch's army on the right.

[Illustration: Map of Operations in France During First Four Months of
the War

(1) Point where Germans failed to hold Nancy, Sept. 12, 1914.

(2) Extreme limits of the dash to Paris, terminating Sept. 8, 1914.

(3) Point to which the first unsuccessful flanking movement against
the French left wing extended, Aug. 30, 1914.

(4) Point of extension of similar flanking operations, balked Nov. 12,
1914.

(5) Scene of frustrated efforts to break through French centre, Sept.
26, 1914.

(6) Line of attacks upon Calais and Dunkirk, defeated Oct. 18, 1914.

(7) Ypres, where desperate and fruitless assaults, ending Nov. 15,
1914, were made by the Germans.

(8) Intrenched line of battle, Feb. 1, 1915.]

For it was on our centre, made up of Foch's army, which had been
constituted on Aug. 20, that the Germans were going to seek revenge
for the check of their right wing; if they had succeeded in cutting us
off between Sezanne and Mailly, the situation would have been reversed
with the advantage on their side.

From Sept. 6 to Sept. 9 Foch's army met with repeated assaults, but on
the evening of the 9th the left of his army, shifting from west to
east toward Fere-Champenoise, flanked the Prussian Guard and the
Saxons who were advancing southeast of this town.

This bold manoeuvre insured success. The Germans withdrew in great
haste, and on the 11th in the morning Gen. Foch entered
Chalons-sur-Marne.

On his right Langle de Gary's army had also moved forward, and on the
12th, after spirited encounters, it joined, and added to, the line of
Gen. Foch's army.

Meanwhile Ruffey's army (now Darrail's) had succeeded in stretching
its lines north, and, although meeting with a stubborn resistance,
hastened the German retreat, which was accelerated by the offensive
taken by Castelnau's and Dubail's armies from Nancy to the Vosges.

Thanks to this strategic offensive, the campaign turned in our favor.
We have maintained this advantage over the enemy ever since.

THE RACE FOR THE COAST.

_After Sept. 13 the German resistance, strengthened by strong
defensive works prepared in advance, checked the French and English
pursuit; then began the "race for the sea." During this long battle
the German staff never lost the hope of turning the allied left wing,
while we hoped to be able to outflank their right wing. The result was
a race which at the end of October extended the fronts of the opposing
armies as far as the North Sea._

In this race the Germans had an advantage over us, namely, the
concentric shape of their front which simplified the problem of
carrying troops and supplies.

In spite of this advantage, the turning movement attempted by their
right with twelve army corps, six reserve corps, and four corps of
cavalry, utterly failed.

This failure confirmed the victory of the Marne.

As early as Sept. 11 Gen. Joffre had directed the effort of Maunoury's
army against the German right wing. But this army was not large enough
to cope with the situation.

So about Sept. 20 a new army was formed on the left of Maunoury's army
and intrusted to Gen. de Castelnau.

This army strongly intrenched itself in the district which stretches
over Lassigny, Roye, and Peronne. It was supported on its left by the
territorial divisions of Gen. Brugere. (Sept. 21-26.)

But still it was inadequate to achieve our end, and on Sept. 30
further north than the army of Castelnau, Maudhuy's army came to the
front, and occupied the region of Arras and Lens, extending toward the
north to co-operate with the divisions coming from Dunkirk.

Nevertheless, all these troops, in presence of the strenuous exertions
of the enemy, formed too thin a line, a line too extended to allow any
breaking.

At that time and at the request of Field Marshal French the
transportation of the English Army from the Aisne to the Lys region
was decided upon.

The valiant Belgian Army which had left Antwerp on Oct. 9 thanks to
the protection of the British and French marines was also on its way
to the Yser region to reinforce the barrier which had to be created
and maintained.

These moves took time. The English Army was only to come into action
by Oct. 20. On the other hand, the Belgian Army, which had been
fighting for three months, was momentarily lacking ammunition. Gen.
Joffre ordered a new effort.

On Oct. 4 he had intrusted to Gen. Foch the mission of co-ordinating
the operations of the armies in the north.

On the 18th he placed at his disposal reinforcements which,
continually increasing until Nov. 12, were to form the French army of
Belgium under the command of Gen. d'Urbal.

This army, in conjunction with the Belgians and an English corps, was
henceforth to fight between the sea and the Lys River.

The Journal de Geneve, judging this phase of the war, has written that
the French General Staff, by shifting so swiftly such huge bodies of
troops, gave evidence that it had the situation splendidly in hand.

The result of this effort was a total failure of the German attack in
Flanders.

GERMAN OFFENSIVE CHECKED.

_This attack was especially violent; twelve army corps and four
cavalry corps were massed between the Lys and the sea._

_The Emperor was at the head of his armies. He addressed his men,
stating that a "decisive blow" was to be delivered. For three weeks
the German staff hurled furious assaults in mass formation. But as
early as Nov. 12 we were in a position to state that the outcome of
these assaults had been a victory for the Allies._

From the sea to Dixmude the Belgian Army, Gen. Grossetti and Admiral
Ronarc'h held first the railroad from Nieuport to Dixmude, then the
left bank of the Yser.

A hostile army corps, which had succeeded in reaching the left bank,
was forced to withdraw. It has never been able to go further than
Dixmude.

More to the south, from Dixmude to the north of Ypres, a like
situation.

The Germans, on Nov. 12, had crossed the river at two points, were
pushed back to the other bank, thus giving Gen. Humbert the command of
the bridges.

East of Ypres, Gens. Dubois, Balfourrier, and Douglas Haig had not
yielded an inch of ground.

Further south the German attack, aiming at our lines of communication,
had been particularly violent, but the English and the French regained
all the ground that had been momentarily lost and made it impregnable.

During the second half of November the shattered German attacks
weakened. The infantry engaged us less frequently and the artillery
showed less activity.

The enemy, in the battle of Ypres alone, had lost at least 120,000
men.

Never had such a thoroughly prepared and spirited offensive undergone
such a complete failure.

A WAR OF SIEGE.

_Meanwhile, from the banks of the Lys to the ridges of the Vosges a
war of siege was ceaselessly raging. The Bulletin des Armees says:_

It is hardly necessary to emphasize the meritorious behavior of our
troops in waging this war inch by inch, never yielding, progressing
often in spite of the added difficulty of transporting important
French and English contingents to the north.

In close conjunction with the armies of the north the armies of Gen.
Maudhuy and Gen. de Castelnau held without flinching in the slightest
the line between the Lys and Noyon, from the middle of October till
the end of November.

Their progress has been continuous since the end of October; our
positions in Arras and La Bassee have been strengthened,
Quesnoy-en-Santerre has been captured, and in all the encounters with
the enemy our artillery and infantry have constantly made gains.

Between the Oise and the Argonne the armies of Maunoury, d'Esperay,
and Langle de Cary were confronted with very strong positions, viz.,
the heights of the Aisne, of Berru, Nogent-l'Abbesse, Moronvilliers,
and the wooded hills of Western Argonne.

In September they had to resist a very violent general attack. This
attack was a failure, especially east of Rheims, (Sept. 26.)

The Emperor had witnessed this check of his troops just as a week
later he was to witness the failure at Ypres.

Our armies, that is to say, Sarrail's and Dubail's, fulfilled with
method and success the task intrusted to them, viz., to protect our
right flank against attacks on the line from Metz to Thionville; to
retain in front of them the greatest possible number of German army
corps; to free as far as practicable, the national territory that had
been invaded, especially in the Woevre region and around Verdun.

In a first period (Sept. 13-29) the enemy had the upper hand,
fortified themselves in St. Mihiel, reached the Hauts-de-Meuse, and
threatened Verdun.

In the second period (Oct. 1 to Nov. 30) we regained the advantage.

We cleared the vicinity of Verdun. We advanced east of Nancy, which is
now quite safe from German shells, to the north of Luneville, and to
the northeast and east of Saint-Die.

In November we had recovered almost in its integrity the invaded
territory between Belfort and the Moselle.

_In brief, the situation on Dec. 1 was as follows:_

In number of men, the French Army is equal to what it was on Aug. 2,
as all the gaps have been filled up.

The quality of the troops is infinitely better. Our men now fight like
veterans. All are deeply convinced of their superiority and have
absolute faith in the final victory.

Several necessary changes were made among the commanding officers, and
in the last three months none of those mistakes was committed that had
been observed and punished in August.

Our supply in artillery ammunition has been largely increased. The
heavy artillery which we lacked has been provided for and seen at work
on the battlefield.

The English Army has been very heavily reinforced in November. It is
numerically stronger than at the outset of the campaign. The Indian
troops have completed their apprenticeship in European warfare.

The Belgian Army has been reorganized into six divisions. It is ready
and eager to reconquer the national territory.

A SERIES OF GERMAN REVERSES.

The enemy have failed in their abrupt attack upon Nancy.

They failed in their swift march on Paris.

They failed to envelop our left wing in August.

They failed in the same attempt in November.

They failed to pierce through our centre in September.

They failed in their attack by way of the coast on Dunkirk and Calais.

They failed in their attack on Ypres.

_The Bulletin des Armees concludes its account in these words:_

Germany has exhausted its reserves in this fruitless effort. Her newly
formed troops are raw.

Russia more and more asserts her superiority against Germany, as well
as against Austria.

The German armies after this check are fatally doomed to retreat.

All this has been accomplished during the last four months. The moment
had come to sum up these operations; the press is now free to comment
upon them.

LONG LIVE THE ALLIES!

By CLAUDE MONET.

[From King Albert's Book.]

I feel myself greatly honored by the opportunity given me to express
all my admiration of heroic Belgium, and to offer a like admiration to
the noble and valiant King of the Belgians.

Long live Belgium! Long live the Allies! Long live France!

United States Fair to All

Disclaimer of Bias Against Germany and Austria

By William J. Bryan, American Secretary of State

The following letter is the most exhaustive document that
has come from the Administration at Washington since the
outbreak of the war dealing with any aspect of the relations
of this country toward that conflict. Its length is due to
the fact that it is intended as a categorical denial of the
different charges that have been made and of the arguments
current in German circles accusing the Administration of
unfriendliness to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Senator Stone
was interested in having these charges answered for two
reasons: First, there is a large German population in St.
Louis, the chief city of his State, and, second, he is
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator
Stone wrote his letter of inquiry on Jan. 8, saying that he
had received many letters from sympathizers with Germany and
Austria who believed the United States Government had been
showing partiality to England, France, and Russia.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20, 1915.

_Hon. William J. Stone, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Washington, D.C._

Dear Mr. Stone: I have received your letter of the 8th inst. referring
to frequent complaints or charges made in one form or another through
the press that this Government has shown partiality to Great Britain,
France, and Russia against Germany and Austria during the present war
and stating that you have received numerous letters to the same effect
from sympathizers with the latter powers. You summarize the various
grounds of these complaints and ask that you be furnished with
whatever information the department may have touching these points of
complaint in order that you may be informed as to what the true
situation is in regard to these matters.

In order that you may have such information as the department has on
the subjects referred to in your letter, I will take them up seriatim.

_(1) Freedom of communication by submarine cables versus censored
communication by wireless._

The reason that wireless messages and cable messages require different
treatment by a neutral Government is as follows:

Communication by wireless cannot be interrupted by a belligerent. With
a submarine cable it is otherwise. The possibility of cutting the
cable exists, and if a belligerent possesses naval superiority the
cable is cut, as was the German cable near the Azores by one of
Germany's enemies, and as was the British cable near Fanning Island by
a German naval force. Since a cable is subject to hostile attack, the
responsibility falls upon the belligerent, and not upon the neutral,
to prevent cable communication.

A more important reason, however, at least from the point of view of a
neutral Government, is that messages sent out from a wireless station
in neutral territory may be received by belligerent warships on the
high seas. If these messages, whether plain or in cipher, direct the
movements of warships or convey to them information as to the location
of an enemy's public or private vessels, the neutral territory becomes
a base of naval operations, to permit which would be essentially
unneutral.

As a wireless message can be received by all stations and vessels
within a given radius, every message in cipher, whatever its intended
destination, must be censored, otherwise military information may be
sent to warships off the coast of a neutral. It is manifest that a
submarine cable is incapable of becoming a means of direct
communication with a warship on the high seas; hence its use cannot,
as a rule, make neutral territory a base for the direction of naval
operations.

_(2) Censorship of mails and in some cases repeated destruction of
American letters on neutral vessels._

As to the censorship of mails, Germany, as well as Great Britain, has
pursued this course in regard to private letters falling into their
hands. The unquestioned right to adopt a measure of this sort makes
objection to it inadvisable.

It has been asserted that American mail on board of Dutch steamers has
been repeatedly destroyed. No evidence to this effect has been filed
with the Government, and therefore no representations have been made.
Until such a case is presented in concrete form this Government would
not be justified in presenting the matter to the offending
belligerent. Complaints have come to the department that mail on board
neutral steamers has been opened and detained, but there seem to be
but few cases where the mail from neutral countries has not been
finally delivered. When mail is sent to belligerent countries open and
is of a neutral and private character it has not been molested so far
as the department is advised.

_(3) Searching of American vessels for German and Austrian subjects on
the high seas and in territorial waters of a belligerent._

So far as this Government has been informed, no American vessels on
the high seas, with two exceptions, have been detained or searched by
belligerent warships for German and Austrian subjects. One of the
exceptions to which reference is made is now the subject of a rigid
investigation, and vigorous representations have been made to the
offending Government. The other exception, where certain German
passengers were made to sign a promise not to take part in the war,
has been brought to the attention of the offending Government with a
declaration that such procedure, if true, is an unwarranted exercise
of jurisdiction over American vessels in which this Government will
not acquiesce.

An American private vessel entering voluntarily the territorial waters
of a belligerent becomes subject to its municipal laws, as do the
persons on board the vessel.

There have appeared in certain publications the assertion that failure
to protest in these cases is an abandonment of the principle for which
the United States went to war in 1812. If the failure to protest were
true, which it is not, the principle involved is entirely different
from the one appealed to against unjustifiable impressment of
Americans in the British Navy in time of peace.

_(4) Submission without protest to British violations of the rules
regarding absolute and conditional contraband as laid down in The
Hague Conventions, the Declaration of London, and international law._

There is no Hague Convention which deals with absolute or conditional
contraband and, as the Declaration of London is not in force, the
rules of international law only apply. As to the articles to be
regarded as contraband, there is no general agreement between nations.
It is the practice of a century, either in time of peace or after the
outbreak of war, to declare the articles which it will consider as
absolute or conditional contraband. It is true that a neutral
Government is seriously affected by this declaration, as the rights of
its subjects or citizens may be impaired. But the rights and interests
of belligerents and neutrals are opposed in respect to contraband
articles and trade and there is no tribunal to which questions of
difference may be readily submitted.

The record of the United States in the past is not free from
criticism. When neutral this Government has stood for a restricted
list of absolute and conditional contraband. As a belligerent, we have
contended for a liberal list, according to our conception of the
necessities of the case.

The United States has made earnest representations to Great Britain in
regard to the seizure and detention by the British authorities of all
American ships or cargoes bona fide destined to neutral ports, on the
ground that such seizures and detentions were contrary to the existing
rules of international law. It will be recalled, however, that
American courts have established various rules bearing on these
matters. The rule of "continuous voyage" has been not only asserted by
American tribunals, but extended by them.

They have exercised the right to determine from the circumstances
whether the ostensible was the real destination. They have held that
the shipment of articles of contraband to a neutral port "to order,"
from which, as a matter of fact, cargoes had been transshipped to the
enemy, is corroborative evidence that the cargo is really destined to
the enemy, instead of to the neutral port of delivery. It is thus seen
that some of the doctrines which appear to bear harshly upon neutrals
at the present time are analogous to or outgrowths from policies
adopted by the United States when it was a belligerent. The
Government, therefore, cannot consistently protest against the
application of rules which it has followed in the past, unless they
have not been practiced as heretofore.

_(5) Acquiescence without protest to the inclusion of copper and other
articles in the British lists of absolute contraband._

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