W. D. Howells - "Through the Eye of the Needle"

Richard F. Burton - "First footsteps in East Africa"

Edgar F. Smith - "Priestley in America"

Edith Wharton - "The Greater Inclination"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Current History, A Monthly Magazine

N >> New York Times >> Current History, A Monthly Magazine




"My conversation with Sir Edward Goschen," said the Chancellor,
"occurred Aug. 4. I had just declared in the Reichstag that only dire
necessity and only the struggle for existence compelled Germany to
march through Belgium, but that Germany was ready to make compensation
for the wrong committed.

"When I spoke I already had certain indications, but no absolute proof
upon which to base a public accusation, that Belgium long before had
abandoned its neutrality in its relations with England. Nevertheless,
I took Germany's responsibilities toward the neutral State so
seriously that I spoke frankly of the wrong committed by Germany.

"What was the British attitude on the same question?" continued the
Chancellor. "The day before my conversation with Ambassador Goschen,
Sir Edward Grey had delivered his well-known speech in Parliament, in
which, while he had not stated expressly that England would take part
in the war, he had left the matter in little doubt.

"One needs only to read this speech through carefully to learn the
reason for England's intervention in the war. Amid all his beautiful
phrases about England's honor and England's obligations we find it
over and over again expressed that England's interests--its own
interests--call for participation in the war, for it is not in
England's interests that a victorious and therefore stronger Germany
should emerge from the war.

"This old principle of England policy--to take as the sole criterion
of its actions its private interests regardless of right, reason, or
considerations of humanity--is expressed in that speech of Gladstone's
in 1870 on Belgian neutrality, from which Sir Edward quoted.

"Mr. Gladstone then declared that he was unable to subscribe to the
doctrine that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is
binding on every party thereto, irrespective altogether of the
particular position in which it may find itself at a time when the
occasion for action on the guarantee arrives; and he referred to such
English statesmen as Aberdeen and Palmerston as supporters of his
views.

"England drew the sword," continued the Chancellor, "only because it
believed its own interests demanded it. Just for Belgian neutrality it
would never have entered the war.

"That is what I meant when I told Sir Edward Goschen in that last
interview, when we sat down to talk the matter over privately as man
to man, that among the reasons which had impelled England to go into
the war the Belgian neutrality treaty had for her only the value of a
scrap of paper.

"I may have been a bit excited and aroused," said the Chancellor. "Who
would not have been at seeing the hopes and the work of the whole
period of my Chancellorship going for nought? I recalled to the
Ambassador my efforts for years to bring about an understanding
between England and Germany; an understanding which, I reminded him,
would have made a general European war impossible, and which
absolutely would have guaranteed the peace of Europe.

"Such an understanding," the Chancellor interjected parenthetically,
"would have formed the basis on which we could have approached the
United States as a third partner; but England had not taken up this
plan, and through its entry into the war had destroyed forever the
hope of its fulfillment.

"In comparison with such momentous consequences was the treaty not a
scrap of paper? England ought really to cease harping on this theme of
Belgian neutrality," said the Chancellor. "Documents on the
Anglo-Belgian military agreement which we have found in the meantime
show plainly enough how England regarded this neutrality. As you know,
we found in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office documents which
showed that England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into
Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government if war had then
broken out--in other words, to do exactly the same thing for which,
with all the pathos of virtuous indignation, it now reproaches
Germany.

"In some later dispatch Sir Edward Grey, I believe, informed Belgium
that he did not believe England would take such a step because he did
not think English public opinion would justify that action. And still
people in the United States wonder that I characterized as a scrap of
paper the treaty whose observance, according to responsible British
statesmen, should be dependent on the pleasure of British public
opinion--a treaty which England itself had long since undermined with
its military agreements with Belgium!

"Remember, too, that Sir Edward Grey expressly refused to assure us of
England's neutrality even in the event that Germany respected Belgian
neutrality.

"I can understand, therefore, the English displeasure at my
characterization of the Treaty of 1839 as a scrap of paper, for this
scrap of paper was for England extremely valuable, furnishing an
excuse before the world for embarking in the war.

"I hope, however, that in the United States you will see clearly
enough that England in this matter, too, acted solely on the principle
of 'right or wrong, my interest.'"

The Chancellor during the conversation had twice risen to take a few
impatient steps about the room. He spoke calmly enough, but with an
undercurrent of deep feeling, particularly when he mentioned his
efforts for an understanding with England and the world peace which he
had hoped would come from them based on an agreement between Great
Britain, Germany, and the United States, and with a note of thorough
conviction as to the justice of the German position toward Belgium.


II.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S REPLY.

London, Jan. 26.--Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, today authorized the following statement in reply to
an interview obtained with Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German
Imperial Chancellor, by a representative of The Associated Press and
published in London on Jan. 26 and in the United States on Jan. 25:

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs authorizes the publication
of the following observations upon the report of an interview recently
granted by the German Chancellor to an American correspondent. It is
not surprising that the German Chancellor should show anxiety to
explain away his now historic phrase about a treaty being a mere
'scrap of paper.'

"The phrase has made a deep impression because the progress of the
world largely depends upon the sanctity of agreements between
individuals and between nations, and the policy disclosed in Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg's phrase tends to debase the legal and moral currency
of civilization.

"What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain in requiring
Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium 'was going to make war
just for a word, just for a scrap of paper'--that is, that Great
Britain was making a mountain out of a molehill. He now asks the
American public to believe that he meant the exact opposite of what he
said; that it was Great Britain who really regarded the neutrality of
Belgium as a mere trifle, and that it was Germany who 'took her
responsibilities toward the neutral States so seriously.'

"The arguments by which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg seeks to establish
the two sides of this case are in flat contradiction of the plain
facts.

"First, the German Chancellor alleges that 'England in 1911 was
determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the
Belgian Government.' This allegation is absolutely false. It is based
upon certain documents found in Brussels which record conversations
between British and Belgian officers in 1906, and again in 1911.

"The fact that there is no note of these conversations at the British
War Office or the Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely
informal character and that no military agreement of any sort was at
either time made between the two Governments. Before any conversations
took place between the British and the Belgian officers it was
expressly laid down on the British side that discussion of the
military possibilities was to be addressed to the manner in which, in
case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to
Belgium for the defense of her neutrality, and on the Belgian side a
marginal note upon the record explains that 'the entry of the English
into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our
(Belgium's) neutrality by Germany.'

"As regards the conversation of 1911, the Belgian officer said to the
British officer: 'You could only land in our country with our
consent'; and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a
categorical assurance that no British Government would violate the
neutrality of Belgium and that 'so long as it was not violated by any
other power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their
territory.'

"The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated in
this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying, 'he did not
believe England would take such a step because he did not think
English public opinion would justify such action.'

"What Sir Edward Grey actually wrote was: 'I said that I was sure
that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality
of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be
the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it.'

"If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations
on military subjects between British and Belgian officers he may find
one reason in a fact well known to him--namely, that Germany was
establishing an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from
the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly populated
tract. The railways were deliberately constructed to permit of a
sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last.

"This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between
Belgium and the other powers on the footing that there would be no
violation of Belgian neutrality, unless it was previously violated by
another power. On no other footing did Belgium ever have any such
communications.

"In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of Belgium as
having thereby 'abandoned and forfeited' her neutrality, and he
implies that he would not have spoken of the German invasion as a
'wrong' had he then known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911.

"It would seem to follow that according to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's
code wrong becomes right if the party which is to be the subject of
the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations to resist
it.

"Those who are content with older and more generally accepted
standards are likely to agree rather with what Cardinal Mercier said
in his pastoral letter: 'Belgium was bound in honor to defend her own
independence. She kept her oath. The other powers were bound to
respect and to protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath.
England kept hers. These are the facts.'

"In the second part of the German Chancellor's thesis, namely, that
Germany 'took her responsibilities toward the neutral States
seriously,' he alleges nothing except that 'he spoke frankly of the
wrong committed by Germany' in invading Belgium.

"That a man knows the right while doing the wrong is not usually
accepted as proof of his serious conscientiousness. The real nature of
Germany's view of her 'responsibilities toward the neutral States'
may, however, be learned on authority which cannot be disputed by
reference to the English 'White Paper.'

"If those responsibilities were in truth taken seriously why, when
Germany was asked to respect the neutrality of Belgium if it were
respected by France, did Germany refuse? France, when asked the
corresponding question at the same time, agreed. This would have
guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack through Belgium.

"The reason of Germany's refusal was given by Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg's colleague, (the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von
Jagow.) It may be paraphrased in the well-known gloss upon
Shakespeare: 'Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just, but four
times he that gets his blow in fust.'

"'They had to advance into France,' said Herr von Jagow, 'by the
quickest and easiest way so as to be able to get well ahead with their
operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as
possible.'

"Germany's real attitude toward Belgium was thus frankly given by the
German Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador, and the German
Chancellor in his speech to the Reichstag claimed the right to commit
a wrong in virtue of the military necessity of hacking his way
through. The treaty which forbade the wrong was by comparison a mere
scrap of paper.

"The truth was spoken in these first statements by the two German
Ministers. All the apologies and arguments which have since been
forthcoming are afterthoughts to excuse and explain away a flagrant
wrong. Moreover, all the attacks upon Great Britain in regard to this
matter and all talk about 'responsibilities toward neutral States'
come badly from the man who, on July 29, asked Great Britain to enter
into a bargain to condone the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

"The German Chancellor spoke to the American correspondent of his
'efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and
Germany.' An understanding, he added, which would have 'absolutely
guaranteed the peace of Europe.'

"He omitted to mention what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at
Cardiff,[3] that Germany required as the price of an understanding an
unconditional pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government
were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggression
against Germany. They were not prepared to pledge their neutrality in
case of aggression by Germany.

[Footnote 3: In his address at Cardiff, appearing in Vol. 1, No. 2, of
THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY, Premier Asquith said:

In a communication to the German Government in 1912
regarding her future policy Great Britain declared that she
would neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon
Germany. But that was not enough for German statesmanship.

Germany wanted us to go further and pledge ourselves to
absolute neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in
war. To that demand there was but one answer, and that was
the answer which the Government gave.]

"An Anglo-German understanding on the latter terms would not have
meant an absolute guarantee for the peace of Europe, but it would have
meant an absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as England was
concerned, for Germany to break the peace of Europe.

"The Chancellor says that in his conversation with the British
Ambassador in August last he 'may have been a bit excited at seeing
the hopes and work of the whole period of his Chancellorship going for
nought.'

"Considering that at the date of the conversation, Aug. 4, Germany had
already made war on France, the natural conclusion is that the
shipwreck of the Chancellor's hopes consisted not in a European war,
but in the fact that England had not agreed to stand out of it.

"The sincerity of the German Chancellor's professions to the American
correspondent may be brought to a very simple test, the application of
which is more apposite because it serves to recall one of the leading
facts which produced the present war.

"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg refused the proposal which England put
forward and in which France, Italy, and Russia concurred, for a
conference at which the dispute would have been settled on fair and
honorable terms without war. If he really wished to work with England
for peace why did he not accept that proposal? He must have known
after the Balkan conference in London that England could be trusted to
play fair. Herr von Jagow had given testimony in the Reichstag to
England's good faith in those negotiations.

"The proposal for the second conference between the powers was made by
Sir Edward Grey with the same straightforward desire for peace as in
1912 and 1913. The German Chancellor rejected this means of averting
the war. He who does not will the means must not complain if the
conclusion is drawn that he did not will the end.

"The second part of the interview with an American newspaper
correspondent consists of a discourse upon the ethics of the war. The
things which Germany has done in Belgium and France have been placed
on record by those who have suffered from them and who know them at
first hand. After this it does not lie with the German Chancellor to
read to the other belligerents a lecture upon the conduct of the
war."




THE KAISER AT DONCHERY.

[By The Associated Press.]


Berlin, Jan. 29, (via London.)--The Lokalanzeiger has published some
further accounts of the visit of Dr. Ludwig Ganghofer, the author, to
Emperor William at the German Field Headquarters. It tells of a trip
made by the Emperor and Dr. Ganghofer to Donchery, in the region of
the Sedan battlefield. Here the Emperor, in speaking of the unity of
the German people, is quoted as saying to Dr. Ganghofer: "It is my
greatest pleasure that I could live to see it."

The Emperor pointed out to the author where his father had stood at
Sedan, where Napoleon and Bismarck met, and other historic spots.

The trip by automobile finally brought the party to the headquarters
of Crown Prince Frederick William, where, after luncheon had been
eaten, the Emperor turned smiling to his son and said:

"One gets better things to eat at your headquarters than at mine. I
shall consider whether I shall not requisition your cook."

The Emperor here had an opportunity to see a thousand French prisoners
march by. He was greatly pleased when some of them doffed their caps
to him and he returned their salute. During this review he turned to a
photographer who was taking pictures, and said:

"Photograph the prisoners and not always me."

The party later climbed a steep ascent to get a view of the
surrounding region. When descending, Dr. Ganghofer slipped, but the
Emperor quickly grasped him by the arm and saved him from a fall,
saying at the same time:

"Soldiers and citizens must help each other all they can."




HAIL!

A HYMN TO BELGIUM

POEM BY

JOHN GALSWORTHY

MUSIC BY

FREDERIC H. COWEN.

(_From King Albert's Book._)

[Music illustration:

1. Men of Belgium! Honour's own!
Ye who saved the Holy Grail,
Ye who died for Freedom's Crown,
Hail, ye brave, for ever hail!

2. Wives of Belgium! who to Death
Paid the toll of Mother's wail,
Bound with widowed sorrow's wreath
The brows of Death, ye dear saints: hail!

3. Maids of Belgium! ye who gazed
At worse than sullen Death, and pale
In terror, yet with eyes undazed,
Smiled on at Hope--ye sweethearts--Hail!
Maids of Belgium! Sweethearts, Hail!

4. Land of Belgium! earth and sky
For evermore shall tell thy tale.
The morning comes! Thou shalt not die!
Hail! Thou Sad Immortal: Hail!
Hail! Thou Sad Immortal: Hail!

N.B.--If it is desired to sing this as a simple Hymn, the Melody of
the 3rd verse should be omitted and the words sung to the opening
eight bars, as in the 1st and 2nd verses]




Holland's Future

By H.G. Wells.

(_Copyright by The New York Times Company._)

The article which follows was written by H.G. Wells for
publication in England. The British censor, however, refused
to permit its appearance there, and thus it was printed in
the United States for the first time by THE NEW YORK TIMES
on Feb. 7, 1915. In the development of his argument Mr.
Wells points out that "the Dutch hold a sword at the back of
Germany." That Holland has no intention of sheathing this
sword, so removing a menace from Germany, is indicated by
the recent cable from The Hague telling of the message sent
by the Government to the Second Chamber of the Legislature
dealing with pending legislation to prolong the term of
enlistment in the regular army, in which this language is
used: "The position of our country demands today, as it did
in August, that our entire military force should be at all
times available."


What changes for Holland are likely to result from the present war?

Let me, as an irresponsible journalist, try to estimate them, and try
to forecast what Holland is likely to do in the next few months. I do
not want for a moment to suggest what Dutchmen ought to do; this
preaching to highly intelligent neutrals is not a writer's business,
but I want to imagine how things must look in the private mind of a
wary patriotic Hollander, and to guess what may be the outcome.
Because in many ways Holland does seem to hold the key to the present
situation.

It is clear that whatever fears may have been felt for the integrity
of Holland at the beginning of the war must now be very much abated.
The risk of Germany attacking Holland diminishes with each day of
German failure, and the whole case and righteousness of the Allies
rests upon their respect for Holland. Holland's position as regards
Germany now is extraordinarily strong materially, and as regards the
Allies it is overwhelmingly strong morally. She has behaved patiently
and sanely through a trying crisis. She has endured much almost
inevitable provocation and temptation with dignity and honesty. Were
she now subjected to any German outrage she could strike with her
excellent army of 400,000 men at Aix-la-Chapelle, and turn repulse
into rapid disaster.

That is the interesting thing about the Dutch position now. The Dutch
hold a sword at the back of Germany. Were they to come into the war on
the German side, they would, no doubt, provide a most effective but
certainly not a decisive reinforcement to the German western front,
but they would also lay open a convenient way for the Allies to the
vital part of Germany, Westphalia. But were they to come in on the
side of the Allies they would at once deliver a conclusive blow. They
could cut the main communications of the German army in Flanders, they
could round up and assist to capture a very large portion of the
German western forces, and they could open the road not only to attack
but to turn the Rhine defenses. In fact, they could finish Germany.

This situation is already fairly obvious; I betray no strategic
secret; it must become manifest to every Dutchman before many more
weeks. One has but to look at the map. Every day now diminishes the
possibility of Germany being able to make any effective
counterattack, any Belgian destruction, in Holland, and every day
increases the weight of the blow that Holland may deliver. What are
the chances that Holland may not ultimately realize to the full the
possibilities of that blow and join the Allies?

Against her doing so is the consideration that she is doing very well
as she is. She keeps her freedom. Practically the Allies fight to
secure it for her. The dread of Germanization which has hung over
Holland for forty years seems to recede.

And, of course, as a secondary restraining force there is the
reasonable fear of devastation. The "good German" vindictiveness might
make one last supreme effort.

But, on the other hand, is she really doing as well as it seems?
Unless she intervenes this war will probably last for another full
year. She wants it to end. It is a terrible oppression. Her army must
remain mobilized, even if it does not fight. Her trade stagnates. She
is incumbered by refugees. What if she struck to end the war and get
the tension over? Not now, perhaps, but presently. Simultaneously with
the Franco-British counter-stroke that now draws near.

And what if she struck also for a hatred of what has happened to
Belgium? Suppose the Dutch are not so much frightened by the horrible
example of Belgium as indignant. My impression of the Dutch--and we
English know something of the Dutch spirit--is that they are a people
not easily cowed. Suppose that they have not only a reasonable fear
but a reasonable hatred of "frightfulness." Suppose that an
intelligent fellow-feeling for a small nation has filled them with a
desire to give Germany a lesson. There, it may be, is a second reason
why Holland should come in.

And by coming in, there is something more than the mere termination of
a strain and the vindication of international righteousness to
consider. There is the possibility, and not only the possibility but
the possible need, that Holland should come out of this world war
aggrandized. I want to lay stress upon that, because it may prove a
decisive factor in this matter.

The Dutch desire aggrandizement for the sake of aggrandizement as
little as any nation in Europe. But what if the path of aggrandizement
be also the path of safety?

It is clear that both France and Belgium will demand and receive
territorial compensation for these last months of horror. It is
ridiculous to suppose that the Germans may fling war in its most
atrocious and filthy form over Belgium and some of the sweetest parts
of France without paying bitterly and abundantly for the freak.

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