Edith Nesbit - "All Round the Year"

Richard F. Burton - "The Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night, Volume 4"

Richard F. Burton - "The Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night, Volume 4"

Feodor Sologub - "The Created Legend"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965




[Footnote 2-52: Stimson's comments were not limited
to overseas areas. To a request by the Second Army
commander that Negroes be excluded from maneuvers
in certain areas of the American south he replied:
"No, get the Southerners used to them!" Memo,
ACofS, WPD, for CofS, 25 Mar 42, sub: The Colored
Troop Problem, OPD 291.2. Stimson's comments are
written marginally in ink and initialed "H.L.S."]

[Footnote 2-53: Memo, G-1 for TAG, 4 Apr 42, and
Revised Proposals, 22 Apr and 30 Apr 42. All in
G-1/15640-2.]

Ultimately, theater commanders decided which troops would be committed
to action and which units would be needed overseas; their decisions
were usually respected by the War Department where few believed that
Washington should dictate such matters. Unwilling to add racial
problems to their administrative burdens, some commanders had been
known to cancel their request for troops rather than accept black
units. Consequently, very few Negroes were sent overseas in the early
years of the war.

Black soldiers were often the victims of gross discrimination that
transcended their difficulties with the Army's administration. For
instance, black soldiers, particularly those from more integrated
regions of the country, resented local ordinances governing
transportation and recreation facilities that put them at a great
disadvantage in the important matters of leave and amusement.
Infractions of local rules were inevitable and led to heightened
racial tension and recurring violence.[2-54] At times black soldiers
themselves, reflecting the low morale and lack of discipline in their
units, instigated the violence. Whoever the culprits, the Army's files
are replete with cases of discrimination charged, investigations
launched, and exonerations issued or reforms ordered.[2-55] An
incredible amount of time and effort went into handling these cases
during the darkest days of the war--cases growing out of a policy (p. 039)
created in the name of military efficiency.

[Footnote 2-54: Memo, Civilian Aide to SW, 17 Nov 42,
ASW 291.2 NT.]

[Footnote 2-55: See, for example, AAF Central Decimal
Files for October 1942-May 1944 (RG 18). For an
extended discussion of this subject, see Lee,
_Employment of Negro Troops_, ch XI-XIII.]

Nor was the violence limited to the United States. Racial friction
also developed in Great Britain where some American troops, resenting
their black countrymen's social acceptance by the British, tried to
export Jim Crow by forcing the segregation of recreational facilities.
Appreciating the treatment they were receiving from the British, the
black soldiers fought back, and the clashes grew at times to riot
proportions. General Davis considered discrimination and prejudice the
cause of trouble, but he placed the immediate blame on local
commanders. Many commanders, convinced that they had little
jurisdiction over racial disputes in the civilian community or simply
refusing to accept responsibility, delegated the task of keeping order
to their noncommissioned officers and military police.[2-56] These men,
rarely experienced in handling racial disturbances and often
prejudiced against black soldiers, usually managed to exacerbate the
situation.

[Footnote 2-56: Memo, Brig Gen B. O. Davis for the
IG, 24 Dec 42, IG 333.9-Great Britain.]

In an atmosphere charged with rumors and counterrumors, personal
incidents involving two men might quickly blow up into riots involving
hundreds. In the summer of 1943 the Army began to reap what Ulysses
Lee called the "harvest of disorder." Race riots occurred at military
reservations in Mississippi, Georgia, California, Texas, and Kentucky.
At other stations, the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies
somberly warned, there were indications of unrest ready to erupt into
violence.[2-57] By the middle of the war, violence over racial issues at
home and abroad had become a source of constant concern for the War
Department.

[Footnote 2-57: Memo, ASW for CofS, 3 Jul 43, sub:
Negro Troops, ASW 291.2 NT. The Judge Advocate
General described disturbances of this type as
military "mutiny." See The Judge Advocate General,
_Military Justice, 1 July 1940 to 31 December
1945_, p. 60, in CMH.]


_Internal Reform: Amending Racial Practices_

Concern over troop morale and discipline and the attendant problem of
racial violence did not lead to a substantial revision of the Army's
racial policy. On the contrary, the Army staff continued to insist
that segregation was a national issue and that the Army's task was to
defend the country, not alter its social customs. Until the nation
changed its racial practices or until Congress ordered such changes
for the armed forces, racially separated units would remain.[2-58] In
1941 the Army had insisted that debate on the subject was closed,[2-59]
and, in fact, except for discussion of the Chamberlain Plan there was
no serious thought of revising racial policy in the Army staff until
after the war.

[Footnote 2-58: Lee, _Employment of Negro Troops_, p.
83.]

[Footnote 2-59: Ltr, TAG to Dr. Amanda V. G. Hillyer,
Chmn Program Cmte, D.C. Branch, NAACP, 12 Apr 41,
AG 291.21 (2-28-41) (1).]

Had the debate been reopened in 1943, the traditionalists on the Army
staff would have found new support for their views in a series of surveys
made of white and black soldiers in 1942 and 1943. These surveys
supported the theory that the Army, a national institution (p. 040)
composed of individual citizens with pronounced views on race, would
meet massive disobedience and internal disorder as well as national
resistance to any substantial change in policy. One extensive survey,
covering 13,000 soldiers in ninety-two units, revealed that 88 percent
of the whites and 38 percent of the Negroes preferred segregated
units. Among the whites, 85 percent preferred separate service clubs
and 81 percent preferred separate post exchanges. Almost half of the
Negroes thought separate service clubs and post exchanges were a good
idea.[2-60] These attitudes merely reflected widely held national
views as suggested in a 1943 survey of five key cities by the Office
of War Information.[2-61] The survey showed that 90 percent of the
whites and 25 percent of the blacks questioned supported segregation.

[Footnote 2-60: Research Branch, Special Service
Division, "What the Soldier Thinks," 8 December
1942, and "Attitudes of the Negro Soldier," 28 July
1943. Both cited in Lee, _Employment of Negro
Troops_, pp. 304-06. For detailed analysis, see
Samuel A. Stouffer et al., _Studies in Social
Psychology in World War II_, vol. I, _The American
Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life_ (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 556-80. For
a more personal view of black experiences in World
War II service clubs, see Margaret Halsey's _Color
Blind: A White Woman Looks at the Negro_ (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1946). For a comprehensive
expression of the attitudes of black soldiers, see
Mary P. Motley, ed., _The Invisible Soldier: The
Experience of the Black Soldier, World War II_
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), a
compilation of oral histories by World War II
veterans. Although these interviews were conducted
a quarter of a century after the event and in the
wake of the modern civil rights movement, they
provide useful insight to the attitude of black
soldiers toward discrimination in the services.]

[Footnote 2-61: Office of War Information, The
Negroes' Role in the War: A Study of White and
Colored Opinions (Memorandum 59, Surveys Division,
Bureau of Special Services), 8 Jul 43, in CMH.]

Some Army officials considered justification by statistics alone a
risky business. Reviewing the support for segregation revealed in the
surveys, for example, the Special Services Division commented: "Many
of the Negroes and some of the whites who favor separation in the Army
indicate by their comments that they are opposed to segregation in
principle. They favor separation in the Army to avoid trouble or
unpleasantness." Its report added that the longer a Negro remained in
the Army, the less likely he was to support segregation.[2-62] Nor did
it follow from the overwhelming support for segregation that a policy
of integration would result in massive resistance. As critics later
pointed out, the same surveys revealed that almost half the
respondents expressed a strong preference for civilian life, but the
Army did not infer that serious disorders would result if these men
were forced to remain in uniform.[2-63]

[Footnote 2-62: Special Services Division, "What the
Soldier Thinks," Number 2, August 1943, pp. 58-59,
SSD 291.2.]

[Footnote 2-63: Dollard and Young, "In the Armed
Forces," p. 68.]

By 1943 Negroes within and without the War Department had just about
exhausted arguments for a policy change. After two years of trying,
Judge Hastie came to believe that change was possible only in response
to "strong and manifest public opinion." He concluded that he would be
far more useful as a private citizen who could express his views
freely and publicly than he was as a War Department employee, bound to
conform to official policy. Quitting the department, Hastie joined the
increasingly vocal black organizations in a sustained attack on the
Army's segregation policy, an attack that was also being translated
into political action by the major civil rights organizations. In
1943, a full year before the national elections, representatives of
twenty-five civil rights groups met and formulated the demands (p. 041)
they would make of the presidential candidates: full integration (some
groups tempered this demand by calling for integrated units of
volunteers); abolition of racial quotas; abolition of segregation in
recreational and other Army facilities; abolition of blood plasma
segregation; development of an educational program in race relations
in the Army; greater black participation in combat forces; and the
progressive removal of black troops from areas where they were subject
to disrespect, abuse, and even violence.[2-64]

[Footnote 2-64: New York _Times_, December 2, 1943.]

The Army could not afford to ignore these demands completely, as
Truman K. Gibson, Jr., Judge Hastie's successor, pointed out.[2-65] The
political situation indicated that the racial policy of the armed
forces would be an issue in the next national election. Recalling the
changes forced on the Army as a result of political pressures applied
before the 1940 election, Gibson predicted that actions that might now
seem impolitic to the Army and the White House might not seem so
during the next campaign when the black vote could influence the
outcome in several important states, including New York, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, and Michigan. Already the Chicago _Tribune_ and other
anti-administration groups were trying to encourage black protest in
terms not always accurate but nonetheless believable to the black
voter. Gibson suggested that the Army act before the political
pressure became even more intense.[2-66]

[Footnote 2-65: Gibson, a lawyer and a graduate of
the University of Chicago, became Judge Hastie's
assistant in 1940. After Hastie's resignation on 29
January 1943, Gibson served as acting civilian aide
and assumed the position permanently on 21
September 1943. See Memo, ASW for Admin Asst (John
W. Martyn), 21 Sep 43, ASW 291.2 NT-Civ Aide.]

[Footnote 2-66: Memo, Gibson to ASW, 3 Nov 43, ASW
291.2 NT. See also New York _Times_, December 2,
1943.]

Caught between the black demands and War Department traditions, the
Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies launched an attack--much
too late and too weak, its critics agreed--on what it perceived as the
causes of the Army's racial disorders. Some of the credit for this
attack must go to Truman Gibson. No less dedicated to abolition of
racial segregation than Hastie, Gibson eschewed the grand gesture and
emphasized those practical changes that could be effected one step at
a time. For all his zeal, Gibson was admirably detached.[2-67] He knew
that his willingness to recognize that years of oppression and
injustice had marred the black soldier's performance would earn for
him the scorn of many civil rights activists, but he also knew that
his fairness made him an effective advocate in the War Department. He
worked closely with McCloy's committee, always describing with his
alternatives for action their probable effect upon the Army, the
public, and the developing military situation. As a result of the
close cooperation between the Advisory Committee and Gibson, the Army
for the first time began to agree on practical if not policy changes.

[Footnote 2-67: For discussion of Gibson's attitude
and judgments, see Interv, author with Evans, 3 Jun
73.]

The Advisory Committee's first campaign was directed at local commanders.
After a long review of the evidence, the committee was convinced that
the major cause of racial disorder was the failure of commanders in
some echelons to appreciate the seriousness of racial unrest and their
own responsibility for dealing with the discipline, morale, and (p. 042)
welfare of their men. Since it found that most disturbances began with
real or fancied incidents of discrimination, the committee concluded
that there should be no discrimination against Negroes in the matter
of privileges and accommodations and none in favor of Negroes that
compromised disciplinary standards. The committee wanted local
commanders to be reminded that maintaining proper discipline and good
order among soldiers, and between soldiers and civilians, was a
definite command responsibility.[2-68]

[Footnote 2-68: Memo, Chmn, Advisory Cmte, for CofS,
3 Jul 43, sub: Negro Troops, ASW 291.2 NT. This was
not sent until 6 July.]

General Marshall incorporated the committee's recommendations in a
letter to the field. He concluded by saying that "failure on the part
of any commander to concern himself personally and vigorously with
this problem will be considered as evidence of lack of capacity and
cause for reclassification and removal from assignment."[2-69] At the
same time, the Chief of Staff did not adopt several of the committee's
specific recommendations. He did not require local commanders to
recommend changes in War Department policy on the treatment of Negroes
and the organization and employment of black units. Nor did he require
them to report on steps taken by them to follow the committee's
recommendations. Moreover, he did not order the dispatch of black
combat units to active theaters although the committee had pointed to
this course as "the most effective means of reducing tension among
Negro troops."

[Footnote 2-69: Memo, CofS for CG, AAF, et al., 13
Jul 43, sub: Negro Troops, WDCSA 291.21.]

Next, the Advisory Committee turned its attention to the black press.
Judge Hastie and the representatives of the senior civil rights
organizations were judicious in their criticism and accurate in their
charges, but this statement could not be made for much of the black
press. Along with deserving credit for spotlighting racial injustices
and giving a very real impetus to racial progress, a segment of the
black press had to share the blame for fomenting racial disorder by
the frequent publication of inaccurate and inflammatory war stories.
Some field commanders charged that the constant criticism was
detrimental to troop morale and demanded that the War Department
investigate and even censor particular black newspapers. In July 1943
the Army Service Forces recommended that General Marshall officially
warn the editors against printing inciting and untrue stories and
suggested that if this caution failed sedition proceedings be
instituted against the culprits.[2-70] General Marshall followed a more
moderate course suggested by Assistant Secretary McCloy.[2-71] The Army
staff amplified and improved the services of the Bureau of Public
Relations by appointing Negroes to the bureau and by releasing more
news items of special interest to black journalists. The result was a
considerable increase in constructive and accurate stories on (p. 043)
black participation in the war, although articles and editorials
continued to be severely critical of the Army's segregation policy.

[Footnote 2-70: Memo, Advisory Cmte for CofS, 16 Mar
43, sub: Inflammatory Publications, ASW 291.2 NT
Cmte; Memo, CG, 4th Service Cmd, ASF, to CG, ASF,
12 Jul 43, sub: Disturbances Among Negro Troops,
with attached note initialed by Gen Marshall, WDCSA
291.2 (12 Jul 43).]

[Footnote 2-71: Memo, J. J. McC (John J. McCloy) for
Gen Marshall, 21 Jul 43, with attached note signed
"GCM," ASW 291.2 NT.]

The proposal to send black units into combat, rejected by Marshall
when raised by the Advisory Committee in 1943, became the preeminent
racial issue in the Army during the next year.[2-72] It was vitally
necessary, the Advisory Committee reasoned, that black troops not be
wasted by leaving them to train endlessly in camps around the country,
and that the War Department begin making them a "military asset." In
March 1944 it recommended to Secretary Stimson that black units be
introduced into combat and that units and training schedules be
reorganized if necessary to insure that this deployment be carried out
as promptly as possible. Elaborating on the committee's
recommendation, Chairman McCloy added:

There has been a tendency to allow the situation to develop where
selections are made on the basis of efficiency with the result
that the colored units are discarded for combat service, but
little is done by way of studying new means to put them in shape
for combat service.

With so large a portion of our population colored, with the
example of the effective use of colored troops (of a much lower
order of intelligence) by other nations, and with the many
imponderables that are connected with the situation, we must, I
think, be more affirmative about the use of our Negro troops. If
present methods do not bring them to combat efficiency, we should
change those methods. That is what this resolution purports to
recommend.[2-73]

[Footnote 2-72: Min of Mtg of Advisory Cmte on Negro
Troop Policies, 29 Feb 44, ASW 291.2 Negro Troops
Cmte; Lee, _Employment of Negro Troops_, pp.
449-50.]

[Footnote 2-73: Memo, ASW for SW, 2 Mar 44, inclosing
formal recommendations, WDCSA 291.2/13 Negroes
(1944).]

Stimson agreed, and on 4 March 1944 the Advisory Committee met with
members of the Army staff to decide on combat assignments for
regimental combat teams from the 92d and 93d Divisions. In order that
both handpicked soldiers and normal units might be tested, the team
from the 93d would come from existing units of that division, and the
one from the 92d would be a specially selected group of volunteers.
General Marshall and his associates continued to view the commitment
of black combat troops as an experiment that might provide
documentation for the future employment of Negroes in combat.[2-74] In
keeping with this experiment, the Army staff suggested to field
commanders how Negroes might be employed and requested continuing
reports on the units' progress.

[Footnote 2-74: Pogue, _Organizer of Victory_, p.
99.]

The belated introduction of major black units into combat helped
alleviate the Army's racial problems. After elements of the 93d
Division were committed on Bougainville in March 1944 and an advanced
group of the 92d landed in Italy in July, the Army staff found it
easier to ship smaller supporting units to combat theaters, either as
separate units or as support for larger units, a course that reduced
the glut of black soldiers stationed in the United States. Recognizing
that many of these units had poor leaders, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair,
head of the Army Ground Forces, ordered that, "if practicable," all
leaders of black units who had not received "excellent" or higher (p. 044)
in their efficiency ratings would be replaced before the units were
scheduled for overseas deployment.[2-75] Given the "if practicable"
loophole, there was little chance that all the units would go overseas
with "excellent" commanders.

[Footnote 2-75: Memo, CG, AGF, for CG's, Second Army,
et al., n.d., sub: Efficiency Ratings of Commanders
of Negro Units Scheduled for Overseas Shipment,
GNGAP-L 201.61/9.]

[Illustration: 93D DIVISION TROOPS IN BOUGAINVILLE, APRIL 1944. _Men,
packing mortar shells, cross the West Branch Texas River._]

A source of pride to the black community, the troop commitments also
helped to reduce national racial tensions, but they did little for the
average black soldier who remained stationed in the United States. He
continued to suffer discrimination within and without the gates of the
camp. The committee attributed that discrimination to the fact that
War Department policy was not being carried out in all commands. In
some instances local commanders were unaware of the policy; in others
they refused to pay sufficient attention to the seriousness of what
was, after all, but one of many problems facing them. For some time
committee members had been urging the War Department to write special
instructions, and finally in February 1944 the department issued a
pamphlet designed to acquaint local commanders with an official
definition of Army racial policy and to improve methods of developing
leaders in black units. _Command of Negro Troops_ was a landmark (p. 045)
publication.[2-76] Its frank statement of the Army's racial problems,
its scholarly and objective discussion of the disadvantages that
burdened the black soldier, and its outline of black rights and
responsibilities clearly revealed the committee's intention to foster
racial harmony by promoting greater command responsibility. The
pamphlet represented a major departure from previous practice and
served as a model for later Army and Navy statements on race.[2-77]

[Footnote 2-76: WD PAM 20-6, _Command of Negro
Troops_, 29 Feb 44.]

[Footnote 2-77: The Army Service Forces published a
major supplement to War Department Pamphlet 20-6 in
October 1944, see Army Service Forces Manual M-5,
_Leadership and the Negro Soldier_.]

But pamphlets alone would not put an end to racial discrimination; the
committee had to go beyond its role of instructor. Although the War
Department had issued a directive on 10 March 1943 forbidding the
assignment of any recreational facility, "including theaters and post
exchanges," by race and requiring the removal of signs labeling
facilities for "white" and "colored" soldiers, there had been little
alteration in the recreational situation. The directive had allowed
the separate use of existing facilities by designated units and camp
areas, so that in many places segregation by unit had replaced
separation by race, and inspectors and commanders reported that
considerable confusion existed over the War Department's intentions.
On other posts the order to remove the racial labels from facilities
was simply disregarded. On 8 July 1944 the committee persuaded the War
Department to issue another directive clearly informing commanders
that facilities could be allocated to specific areas or units, but
that all post exchanges and theaters must be opened to all soldiers
regardless of race. All government transportation, moreover, was to be
available to all troops regardless of race. Nor could soldiers be
restricted to certain sections of government vehicles on or off base,
regardless of local customs.[2-78]

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