Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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The President's heart bleeds when any Americans are victims of
injustice, and he is doing everything he possibly can to rectify
this situation in our country.

You can hold up his hand by carrying on, despite the unpleasant
things that are happening to you at this moment, realizing that,
on this end, we will work all the harder to make your sacrifices
worthwhile.[19-31]

[Footnote 19-30: Ltrs, C. B. Nichols to President, 28
Mar 55, and Rabb to Nichols, 20 Apr 55; both in
G-124-1, Eisenhower Library.]

[Footnote 19-31: Ltr, E. Frederic Morrow to Pfc John
Washington, 9 Apr 57, in reply to Ltr, Washington
to President, 5 Mar 57; both in G-124-A-1,
Eisenhower Library.]

But as the record suggests, this promise to rectify the situation was
never meant to extend beyond the gates of the military reservation.
Thus, the countless incidents of blatant discrimination encountered by
black GI's would continue largely unchallenged into the 1960's, masking
the progress made by the Eisenhower administration in ordering the
sometimes reluctant services to adopt reforms. This presidential (p. 483)
resolution was particularly obvious in the integration of civilian
facilities at Navy shipyards and installations and in schools for
dependent children on military posts.

_Integration of Navy Shipyards_

The Navy employed many thousands of civilians, including a large
number of Negroes, at some forty-three installations from Virginia to
Texas. At the Norfolk shipyard, for example, approximately 35 percent
of the 15,000 employees were black. To the extent dictated by local
laws and customs, black employees were segregated and otherwise
discriminated against. The degree of segregation depended upon
location, and, according to a 1953 newspaper survey, ranged "from
minor in most instances to substantial in a few cases."[19-32]

[Footnote 19-32: UPI News Release, 20 Aug 53, copy in
CMH files.]

In January 1952 the Chief of the Office of Industrial Relations, Rear
Adm. W. McL. Hague, all but absolved Navy installations from the
provisions of Executive Order 9980.[19-33] He announced that
segregation would continue if "the station is subject to local laws of
the community in which located, and the laws of the community require
segregated facilities," or if segregation were "the norm of the
community and conversion to common facilities would, in the judgment
of the commanding officer, result in definite impediment to productive
effort." Known officially as "OIR Notice CP75," Hague's statement left
little doubt that segregation would remain the norm in most instances.
It specified that a change to integrated facilities would be allowed
only after the commander had decided that it could be accomplished
without "inordinate interference with the Station's ability to carry
out its mission." If other facilities stood nearby, the change would
be allowed only after he had coordinated with the naval district
commander.[19-34] Shortly thereafter the Acting Secretary of the Navy
expressed his agreement with Hague's statement,[19-35] thus elevating
it to an official expression of Navy policy.

[Footnote 19-33: Executive Order 9980, announcing
regulations governing fair employment practices
within the federal government, was signed by
President Truman on 26 July 1948, the same day and
as a companion to his order on equal treatment and
opportunity in the services.]

[Footnote 19-34: OIR Notice CP75, Chief, Office of
Industrial Relations, to Chiefs, Bureaus, et al.,
23 Jan 52, sub: Segregation of Facilities for Civil
Service Employees; Navy Department Policy.]

[Footnote 19-35: Ltr, Actg SecNav Francis Whitehair to
Jerry O. Gilliam, Norfolk Branch, NAACP, 19 Mar 52,
P 8(4), SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]

Official protestations to the contrary, the Navy was again segregating
people by race. Evans, in the Department of Defense, charged that this
was in fact the "insidious intent" of Hague's notice. He pointed out
to Assistant Secretary of Defense Rosenberg that signs and notices of
segregation were reappearing over drinking fountains and toilets at
naval installations which had abandoned such practices, that men in
uniform were now subjected to segregation at such facilities, and that
the local press was making the unrefuted claim that local law was (p. 484)
being reestablished on federal properties.[19-36] Somewhat late to the
battle, Dennis D. Nelson seemingly a permanent fixture in the
Pentagon, spoke out against his department's policy, but from a
different angle. He warned the Secretary of the Navy through his aide
that Notice 75 was embarrassing not only for the Navy but for the
White House as well.[19-37]

[Footnote 19-36: Draft Memo, Evans for Rosenberg,
SecDef 291.2. Evans delivered the draft memo to
Mrs. Rosenberg and discussed the situation with her
at length "in the spring of 1952." See Interv,
author with Evans, 28 Mar 72, CMH files. On Mrs
Rosenberg's request for a survey of the situation,
see Memo, ASD (M&P) for Under SecNav, 23 Dec 52.
See also Memo, CO, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, for
Chief, NavPers, 23 Apr 52, P 8(4), BuPersRecs.]

[Footnote 19-37: Memo, Nelson for Aide to Asst SecNav,
20 May 53, P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

[Illustration: CONGRESSMAN POWELL.]

Nelson was right of course. The notice quickly won the attention of
civil rights leaders. Walter White condemned the policy, but his
protest, along with the sharp complaints of the NAACP's Clarence
Mitchell and Jerry Gilliam and the arguments of the Urban League's
Lester Granger, failed to move Secretary of the Navy Dan A.
Kimball.[19-38] The secretary insisted that integrating these
installations might jeopardize the fulfillment of the Navy's mission,
dependent as it was on the "efficiency and whole-hearted cooperation"
of the employees. "In a very realistic way," he told Walter White, the
Navy must recognize and conform to local labor customs and
usages.[19-39] Answering Rosenberg's inquiry on the subject, the Navy
gave its formula for change:

This Department cannot take the initiative in correcting this
social ill but must content itself with being alert to take
advantage of the gradual dissolution of these racial prejudices
which can be effectively brought about only by a process of
social education and understanding. This Department is ever ready
to dissolve segregation practices of long standing as soon as
that can be done without decreasing the effectiveness of our
activities.[19-40]

[Footnote 19-38: Kimball succeeded Sullivan as
Secretary of the Navy on 31 July 1951.]

[Footnote 19-39: Ltrs, White to SecNav, 26 May 52;
Mitchell to same, 8 Feb 52; Jerry Gilliam to same,
10 Feb 52; Granger to same, 22 May and 27 Jun 52;
SecNav to Granger, 16 Jun 52; same to White, 20 Jun
52; Chief, OIR, to Mitchell, 4 Feb 52; Under SecNav
to Mitchell, 5 Mar 52. All in P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-40: Memo, Actg SecNav for ASD (M&P), 22
Jan 53; Memo, ASD (M&P) for Under SecNav, 23 Dec
52; both in P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

President Eisenhower's newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, Robert
B. Anderson, endorsed Notice 75 along the same lines, informing
Mitchell that the Navy would "measure the pace of non-segregation by
the limits of what is practical and reasonable in each area."[19-41]

[Footnote 19-41: Ltr, SecNav to Mitchell (ca., Apr
53), OIR 161, GenRecsNav.]

But what seemed practical and reasonable in the Navy was not (p. 485)
necessarily so in the White House, where the President had publicly
pledged his administration to the abolition of segregation in the
federal government. Should Eisenhower falter, there was always his
1952 campaign ally, Congressman Powell, to remind him of his
"forthright stand on segregation when federal funds are expended."[19-42]
In colorful prose that pulled no punches, Powell reminded the
President of his many black supporters and pressed him on the Navy's
continuing segregation. Although he denied Powell's charge of
obstructionist tactics in the executive branch, the President had in
fact been told by Maxwell Rabb, now serving as his minority affairs
assistant, that "some government agencies were neglecting their
duty."[19-43] The President responded to this news promptly enough by
ordering Rabb to supervise the executive agencies in their application
of the presidential racial policy. Rabb thereafter discussed the
Navy's policy with Secretary Anderson and his assistants on 11 June
1953.

[Footnote 19-42: Ltr, Powell to Eisenhower, 17 Apr 53,
copy in SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-43: Dwight D. Eisenhower, _Mandate for
Change 1953-1956_ (New York: New American Library,
1963), p. 293.]

With his policy openly contradicting the President's, Anderson was in
an awkward position. He had been unaware of the implications of the
problem, he later explained, and had accepted his predecessor's
judgment. His mistake, he pled, was one of timing not intent.[19-44]
Yet Anderson had conducted a wide correspondence on the subject,
discussed the matter with Lester Granger, and as late as 28 May was
still defending Notice 75, telling Special White House Assistant
Wilton B. Persons that it represented a practical answer to a problem
that could not be corrected by edict. Nor could he introduce any
changes, he maintained, adopting his predecessor's argument that the
Navy should "be alert to take advantage of its [segregation's] gradual
dissolution through the process of social education and
understanding."[19-45]

[Footnote 19-44: Interv, Nichols with Anderson, 18 Sep
53, and Nichols UPI Release, 21 Sep 53; both in
Nichols Collection, CMH.]

[Footnote 19-45: Ltrs, SecNav to W. Persons, 28 May
53; SecNav to Granger, 28 May and 29 Jul 53;
Granger to Anderson, 24 Apr and 2 Jul 53. See also
Memo, Chief, NavPers for SecNav, 11 May 53. All in
SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]

But neither the civil rights leaders nor the White House could be put
off with gradualism. Anderson's stand was roundly criticized. In an
address to the NAACP annual convention, Walter White plainly referred
to the secretary's position as a "defiance of President Eisenhower's
order."[19-46] If such barbed criticism left the secretary unmoved,
Rabb carried a stronger weapon, and in their 11 June meeting the two
men discussed the President's order to integrate federally owned or
controlled properties, the possibility of a Supreme Court decision on
the same subject, and, more to the point, Powell's public statements
concerning segregation at the Norfolk and Charleston naval
shipyards.[19-47]

[Footnote 19-46: White, Address Delivered at 44th
NAACP Annual Convention, 28 Jun 53, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 19-47: Memo, Under SecNav for President, 23
Jun 53, sub: Segregation in Naval Activities,
attached to Ltr, Under SecNav to Sherman Adams, 24
Jun 53, P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

[Illustration: SECRETARY ANDERSON _talks to a member of the fleet_.]

Anderson then proceeded to reverse his position. He began by (p. 486)
ordering a survey of a group of southern installations to estimate
the effect of integration on their civilian programs. He learned
segregation could be virtually eliminated at these shipyards and
stations within six months, although Under Secretary Charles S.
Thomas, who prepared the report, agreed with the local commanders that
an integration directive would be certain to cause trouble. But the
formula chosen by the commanders for eliminating segregation, in which
Thomas concurred, might well have given Anderson pause. They wanted to
remove racial signs from drinking fountains and toilets, certain that
the races would continue using separate facilities, and leave the
problem of segregated cafeterias till later. It was the unanimous
opinion of those involved, Thomas reported, that the situation should
not be forced by "agitators," a category in which they all placed
Powell.

On 20 August Anderson directed commanders of segregated facilities to
proceed steadily toward complete elimination of racial barriers.
Furthermore, each commander was to submit a progress report on 1
November and at sixty-day intervals thereafter.[19-48] Although the
secretary was concerned with the possible reaction of the civil rights
groups were integration not achieved in the first sixty days, he was
determined to give local commanders some leeway in carrying out his
order.[19-49] But he made it clear to the press that he did not intend
"to put up with inaction."

[Footnote 19-48: ALL NAV, 20 Aug 53; Ltr, Chief,
Industrial Relations, to Commandant, 6th Naval
District, 21 Aug 53, OIR 200, GenRecsNav. For an
example of how the new policy was transmitted to
the field, see COMFIVE Instruction 5800, 15 Sep 53,
A. (2), GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-49: Interv, Nichols with Anderson;
Nichols News Release, 23 Sep 53, in Nichols
Collection, CMH.]

He need not have worried. Evans reported on 29 October that
integration of the Charleston shipyard was almost complete and had
occurred so far without incident. In fact, he told Assistant Secretary
of Defense John A. Hannah, the reaction of the local press and
community had been "surprisingly tolerant and occasionally
favorable."[19-50] Evans, however, apparently overlooked an attempt by
some white employees to discourage the use of integrated facilities.
Although there was no disorder, the agitators were partly successful;
the Chief of Industrial Relations reported that white usage had (p. 487)
dropped severely.[19-51] Nevertheless by 14 January 1954 this same
officer could tell Secretary Anderson that all racial barriers for
civilian employees had been eliminated without incident.[19-52]

[Footnote 19-50: Evans, Weekly Thursday Report to ASD
(M&P), 29 Oct 53, SD 291.2. Begun by Evans as a
means of informing Rosenberg of activities in his
office, the Weekly Thursday Report was adopted by
the assistant secretary for use in all parts of the
manpower office.]

[Footnote 19-51: Memo, Chief, Industrial Relations,
for SecNav, 5 Nov 53, sub: Segregation of
Facilities for Civil Service Employees; see also
Ltr, SecNav to President, 9 Nov 53; both in P 8(4),
GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-52: Memo, Chief, Industrial Relations,
for SecNav, 5 Nov 53, sub: Segregation of
Facilities for Civil Service Employees, P 8(4),
GenRecsNav.]

_Dependent Children and Integrated Schools_

The Department of Defense's effort to integrate schools attended by
servicemen's children proved infinitely more complex than integrating
naval shipyards. In a period when national attention was focused on
the constitutional implications of segregated education, the
Eisenhower administration was thrust into a dispute over the intent of
federal aid to education and eventually into a reappraisal of the
federal role in public education. Confusing to the Department of
Defense, the President's personal attitude remained somewhat ambiguous
throughout the controversy. He had publicly committed himself to
ending segregation in federally financed institutions, yet he had
declared scruples against federal interference with state laws and
customs that would prevent him from acting to keep such a pledge when
all its ramifications were revealed.

In fact not one but four separate categories of educational
institutions came under scrutiny. Only the first category, schools run
by the U.S. Office of Education for the Department of Defense overseas
and on military reservations in the United States, operated
exclusively with federal funds. The next two categories, schools
operated by local school districts on military reservations and
schools on federal land usually adjacent to a military reservation,
were supported by local and state funds with federal subsidies. The
fourth and by far the largest group contained the many community
schools attended by significant numbers of military dependents. These
schools received considerable federal support through the impact aid
program.

The federal support program for schools in "federally impacted" areas
added yet another dimension to the administration's reappraisal. The
impact aid legislation (Public Laws 815 and 874),[19-53] like similar
programs during World War II, was based on the premise that a school
district derived no tax from land occupied by a federal installation
but usually incurred an increase in school enrollment. In many cases
the enrollment of military dependents was far greater than that of the
communities in the school district. Actually, these programs were not
limited to the incursion of military families; the most extreme
federal impact in terms of enrollment percentages was found in remote
mountain districts where in some cases almost all students were
children of U.S. Forest Service or National Park Service employees.

[Footnote 19-53: PL 815, 23 Sep 50, 64 U.S. 967; PL
874, 30 Sep 50, 64 U.S. 1100.]

In recognition of these inequities in the tax system, Congress gave
such school systems special "in-lieu of tax" support. Public Law 815
provided for capital projects, land, buildings, and major equipment;
Public Law 874 gave operating support in the form of salaries, (p. 488)
supplies, and the like. If, for example, a school district could prove
at least 3 percent of its enrollment federally connected, it was
eligible to receive from the U.S. Office of Education a grant equal to
the district's cost of instruction for federally connected students.
If it could show federally connected enrollment necessitated
additional classrooms, the school district was eligible for federally
financed buildings. Such schools were usually concentrated in military
housing areas, but examples existed of federally financed schools,
like federal dependents, scattered throughout the school district.
Students from the community at large attended the federally
constructed schools and the school district continued to receive state
support for all students. Although Public Law 874 was far more
important in terms of general application and fiscal impact, its
companion piece, Public Law 815, was more important to integration
because it involved the construction of schools. From the beginning
Congress sought to prevent these laws from becoming a means by which
federal authorities exercised control over the operation of school
districts. It stipulated that "no department, officer or employee of
the United States shall exercise any direction, supervision or control
over the personnel, curriculum or program of instruction" of any local
school or school system.[19-54] The firmness of this admonition, an
indication of congressional opinion on this important issue, later
played a decisive part in the integration story.

[Footnote 19-54: Sec. 7a, PL 874, 64 U.S. 1100.]

Attacks on segregation in schools attended by military dependents did
not begin until the early fifties when the Army, in answer to
complaints concerning segregated schools in Texas, Oklahoma, and
Virginia, began using a stock answer to the effect that the schools
were operated by state agencies as part of the state school system
subject to state law.[19-55] Trying to justify the situation to
Clarence Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of the Army Fred Korth cited
Public Law 874, whose intent, he claimed, was that educating children
residing on federal property was the responsibility of "the local
educational agency."[19-56]

[Footnote 19-55: DA Office of Legislative Liaison
Summary Sheet for ASA, 27 Sep 51, sub: Alleged
Segregation Practiced at Fort Bliss, Texas, CS
291.2 Negroes (17 Sep 51); Ltr, CG, The Artillery
School, to Parents of School Age Children, 2 Sep
52, sub: School Information, AG 352.9 AKPSIGP. For
examples of complaints on segregated schools, see
Ltrs, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey to ASD (M&P), 16 Jun
52, and Dir, Washington Bureau, NAACP, to SecDef, 2
Oct 52; both in OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-56: Draft Ltr, ASA (M&P) to Mitchell.
Although he never dispatched it, Korth used this
letter as a basis for a discussion of the matter
with Mitchell in an October 1952 meeting.]

Senator Humphrey, for one, was not to be put off by such an
interpretation. He reminded Assistant Secretary Rosenberg that
President Truman had vetoed an education bill in 1951 because of
provisions requiring segregation in schools on federal property. As a
member of the subcommittee that guided Public Law 874 through
Congress, Humphrey could assure Rosenberg that at no time did Congress
include language requiring segregation in post schools. Thanks to the
Army's interpretation, he observed, local community segregation
practices were being extended for the first time to federal property
under the guise of compliance with federal law. He predicted further
incursions by the segregationists if this move was left
unchallenged.[19-57]

[Footnote 19-57: Ltr, Humphrey to ASD (M&P), 16 Oct
52, OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

After conferring with both Humphrey and Mitchell, Rosenberg took (p. 489)
the matter of segregated schools on military posts to the U.S.
Commissioner of Education, Earl J. McGrath. With Secretary of Defense
Lovett's approval she put the department on record as opposed to
segregated schools on posts because they were "violative not only of
the policy of the Department" but also of "the policy set forth by the
President."[19-58] Evidently McGrath saw Public Law 874 in the same
light, for on 15 January 1953 he informed Rosenberg that if the
Department of Defense outlawed segregated dependent schooling and
local educational agencies were unable to comply, his office would
have to make "other arrangements" for the children.[19-59]

[Footnote 19-58: Ltr, ASD (M&P) to U.S. Commissioner
of Educ, 10 Jan 53, SecDef 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-59: Ltr, U.S. Commissioner of Educ to ASD
(M&P), 15 Jan 53; Ltr, ASD (M&P) to Humphrey, 10
Jan 53; both in OASD 291.2.]

Commissioner McGrath proposed that his office discuss the integration
question further with Defense Department representatives but the
change in administrations interrupted these negotiations and
Rosenberg's successor, John A. Hannah, made it clear that there would
be no speedy change in the racial composition of post schools.
Commenting at Hannah's request on the points raised by McGrath, the
Army's principal personnel officer concluded that integration should
be considered a departmental goal, but one that should be approached
by steps "consistent with favorable local conditions as determined by
the installation commander concerned." In his opinion, committing the
department to integration of all on-post schools, as the Assistant
Secretary of Defense had proposed earlier, would create teacher
procurement problems and additional financial burdens.[19-60] This
cautious endorsement of integrated schools was further qualified by
the Secretary of the Army. It was a "desirable goal," he told Hannah,
but "positive steps to eliminate segregation ... should be preceded
by a careful analysis of the impact on each installation
concerned."[19-61] Hannah then broke off negotiations with the Office
of Education.