George Chetwynd Griffith - "The Romance of Golden Star ..."

William T. Stead - "Real Ghost Stories"

Leader Scott (Re Edited By Horace Shipp And Flora Kendrick) - "Fra Bartolommeo"

Clovis G. Chappell - "Sermons on Biblical Characters"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965




[Footnote 17-106: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical
Report, 1 July 1954-30 June 1955," pp. 76-80, 92;
ibid., 1 July 1955-30 June 1956, pp. 65-67.]

The racial quota, in the guise of an "acceptable" percentage of
Negroes in individual units, continued to operate long after the Army
agreed to abandon it. No one, black or white, appears to have voiced
in the early 1950's the logical observation that the establishment of
a racial quota in individual Army units--whatever the percentage and
the grounds for that percentage--was in itself a residual form of
discrimination. Nor did anyone ask how establishing a race quota,
clearly distinct from restricting men according to mental, moral, or
professional standards, could achieve the "effective working (p. 459)
level" posited by the Army's scientific advisers.

These questions would still be pertinent years later because the
alternative to the racial quota--the enlistment and assignment of men
without regard for color--would continue to be unacceptable to many.
They would argue that to abandon the quota, as the services did in the
1960's, was to violate the concept of racial balance, which is yet
another hallmark of an egalitarian society. For example, during the
Vietnam War some black Americans complained that too many Negroes were
serving in the more dangerous combat arms. Since men were assigned
without regard to race, these critics were in effect asking for the
quota again, reminding the service that the population of the United
States was only some 11 percent black. And during discussions of the
all-volunteer Army a decade later, critics would be asking how the
white majority would react to an army 30 or even 50 percent black.

These considerations were clearly beyond the ken of the men who
integrated the Army in the early 1950's. They concentrated instead on
the perplexities of enlisting and assigning vast numbers of segregated
black soldiers during wartime and closely watched the combat
performance of black units in Korea. Integration provided the Army
with a way to fill its depleted combat units quickly. The shortage of
white troops forced local commanders to turn to the growing surplus of
black soldiers awaiting assignment to a limited number of black units.
Manpower restrictions did not permit the formation of new black units
merely to accommodate the excess, and in any case experience with the
24th Infantry had strengthened the Army staff's conviction that black
combat units did not perform well. However commanders may have felt
about the social implications of integration, and whatever they
thought of the fighting ability of black units, the only choice left
to them was integration. When the Chief of Staff ordered the
integration of the Far East Command in 1951, what had begun as a
battlefield expedient became official policy.

Segregation became unworkable when the Army lost its power to limit
the number of black soldiers. Abandonment of the quota on enlistments,
pressed on the Army by the Fahy Committee, proved compatible with
segregated units only so long as the need for fighting men was not
acute. In Korea the need became acute. Ironically, the Gillem Board,
whose work became anathema to the integrationists, accurately
predicted the demise of segregation in its final report, which
declared that in the event of another major war the Army would use its
manpower "without regard to antecedents or race."




CHAPTER 18 (p. 460)

Integration of the Marine Corps


Even more so than in the Army, the history of racial equality in the
Marine Corps demonstrates the effect of the exigencies of war on the
integration of the armed forces. The Truman order, the Fahy Committee,
even the demands of civil rights leaders and the mandates of the draft
law, all exerted pressure for reform and assured the presence of some
black marines. But the Marine Corps was for years able to stave off
the logical outcome of such pressures, and in the end it was the
manpower demands of the Korean War that finally brought integration.

In the first place the Korean War caused a sudden and dramatic rise in
the number of black marines: from 1,525 men, almost half of them
stewards, in May 1949, to some 17,000 men, only 500 of them serving in
separate stewards duty, in October 1953.[18-1] Whereas the careful
designation of a few segregated service units sufficed to handle the
token black representation in 1949, no such organization was possible
in 1952, when thousands of black marines on active duty constituted
more than 5 percent of the total enlistment. The decision to integrate
the new black marines throughout the corps was the natural outcome of
the service's early experiences in Korea. Ordered to field a full
division, the corps out of necessity turned to the existing black
service units, among others, for men to augment the peacetime strength
of its combat units. These men were assigned to any unit in the Far
East that needed them. As the need for more units and replacements
grew during the war, newly enlisted black marines were more and more
often pressed into integrated service both in the Far East and at
home.

[Footnote 18-1: All statistics from official Marine
Corps sources, Hist Div, HQMC.]

Most significantly, the war provided a rising generation of Marine
Corps officers with a first combat experience with black marines. The
competence of these Negroes and the general absence of racial tension
during their integration destroyed long accepted beliefs to the
contrary and opened the way for general integration. Although the
corps continued to place special restrictions on the employment of
Negroes and was still wrestling with the problem of black stewards
well into the next decade, its basic policy of segregating marines by
race ended with the cancellation of the last all-black unit
designation in 1951. Hastily embraced by the corps as a solution to a
pressing manpower problem, integration was finally accepted as a
permanent manpower policy.


_Impetus for Change_ (p. 461)

This transformation seemed remote in 1949 in view of Commandant
Clifton B. Cates's strong defense of segregation. At that time Cates
made a careful distinction between allocating men to the services
without regard to race, which he supported, and ordering integration
of the services themselves. "Changing national policy in this respect
through the Armed Forces," he declared, "is a dangerous path to pursue
inasmuch as it effects [_sic_] the ability of the National Military
Establishment to fulfill its mission."[18-2] Integration of the
services had to follow, not precede, integration of American society.

[Footnote 18-2: Memo, CMC for Asst SecNav for Air, 17
Mar 49, MC files.]

The commandant's views were spelled out in a series of decisions
announced by the corps in the wake of the Secretary of the Navy's call
for integration of all elements of the Navy Department in 1949. On 18
November 1949 the corps' Acting Chief of Staff announced a new racial
policy: individual black marines would be assigned in accordance with
their specialties to vacancies "in any unit where their services can
be effectively utilized," but segregated black units would be retained
and new ones created when appropriate in the regular and reserve
components of the corps. In the case of the reserve component, the
decision on the acceptance of an applicant was vested in the unit
commander.[18-3] On the same day the commandant made it clear that the
policy was not to be interpreted too broadly. Priority for the
assignment of individual black marines, Cates informed the commander
of the Pacific Department, would be given to the support establishment
and black officers would be assigned to black units only.[18-4]

[Footnote 18-3: MC Memo 119-14, 18 Nov 49, sub: Policy
Regarding Negro Marines, Hist Div, HQMC, files.
Unless otherwise noted, all documents in this
section are located in these files.]

[Footnote 18-4: Msg, CMC (signed C. B. Cates) to CG,
Dept of Pacific, 18 Nov 49. Aware of the delicate
public relations aspects of this subject, the
Director of Plans and Policies recommended that
this message be classified; see Memo, E. A. Pollock
for Asst CMC, 8 Nov 49.]

Further limiting the chances that black marines would be integrated,
Cates approved the creation of four new black units. The Director of
Personnel and the Marine Quartermaster had opposed this move on the
grounds that the new units would require technical billets,
particularly in the supply specialties, which would be nearly
impossible to fill with available enlisted black marines. Either
school standards would have to be lowered or white marines would have
to be assigned to the units. Cates met this objection by agreeing with
the Director of Plans and Policies that no prohibition existed against
racial mixing in a unit during a period of on-the-job training. The
Director of Personnel would decide when a unit was sufficiently
trained and properly manned to be officially designated a black
organization.[18-5] In keeping with this arrangement, for example, the
commanding general of the 2d Marine Division reported in February 1950
that his black marines were sufficiently trained to assume complete
operation of the depot platoon within the division's service command.
Cates then designated the platoon as a unit suitable for general (p. 462)
duty black marines, which prompted the Coordinator of Enlisted
Personnel to point out that current regulations stipulated "after a
unit has been so designated, all white enlisted personnel will be
withdrawn and reassigned."[18-6]

[Footnote 18-5: DP&P Study 119-49, 14 Nov 49, sub:
Designation of Units for Assignment of Negro
Marines, approved by CMC, 2 Dec 49.]

[Footnote 18-6: Memo, CG, 2d Marine Div, for CMC, 18
Feb 50, sub: Assignment of Negro Enlisted
Personnel; Memo, CMC to CG, 2d Marine Div, 28 Mar
50, sub: Designation of the Depot Platoon, Support
Company, Second Combat Service Group, Service
Command, for Assignment of Negro Enlisted Marines;
MC Routing Sheet, Enlisted Coordinator, Personnel
Department, 27 Mar 50, same sub.]

Nor were there any plans for the general integration of black
reservists, although some Negroes were serving in formerly all-white
units. The 9th Infantry Battalion, for instance, had a black
lieutenant. As the assistant commandant, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith,
put it on 4 January 1950, black units would be formed "in any area
where there is an expressed interest" provided that the black
population was large enough to support it.[18-7] When the NAACP
objected to the creation of another all-black reserve unit in New York
City as being contrary to Defense Department policy, the Marine Corps
justified it on the grounds that the choice of integrated or
segregated units must be made by the local community "in accord with
its cultural values."[18-8] Notwithstanding the Secretary of the
Navy's integration order and assignment policies directed toward
effective utilization, it appeared that the Marine Corps in early 1950
was determined to retain its system of racially segregated units
indefinitely.

[Footnote 18-7: Ltr, Smith to Franklin S. Williams,
Asst Special Counsel, NAACP, 4 Jan 50, AO-1, MC
files.]

[Footnote 18-8: Ltr, Roy Wilkins to SecDef, 27 Feb 50;
Memo, SecNav for SecDef, 17 Apr 50, sub: Activation
of Negro Reserve Units in the U.S. Marine Corps;
both in SecDef 291.2. See also Ltr, Asst CMC to
Franklin Williams, 7 Feb 50.]

But the corps failed to reckon with the consequences of the war that
broke out suddenly in Korea in June. Two factors connected with that
conflict caused an abrupt change in Marine race policy. The first was
the great influx of Negroes into the corps. Although the commandant
insisted that race was not considered in recruitment, and in fact
recruitment instructions since 1948 contained no reference to the race
of applicants, few Negroes had joined the Marine Corps in the two
years preceding the war.[18-9] In its defense the corps pointed to its
exceedingly small enlistment quotas during those years and its high
enlistment standards, which together allowed recruiters to accept only
a few men. The classification test average for all recruits enlisted
in 1949 was 108, while the average for black enlistees during the same
period was 94.7. New black recruits were almost exclusively enlisted
for stewards duty.[18-10]

[Footnote 18-9: Ltr, CMC to Walter White, 2 Jul 51.]

[Footnote 18-10: Memo, Div of Plans and Policies for
Asst Dir of Public Info, 4 Jun 51, sub: Article in
Pittsburgh _Courier_ of 26 May 51.]

A revision of Defense Department manpower policy combined with the
demands of the war to change all that. The imposition of a qualitative
distribution of manpower by the Secretary of Defense in April 1950
meant that among the thousands of recruits enlisted during the Korean
War the Marine Corps would have to accept its share of the large
percentage of men in lower classification test categories. Among these
men were a significant number of black enlistees who had failed to
qualify under previous standards. They were joined by thousands (p. 463)
more who were supplied through the nondiscriminatory process of the
Selective Service System when, during the war, the corps began using
the draft. The result was a 100 percent jump in the number of black
marines in the first year of war, a figure that would be multiplied
almost six times before war inductions ran down in 1953. (_Table 11_)

Table 11--black Marines, 1949-1955

Percent
Date Officers Enlisted Men of Corps

July 1949 0 1,525 1.6
July 1950 0 1,605 1.6
January 1951 2 2,077 1.2
July 1951 3 3,145 1.6
January 1952 3 8,315 3.7
July 1952 NA 13,858 6.0
January 1953 10 14,479 6.1
July 1953 13 15,729 6.0
November 1953 18 16,906 6.7
June 1954 19 15,682 6.5
January 1955 19 12,456 5.7

A second factor forcing a change in racial policy was the manpower
demands imposed upon the corps by the war itself. When General
MacArthur called for the deployment of a Marine regimental combat team
and supporting air group on 2 July 1950, the Secretary of the Navy
responded by sending the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, which
included the 5th Marine Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 11th
Marines (Artillery), and Marine Air Group 33. By 13 September the 1st
Marine Division and the 1st Marine Air Wing at wartime strength had
been added. Fielding these forces placed an enormous strain on the
corps' manpower, and one result was the assignment of a number of
black service units, often combined with white units in composite
organizations, to the combat units.

The pressures of battle quickly altered this neat arrangement.
Theoretically, every marine was trained as an infantryman, and when
shortages occurred in combat units commanders began assigning black
replacements where needed. For example, as the demand for more marines
for the battlefield grew, the Marine staff began to pull black marines
from routine duties at the Marine Barracks in New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Hawaii and send them to Korea to bring the fighting
units up to full strength. The first time black servicemen were
integrated as individuals in significant numbers under combat
conditions was in the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade during the
fighting in the Pusan Perimeter in August 1950. The assignment of
large numbers of black marines throughout the combat units of the 1st
Marine Division, beginning in September, provided the clearest
instance of a service abandoning a social policy in response to the
demands of the battlefield. The 7th Marines, for example, an organic
element of the 1st Marine Division since August 1950, received into
its rapidly expanding ranks, along with many recalled white reservists
and men from small, miscellaneous Marine units, a 54-man black (p. 464)
service unit. The regimental commander immediately broke up the
black unit, assigning the men individually throughout his combat
battalions.

That the emergency continued to influence the placement of Negroes is
apparent from the distribution of black marines in March 1951, when
almost half were assigned to combat duty in integrated units.[18-11]
Before the war was over, the 1st Marine Division had several thousand
black marines, serving in its ranks in Korea, where they were assigned
to infantry and signal units as well as to transportation and food
supply organizations. One of the few black reserve officers on active
duty found himself serving as an infantry platoon commander in Company
B of the division's 7th Marines.

[Footnote 18-11: _Location of Black Marines, 31 March
1951_

Posts and stations inside the United States 938
Posts and stations outside the United States 181
Troop training units 3
Aviation 190
Fleet Marine Force (Ground) 1,327
Ships 3
En route 58
Missing in action 8

Total 2,708

_Source_: Tab 1 to Memo, ACofS, G-1, to Asst Dir of
Public Info, 6 Jun 51, sub: Queries Concerning
Negro Marines.]

The shift to integration in Korea proved uneventful. In the words of
the 7th Marines commander: "Never once did any color problem bother
us.... It just wasn't any problem. We had one Negro sergeant in
command of an all-white squad and there was another--with a graves
registration unit--who was one of the finest Marines I've ever
seen."[18-12] Serving for the first time in integrated units, Negroes
proceeded to perform in a way that not only won many individuals
decorations for valor but also won the respect of commanders for
Negroes as fighting men. Reminiscing about the performance of black
marines in his division, Lt. Gen. Oliver P. Smith remembered "they did
everything, and they did a good job because they were integrated, and
they were with good people."[18-13] In making his point the division
commander contrasted the performance of his integrated men with the
Army's segregated 24th Infantry. The observations of field commanders,
particularly the growing opinion that a connection existed between
good performance and integration, were bound to affect the
deliberations of the Division of Plans and Policies when it began to
restudy the question of black assignments in the fall of 1951.

[Footnote 18-12: Washington _Post_, February 27,
1951.]

[Footnote 18-13: USMC Oral History Interview, Lt Gen
Oliver P. Smith, Jun 69.]

As a result of the division's study, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps announced a general policy of racial integration on 13 December
1951, thus abolishing the system first introduced in 1942 of
designating certain units in the regular forces and organized reserves
as black units.[18-14] He spelled out the new order in some detail (p. 465)
on 18 December, and although his comments were addressed to the
commanders in the Fleet Marine Force, they were also forwarded to
various commands in the support establishment that still retained
all-black units. The order indicated that the practices now so
commonplace in Korea were about to become the rule in the United
States.[18-15] Some six months later the commandant informed the Chief
of Naval Personnel that the Marine Corps had no segregated units and
while integration had been gradual "it was believed to be an
accomplished fact at this time."[18-16]

[Footnote 18-14: MC Policy Memo 109-51, 13 Dec 51,
sub: Policy Regarding Negro Marines.]

[Footnote 18-15: Memo, CMC for CG, FMF, Pacific, et
al., 18 Dec 51, sub: Assignment of Negro Enlisted
Personnel.]

[Footnote 18-16: Idem for Chief, NavPers (ca. Jun 51),
MC files.]

[Illustration: MARINES ON THE KANSAS LINE, KOREA. _Men of the 1st
Marines await word to move out._]

The change was almost immediately apparent in other parts of the
corps, for black marines were also integrated in units serving with
the fleet. Reporting on a Mediterranean tour of the 3d Battalion, 6th
Marines (Reinforced), from 17 April to 20 October 1952, Capt. Thomas
L. Faix, a member of the unit, noted: "We have about fifteen Negro
marines in our unit now, out of fifty men. We have but very little
trouble and they sleep, eat and go on liberty together. It would be
hard for many to believe but the thought is that here in the service
all are facing a common call or summons to service regardless of
color."[18-17] Finally, in August 1953, Lt. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, (p. 466)
who framed the postwar segregation policy, announced that "integration
of Negroes in the Corps is here to stay. Colored boys are in almost
every military occupation specialty and certainly in every enlisted
rank. I believe integration is satisfactory to them, and it is
satisfactory to us."[18-18]

[Footnote 18-17: Extract from Thomas L. Faix, "Marines
on Tour (An Account of Mediterranean Goodwill
Cruise and Naval Occupation Duty), Third Battalion,
Sixth Marines (Reinforced), April 17-October 20,
1952," in Essays and Topics of Interest: #4, Race
Relations, p. 36.]

[Footnote 18-18: The Chief of Staff was quoted in
"Integration of the Armed Forces," _Ebony_ 13 (July
1958):22.]

[Illustration: MARINE REINFORCEMENTS. _A light machine gun squad of 3d
Battalion, 1st Marines, arrives during the battle for "Boulder
City."_]


_Assignments_

The 1951 integration order ushered in a new era in the long history of
the Marine Corps, but despite the abolition of segregated units, the
new policy did not bring about completely unrestricted employment of
Negroes throughout the corps. The commandant had retained the option
to employ black marines "where their services can be effectively
utilized," and in the years after the Korean War it became apparent
that the corps recognized definite limits to the kinds of duty to
which black marines could be assigned. Following standard assignment
procedures, the Department of Personnel's Detail Branch selected
individual staff noncommissioned officers for specific duty billets.
After screening the records of a marine and considering his race, the
branch could reject the assignment of a Negro to a billet for any (p. 467)
reason "of overriding interest to the Marine Corps."[18-19]

[Footnote 18-19: Memo, Head of Detail Br, Pers Dept,
for Dir of Pers, 10 Jun 52, sub: Policy Regarding
Negro Marines, MC files. This method of assigning
staff noncommissioned officers still prevailed in
1976.]

By the same token, the assignment of marines in the lower ranks was
left to the individual commands, which filled quotas established by
headquarters. Commanders usually filled the quotas from among eligible
men longest on station, but whether or not Negroes were included in a
transfer quota was left entirely to the discretion of the local
commander. The Department of Personnel reserved the right, however, to
make one racial distinction in regard to bulk quotas: it regulated the
number of black marines it took from recruit depots as replacements,
as insurance against a "disproportionate" number of Negroes in combat
units. Under the screening procedures of Marine headquarters and unit
commanders, black enlisted men were excluded from assignment to
reserve officer training units, recruiting stations, the State
Department for duty at embassies and legations, and certain special
duties of the Department of Defense and the Navy Department.[18-20]

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