Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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[Footnote 17-77: See, for example, _Pathfinder_
Magazine 58 (May 7, 1952):11. See also Ltr, Philleo
Nash to Donald Dawson, 27 May 52, Nash Collection,
Truman Library; Ltr, Brig Gen Charles T. Lanham to
Evans, 7 Aug 51, CMH files; CINFO Summary Sheet, 12
Jun 52, sub: Query Washington Bureau, NAACP, CSA
291.2.]

Obviously it was going to take more than a visit from Ginzberg to move
the European Command's staff, and later in the year Collins took the
matter up personally with Handy. This consultation, and a series of
exchanges between McAuliffe and command officials, led Collins to ask
Handy to submit an integration plan as quickly as possible.[17-78]
Handy complied with a proposal that failed on the whole to conform to
the Army's current plans for worldwide integration and was quickly
amended in Washington. The European Command would not, Collins
decreed, conduct a special screening of its black officers and noncoms
for fitness for combat duty. The command would not retain segregated
service units, although the Army would allow an extension of the
program's timetable to accomplish the integration of these units.
Finally, the command would stage no publicity campaign but would
instead proceed quietly and routinely. The program was to begin in
April 1952.[17-79]

[Footnote 17-78: Msg, CofSA to CINCEUR, 4 Dec 51, DA
88688.]

[Footnote 17-79: Ltr, AG, EUCOM, to CofSA, 14 Dec 51,
sub: Racial Integration in Combat Units; G-1
Summary Sheet, 24 Jan 52, same sub; Ltr, CofSA to
Handy, 15 Feb 52; Msg, CINCEUR to CofSA, 22 Mar 52,
DA IN 119235; Msg, CofSA to CINCEUR, DA 904459, 24
Mar 52. All in CS 291.2.]

Integration of the European Command proceeded without incident, but
the administrative task was complicated and frequently delayed by the
problem of black overstrength. Handy directed that Negroes be assigned
as individuals in a 1 to 10 ratio in all units although he would
tolerate a higher ratio in service and temporary duty units during the
early stages of the program.[17-80] This figure was adjusted upward
the following year to a maximum of 12 percent black for armor and
infantry units, 15 percent for combat engineers and artillery, and
17.5 percent for all other units. During the process of integrating
the units, a 25 percent black strength was authorized.[17-81]

[Footnote 17-80: Memo, CINCEUCOM for Commanding
Generals et al., 1 Apr 52, sub: Racial Integration
of EUCOM Army Units, copy in CS 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-81: Sher Monograph, p. 27.]

The ratios were raised because the percentage of Negroes in the (p. 452)
command continued to exceed the 1 to 10 ratio and was still
increasing. In September 1953 the new commander, General Alfred M.
Gruenther, tried to slow the rate of increase.[17-82] He got
Washington to halt the shipment of black units, and he himself
instituted stricter reenlistment standards in Europe. Finally, he
warned that with fewer segregated units to which black troops might be
assigned, the racial imbalance was becoming more critical, and he
asked for a deferment of the program's completion.[17-83] The Army
staff promised to try to alleviate the racial disproportions in the
replacement stream, but asked Gruenther to proceed as quickly as
possible with integration.[17-84]

[Footnote 17-82: As of 1 August 1952 the major joint
American command in Europe was designated U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM). The U.S. Army element
in this command was designated U.S. Army, Europe
(USAREUR). Gruenther was the commander in chief of
the European Command from July 1953 to November
1956. At the same time he occupied the senior
position in the NATO Command under the title
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).]

[Footnote 17-83: Memo, USCINCEUR for TAG, 30 Sep 53,
sub: Racial Integration of USAREUR Units, AG 291.2
(30 Sep 53); see also Sher Monograph, pp. 24-27.]

[Footnote 17-84: Memos, G-1 for TAG, 30 Oct 53, sub:
Negro Overstrength in USAREUR, and TAG for
USCINCEUR, 2 Nov 53, same sub; both in AG 291.2 (30
Oct 53).]

There was little the Army staff could do. The continental commands had
the same overstrength problem, and the staff considered the European
Command an inappropriate place to raise black percentages. By mid-1953
Negroes accounted for some 16 percent of Army personnel in Europe and,
more important to the command, the number of Negroes with combat
occupation specialties continued to increase at the same rate. As an
alternative to the untenable practice of reclassifying combat-trained
men for noncombat assignments purely on account of race, Gruenther
again raised the acceptable ratio of blacks in combat units. At the
same time he directed the Seventh Army commander to treat ratios in
the future merely as guidelines, to be adhered to as circumstances
permitted.[17-85] The percentage of Negroes in the command leveled off
at this time, but not before the black proportion of the command's
transportation units reached 48.8 percent. Summing up his command's
policy on integration, Gruenther concluded: "I cannot permit the
assignment of large numbers of unqualified personnel, regardless of
race, to prejudice the operation readiness of our units in an effort
to attain 100 percent racial integration, however desirable that goal
may be."[17-86] A heavy influx of white replacements with
transportation specialties allowed the European Command to finish
integrating the elements of the Seventh Army in July 1954.[17-87] The
last black unit in the command, the 94th Engineer Battalion, was
inactivated in November.

[Footnote 17-85: Ltr, USCINCEUR to CG, Seventh Army, 8
Jul 53, sub: Racial Integration of USAREUR Units,
USAREUR AG 291.2 (1953).]

[Footnote 17-86: Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to SACEUR, 10 Apr
53, USAREUR SGS 291.2 (1953), quoted in Sher
Monograph, p. 28.]

[Footnote 17-87: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical
Report, 1 January 1953-30 June 1954," p. 60, in
CMH.]

Integration of black troops in Europe proved successful on several
counts, with the Army, in Assistant Secretary Fred Korth's words,
"achieving benefits therefrom substantially greater than we
had anticipated at its inception."[17-88] The command's combat (p. 453)
readiness increased, he claimed, while its racial incidents and
disciplinary problems declined. The reaction of the soldiers was,
again in Korth's words, "generally good" with incidents stemming from
integration "fewer and much farther between." Moreover, the program
had been a definite advantage in counteracting Communist propaganda,
with no evidence of problems with civilians arising from social
integration. More eloquent testimony to the program's success appeared
in the enthusiasm of the European Command's senior officials.[17-89]
Their fears and uncertainties eased, they abruptly reversed their
attitudes and some even moved from outright opposition to praise for
the program as one of their principal achievements.

[Footnote 17-88: Memo, ASA (M&RF) for J. C. Evans,
OASD (M), 26 Nov 52, sub: Negro Integration in
Europe, SD 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-89: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 15 Nov 55,
CMH files; Ernest Leiser, "For Negroes, It's a New
Army Now," _Saturday Evening Post_ 225 (December
13, 1952):26-27, 108-12.]

The smaller overseas commands also submitted plans to Army
headquarters for the breakup of their segregated units in 1951, and
integration of the Alaskan Command and the rest proceeded during 1952
without incident.[17-90] At the same time the continental Army
commands, faced with similar manpower problems, began making
exceptions, albeit considerably more timidly than the great overseas
commands, to the assignment of Negroes to black units. As early as
September 1951 the Army G-1 discovered instances of unauthorized
integration in every Army area,[17-91] the result of either
unrectified administrative errors or the need to find suitable
assignments for black replacements. "The concern shown by you over the
press reaction to integrating these men into white units," the Sixth
Army commander, Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, reported to the Army staff,
"causes me to guess that your people may not realize the extent to
which integration has already progressed--at least in the Sixth
Army."[17-92] Swing concluded that gradual integration had to be the
solution to the Army's race problems everywhere. McAuliffe agreed with
Swing that the continental commands should be gradually integrated,
but, as he put it, "the difficulty is that my superiors are not
prepared to admit that we are already launched on a progressive
integration program" in the United States. The whole problem was a
very touchy one, McAuliffe added.[17-93]

[Footnote 17-90: On the integration of these commands,
see, for example, G-1 Summary Sheet, 4 Sep 52, sub:
Utilization of Negro Personnel; Ltr, CG, USARAL, to
DA, 15 Sep 51; Ltr, G-1 to Maj Gen Julian
Cunningham, 22 Oct 51. All in G-1 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-91: Memo, Chief, Manpower Control Div,
G-1, for Gen Taylor, 6 Sep 51, sub: Negro
Integration, G-1 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-92: Ltr, CG, Sixth Army, to ACofS, G-1,
10 Sep 51, G-1 291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 17-93: Ltr, G-1 to CG, Sixth Army, 17 Sep
51, G-1 291.2.]

The Army staff had agreed to halt the further integration of units in
the United States until the results of the overseas changes had been
carefully analyzed. Nevertheless, even while the integration of the
Far East forces was proceeding, General McAuliffe's office prepared a
comprehensive two-phase plan for the integration of the continental
armies. It would consolidate all temporary units then separated into
racial elements, redistributing all Negroes among the organized white
units; then, Negroes assigned to black components of larger white
units would be absorbed into similar white units through normal
attrition or by concentrated levies on the black units. McAuliffe (p. 454)
estimated that the whole process would take two years.[17-94]

[Footnote 17-94: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS, 21 Sep
51, sub: G-1 Attitude Toward Integration of Negroes
Into CONUS Units, CS 291.2 Negroes (21 Sep 51). The
staff's decision to halt further integration was
announced in Memo, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS, G-3, 18
Jul 51, G-1 291.2.]

[Illustration: VISIT WITH THE COMMANDER. _Soldiers of the Ordnance
Branch, Berlin Command, meet with Brig. Gen. Charles F. Craig._]

McAuliffe's plan was put into effect when General Collins ordered
worldwide integration in December 1952. The breakdown of the "10
percent Army" proceeded uneventfully, and the old black units
disappeared. The 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments, now converted into
the 509th and 510th Tank Battalions (Negro), received white
replacements and dropped the racial designation. The 25th Infantry,
now broken down into smaller units, was integrated in September 1952.
On 12 October 1953 Assistant Secretary of Defense John Hannah
announced that 95 percent of the Army's Negroes were serving in
integrated units with the rest to be so assigned not later than June
1954.[17-95] His estimate was off by several months. The European (p. 455)
Command's 94th Engineer Battalion, the last major all-black unit, was
inactivated in November 1954, several weeks after the Secretary of
Defense had announced the end of all segregated units.[17-96]

[Footnote 17-95: _U.S. News and World Report_ 35
(October 16, 1953):99-100.]

[Footnote 17-96: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical
Report, 1 July 1954-30 June 1955," p. 83.]

[Illustration: BROTHERS UNDER THE SKIN, _inductees at Fort Sam
Houston, Texas, 1953_.]

Like a man who discovers that his profitable deeds are also virtuous,
the Army discussed its new racial policy with considerable pride. From
company commander to general officer the report was that the Army
worked better; integration was desirable, and despite all predictions
to the contrary, it was a success. Military commentators in and out of
uniform stoutly defended the new system against its few
critics.[17-97] Most pointed to Korea as the proving ground for the
new policy. Assistant Secretary of Defense Hannah generalized about
the change to integration: "Official analyses and reports indicate a
definite increase in combat effectiveness in the overseas areas....
From experience in Korea and elsewhere, Army commanders have (p. 456)
determined, also, that more economical and effective results accrue
from the policies which remove duplicate facilities and operations
based upon race."[17-98] The Army, it would seem, had made a complete
about-face in its argument from efficiency.

[Footnote 17-97: See, for example, _Semiannual Report
of the Secretary of Defense, January 1-June 30,
1933_, p. 24; ibid., January 1-June 30, 1954, pp.
21-22; and annual reports of the Secretary of the
Army for same period, as well as CINCUSAREUR's
response to criticisms by General Mark Clark, _Army
Times_, May 19, 1956, and S. L. A. Marshall's
devastating rejoinder to General Almond in the
Detroit _News_, May 13, 1956. Clark's views are
reported in _U.S. News and World Report_ 40 (May
11, 1956). See also Ltr, Lt Col Gordon Hill, CINFO,
to Joan Rosen, WCBS, 17 Apr 64, CMH files; New York
_Herald Tribune_, May 14, 1956; New York _Times_
May 6, 1956.]

[Footnote 17-98: Ltr, Hannah, ASD (M), to Sen. Lyndon
B. Johnson, 27 Feb 53, ASD (M) 291.2.]

But integration did more than demonstrate a new form of military
efficiency. It also stilled several genuine fears long entertained by
military leaders. Many thoughtful officials had feared that the social
mingling that would inevitably accompany integration in the
continental United States might lead to racial incidents and a
breakdown in discipline. The new policy seemed to prove this fear
groundless.[17-99] A 1953 Army-sponsored survey reported that, with
the single major exception of racially separate dances for enlisted
men at post-operated service clubs on southern bases, segregation
involving uniformed men and women now stopped at the gates of the
military reservation.[17-100] Army headquarters, carefully monitoring
the progress of social integration, found it without incident.[17-101]
At the same time the survey revealed that some noncommissioned
officers' clubs and enlisted men's clubs tended to segregate
themselves, but no official notice was taken of this tendency, and not
one such instance was a source of racial complaint in 1953. The survey
also discovered that racial attitudes in adjacent communities had
surprisingly little influence on the relations between white and black
soldiers on post. Nor was there evidence of any appreciable resentment
toward integration on the part of white civilian employees, even when
they worked with or under black officers and enlisted men.

[Footnote 17-99: One exception was the strong
objection in some states to racially mixed
marriages contracted by soldiers. Twenty-seven
states had some form of miscegenation law. The Army
therefore did not assign to stations in those
states soldiers who by reason of their mixed
marriages might be subject to criminal penalties.
See Memo, Chief, Classification and Standards
Branch, DCSPER, for Planning Office, 28 Feb 50,
sub: Assignment of Personnel; DF, DCSPER to TAG, 4
Jun 54; both in DCSPER 291.2. For further
discussion of the matter, see TAGO, Policy Paper,
July 1954; New York _Post_, November 13, 1957.]

[Footnote 17-100: HUMRRO, Integration of Social
Activities on Nine Army Posts, Aug 53. See also
Interv, Nichols with Davis. A DCSPER action
officer, Davis was intimately involved with the
Army's integration program during this period.]

[Footnote 17-101: Interv, author with Evans, 4 Dec 73,
CMH files.]

The on-post dance, a valuable morale builder, was usually restricted
to one race because commanders were afraid of arousing antagonism in
nearby communities. But even here restrictions were not uniform.
Mutual use of dance floors by white and black couples was frequent
though not commonplace and was accepted in officers' clubs, many
noncommissioned officers' clubs, and at special unit affairs. The
rules for social integration were flexible, and many adjustments could
be made to the sentiments of the community if the commander had the
will and the tact. Some commanders, unaware of what was being
accomplished by progressive colleagues, were afraid to establish a
precedent, and often avoided practices that were common elsewhere.
Social scientists reviewing the situation suggested that the Army
should acquaint the commanders with the existing wide range of social
possibilities.

Fear of congressional disapproval, another reason often given for
deferring integration, was exaggerated, as a meeting between Senator
Richard B. Russell and James Evans in early 1952 demonstrated. (p. 457)
At the request of the manpower secretary, Evans went to Capitol Hill
to inform the chairman of the Armed Services Committee that for
reasons of military efficiency the Army was going to integrate.
Senator Russell observed that he had been unable to do some things he
wanted to do "because your people [black voters] weren't strong enough
politically to support me." Tell the secretary, Russell added, "that I
won't help him integrate, but I won't hinder him either--and neither
will anyone else."[17-102] The senator was true to his word. News of
the Army's integration program passed quietly through the halls of
Congress without public or private protest.

[Footnote 17-102: Ibid.]

Much opposition to integration was based on the fear that low-scoring
black soldiers, handicapped by deficiencies in schooling and training,
would weaken integrated units as they had the all-black units. But
integration proved to be the best solution. As one combat commander
put it, "Mix 'um up and you get a strong line all the way; segregate
'um and you have a point of weakness in your line. The enemy hits you
there, and it's bug out."[17-103] Korea taught the Army that an
integrated unit was not as weak as its weakest men, but as strong as
its leadership and training. Integration not only diluted the impact
of the less qualified by distributing them more widely, but also
brought about measurable improvement in the performance and standards
of a large number of black soldiers.

[Footnote 17-103: Quoted in John B. Spore and Robert
F. Cocklin, "Our Negro Soldiers," _Reporter_ 6
(January 22, 1952):6-9.]

Closely related to the concern over the large number of ill-qualified
soldiers was the fear of the impact of integration on a quota-free
Army. The Project CLEAR team concluded that a maximum of 15 to 20
percent black strength "seems to be an effective interim working
level."[17-104] General McAuliffe pointed out in November 1952 that he
was trying to maintain a balanced distribution of black troops, not
only geographically but also according to combat and service
specialties (_see Tables 9 and 10_). Collins decided to retain the
ceiling on black combat troops--no more than 12 percent in any combat
unit--but he agreed that a substantially higher percentage was
acceptable in all other units.[17-105]

[Footnote 17-104: Ltr, Dir, ORO, to ACofS, G-3, 20 Nov
52, G-3 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-105: Memo for Rcd, G-1, 6 Nov 52, ref:
ACofS, G-1, Memo for CofS, sub: Distribution of
Negro Personnel, 14 Oct 52, G-1 291.2.]

Table 9--Worldwide Distribution of Enlisted Personnel by Race,
October 1952

(In Thousands)

European Far East Other Overseas Continental
Category Command Command Commands United Total
States

White 212.1 293.1 96.0 649.2 1,250.5
Black 35.6 41.5 5.8[a] 110.6 193.4
Total 247.7 334.6 101.8 759.8 1,445.9
Percent black 14.4 12.4 5.7 14.6 13.4

[Tablenote a: Restrictions remained in effect on
the assignment of Negroes to certain stations in
USARPAC, TRUST, and USARCARIB.]

_Source_: Memo, Chief, Per and Dist Br, G-1, for ACofS, G-1, 8 Oct 52,
sub: Distribution of Negro Enlisted Personnel, G-1, 291.2.

Table 10--Distribution of Black Enlisted Personnel by Branch and Rank,
31 October 1952

AUS Regular
Branch Total Percent[b] Total Percent[b]

Armor 7,738 13.7 3,565 13.8
Artillery 33,684 16.9 14,854 19.9
Infantry 37,220 14.1 15,713 14.9
Adjutant General's Corps 1,074 8.8 663 10.8
Chemical Corps 1,504 15.5 633 20.1
Corps of Engineers 18,987 16.4 8,315 17.9
Military Police Corps 3,012 8.1 1,751 9.8
Finance Corps 68 2.4 51 5.3
Army Medical Service 9,896 12.2 4,439 12.9
Ordnance Corps 5,683 10.2 2,598 12.0
Quartermaster Corps 9,690 20.8 4,187 20.6
Signal Corps 6,923 8.2 3,192 8.7
Transportation Corps 16,380 31.2 8,765 38.2
Women's Army Corps 1,310 13.1 1,283 13.3
No Branch assignment[a] 42,643 11.4 17,779 11.7
Total 195,812[c] 87,788

[Tablenote a: In training.]

[Tablenote b: Figures show black percentage of
total Army enlistments.]

[Tablenote c: Discrepancy with Table 9, which is
based on September figures.]

_Source_: STM-30, 31 Oct 52.

These percentages were part of a larger concern over the number of
Negroes in the Army as a whole. Based on the evidence of draft-swollen
enlistment statistics, it seemed likely that the 15 to 20 percent
figure would be reached or surpassed in 1953 or 1954, and there was
some discussion in the staff about restoring the quota. But such talk
quickly faded as the Korean War wound down and the percentage
declined. Negroes constituted 14.4 percent of enlisted strength in
December 1952 and leveled off by the summer of 1955 at 11.9 percent.
Statistics for the European Command illustrated the trend. In June
1955, Negroes accounted for 3.6 percent of the command's officer
strength and 11.4 percent of its enlisted strength. The enlisted
figure represents a drop from a high of 16.1 percent in June 1953.
The percentage of black troops was down to 11.2 percent of the (p. 458)
command's total strength--officers, warrant officers, and enlisted
men--by June 1956. The reduction is explained in part by a policy
adopted by all commands in February 1955 of refusing, with certain
exceptions, to reenlist three-year veterans who scored less than
ninety in the classification tests. In Europe alone some 5,300
enlisted men were not permitted to reenlist in 1955. Slightly more
than 25 percent were black.[17-106]