Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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[Footnote 17-49: G-1 Summary Sheets for CofS, 18 and
23 May 51, sub: Utilization of Negro Troops in
FECOM, G-1 291.2. See also Elva Stillwaugh's study,
"Personnel Problems in the Korean Conflict," pp.
26-29, in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-50: See, for example, Msg, DA to CINCFE,
DA 92561, 28 May 51; Msg, CINCFE to DA, C6444, 8
Jun 51.]

[Footnote 17-51: Memo, Actg CofS for SA, 28 May 51,
sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, CS 291.2.]

Pace had succeeded Gordon Gray as secretary in April 1950 and
participated in the decisions leading to integration. A
Harvard-trained lawyer with impressive managerial skills, Pace did not
originate any of the Army's racial programs, but he fully supported
the views of his Chief of Staff, General Collins.[17-52] Meeting with
his senior civilian assistants, the G-1 and G-3 of the Army, and
Assistant Secretary of Defense Rosenberg on 9 June, Pace admitted that
their discussions were being conducted "probably with a view to
achieving complete integration in the Army." Nevertheless, he stressed
a cautionary approach because "once a step was taken it was very much
harder to retract." He was particularly worried about the high
percentage of black soldiers, 12.5 percent of the Army's total,
compared with the percentage of Negroes in the other services. He
summarized the three options still under discussion in the Department
of the Army: Ridgway's call for complete integration in Korea, followed
by integration of Army elements in Japan, with a 10 percent limit (p. 444)
on black replacements; Mark Clark's proposal to ship black combat
battalions to Korea to be used at the division commanders' discretion,
with integration limited to combat-tested individuals and then only in
support units; and, finally, the Army staff's decision to continue
sending replacements for use as the Far East Command saw fit.

[Footnote 17-52: Interv, author with Collins.]

[Illustration: GENERAL RIDGWAY.]

Commenting on the Ridgway proposal, one participant pointed out that a
10 percent limit on black replacements, even if integration spread to
the European Command, would mean that the majority of the Army's
Negroes would remain in the United States. Rosenberg, however,
preferred the Ridgway plan. Stressing that it was an Army decision and
that she was "no crusader," she nevertheless reminded Secretary Pace
that the Army needed to show some progress. Rosenberg mentioned the
threat of a Congress which might force more drastic measures upon the
Army and pointedly offered to defer answering her many congressional
inquisitors until the Army reached a decision.[17-53]

[Footnote 17-53: Memo for Rcd, Col James F. Collins,
Asst to ASD (M&P), 9 Jun 51, SD 291.2.]

The decision was finally announced on 1 July 1951. A message went out
to General Ridgway approving "deactivation of the 24th Infantry and
your general plan for integration of Negroes into all units (with the
temporary exception of the 40th and 45th Divisions)."[17-54] The staff
wanted the move to be gradual, progressive, and secret to avoid any
possible friction in the Eighth Army and to win general acceptance for
integration. But it did not remain secret for long. In the face of
renewed public criticism for its segregated units and after lengthy
staff discussion, the Army announced the integration of the Far East
Command on 26 July, the third anniversary of the Truman order.[17-55]
Prominent among the critics of the Army's delay was General MacArthur,
who publicly blamed President Truman for the continued segregation of
his former command. The charge, following as it did the general's
dismissal, was much discussed in the press and the Department of
Defense. Easily disputed, it was eventually overtaken by the fact of
integration.

[Footnote 17-54: Msg, DA to CINCFE, DA 95359, 1 Jul
51.]

[Footnote 17-55: Memo, Chief, Public Info Div, CINFO,
for Dir, Office of Public Info, DOD, 26 Jul 51; DOD
Press Release, 26 Jul 51. For last-minute criticism
of the continued segregation see, for example, Ltr,
Sens. Herbert Lehman and Hubert Humphrey to SecDef,
25 Jul 51; Memo, ASA for ASD (M&P), 19 Jul 51, sub:
Racial Segregation in FECOM; Telg, Elmer W.
Henderson, Dir, American Council on Human Rights,
to George C. Marshall, SecDef, 31 May 51. All in
SecDef 291.2.]

Three problems had to be solved in carrying out the integration (p. 445)
order. The first, inactivation of the 24th Infantry and the choice of
a replacement, was quickly overcome. From the replacements suggested,
Ridgway decided on the 14th Infantry, which had been recently assigned,
minus men and equipment, to the Far East Command. It was filled with
troops and equipment from the 34th Infantry, then training replacements
in Japan. On 1 October it was assigned to the 24th's zone of
responsibility in the 25th Division's line. The 24th Infantry, its men
and equipment transferred to other infantry units in Korea, was
inactivated on 1 October and "transferred to the control of the
Department of the Army."[17-56]

[Footnote 17-56: Per Ltr, TAG to CINCFE, 9 Aug 51,
AGAO-I 322 (26 Jul 51), implemented by Eighth Army
GO 717, 22 Sep 51.]

The second problem, integration of units throughout the command,
proved more difficult and time-consuming. Ridgway considered the need
most urgent in the infantry units and wanted their integration to take
precedence. The 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry was reorganized
first, many of its black members scattered throughout other infantry
units in the 2d Division. But then things got out of phase. To speed
the process the Army staff dropped its plan for inactivating all
segregated units and decided simply to remove the designation
"segregated" and assign white soldiers to formerly all-black units.
Before this form of integration could take place in the 3d Battalion,
15th Infantry, the last major black infantry unit, the 64th Tank
Battalion and the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion began the
process of shifting their black troops to nearby white units. The 77th
Engineer Combat Company was the last combat unit to lose the asterisk,
the Army's way of designating a unit black.[17-57] The command was
originally committed to an Army contingency plan that would transfer
black combat troops found superfluous to the newly integrated units to
service units, but this proved unnecessary. All segregated combat
troops were eventually assigned to integrated combat units.[17-58]

[Footnote 17-57: Msg, DA 81846, 19 Sep 51; Eighth Army
GO 774, 16 Oct 51.]

[Footnote 17-58: FECOM Mil Hist Section, "History of
the Korean War," III (pt. 2):153-57.]

To soften the emotional aspects of the change, troop transfers were
scheduled as part of the individual soldier's normal rotation. By the
end of October 1951 the Eighth Army had integrated some 75 percent of
its infantry units. The process was scheduled for completion by
December, but integration of the rest of its combat units and the
great number of service units dragged on for another half year. It was
not until May 1952 that the last divisional and nondivisional
organizations were integrated.[17-59]

[Footnote 17-59: Memo, ASA (M&RF) for ASD (M&P), 22
Aug 52, sub: Integration of Negro Manpower, SD
291.2.]

The third and greatest problem in the integration of the Far East
Command was how to achieve a proportionate distribution of black
troops throughout the command. Ridgway was under orders to maintain
black strength at a maximum 12 percent except in combat infantry
units, where the maximum was 10 percent. The temporary restriction on
integrating the 40th and 45th Divisions and the lack of specially
trained Negroes eligible for assignment to the Japan Logistical
Command added to the difficulty of achieving this goal, but the basic
cause of delay was the continued shipment of black troops to the (p. 446)
Far East in excess of the prescribed percentage. During the integration
period the percentage of black replacements averaged between 12.6 and
15 percent and occasionally rose above 15 percent.[17-60] Ridgway
finally got permission from Washington to raise the ratio of black
soldiers in his combat infantry units to 12 percent, and further
relief could be expected in the coming months when the two National
Guard divisions began integrating.[17-61] Still, in October 1951 the
proportion of Negroes in the Eighth Army had risen to 17.6 percent,
and the flow of black troops to the Far East continued unabated,
threatening the success of the integration program. Ridgway repeatedly
appealed for relief, having been warned by his G-1 that future black
replacements must not exceed 10 percent if the integration program was
to continue successfully.[17-62]

[Footnote 17-60: Ibid.; Stillwaugh, "Personnel
Problems in the Korean Conflict," pp. 33-35.]

[Footnote 17-61: Msg, CSA to CINCFE, DA 96489, 18 Jul
51.]

[Footnote 17-62: Journal Files, G-1, FEC, Oct 51,
Annex 2.]

[Illustration: MACHINE GUNNERS OF COMPANY L, 14TH INFANTRY, _Hill 931,
Korea, September 1952_.]

Ridgway was particularly concerned with the strain on his program
caused by the excessive number of black combat replacements swelling
the percentage of Negroes in his combat units. By September black
combat strength reached 14.2 percent, far above the limits set by
the Army staff. Ridgway wanted combat replacements limited to 12 (p. 447)
percent. He also proposed that his command be allowed to request
replacements by race and occupational specialty in order to provide
Army headquarters with a sound basis for allotting black enlisted men
to the Far East. While the Army staff promised to try to limit the
number of black combat troops, it rejected the requisition scheme.
Selection for occupational specialist training was not made by race,
the G-1 explained, and the Army could not control the racial
proportions of any particular specialty. Since the Army staff had no
control over the number of Negroes in the Army, their specialties or
the replacement needs of the command, no purpose would be served by
granting such a request.[17-63]

[Footnote 17-63: Rad, CINCFE for DA, DA IN 182547, 11
Sep 52, sub: Negro Personnel; Msg, DA to CINCFE, 23
Sep 52, G-1 291.2.]

Yet Ridgway's advice could not be ignored, because by year's end the
whole Army had developed a vested interest in the success of
integration in the Far East. The service was enjoying the praise of
civil rights congressmen, much of the metropolitan press, and even
some veterans' groups, such as the Amvets.[17-64] Secretary Pace was
moved to call the integration of the Eighth Army a notable advance in
the field of human relations.[17-65] But most of all, the Army began
to experience the fruits of racial harmony. Much of the conflict and
confusion among troops that characterized the first year of the war
disappeared as integration spread, and senior officials commented
publicly on the superior military efficiency of an integrated Army in
Korea.[17-66] As for the men themselves, their attitudes were in sharp
contrast to those predicted by the Army traditionalists. The
conclusion of some white enlisted men, wounded and returned from
Korea, were typical:

Far as I'm concerned it [integration] worked pretty good.... When
it comes to life or death, race does not mean any difference....
It's like one big family.... Got a colored guy on our machine gun
crew--after a while I wouldn't do without him.... Concerning
combat, what I've seen, an American is an American. When we have
to do something we're all the same.... Each guy is like your own
brother--we treated all the same.... Had a colored platoon
leader. They are as good as any people.... We [an integrated
squad] had something great in common, sleeping, guarding each
other--sometimes body against body as we slept in bunkers....
Takes all kinds to fight a war.[17-67]

[Footnote 17-64: See, for example, Press Release by
Senator Herbert H. Lehman, 27 July 1951, which
expressed the praise of nine U.S. senators;
Editorial in the Baltimore Sun, December 21, 1951;
Ltr, National Cmdr, Amvets, to CINCFE, 5 Dec 51,
copies in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-65: _Semiannual Report of the Secretary
of Defense, July 1-December 31, 1951_ (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 13.]

[Footnote 17-66: See, for example, Interv, Nichols
with Bradley; Ltr, Ridgway to author, 3 Dec 73;
Mark S. Watson, "Most Combat GI's are
Unsegregated," datelined 15 Dec 51 (probably
prepared for the Baltimore _Sun_). All in CMH
files. See also James C. Evans and David Lane,
"Integration in the Armed Services," _Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences_
304 (March 1956):78.]

[Footnote 17-67: Extracted from a series of interviews
conducted by Lee Nichols with a group of wounded
soldiers at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 12
November 1952, in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

Integration was an established fact in Korea, but the question
remained: could an attitude forged in the heat of battle be sustained
on the more tranquil maneuver grounds of central Europe and the
American south?

[Illustration: COLOR GUARD, 160TH INFANTRY, KOREA, 1952.]

_Integration of the European and Continental Commands_ (p. 448)

Since the Army was just 12 percent Negro in September 1951, it should
have been possible to solve Ridgway's problem of black overstrength
simply by distributing black soldiers evenly throughout the Army. But
this solution was frustrated by the segregation still in force in
other commands. Organized black units in the United States were small
and few in number, and black recruits who could not be used in them
were shipped as replacements to the overseas commands, principally in
the Far East and Europe.[17-68] Consequently, Ridgway's problem was
not an isolated one; his European counterpart was operating a largely
segregated command almost 13 percent black. The Army could not prevent
black overstrengths so long as Negroes were ordered into the
quota-free service by color-blind draft boards, but it could equalize
the overstrength by integrating its forces all over the world.

[Footnote 17-68: In 1951 the European Command was the
major Army headquarters in the European theater. It
was, at the same time, a combined command with some
20,000 members of the Air Force and Navy serving
along with 234,000 Army troops. In August 1952 a
separate Army command (U.S. Army, Europe) was
created within the European Command. Discussion of
the European Command and its commander in the
following paragraphs applies only to Army troops.]

This course, along with the knowledge that integration was working in
the Far East and the training camps, was leading senior Army officials
toward full integration. But they wanted certain reassurances.
Believing that integration of the continental commands would create,
in the words of the G-1, "obstacles and difficulties vastly greater
than those in FECOM," the Army staff wanted these problems (p. 449)
thoroughly analyzed before taking additional moves, "experimental or
otherwise," to broaden integration.[17-69] General Collins, although
personally committed to integration, voiced another widespread concern
over extending integration beyond the Far East units. Unlike the Navy
and the Air Force, which were able to secure more highly qualified men
on a volunteer basis, the Army had long been forced to accept anyone
meeting the draft's minimum standards. This circumstance was very
likely to result, he feared, in an army composed to an unprecedented
degree of poorly educated black soldiers, possibly as much as 30
percent in the near future.[17-70]

[Footnote 17-69: Memo, G-1 for DCofS, Admin, 18 Jul
51, G-1 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-70: Ltr, Eli Ginzberg to Lt Col Edward J.
Barta, Hist Div, USAREUR, attached to Ltr, Ginzberg
to Carter Burgess, ASD (M&P), 11 Nov 55, SD 291.2
(11 Nov 55).]

The Army's leaders received the necessary reassurances in the coming
months. The Secretary of Defense laid to rest their fear that the
draft-dependent Army would become a dumping ground for the ignorant
and untrainable when, in April 1951, he directed that troops must be
distributed among the services on a qualitative basis. Assistant
Secretary of the Army Johnson asked Professor Eli Ginzberg, a social
scientist and consultant to the Army, to explain to the Army Policy
Council the need for aggressive action to end segregation.[17-71] And
once again, but this time with considerable scientific detail to
support its recommendations, the Project CLEAR final report told Army
leaders that the service should be integrated worldwide. Again the
researchers found that the Army's problem was not primarily racial,
but a question of how best to use underqualified men. Refining their
earlier figures, they decided that black soldiers were best used in
integrated units at a ratio of 15 to 85. Integration on the job was
conducive to social integration, they discovered, and social
integration, dependent on several variables, was particularly amenable
to firm policy guidance and local control. Finally, the report found
that integration on military posts was accepted by local civilians as
a military policy unlikely to affect their community.[17-72]

[Footnote 17-71: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 11 Nov 55.]

[Footnote 17-72: ORO-R-11, Rpt, Utilization of Negro
Manpower in the Army, Project CLEAR, vol. 1; G-1
Summary Sheet for CofSA, 5 Jan 52, sub: Evaluation
of ORO-R-11 on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the
Army, CS 291.2 Negroes (5 Jan 52).]

The Chief of Staff approved the Project CLEAR final report, although
his staff had tried to distinguish between the report's view of
on-the-job integration and social integration, accepting the former
with little reservation, but considering the latter to be "weak in
supporting evidence." The personnel staff continued to stress the need
to reimpose a racial quota quickly without waiting for black
enrollment to reach 15 percent as the Project CLEAR report suggested.
It also believed that integration should be limited to the active
federal service, exempting National Guard units under state control.
General McAuliffe agreed to drop racial statistics but warned that
investigation of discrimination charges depended on such statistics.
He also agreed that blacks could be mixed with whites at 10 to 20
percent of the strength of any white unit, but to assign whites in
similar percentages to black units "would undoubtedly present
difficulties and place undue burdens on the assigned white personnel."
Finally, McAuliffe stressed that commanders would have flexibility (p. 450)
in working out the nonoperational aspects of integration so long as
their methods and procedures were consistent with Army policy.[17-73]

[Footnote 17-73: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofSA, 5 Jan
52.]

These reservations aside, McAuliffe concluded that integration was
working in enough varied circumstances to justify its extension to the
entire Army. General Collins agreed, and on 29 December 1951 he
ordered all major commanders to prepare integration programs for their
commands. Integration was the Army's immediate goal, and, he added, it
was to be progressive, in orderly stages, and without publicity.[17-74]

[Footnote 17-74: Ibid., 29 Dec 51, sub: Integration of
Negro Enlisted Personnel, G-1 291.2 Negroes.]

The Chief of Staff's decision was especially timely for the European
Command where General Thomas T. Handy faced manpower problems similar
to if not so critical as those in the Far East. During 1951 Army
strength in Europe had also risen sharply--from 86,000 to 234,000 men.
Black strength had increased even more dramatically, from 8,876 (or 11
percent) to 27,267 (or 13 percent). The majority of black soldiers in
Europe served in segregated units, the number of which more than
doubled because of the Korean War. From sixty-six units in June 1950,
the figure rose to 139 in March 1952. Most of these units were not in
divisions but in service organizations; 113 were service units, of
which fifty-three were transportation units.

Again as in the Far East, some integration in Europe occurred in
response to the influx of new soldiers as well as to Army directives.
Handy integrated his Noncommissioned Officers' Academy in 1950 in an
operation involving thousands of enlisted men. After he closed the
segregated Kitzingen Training Center in February 1951, black troops
were absorbed into other training and replacement centers on an
integrated basis. For some time Army commanders in Europe had also
been assigning certain black soldiers with specialist training to
white units, a practice dramatically accelerated in 1950 when the
command began receiving many Negroes with occupation specialties
unneeded in black units. In March 1951 Handy directed that, while the
assignment of Negroes to black units remained the first priority,
Negroes possessing qualifications unusable or in excess of the needs
of black units would be assigned where they could be used most
effectively.[17-75] Consequently, by the end of 1951 some 7 percent of
all black enlisted men, 17 percent of the black officers, and all
black soldiers of the Women's Army Corps in the command were serving
in integrated units.

[Footnote 17-75: Ltr, EUCOM to Sub Cmds, 16 Mar 51,
sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel, USAREUR SGS
291.2. See also EUCOM Hist Div, "Integration of
Negro and White Troops in the U.S. Army, Europe,
1952-1954," p. 4, in CMH. This monograph, prepared
by Ronald Sher, will be cited hereafter as Sher
Monograph.]

In sharp contrast to the Far East Command, there was little support
among senior Army officials in Europe for full integration. Sent by
Assistant Secretary Johnson to brief European commanders on the Army's
decision, Eli Ginzberg met with almost universal skepticism. Most
commanders were unaware of the Army's success with integration in the
Far East and in the training divisions at home; when so informed they
were quick to declare such a move impractical for Europe. They warned
of the social problems that would arise with the all-white civilian
population and predicted that the Army would be forced to abandon (p. 451)
the program in midstream.[17-76]

[Footnote 17-76: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 11 Nov 55,
CMH files.]

There were exceptions. Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, the commander of the
Seventh Army, described the serious operational problems caused by
segregation in his command. Most of his black units were
unsatisfactory, and without minimizing the difficulties he concluded
in 1951 that integration was desirable not only for the sake of his
own mission but for the Army's efficiency and the nation's world
leadership. Officers at Headquarters, Supreme Allied Powers, Europe,
also recited personnel and training problems caused in their command
by segregation, but here, Ginzberg noted, the attitude was one of
cautious silence, an attitude that made little difference because
General Eisenhower's command was an international organization having
nothing to do with the Army's race policies. It would, however, be of
some interest during the 1952 political campaign when some
commentators made the false claim that Eisenhower had integrated
American units in Europe.[17-77]