George Herbert Betts - "The Mind and Its Education"

James M. Beck - "The Case of Edith Cavell"

Benjamin Disraeli - "The Young Duke"

Emily Dickinson - "Poems [Series 2]"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965




[Footnote 2-28: Ltr, Walter White to Gen Marshall, 22
Dec 41, AG 291.21 (12-22-41).]

[Footnote 2-29: See C-279, 2, Volunteer Division
Folder, NAACP Collection, Manuscripts Division,
LC.]

[Footnote 2-30: Ltr, CofS to Dorothy Canfield Fisher,
16 Feb 42, OCS 20602-254.]

Even though it rejected the idea of a volunteer, integrated division,
the Army staff reviewed in the fall of 1942 a proposal for
the assignment of some black recruits to white units. The
Organization-Mobilization Group of G-3, headed by Col. Edwin W.
Chamberlain, argued that the Army General Classification Test scores
proved that black soldiers in groups were less useful to the Army than
white soldiers in groups. It was a waste of manpower, funds, and
equipment, therefore, to organize the increasingly large numbers of
black recruits into segregated units. Not only was such organization
wasteful, but segregation "aggravated if not caused in its entirety"
the racial friction that was already plaguing the Army. To avoid both
the waste and the strife, Chamberlain recommended that the Army halt
the activation of additional black units and integrate black recruits
in the low-score categories, IV and V, into white units in the ratio
of one black to nine whites. The black recruits would be used as
cooks, orderlies, and drivers, and in other jobs which required only
the minimum basic training and which made up 10 to 20 percent of those
in the average unit. Negroes in the higher categories, I through III,
would be assigned to existing black units where they could be expected
to improve the performance of those units. Chamberlain defended his
plan against possible charges of discrimination by pointing out that
the Negroes would be assigned wholly on the basis of native capacity,
not race, and that this plan would increase the opportunities for
Negroes to participate in the war effort. To those who objected on the
grounds that the proposal meant racial integration, Chamberlain
replied that there was no more integration involved than in "the (p. 032)
employment of Negroes as servants in a white household."[2-31]

[Footnote 2-31: Draft Memo (initialed E.W.C.) for Gen
Edwards, G-3 Negro File, 1942-44. See also Lee,
_Employment of Negro Troops_, pp. 152-57.]

The Chamberlain Plan and a variant proposed the following spring
prompted discussion in the Army staff that clearly revealed general
dissatisfaction with the current policy. Nonetheless, in the face of
opposition from the service and ground forces, the plan was abandoned.
Yet because something had to be done with the mounting numbers of
black draftees, the Army staff reversed the decision made in its
prewar mobilization plans and turned once more to the concept of the
all-black division. The 93d Infantry Division was reactivated in the
spring of 1942 and the 92d the following fall. The 2d Cavalry Division
was reconstituted as an all-black unit and reactivated in February
1943. These units were capable of absorbing 15,000 or more men each
and could use men trained in the skills of practically every arm and
service.

This absorbency potential became increasingly important in 1943 when
the chairman of the War Manpower Commission, Paul V. McNutt, began to
attack the use of racial quotas in selecting inductees. He considered
the practice of questionable legality, and the commission faced
mounting public criticism as white husbands and fathers were drafted
while single healthy Negroes were not called.[2-32] Secretary Stimson
defended the legality of the quota system. He did not consider the
current practice "discriminatory in any way" so long as the Army
accepted its fair percentage of Negroes. He pointed out that the
Selective Service Act provided that no man would be inducted "_unless
and until_" he was acceptable to the services, and Negroes were
acceptable "only at a rate at which they can be properly
assimilated."[2-33] Stimson later elaborated on this theme, arguing that
the quota system would be necessary even after the Army reached full
strength because inductions would be limited to replacement of losses.
Since there were few Negroes in combat, their losses would be
considerably less than those of whites. McNutt disagreed with
Stimson's interpretation of the law and announced plans to abandon it
as soon as the current backlog of uninducted Negroes was absorbed, a
date later set for January 1944.[2-34]

[Footnote 2-32: Ltr, Paul V. McNutt to SW, 17 Feb 43,
AG 327.31 (9-19-40) (1) sec. 12.]

[Footnote 2-33: Ltr, SW to McNutt, 20 Feb 43, AG
327.31 (9-19-40) (1) sec. 12.]

[Footnote 2-34: Ltr, McNutt to SW, 23 Mar 43, AG
327.31 (9-19-40) (1) sec. 12.]

A crisis over the quota system was averted when, beginning in the
spring of 1943, the Army's monthly manpower demands outran the ability
of the Bureau of Selective Service to provide black inductees. So long
as the Army requested more Negroes than the bureau could supply,
little danger existed that McNutt would carry out his threat.[2-35] But
it was no victory for the Army. The question of the quota's legality
remained unanswered, and it appeared that the Army might be forced to
abandon the system at some future time when there was a black surplus.

[Footnote 2-35: The danger was further reduced when,
as part of a national manpower allocation reform,
President Roosevelt removed the Bureau of Selective
Service from the War Manpower Commission's control
and restored it to its independent status as the
Selective Service System on 5 December 1943. See
Stimson and Bundy, _On Active Service_, pp. 483-86;
Theodore Wyckoff, "The Office of the Secretary of
War Under Henry L. Stimson," in CMH.]

There were many reasons for the sudden shortage of black inductees (p. 033)
in the spring of 1943. Since more Negroes were leaving the service for
health or other reasons, the number of calls for black draftees had
increased. In addition, local draft boards were rejecting more
Negroes. But the basic reason for the shortage was that the magnitude
of the war had finally turned the manpower surpluses of the 1930's
into manpower shortages, and the shortages were appearing in black as
well as white levies for the armed forces. The Negro was no longer a
manpower luxury. The quota calls for Negroes rose in 1944, and black
strength stood at 701,678 men in September, approximately 9.6 percent
of the whole Army. [2-36] The percentage of black women in the Army
stayed at less than 6 percent of the Women's Army Auxiliary
Corps--after July 1943 the Women's Army Corps--throughout the war.
Training and serving under the same racial policy that governed the
employment of men, the women's corps also had a black recruitment goal
of 10 percent, but despite the active efforts of recruiters and
generally favorable publicity from civil rights groups, the volunteer
organization was unable to overcome the attitude among young black
women that they would not be well received at Army posts.[2-37]

[Footnote 2-36: Strength of the Army, 1 Jan 46,
STM-30, p. 60.]

[Footnote 2-37: Memo, Dir of Mil Pers, SOS, for G-1,
12 Sep 42, SPGAM/322.5 (WAAC) (8-24-42). See also
Edwin R. Embree, "Report of Informal Visit to
Training Camp for WAAC's Des Moines, Iowa" (c.
1942), SPWA 291.21. For a general description of
Negroes in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, see
Mattie E. Treadwell, _The Women's Army Corps_,
United States Army in World War II (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1954), especially
Chapter III. See also Lee, _Employment of Negro
Troops_, pp. 421-26.]

Faced with manpower shortages, the Army began to reassess its plan to
distribute Negroes proportionately throughout the arms and services.
The demand for new service units had soared as the size of the
overseas armies grew, while black combat units, unwanted by overseas
commanders, had remained stationed in the United States. The War
Department hoped to ease the strain on manpower resources by
converting black combat troops into service troops. A notable example
of the wholesale conversion of such combat troops and one that
received considerable notice in the press was the inactivation of the
2d Cavalry Division upon its arrival in North Africa in March 1944.
Victims of the change included the 9th and 10th Cavalry regiments,
historic combat units that had fought with distinction in the Indian
wars, with Teddy Roosevelt in Cuba, and in the Philippine
Insurrection.[2-38]

[Footnote 2-38: Inactivation of the 2d Cavalry
Division began in February 1944, and its
headquarters completed the process on 10 May. The
9th Cavalry was inactivated on 7 March, the 10th
Cavalry on 20 March 1944.]

By trying to justify the conversion, Secretary Stimson only aggravated
the controversy. In the face of congressional questions and criticism
in the black press, Stimson declared that the decision stemmed from a
study of the relative abilities and status of training of the troops
in the units available for conversion. If black units were
particularly affected, it was because "many of the Negro units have
been unable to master efficiently the techniques of modern
weapons."[2-39] Thus, by the end of 1944, the Army had abandoned its
attempt to maintain a balance between black combat and service units,
and during the rest of the war most Negroes were assigned to service
units.

[Footnote 2-39: Ltr, SW to Rep. Hamilton Fish, 19 Feb
44, reprinted in U.S. Congress, House,
_Congressional Record_, 78th Cong., 2d sess., pp.
2007-08.]

According to the War Department, the relationship between Negroes (p. 034)
and the Army was a mutual obligation. Negroes had the right and duty
to serve their country to the best of their abilities; the Army had
the right and the duty to see that they did so. True, the use of black
troops was made difficult because their schooling had been largely
inferior and their work therefore chiefly unskilled. Nevertheless, the
Army staff concluded, all races were equally endowed for war and most
of the less mentally alert could fight if properly led.[2-40] A manual
on leadership observed:

War Department concern with the Negro is focused directly and
solely on the problem of the most effective use of colored troops
... the Army has no authority or intention to participate in
social reform as such but does view the problem as a matter of
efficient troop utilization. With an imposed ceiling on the
maximum strength of the Army it is the responsibility of all
officers to assure the most efficient use of the manpower
assigned.[2-41]

[Footnote 2-40: War Department Pamphlet 20-6,
_Command of Negro Troops_, 29 February 1944.]

[Footnote 2-41: Army Service Forces Manual M-5,
_Leadership and the Negro Soldier_, October 1944,
p. iv.]

But the best efforts of good officers could not avail against poor
policy. Although the Army maintained that Negroes had to bear a
proportionate share of the casualties, by policy it assigned the
majority to noncombat units and thus withheld the chance for them to
assume an equal risk. Subscribing to the advantage of making full use
of individual abilities, the Army nevertheless continued to consider
Negroes as a group and to insist that military efficiency required
racially segregated units. Segregation in turn burdened the service
with the costly provision of separate facilities for the races.
Although a large number of Negroes served in World War II, their
employment was limited in opportunity and expensive for the service.


_The Need for Change_

If segregation weakened the Army's organization for global war, it had
even more serious effects on every tenth soldier, for as it deepened
the Negro's sense of inferiority it devastated his morale. It was a
major cause of the poor performance and the disciplinary problems that
plagued so many black units. And it made black soldiers blame their
personal difficulties and misfortunes, many the common lot of any
soldier, on racial discrimination.[2-42]

[Footnote 2-42: Lee, _Employment of Negro Troops_, p.
84; for a full discussion of morale, see ch. XI.
See also David G. Mandelbaum, _Soldier Groups and
Negro Soldiers_ (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1952); Charles Dollard and Donald Young, "In
the Armed Forces," _Survey Graphic_ 36 (January
1947):66ff.]

Deteriorating morale in black units and pressure from a critical
audience of articulate Negroes and their sympathizers led the War
Department to focus special attention on its race problem. Early in
the war Secretary Stimson had agreed with a General Staff
recommendation that a permanent committee be formed to evaluate racial
incidents, propose special reforms, and answer questions involving the
training and assignment of Negroes.[2-43] On 27 August 1942 he
established the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies, with
Assistant Secretary McCloy as chairman.[2-44] Caught in the cross (p. 035)
fire of black demands and Army traditions, the committee contented
itself at first with collecting information on the racial situation
and acting as a clearinghouse for recommendations on the employment of
black troops.[2-45]

[Footnote 2-43: Memo, G-1 for CofS, 18 Jul 42; DF,
G-1 to TAG, 11 Aug 42. Both in AG 334 (Advisory
Cmte on Negro Trp Policies, 11 Jul 42) (1).]

[Footnote 2-44: The committee included the Assistant
Chiefs of Staff, G-1, of the War Department General
Staff, the Air Staff, and the Army Ground Forces;
the Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces;
General Davis, representing The Inspector General,
and an acting secretary. The Civilian Aide to the
Secretary of War was not a member, although Judge
Hastie's successor was made an _ex officio_ member
in March 1943. See Min of Mtg of Advisory Cmte, Col
J. S. Leonard, 22 Mar 43, ASW 291.2 NTC.]

[Footnote 2-45: See, for example, Memo, Recorder,
Cmte on Negro Troop Policies (Col John H.
McCormick), for CofS, sub: Negro Troops, WDCSA
291.2 (12-24-42).]

[Illustration: SERVICE CLUB, FORT HUACHUCA.]

Serious racial trouble was developing by the end of the first year of
the war. The trouble was a product of many factors, including the
psychological effects of segregation which may not have been so
obvious to the committee or even to the black soldier. Other factors,
however, were visible to all and begged for remedial action. For
example, the practice of using racially separated facilities on
military posts, which was not sanctioned in the Army's basic plan for
black troops, took hold early in the war. Many black units were
located at camps in the south, where commanders insisted on applying
local laws and customs inside the military reservations. This (p. 036)
practice spread rapidly, and soon in widely separated sections of the
country commanders were separating the races in theaters, post
exchanges, service clubs, and buses operating on posts. The
accommodations provided Negroes were separate but rarely equal, and
substandard recreational and housing facilities assigned to black
troops were a constant source of irritation. In fact the Army, through
the actions of local commanders, actually introduced Jim Crow in some
places at home and abroad. Negroes considered such practices in
violation of military regulations and inconsistent with the announced
principles for which the United States was fighting. Many believed
themselves the victims of the personal prejudices of the local
commander. Judge Hastie reported their feelings: "The traditional
mores of the South have been widely accepted and adopted by the Army
as the basis of policy and practice affecting the Negro soldier.... In
tactical organization, in physical location, in human contacts, the
Negro soldier is separated from the white soldier as completely as
possible."[2-46]

[Footnote 2-46: Memo, Hastie for SW, 22 Sep 41, sub:
Survey and Recommendations Concerning the
Integration of the Negro Soldier Into the Army,
G-1/15640-120.]

In November 1941 another controversy erupted over the discovery that
the Red Cross had established racially segregated blood banks. The Red
Cross readily admitted that it had no scientific justification for the
racial separation of blood and blamed the armed services for the
decision. Despite the evidence of science and at risk of demoralizing
the black community, the Army's Surgeon General defended the
controversial practice as necessary to insure the acceptance of a
potentially unpopular program. Ignoring constant criticism from the
NAACP and elements of the black press, the armed forces continued to
demand segregated blood banks throughout the war. Negroes appreciated
the irony of the situation, for they were well aware that a black
doctor, Charles R. Drew, had been a pioneer researcher in the plasma
extraction process and had directed the first Red Cross blood
bank.[2-47]

[Footnote 2-47: On 16 January 1942 the Navy announced
that "in deference to the wishes of those for whom
the plasma is being provided, the blood will be
processed separately so that those receiving
transfusions may be given blood of their own race."
Three days later the Chief of the Bureau of
Medicine, who was also the President's personal
physician, told the Secretary of the Navy, "It is
my opinion that at this time we cannot afford to
open up a subject such as mixing blood or plasma
regardless of the theoretical fact that there is no
chemical difference in human blood." See Memo, Rear
Adm Ross T. McIntire for SecNav, 19 Jan 42,
GenRecsNav. See also Florence Murray, ed., _Negro
Handbook, 1946-1947_ (New York: A. A. Wyn, 1948),
pp. 373-74. For effect of segregated blood banks on
black morale, see Mary A. Morton, "The Federal
Government and Negro Morale," _Journal of Negro
Education_ (Summer 1943): 452, 455-56.]

Black morale suffered further in the leadership crisis that developed
in black units early in the war. The logic of segregated units
demanded a black officer corps, but there were never enough black
officers to command all the black units. In 1942 only 0.35 percent of
the Negroes in the Army were officers, a shortcoming that could not be
explained by poor education alone.[2-48] But when the number of black
officers did begin to increase, obstacles to their employment
appeared: some white commanders, assuming that Negroes did not
possess leadership ability and that black troops preferred white (p. 037)
officers, demanded white officers for their units. Limited segregated
recreational and living facilities for black officers prevented their
assignment to some bases, while the active opposition of civilian
communities forced the Army to exclude them from others. The Army
staff practice of forbidding Negroes to outrank or command white
officers serving in the same unit not only limited the employment and
restricted the rank of black officers but also created invidious
distinctions between white and black officers in the same unit. It
tended to convince enlisted men that their black leaders were not
full-fledged officers. Thus restricted in assignment and segregated
socially and professionally, his ability and status in question, the
black officer was often an object of scorn to himself and to his men.

[Footnote 2-48: Eli Ginzberg, _The Negro Potential_
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 85.
Ginzberg points out that only about one out of ten
black soldiers in the upper two mental categories
became an officer, compared to one out of four
white soldiers.]

The attitude and caliber of white officers assigned to black units
hardly compensated for the lack of black officers. In general, white
officers resented their assignment to black units and were quick to
seek transfer. Worse still, black units, where sensitive and patient
leaders were needed to create an effective military force, often
became, as they had in earlier wars, dumping grounds for officers
unwanted in white units.[2-49] The Army staff further aggravated black
sensibilities by showing a preference for officers of southern birth
and training, believing them to be generally more competent to
exercise command over Negroes. In reality many Negroes, especially
those from the urban centers, particularly resented southern officers.
At best these officers appeared paternalistic, and Negroes disliked
being treated as a separate and distinct group that needed special
handling and protection. As General Davis later circumspectly
reported, "many colored people of today expect only a certain line of
treatment from white officers born and reared in the South, namely,
that which follows the southern pattern, which is most distasteful to
them."[2-50]

[Footnote 2-49: Memo, DCofS to CG, AAF, 10 Aug 42,
sub: Professional Qualities of Officers Assigned to
Negro Units, WDGAP 322.99; Memo, CG, VII Corps, to
CG, AGF, 28 Aug 42, same sub, GNAGS 210.31.]

[Footnote 2-50: Brig Gen B. O. Davis, "History of a
Special Section Office of the Inspector General (29
June 1941 to 16 November 1944)," p. 8, in CMH.]

Some of these humiliations might have been less demeaning had the
black soldier been convinced that he was a full partner in the crusade
against fascism. As news of the conversion of black units from combat
to service duties and the word that no new black combat units were
being organized became a matter of public knowledge, the black press
asked: Will any black combat units be left? Will any of those left be
allowed to fight? In fact, would black units ever get overseas?

Actually, the Army had a clear-cut plan for the overseas employment of
both black service and combat units. In May 1942 the War Department
directed the Army Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Service Forces to
make sure that black troops were ordered overseas in numbers not less
than their percentage in each of these commands. Theater commanders
would be informed of orders moving black troops to their commands, but
they would not be asked to agree to their shipment beforehand. Since
troop shipments to the British Isles were the chief concern at (p. 038)
that time, the order added that "there will be no positive
restrictions on the use of colored troops in the British Isles, but
shipment of colored units to the British Isles will be limited,
initially, to those in the service categories."[2-51]

[Footnote 2-51: Ltr, TAG to CG, AAF, et al., 13 May
42, AG 291.21 (3-31-42).]

The problem here was not the Army's policy but the fact that certain
foreign governments and even some commanders in American territories
wanted to exclude Negroes. Some countries objected to black soldiers
because they feared race riots and miscegenation. Others with large
black populations of their own felt that black soldiers with their
higher rates of pay might create unrest. Still other countries had
national exclusion laws. In the case of Alaska and Trinidad, Secretary
Stimson ordered, "Don't yield." Speaking of Iceland, Greenland, and
Labrador, he commented, "Pretty cold for blacks." To the request of
Panamanian officials that a black signal construction unit be
withdrawn from their country he replied, "Tell them [the black unit]
they must complete their work--it is ridiculous to raise such
objections when the Panama Canal itself was built with black labor."
As for Chile and Venezuela's exclusion of Negroes he ruled that "As we
are the petitioners here we probably must comply."[2-52] Stimson's
rulings led to a new War Department policy: henceforth black soldiers
would be assigned without regard to color except that they would not
be sent to extreme northern areas or to any country against its will
when the United States had requested the right to station troops in
that country.[2-53]

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