Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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[Footnote 17-25: Memo, ASA for ASD (M&P), 5 Jun 51;
Memo, SA for ASD (M&P), 3 Sep 52; both in SD
291.2.]

_Performance of Segregated Units_

Another factor leading to a change in racial policy was the
performance of segregated units in Korea. Despite "acts of heroism and
capable performance of duty" by some individuals, the famous old 24th
Infantry Regiment as a whole performed poorly. Its instability was
especially evident during the fighting on Battle Mountain in August
1950, and by September the regiment had clearly become a "weak link in
the 25th Division line," and in the Eighth Army as well.[17-26] On 9
September the division commander recommended that the regiment be
removed from combat. "It is my considered opinion," Maj. Gen. William
B. Kean told the Eighth Army commander, that the 24th Infantry has
demonstrated in combat that

it is untrustworthy and incapable of carrying out missions
expected of an Infantry Regiment. In making this statement, I am
fully cognizant of the seriousness of the charges that I am
making, and the implications involved.... The continued use of
this Regiment in combat will jeopardize the United Nations war
effort in Korea.[17-27]

[Footnote 17-26: Roy E. Appleman, _South to the
Naktong, North to the Yalu_ (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1961), pp. 485-86. For a detailed
account of the battlefield performance of the 24th
and other segregated units, see ibid., passim.]

[Footnote 17-27: Ltr, Maj Gen W. B. Kean to CG, Eighth
Army, 9 Sep 50, sub: Combat Effectiveness of the
24th Infantry Regiment, AG 330.1 (A).]

Kean went on to spell out his charges. The regiment was unreliable (p. 437)
in combat, particularly on the defensive and at night; it abandoned
positions without warning to troops on its flanks; it wasted
equipment; it was prone to panic and hysteria; and some of its members
were guilty of malingering. The general made clear that his charges
were directed at the unit as an organization and not at individual
soldiers, but he wanted the unit removed and its men reassigned as
replacements on a percentage basis in the other units of the Eighth
Army.

General Kean also claimed to have assigned unusually able officers to
the regiment, but to no avail. In attempting to lead their men in
battle, all the unit's commanders had become casualties. Concluding
that segregated units would not work in a combat situation, the
general believed that the combat value of black soldiers would never
be realized unless they were integrated into white units at a rate of
not more than 10 percent.[17-28]

[Footnote 17-28: Observer Report, Lt Col J. D.
Stevens, Plans Div, G-3, 25 Oct 50, G-3 333 PAC
(Sec I-D), Case 18, Tab G.]

The 25th Division commander's charges were supported by the Eighth
Army inspector general, who investigated the 24th Infantry at length
but concluded that the inactivation of the 24th was unfeasible.
Instead he suggested integrating Negroes in all Eighth Army units up
to 15 percent of their strength by means of the replacement process.
The Far East Command's inspector general, Brig. Gen. Edwin A. Zundel,
concurred, stating that the rotation process would provide a good
opportunity to accomplish integration and expressing hope that the
theater would observe the "spirit" of the Army's latest racial
regulations.[17-29]

[Footnote 17-29: FECOM Check Sheet, IG to G-1, FEC, 27
May 51, sub: Report of Investigation; Memo, FEC G-1
for CofS, FEC, 30 Apr 51, sub: G-1 Topics Which
CINC May Discuss With Gen Taylor; both are quoted
in FECOM Mil Hist Section, "History of the Korean
War," III (pt. 2): 151-52, in CMH.]

Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army commander, accepted the
inspector general's report, and the 24th Infantry remained on duty in
Korea through the winter. Zundel meanwhile continued the investigation
and in March 1951 offered a more comprehensive assessment of the 24th.
It was a fact, for example, that 62 percent of the unit's troops were
in categories IV and V as against 41 percent of the troops in the 35th
Infantry and 46 percent in the 27th, the 25th Division's white
regiments. The Gillem Board had recommended supplying all such units
with 25 percent more officers in the company grades, something not
done for the 24th Infantry. Some observers also reported evidence in
the regiment of the lack of leadership and lack of close relationships
between officers and men; absence of unit _esprit de corps_;
discrimination against black officers; and poor quality of
replacements.

Whatever the cause of the unit's poor performance, the unanimous
recommendation in the Eighth Army, its inspector general reported, was
integration. Yet he perceived serious difficulty in integration. To
mix the troops of the eighty-four major segregated units in the Eighth
Army under wartime conditions would create an intolerable
administrative burden and would be difficult for the individuals
involved. If integration was limited to the 24th Infantry alone, on
the other hand, its members, indeed even its former members, would
share the onus of its failure. The inspector general therefore (p. 438)
again recommended retaining the 24th, assigning additional officers
and noncommissioned officers to black units with low test averages,
and continuing the integration of the Eighth Army.[17-30]

[Footnote 17-30: Ltr, EUSAK IG to CG, EUSAK, 15 Mar
51, sub: Report of Investigation Concerning 24th
Infantry Regiment and Negro Soldiers in Combat,
EUSAK IG Report.]

[Illustration: SURVIVORS OF AN INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE
PLATOON, _24th Infantry, Korea, May 1951_.]

The Eighth Army was not alone in investigating the 24th Infantry. The
NAACP was also concerned with reports of the regiment's performance,
in particular with figures on the large number of courts-martial.
Thirty-six of the men convicted, many for violation of Article 75 of
the Articles of War (misbehavior before the enemy), had appealed to
the association for assistance, and Thurgood Marshall, then one of its
celebrated attorneys, went to the Far East to investigate. Granted
_carte blanche_ by the Far East commander, General Douglas MacArthur,
Marshall traveled extensively in Korea and Japan reviewing the record
and interviewing the men. His conclusions: "the men were tried in an
atmosphere making justice impossible," and the NAACP had the evidence
to clear most of them.[17-31] Contrasting the Army's experiences
with those of the Navy and the Air Force, Marshall attributed (p. 439)
discrimination in the military justice system to the Army's
segregation policy. He blamed MacArthur for failing to carry out
Truman's order in the Far East and pointed out that no Negroes served
in the command's headquarters. As long as racial segregation
continued, the civil rights veteran concluded, the Army would dispense
the kind of injustice typical of the courts-martial he reviewed.

[Footnote 17-31: Thurgood Marshall, _Report on Korea:
The Shameful Story of the Courts Martial of Negro
GIs_ (New York: NAACP, 1951).]

It would be hard to refute Marshall's contention that discrimination
was a handmaiden of segregation. Not so Walter White's contention that
the reports of the 24th Infantry's poor performance constituted an
attempt to discredit the combat ability of black soldiers and return
them to labor duties. The association's executive secretary had fought
racial injustice for many decades, and, considering his World War II
experiences with the breakup of the 2d Cavalry Division into labor
units, his acceptance of a conspiracy theory in Korea was
understandable. But it was inaccurate. The Army operated under a
different social order in 1951, and many combat leaders in the Eighth
Army were advocating integration. The number of black service units in
the Eighth Army, some ninety in March 1951, was comparable to the
number in other similar Army commands. Nor, for that matter, was the
number of black combat units in the Eighth Army unusual. In March 1951
the Eighth Army had eighty-four such units ranging in size from
regiment to detachment. Far from planning the conversion of black
combat troops to service troops, most commanders were recommending
their assignment to integrated combat units throughout Korea.

Apprised of these various conclusions, MacArthur ordered his staff to
investigate the problem of segregation in the command.[17-32] The Far
East Command G-1 staff incorporated the inspector general's report in
its study of the problem, adding that "Negro soldiers can and do fight
well when integrated." The staff went on to dismiss the importance of
leadership as a particular factor in the case of black troops by
observing that "no race has a monopoly on stupidity."[17-33]

[Footnote 17-32: Ltr, Lt Gen Edward Almond, CofS,
FECOM, to TIG, 15 Mar 51, IG 333.9.]

[Footnote 17-33: FECOM Check Sheet, IG to G-1, FEC, 27
May 51, sub: Report of Investigation; Memo, FEC G-1
for CofS FEC, 30 Apr 51, sub: G-1 Topics Which CINC
May Discuss With Gen Taylor.]

Before the staff could finish its investigation, General Matthew B.
Ridgway replaced MacArthur as Far East commander. Fresh from duty as
Eighth Army commander, Ridgway had had close-hand experience with the
24th Infantry's problems; from both a military and a human viewpoint
he had concluded that segregation was "wholly inefficient, not to say
improper." He considered integration the only way to assure _esprit de
corps_ in any large segment of the Army. As for segregation, Ridgway
concluded, "it has always seemed to me both un-American and
un-Christian for free citizens to be taught to downgrade themselves
this way as if they were unfit to associate with their fellows or to
accept leadership themselves."[17-34] He had planned to seek
authorization to integrate the major black units of the Eighth Army in
mid-March, but battlefield preoccupations and his sudden elevation to
theater command interfered. Once he became commander in chief, however,
he quickly concurred in his inspector general's recommendation, adding
that "integration in white combat units in Korea is a practical (p. 440)
solution to the optimum utilization of Negro manpower provided the
overall theater level of Negroes does not exceed 15 percent of troop
level and does not exceed over 12 percent in any combat unit."[17-35]

[Footnote 17-34: Matthew B. Ridgway, _The Korean War_
(New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 192-93.]

[Footnote 17-35: Memorandum for File, FECOM IG, 2 May
51, copy in AG 330.1.]

The 24th Infantry's experiences struck yet another blow at the Army's
race policy. Reduce the size of black units, the Gillem Board had
reasoned, and you will reduce inefficiency and discrimination. Such a
course had not worked. The same troubles that befell the 92d Division
in Italy were now being visited in Korea on the 24th Infantry, a unit
rich with honors extending back to the Indian fighting after the Civil
War, the War with Spain, and the Philippine Insurrection. The unit
could also boast among its medal of honor winners the first man to
receive the award in Korea, Pfc. William Thompson of Company M. Before
its inactivation in 1951 the 24th had yet another member so honored,
Sgt. Cornelius H. Carlton of Company H.

_Final Arguments_

To concentrate on the widespread sentiment for integration in the Far
East would misrepresent the general attitude that still prevailed in
the Army in the spring of 1951. This attitude was clearly reflected
again by the Chamberlin Board, which completed its reexamination of
the Army's racial policy in light of the Korean experience in April.
The board recognized the success of integrated units and even cited
evidence indicating that racial friction had decreased in those units
since the men generally accepted any replacement willing to fight. But
in the end the board retreated into the Army's conventional wisdom:
separate units must be retained, and the number of Negroes in the Army
must be regulated.[17-36]

[Footnote 17-36: Report of Board of Officers on
Utilization of Negro Manpower (2d Chamberlin
Report), 3 Apr 51, G-1 334 (8 Nov 51).]

The board's recommendations were not approved. Budgetary limitations
precluded the creation of more segregated units and the evidence of
Korea could not be denied. Yet the board still enjoyed considerable
support in some quarters. The Vice Chief of Staff, General Haislip,
who made no secret of his opposition to integration, considered it
"premature" to rely and act solely on the experience with integration
in Korea and the training divisions, and he told Secretary Pace in May
1951 that "no action should be taken which would lead to the immediate
elimination of segregated units."[17-37] And then there was the
assessment of Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, World War II commander of the
92d Division and later X Corps commander in Korea and MacArthur's
chief of staff. Twenty years after the Korean War Almond's attitude
toward integration had not changed.

I do not agree that integration improves military efficiency; I
believe that it weakens it. I believe that integration was and is
a political solution for the composition of our military forces
because those responsible for the procedures either do not
understand the characteristics of the two human elements (p. 441)
concerned, the white man and the Negro as individuals.
The basic characteristics of Negro and White are fundamentally
different and these basic differences must be recognized by those
responsible for integration. By trial and error we must test the
integration in its application. These persons who promulgate and
enforce such policies either have not the understanding of the
problem or they do not have the intestinal fortitude to do what
they think if they do understand it. There is no question in my
mind of the inherent difference in races. This is not racism--it
is common sense and understanding. Those who ignore these
differences merely interfere with the combat effectiveness of
battle units.[17-38]

[Footnote 17-37: Memo, Actg CofS for SA, 31 May 51,
sub: Negro Strength in the Army, CS 291.2 Negroes
(11 Apr 51); see also Interv, author with Haislip,
14 Feb 71, CMH files.]

[Footnote 17-38: Incl to Ltr, Almond to CMH, 1 Apr 72,
CMH files.]

The opinions of senior commanders long identified with segregated
units in combat carried weight with the middle-ranking staff officers
who, lacking such experience, were charged with devising policy.
Behind the opinions expressed by many staff members there seemed to be
a nebulous, often unspoken, conviction that Negroes did not perform
well in combat. The staff officers who saw proof for their convictions
in the troubles of the 24th Infantry ignored the possibility that
segregated units, not individual soldiers, was the problem. Their
attitude explains why the Army continued to delay changes made
imperative by its experience in Korea.

It also explains why at this late date the Army turned to the
scientific community for still another review of its racial policy.
The move originated with the Army's G-3, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor,
who in February called for the collection of all information on the
Army's experiences with black troops in Korea. If the G-1, General
McAuliffe, did not consider the available data sufficient, General
Taylor added, he would join in sponsoring further investigation in the
Far East.[17-39] The result was two studies. The G-1 sent an Army
personnel research team, which left for Korea in April 1951, to study
the Army's regulations for assigning men under combat conditions and
to consider the performance of integrated units.[17-40] On 29 March,
Maj. Gen. Ward S. Maris, the G-4, requested the Operations Research
Office, a contract agency for the Army, to make a study of how best to
use black manpower in the Army.[17-41] The G-1 investigation,
undertaken by manpower experts drawn from several Army offices,
concentrated on the views of combat commanders; the contract agency
reviewed all available data, including a detailed battlefield survey
by social scientists. Both groups submitted preliminary reports in
July 1951.

[Footnote 17-39: Memo, ACofS, G-3, for ACofS, G-1, 22
Feb 51, WDGPA 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-40: Memo, Chief, Pers Mgmt Div, G-1, for
CofS, G-3, 6 Mar 51, WDGPA 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-41: Ltr, Maj Gen Ward Maris, G-4, for
Dir, ORO, 29 Mar 51, G-4 291.2. The Operations
Research Office, a subsidiary of the Johns Hopkins
University, performed qualitative and quantitative
analyses of strategy, tactics, and materiel. Some
of its assignments were subcontracted to other
research institutions; all were assigned by the
G-4's Research and Development Division and
coordinated with the Department of Defense.]

Their findings complemented each other. The G-1 team reported that
integration of black soldiers into white combat units in Korea had
been accomplished generally "without undue friction and with better
utilization of manpower." Combat commanders, the team added, "almost
unanimously favor integration."[17-42] The individual soldier's own
motivation determined his competence, the team concluded. The (p. 442)
contract agency, whose report was identified by the code name Project
CLEAR,[17-43] observed that large black units were, on average, less
reliable than large white units, but the effectiveness of small black
units varied widely. The performance of individual black soldiers in
integrated units, on the other hand, approximated that of whites. It
found that white officers commanding black units tended to attribute
their problems to race; those commanding integrated units saw their
problems as military ones. The contract team also confirmed previous
Army findings that efficient officers and noncommissioned officers,
regardless of race, were accepted by soldiers of both races.
Integration, it decided, had not lowered white morale, but it had
raised black morale. Virtually all black soldiers supported
integration, while white soldiers, whatever their private sentiments,
were not overtly hostile. In most situations, white attitudes toward
integration became more favorable with firsthand experience. Although
opinions varied, most combat commanders with integration experience
believed that a squad should contain not more than two Negroes. In
sum, the Project CLEAR group concluded that segregation hampered the
Army's effectiveness while integration increased it. Ironically, this
conclusion practically duplicated the verdict of the Army's surveys of
the integration of black and white units in Europe at the end of World
War II.

[Footnote 17-42: DA Personnel Research Team, "A
Preliminary Report on Personnel Research Data" (ca.
28 Jul 51), AG 333.3.]

[Footnote 17-43: ORO-T-99, "A Preliminary Report on
the Utilization of Negro Manpower," 30 Jun 51,
S4-S6, copy in CMH. A draft version of a more
comprehensive study on the same subject was
prepared in seven volumes (ORO-R-11) in November
1951. These several documents are usually referred
to as Project CLEAR, the code name for the complete
version. The declassification and eventual
publication of this very important social document
had a long and interesting history; see, for
example, Memo, Howard Sacks, Office of the General
Counsel, SA, for James C. Evans, 3 Nov 55, in CMH.
For over a decade a "sanitized" version of Project
CLEAR remained For Official Use Only. The study was
finally cleared and published under the title
_Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S.
Army_, ed. Leo Bogart (Chicago: Markham, 1969).]

General Collins immediately accepted the Project CLEAR conclusions
when presented to him verbally on 23 July 1951.[17-44] His endorsement
and the subsequent announcement that the Army would integrate its
forces in the Far East implied a connection which did not exist.
Actually, the decision to integrate in Korea was made before Project
CLEAR or the G-1 study appeared. This is not to denigrate the
importance of these documents. Their justification of integration in
objective, scientific terms later helped convince Army traditionalists
of the need for worldwide change and absolved the Secretary of the
Army, his Chief of Staff, and his theater commander of the charge of
having made a political and social rather than a military
decision.[17-45]

[Footnote 17-44: ORO, "Utilization of Negro Manpower
in the Army: A 1951 Study" (advance draft), pp.
viii-ix, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-45: Ltr, Dir, ORO, to G-3, 20 Nov 52, G-3
291.2; see also Interv, Nichols with Davis.]

_Integration of the Eighth Army_

On 14 May 1951 General Ridgway forced the issue of integration by
formally requesting authority to abolish segregation in his command.
He would begin with the 24th Infantry, which he wanted to replace
after reassigning its men to white units in Korea. He would then
integrate the other combat units and, finally, the service units. (p. 443)
Where special skills were not a factor Ridgway wanted to assign his
black troops throughout the theater to a maximum of 12 percent of any
unit. To do this he needed permission to integrate the 40th and 45th
Divisions, the federalized National Guard units then stationed in
Japan. He based his proposals on the need to maintain the combat
effectiveness of his command where segregated units had proved
ineffective and integrated units acceptable.[17-46]

[Footnote 17-46: Msg, CINCFE to DA, DA IN 12483, 14
May 51, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the
FEC; ibid., DA IN 13036, 15 May 51, same sub. See
also Ltrs, CG, Eighth Army, to CINCFE, 7 May 51,
sub: Redesignation of Negro Combat Units, and
Ridgway to author, 3 Dec 73, both in CMH.]

When it finally arrived, the proposal for wide-scale integration of
combat units encountered no real opposition from the Army staff.
General Ridgway had rehearsed his proposal with the G-3 when the
latter visited the Far East in April. Taylor "heartily approved,"
calling the times auspicious for such a move.[17-47] Of course his
office quickly approved the plan, and McAuliffe in G-1 and the rest of
the staff followed suit. There was some sentiment on the staff,
eventually suppressed, for retaining the 24th Infantry as an
integrated unit since the statutory requirement for the four black
regiments had been repealed in 1950.[17-48] The staff did insist, over
the G-1's objections, on postponing the integration of the two
National Guard divisions until their arrival in Korea, where the
change could be accomplished through normal replacement-rotation
procedures.[17-49] There were other minor complications and
misunderstandings between the Far East Command and the Army staff over
the timing of the order, but they were easily ironed out.[17-50]
Collins discussed the plan with the appropriate congressional
chairmen, Ridgway further briefed the Secretary of Defense during
General Marshall's 1951 visit to Japan, and Secretary of the Army Pace
kept the President informed.[17-51]

[Footnote 17-47: Ridgway, _The Korean War_, p. 192.]

[Footnote 17-48: Section 401, Army Organization Act of
1950 (PL 581, 81st Cong.), published in DA Bull 9,
6 Jul 50. See also Msg, DA to CINCFE, DA 92561, 28
May 51; G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS and SA, 14 May
51, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower; Memo for
Rcd, G-1 (ca. 14 May 51). All in G-1 291.2.]