Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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[Footnote 16-4: Memo, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, CofS, USAF,
for SecAF, 12 Jan 49, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 16-5: Memo, SecAF for Forrestal, 17 Feb 49;
Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 24 Mar 49, sub:
Lockbourne AFB; both in SecAF files.]

By then the long official silence had produced serious consequences,
for despite the lack of any public announcement, parts of the plan had
leaked to the press and caused some debate in Congress and
considerable dissatisfaction among black servicemen. Congressional
interest in the internal affairs of the armed forces was always of
more than passing concern to the services. When a discussion of the
new integration plan appearing in the Washington _Post_ on 29 March
caused a flurry of comment on Capitol Hill, Zuckert's assistant,
Clarence H. Osthagen, met with the clerk of the House Armed Services
Committee to "explain and clarify" for the Air Force. The clerk,
Robert Harper, warned Osthagen that the impression in the House was
that a "complete intermingling of Negro and white personnel was to
take place" and that Congressman Winstead of Mississippi had been
tempted to make a speech on the subject. Still, Harper predicted that
there would be no adverse criticism of the plan in the House "at this
time," adding that since that body had already passed the Air Force
appropriation Chairman Carl Vinson was generally unconcerned about the
Air Force racial program. Reporting on Senate reaction, Harper noted
that while many members of the upper house would have liked to see the
plan deferred, they recognized that the President's order made change
mandatory. At any rate, Harper reassured Osthagen, the announcement of
an integration plan would not jeopardize pending Air Force
legislation.[16-6]

[Footnote 16-6: Memo for Files, Osthagen, Asst to
ASecAF, 13 Apr 49, SecAF files.]

Unfortunately, the Air Force's black personnel were not so easily
reassured, and the service had a morale problem on its hands during
the spring of 1949. As later reported by the Fahy Committee staff,
black troops generally supported the inactivation of the all-black
332d Fighter Wing at Lockbourne as a necessary step toward
integration, but news reports frequently linked the disbandment of
that unit to the belt tightening imposed on the Air Force by the 1950
budget. Some Negroes in the 332d concluded that the move was not (p. 399)
directed at integration but at saving money for the Air Force.[16-7]
They were concerned lest they find themselves relegated to unskilled
labor units despite their training and experience. This fear was not
so farfetched, considering Zuckert's private prediction that the
redistribution of Lockbourne men had to be executed exactly according
to the proposed program or "we would find experienced Air Force Negro
technical specialists pushing wheelbarrows or driving trucks in Negro
service units."[16-8]

[Footnote 16-7: Ltr, Joseph H. Evans, Assoc Exec Secy,
Fahy Cmte, to Fahy Cmte, 23 Jun 49, FC file. See
also "U.S. Armed Forces: 1950," _Our World 5_ (June
1950):11-35.]

[Footnote 16-8: Draft Memo, Zuckert for Symington, 15
Feb 49, sub: Air Force Policies on Negro Personnel
(not sent), SecAF files.]

The truth was that, while most Negroes in the Air Force favored
integration, some were disturbed by the prospect of competition with
whites of equivalent rank that would naturally follow. Many of the
black officers were overage in grade, their proficiency geared to the
F-51, a wartime piston plane, and they were the logical victims of any
reduction in force that might occur in this period of reduced military
budgets.[16-9] Some men doubted that the new program, as they
imperfectly understood it, would truly integrate the service. They
could, for example, see no way for the Air Force to break through what
the press called the "community patterns" around southern bases, and
they were generally suspicious of the motives of senior department
officials. The Pittsburgh _Courier_ summarized this attitude by
quoting one black officer who expressed doubt "that a fair program
will be enforced from the top echelon."[16-10]

[Footnote 16-9: Washington _Post_, April 4, 1949; USAF
Oral History Program, Interview with Lt Col Spann
Watson (USAF, Ret.), 3 Apr 73.]

[Footnote 16-10: Pittsburgh _Courier_, January 22,
1949.]

But such suspicions were unfounded, for the Air Force's senior
officials were determined to enforce the new program both fairly and
expeditiously. General Vandenberg, the Chief of Staff, reported to the
War Council on 11 January that the Air Force would "effect full and
complete implementation" of its integration plan not only by issuing
the required directives and orders, but also by assigning
responsibility for monitoring the worldwide implementation of the
program to his deputy for personnel. The Chief of Staff also planned
to call a meeting of his senior commanders to discuss and solve
problems rising from the plan and impress on them the personal
attention they must give to carrying it out in the field.[16-11]

[Footnote 16-11: Memo, Vandenberg, CofS, USAF, for
SecAF, 12 Jan 49, SecAF files.]

The Air Force Commanders' Conference, assembled on 12 April 1949,
heard Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
explain the genesis of the integration plan and outline its major
provisions. He mentioned two major steps to be taken in the first
phase of the program. First, the 332d Fighter Wing would be
inactivated on or before 30 June, and all blacks would be removed from
Lockbourne. The commander of the Continental Air Command would create
a board of Lockbourne officers to screen those assigned to the
all-black base, dividing them into three groups. The skilled and
qualified officers and airmen would be reassigned worldwide to white
units "just like any other officers or airmen of similar skills (p. 400)
and qualifications." General Edwards assumed that the number of men in
this category would not be large. Some 200 officers and 1,500 airmen,
he estimated, would be found sufficiently qualified and proficient for
such reassignment. He added parenthetically that Colonel Davis
understood the "implications" of the new policy and intended to
recommend only an individual "of such temperament, judgment, and
common sense that he can get along smoothly as an individual in a
white unit, and second, that his ability is such as to warrant respect
of the personnel of the unit to which he is transferred."

The technically unqualified but still "usable" men would be reassigned
to black service units. The staff recognized, General Edwards added,
that some Negroes were unsuited for assignment to white units for
"various reasons" and had specifically authorized the retention of
"this type of Negro" in black units. Finally, those who were found
neither qualified nor useful would be discharged under current
regulations.

The second major action would be taken at the same time as the first.
All commands would similarly screen their black troops with the object
of reassigning the skilled and qualified to white units and
eliminating the chronically unqualified. At the same time racial
quotas for recruitment and school attendance would be abolished.
Henceforth, blacks would enter the Air Force under the same standards
as whites and would be classified, assigned, promoted, or eliminated
in accordance with rules that would apply equally to all. "In other
words," Edwards commented, "no one is either helped or hindered
because of the color of his skin; how far or how fast each one goes
depends upon his own ability." To assure equal treatment and
opportunity, he would closely monitor the problem. Edwards admitted
that the subject of integrated living quarters had caused discussion
in the staff, but based on the Navy's years of good experience with
integrated quarters and bolstered by the probability that the number
of Negroes in any white unit would rarely exceed 1 percent, the staff
saw no need for separate sleeping accommodations.

General Edwards reminded the assembled commanders that, while
integration was new to the Air Force, the Navy had been following a
similar policy for years, encountering no trouble, even in the Deep
South where black troops as well as the nearby civilian communities
understood that when men left the base they must conform to the laws
and customs of the community. And as a parting shot he made the
commanders aware of where the command responsibility lay:

There will be frictions and incidents. However, they will be
minimized if commanders give the implementation of this policy
their personal attention and exercise positive command control.
Unless our young commanders are guided and counselled by the
senior commanders in unbiased implementation, we may encounter
serious troubles which the Navy has very ably avoided. It must
have your _personal attention and personal control_.[16-12]

[Footnote 16-12: Lt Gen I. H. Edwards, "Remarks on
Major Personnel Problems Presented to USAF
Commanders' Conference Headquarters, USAF," 12 Apr
49, SecAF files. Italics in the original.]

Compelling reasons for reform notwithstanding, the effectiveness of
an integration program would in the end depend on the attitude and
initiative of the local commander. In the Air Force's case the (p. 401)
ultimate effectiveness owed much to the fact that the determination of
its senior officials was fully explained and widely circulated
throughout the service. As Lt. Gen. Daniel (Chappie) James, Jr., later
recalled, those who thought to frustrate the process were well aware
that they risked serious trouble if their opposition was discovered by
the senior commanders. None of the obvious excuses for preserving the
racial _status quo_ remained acceptable after Vandenberg and Edwards
made their positions clear.[16-13]

[Footnote 16-13: USAF Oral History Program, Interview
with Lt Gen Daniel James, Jr., 2 Oct 73. James was
to become the first four-star black officer in the
armed forces.]

The fact that the control of the new plan was specifically made a
personal responsibility of the senior commanders spoke well for its
speedy and efficient execution. This was the kind of talk commanders
understood, and as the order filtered down to the lower echelons its
terms became even more explicit.[16-14] "Direct attention to this
changed condition is required throughout the Command," Maj. Gen.
Laurence S. Kuter notified his subordinate commanders at the Military
Air Transport Service. "Judgment, leadership, and ingenuity are
demanded. Commanders who cannot cope with the integration of Negroes
into formerly white units or activities will have no place in the Air
Force structure."[16-15]

[Footnote 16-14: Ltr, Marr to author, 19 Jun 70.]

[Footnote 16-15: MATS Hq Ltr No. 9, 1 May 49, SecAF
files.]

The order itself, as approved by the Secretary of Defense on 11 May
1949 and published on the same day as Air Force Letter 35-3, was
unmistakable in intent and clearly spelled out a new bill of rights
for Negroes in the Air Force.[16-16] The published directive differed
in some respects from the version drafted by the Chief of Staff in
January. Despite General Edwards's comments at the commanders'
conference in April, the provision for allowing commanders to
segregate barracks "if considered necessary" was removed even before
the plan was first forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. This
deletion was made in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,
probably by Zuckert.[16-17] Later Zuckert commented, "I wouldn't want
to give the commanders that kind of sweeping power. I would be afraid
of how it might be exercised."[16-18] From the beginning, black airmen
were billeted routinely in the living quarters of the units to which
they were assigned.

[Footnote 16-16: AF Ltr 35-3, 11 May 49. Effective
until 11 May 1950, the order was superseded by a
new but similar letter, AF Ltr 35-78, on 14
September 1950.]

[Footnote 16-17: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 12 Jan
49, AF Negro Affairs 49, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 16-18: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Zuckert.]

The final version of the directive also deleted reference to a 10
percent limitation on black strength in formerly white units. Zuckert
had assured the Fahy Committee this limitation was designed to
facilitate, not frustrate, the absorption of Negroes into white units,
and Edwards even agreed that given the determination of Air Force
officials to make a success of their program, the measure was probably
unnecessary.[16-19] In the end Zuckert decided to drop any reference
to such limitations "because of the confusion that seemed to arise
from this statement."[16-20]

[Footnote 16-19: Testimony of Zuckert and Edwards,
USAF, Before the Fahy Committee, 28 Mar 49,
afternoon session, pp. 7-8.]

[Footnote 16-20: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 29 Apr
49, sub: Department of the Air Force Implementation
of the Department of Defense Policy on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,
SecAF files.]

[Illustration: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ZUCKERT.]

Zuckert also deleted several clauses in the supplementary letter (p. 402)
to Air Force commanders that was to accompany and explain the order.
These clauses had listed possible exemptions from the new order: one
made it possible to retain a man in a black unit if he was one of the
"key personnel" considered necessary for the successful functioning of
a black unit, and the other allowed the local commander to keep those
Negroes he deemed "best suited" for continued assignment to black
units. The free reassignment of all eligible Negroes, particularly the
well-qualified, was essential to the eventual dissolution of the
all-black units. The Fahy Committee had objected to these provisions
and considered it important for the Air Force to delete them,[16-21]
but the matter was not raised during the committee hearings. There is
evidence that the deletions were actually requested by the Secretary
of Defense's Personnel Policy Board, whose influence in the
integration of the Air Force is often overlooked.[16-22]

[Footnote 16-21: _Freedom to Serve_, pp. 37-38.]

[Footnote 16-22: Memo, SecAF for Chmn, PPB, 30 Apr 49,
copy in FC file. McCoy and Ruetten, _Quest and
Response_, p. 223, call the deletion a victory for
the committee.]

The screening of officers and men at Lockbourne got under way on 17
May. A board of officers under the presidency of Col. Davis, the
commander of Lockbourne, and composed of representatives of Air Force
headquarters, the Continental Air Command, and the Air Training
Command, and important officers of Lockbourne, interviewed every
officer in the wing. After considering each man's technical training,
his performance, and his career field preference, the board
recommended him for reassignment in a specific duty field. Although
Edwards had promised that the screening boards would also judge each
man's "adaptability" to integrated service, this requirement was
quickly dropped by Davis and his fellow board members.[16-23] In fact,
the whole idea of having screening boards was resented by some black
officers. Zuckert later admitted that the screening may have been a
mistake, but at the time it had been considered the best mechanism for
ascertaining the proper assignment for the men.[16-24]

[Footnote 16-23: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Davis.]

[Footnote 16-24: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Zuckert.]

At the same time, a screening team in the Air Training Command gave a
written examination to Lockbourne's more than 1,100 airmen and WAF's
to determine if they were in appropriate military occupational
specialties. A team of personnel counselors interviewed all (p. 403)
airmen, weighed test scores, past performances, qualifications outside
of assigned specialty, and choices of a career field, and then placed
them in one of three categories. First, they could be earmarked for
general reassignment in a specific military occupational specialty
different from the one they were now in; second, they could be
scheduled for additional or more advanced technical training; or
third, they could be trained in their current specialties. The
screeners referred marginal or extraordinary cases to Colonel Davis's
board for decision.[16-25]

[Footnote 16-25: NME Fact Sheet No. 105-49, 27 Jul
49.]

Concurrently with the Lockbourne processing, individual commanders
established similar screening procedures wherever black airmen were
then assigned. All these teams uncovered a substantial number of men
and women considered eligible for further training or reassignment.
(_Table 4_)

Table 4--Disposition of Black Personnel at Eight Air Force Bases, 1949

Percentages
Total Asgmt to Asgmt to Asgmt to Recom for
Base Tested Instr Tech Present Board
Duty School MOS Action

Lockbourne
Male 970 .32 12.08 64.64 22.98
Female 58 0.00 25.86 55.17 18.97
Lackland 247 1.62 20.65 67.61 10.12
Barksdale 158 0.00 20.25 65.82 13.93
Randolph 252 2.38 26.19 57.14 14.29
Waco 146 2.06 30.14 57.53 10.27
Mather 126 .79 27.78 40.48 30.95
Williams 144 8.33 21.53 39.58 30.56
Goodfellow 122 .82 36.89 40.89 21.31

Total 2,223 1.35 19.61 59.20 19.84

_Source_: President's Cmte on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in
the Armed Forces, "A First Report on the Racial Integration Program of
the Air Force," 6 Feb 50, FC file.

The process of screening Lockbourne's troops was quickly completed,
but the process of reassigning them was considerably more drawn-out.
The reassignments were somewhat delayed in the first place by
indecision, caused by budgetary uncertainties, on the future of
Lockbourne itself. By 25 July, a full two months after the screening
began, the Lockbourne board had recommended only 181 officers and 700
airmen to Air Force headquarters for new assignment. A short time
later, however, Lockbourne was placed on inactive status and its
remaining men and women, with the exception of a small caretaker
detachment, were quickly reassigned throughout the Air Force.

The staff had predicted that the speed with which the integration
order was carried out would follow a geographical pattern, with
southern bases the last to integrate, but in fact no special pattern
prevailed. For the many Negroes assigned to all-black base squadrons
for administrative purposes but serving on a day-to-day basis in
integrated units, the change was relatively simple. These men had
already demonstrated their ability to perform their duties competently
under integration, and in conformity with the new order most (p. 404)
commanders immediately assigned them to the units in which they were
already working. Except for their own squadron overhead, some base
service squadrons literally disappeared when these reassignments were
effected. After the screening process, most commanders also quickly
reassigned troops serving in the other all-black units, such as
Squadron F's, air ammunition, motor transport, vehicle repair, signal
heavy construction, and aviation engineer squadrons.[16-26]

[Footnote 16-26: "Report on the First Year of
Implementation of Current Policies Regarding Negro
Personnel," Incl to Memo, Maj Gen Richard E. Nugent
for ASecAF, 14 Jul 50, sub: Distribution of Negro
Personnel, PPB 291.2 (9 Jul 50) (hereafter referred
to as Marr Report). See also USAF Oral Hist Interv
with Marr.]

There were of course a few exceptions. Some commanders, noticeably
more cautious than the majority, began the integration process with
considerably less ease and speed.[16-27] As late as January 1950, for
example, the Fahy Committee's executive secretary found that, with the
exception of a small number of Negroes assigned to white units, the
black airmen at Maxwell Air Force Base were still assigned to the
all-black 3817th Base Service Squadron, the only such unit he found,
incidentally, in a tour of seven installations.[16-28] But as the
months went by even the most cautious commander, learning of the
success of the new policy in other commands, began to reassign his
black airmen according to the recommendations of the screening board.
Despite the announcement that some black units would be retained,
practically all units were integrated by the end of the first year of
the new program. Even using the Air staff's very restricted definition
of a "Negro unit," that is, one whose strength was over 50 percent
black, statistics show how radical was the change in just one year.
(_Table 5_)

[Footnote 16-27: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Davis.]

[Footnote 16-28: President's Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, "A
First Report on the Racial Integration Program of
the Air Force," 6 Feb 50, FC file (hereafter cited
as Kenworthy Report).]

Table 5--Racial Composition of Air Force Units

Negroes Assigned Negroes Assigned
Month Black Integrated to Black to Integrated
Units Units Units Units[1]

1949
June 106 167 Not available Not available
July 89 350 14,609 7,369
August 86 711 11,921 11,977
September 91 863 11,521 13,290
October 88 1,031 9,522 15,980
November 75 1,158 8,038 17,643
December 67 1,253 7,402 18,489

1950
January 59 1,301 6,773 18,929
February 36 1,399 5,511 20,654
March 26 1,476 5,023 20,938
April 24 1,515 4,728 20,793
May 24 1,506 4,675 21,033

[Tablenote 1: Figures extracted from the Marr
Report; see also monthly reports on AF integration,
for example Memo, Dir, Pers Plng, for Osthagen
(SecAF office), 10 Mar 50, sub: Distribution of
Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]

Despite the predictions of some analysts, the effect of (p. 405)
integration on black recruitment proved to be negligible. In a service
whose total strength remained about 415,000 men during the first year
of integration, Negroes numbered as follows (_Table 6_):

Table 6--Black Strength in the Air Force

Percentage
Officer Enlisted of Air Force
Date Strength[1] Strength[1] Strength

December 1948 Not available Not available 6.5
June 1949 319 (47) 21,782 (2,196) 6.0
August 1949 330 (32) 23,568 (2,275) 6.5
December 1949 368 (18) 25,523 (3,072) 7.2
May 1950 341 (8) 25,367 (2,611) 7.1

[Tablenote 1: Includes in parentheses the Special
Category Army Personnel with Air Force (SCARWAF),
those soldiers assigned for duty in the Air Force
but still administratively under the segregated
Army, leftovers from the Department of Defense
reorganization of 1947. Figures extracted from Marr
Report.]