James Anthony Froude - "Short Studies on Great Subjects"

Thomas Henry Huxley - "This is Essay #4 from Science and Hebrew Tradition"

Sarah Tytler - "A Houseful of Girls"

Victor Appleton - "Tom Swift in the Land of Wonders"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965




[Footnote 14-70: Memo, SecDef for SA, 7 Jun 49, sub:
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services; NME, Off of Pub Info, Press Release
78-49A, 7 Jun 49. The secretary gave the Army a new
deadline of 20 June, but by mutual agreement of all
concerned this date was postponed several times and
finally left to the Secretary of the Army to submit
his program "at his discretion," although at the
earliest possible date. See Memo, T. Reid for Maj
Gen Levin Allen, 6 Jul 49, sub: Army Reply to the
Secretary of Defense on Equality of Treatment; Min,
PPB Mtg, 18 Aug 49. All in FC file.]

[Footnote 14-71: Interv, author with Kenworthy.]


_A Summer of Discontent_

The committee approached its negotiations with the Army with
considerable optimism. Kenworthy was convinced that the committee's
moderate and concrete recommendations had reassured Reid and the
Personnel Policy Board and would strengthen its hand in dealing with
the recalcitrant Army,[14-72] and Fahy, outlining for the President the
progress the committee had made with the services, said that he looked
forward to his coming meetings with Gray and Bradley.[14-73]

[Footnote 14-72: Ltr, Kenworthy to Fahy, 20 May 49,
Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-73: Fahy Cmte, "A Progress Report for the
President," 7 Jun 49, FC file.]

To remove any unnecessary obstacle to what Fahy hoped would be
fruitful sessions, the committee revised its initial recommendations
to the Army. First, as Fahy had promised Johnson, it modified its
position on guaranteeing qualified black soldiers already assigned to
units the opportunity to attend Army schools within eighteen months.
Calling the imbroglio over this issue a mere misunderstanding--the
committee did not intend that preferential treatment be given Negroes
nor that the Army train more people than it needed--Fahy explained to
Johnson that the committee only wanted to make sure that qualified
Negroes would have the same chance as qualified white men. It would be
happy, Fahy said, to work with the Army on rewording the
recommendation.[14-74] The committee also added the suggestion that so
long as racial units existed, the Army might permit enlisted men in
the four lowest grades, at their request, to remain in a unit
predominantly composed of men of their own race. This provision,
however, was not to extend to officers and noncommissioned officers in
the top three grades, who received their promotions on a worldwide
competitive basis. Finally, the committee offered a substitute for the
numerical quota it wanted abolished. So that the Army would not get
too many low-scoring recruits, either black or white, the committee
proposed a separate quota for each category in the classification test
scores. Only so many voluntary enlistments would be accepted in
categories I through III, their numbers based on the normal spread of
scores that existed in both the wartime and peacetime Army. If the
Army netted more high scorers than average in any period, it would
induct fewer men from the next category. It would also deny
reenlistment to any man scoring less than eighty (category IV).[14-75]

[Footnote 14-74: Ltr, Fahy to Johnson, 15 Jun 49, FC
file.]

[Footnote 14-75: Idem to SA, 25 Jul 49, FC file.]

After meeting first with Gray and then the Chief of Staff, Fahy called
the sessions "frank and cordial" and saw some prospect of accord,
although their positions were still far apart.[14-76] Just how far
apart had already become apparent on 5 July when Gray presented (p. 363)
Fahy with an outline for yet another program for using black soldiers.
This new program was based in part on the comments of the field
commanders, and the Director of Personnel and Administration warned
that "beyond the steps listed in this plan, there is very little major
compromise area left short of complete integration."[14-77] While the
Army plan differed from the committee's recommendations in many ways,
in essence the disagreement was limited to two fundamental points.
Determined to retain segregated units, the Army opposed the
reassignment of school-trained Negroes to vacancies in white units;
and in order to prevent an influx of Negroes in the low achievement
categories, the Army was determined to retain the numerical
quota.[14-78]

[Footnote 14-76: Idem to SecDef, 25 Jul 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-77: P&A Summary Sheet to DC/S (Adm), 24
Jun 49, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, CSUSA
291.2 Negroes. For comments of Army commanders, see
the following Memos: Wade H. Haislip (DC/S Adm) for
Army Cmdrs, 8 Jun 49, sub: Draft Recommendations of
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity;
Lt Gen M. S. Eddy for CofS, 10 Jun 49, same sub; Lt
Gen W. B. Smith for CofS, 10 Jun 49, same sub; Lt
Gen S. J. Chamberlain, 5th Army Cmdr, for CofS, 13
Jun 49, same sub; Lt Gen John R. Hodge for CofS, 14
Jun 49, same sub; Gen Jacob Devers, 13 Jun 49, same
sub; Gen Thomas T. Handy, 4th Army Cmdr, for CofS,
10 Jun 49, sub: Comments on Fahy Committee Draft
Recommendations. All in CSUSA 291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 14-78: An Outline Plan for Utilization of
Negro Manpower Submitted by the Army to the
President's Committee, 5 Jul 49, Incl to Ltr, Fahy
to SecDef, 25 Jul 49, FC file. See also Ltr,
Kenworthy to Fahy, 23 Jun 49, Fahy Papers, Truman
Library; Fahy Cmte, "Meeting to Discuss the
Proposals Made by the Army as Preliminary to the
Third Response," 11 Jul 49, FC file.]

The committee argued that if the Army was to train men according to
their ability, hence efficiently, and in accord with the principle of
equality, it must consider assigning them without regard to race. It
could not see how removal of the numerical quota would result in a
flood of Negroes joining the Army, but it could see how retaining the
quota would prevent the enlistment of blacks for long periods of time.
These two provisions--that school-trained Negroes be freely assigned
and that the quota be abolished--were really the heart of the
committee's plan and hope for the gradual integration of the Army. The
provisions would not require the abolition of racial units "at this
time," Fahy explained to President Truman, but they would gradually
extend the integration already practiced in overhead installations and
Army schools. The committee could not demand any less, he confessed,
in light of the President's order.[14-79]

[Footnote 14-79: Ltrs, Fahy to SecDef and SA, 25 Jul
49; idem to President, 27 Jul 49. All in FC file.]

The committee and the Army had reached a stalemate. As a staff member
of the Personnel Policy Board put it, their latest proposal and
counterproposals were simply extensions of what had long been put
forth by both parties. He advised Chairman Reid to remain neutral
until both sides presented their "total proposal."[14-80] But the
press was not remaining neutral. The New York _Times_, for example,
accused the Army of stalling and equivocating, engaging in a "private
insurrection," and trying "to preserve a pattern of bigotry which
caricatures the democratic cause in every corner of the world." There
was no room for compromise, the _Times_ added, and President Truman
could not retreat without abdicating as Commander in Chief.[14-81]
Secretary Gray countered with a statement that the Army was still (p. 364)
under injunction from the Secretary of Defense to submit a new race
program, and he was contemplating certain new proposals on the
military occupational specialty issue.[14-82]

[Footnote 14-80: Memo, Col J. F. Cassidy for Reid, 23
Aug 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity
in the Department of the Army, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-81: New York _Times_, July 16 and 18,
1949.]

[Footnote 14-82: Interv, NBC's "Meet the Press" with
Gordon Gray, 18 Jul 49; Ltr, SecDef to Charles
Fahy, 3 Aug 49, FC file.]

The Army staff did prepare another reply for the Secretary of Defense,
and on 16 September Gray met with Fahy and others to discuss it.
General Wade H. Haislip, the Vice Chief of Staff, claimed privately to
Gray that the new reply was almost identical with the plan presented
to the committee on 5 July and that the new concessions on
occupational specialties would only require the conversion of some
units from white to black.[14-83] Haislip, however, had not reckoned
with the concession that Gray was prepared to make to Fahy. Gray
accepted in principle the committee's argument that the assignment of
black graduates of specialist schools should not be limited to black
units or overhead positions but could be used to fill vacancies in any
unit. At the same time, he remained adamant on the quota. When the
committee spoke hopefully of the advantages of an Army open to all,
the Army contemplated fearfully the racial imbalance that might
result. The future was to prove the committee right about the
advantages, but as of September 1949 Gray and his subordinates had no
intention of giving up the quota.[14-84] Gray did agree, however, to
continue studying the quota issue with the committee, and Fahy
optimistically reported to President Truman: "It is the Committee's
expectation that it will be able within a few weeks to make a formal
report to you on a complete list of changes in Army policy and
practices."[14-85]

[Footnote 14-83: Memo, VCofS for Gray, 29 Aug 49, sub:
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services, CSUSA 291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 14-84: Interv, Nichols with Gordon Gray,
1953, in Nichols Collection, CMH; Memo, Kenworthy
for Cmte, 19 Sep 49, sub: Meeting With Gray, 16 Sep
49, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-85: Ltrs, Fahy to President, 21 Sep and
26 Sep 49, both in FC file.]

Fahy made his prediction before Secretary of Defense Johnson took a
course of action that, in effect, rendered the committee's position
untenable. On 30 September Johnson received from Gray a new program
for the employment of black troops. Without reference to the Fahy
Committee, Johnson approved the proposal and announced it to the
press. Gray's program opened all military occupational specialties to
all qualified men, abolished racial quotas for the Army's schools, and
abolished racially separate promotion systems and standards. But it
also specifically called for retention of the racial quota on
enlistments and conspicuously failed to provide for the assignment of
black specialists beyond those jobs already provided by the old Gillem
Board policy.[14-86] Secretary Gray had asked for Fahy's personal
approval before forwarding the plan discussed by the two men at such
length, but Fahy refused; he wanted the plan submitted to his full
committee. When Johnson received the plan he did not consult the
committee at all, although he briefly referred it to the acting
chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, who interposed no
objection.[14-87]

[Footnote 14-86: Memo, SA for SecDef, 30 Sep 49, sub:
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services, CSGPA 291.2; DOD, Off of Pub Info, Press
Release 256-49, 30 Sep 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-87: Memo, Kenworthy for Cmte, 27 Sep 49,
sub: Army's Reply to Secretary Johnson, Fahy
Papers, Truman Library; Note, handwritten and
signed McCrea, attached to memo, SA for SecDef, 30
Sep 49; Memo, Thompson for Leva, 3 Oct 49, sub:
Army Policy of Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity, CD 30-1-4; both in SecDef files.]

It is not difficult to understand Johnson's reasons for ignoring (p. 365)
the President's committee. He had been forced to endure public
criticism over the protracted negotiations between the Army and the
committee. Among liberal elements on Capitol Hill, his position--that
his directive and the service replies made legislation to prohibit
segregation in the services unnecessary--was obviously being
compromised by the lack of an acceptable Army response.[14-88] In a
word, the argument over civil rights in the armed forces had become a
political liability for Louis Johnson, and he wanted it out of the
way. Glossing over the Army's truculence, Johnson blamed the committee
and its recommendations for his problem, and when his frontal assault
on the committee failed--Kenworthy reported that the secretary tried
to have the committee disbanded--he had to devise another
approach.[14-89] The Army's new proposal, a more reasonable-sounding
document than its predecessor, provided him with a convenient
opportunity. Why not quickly approve the program, thereby presenting
the committee with a _fait accompli_ and leaving the President with
little excuse for prolonging the civil rights negotiations?

[Footnote 14-88: Ltr, SecDef to Congressman Vinson, 7
Jul 49; Memo, Lanham for Reid, 29 Mar 49; both in
PPB files.]

[Footnote 14-89: Ltr, Kenworthy to Nichols, 28 Jul 53,
in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

Unfortunately for Johnson the gambit failed. While Fahy admitted that
the Army's newest proposal was an improvement, for several reasons he
could not accept it. The assignment of black specialists to white
units was a key part of the committee's program, and despite Gray's
private assurances that specialists would be integrated, Fahy was not
prepared to accept the Army's "equivocal" language on this subject.
There was also the issue of the quota, still very much alive between
the committee and the Army. The committee was bound, furthermore, to
resent being ignored in the approval process. Fahy and his associates
had been charged by the President with advising the services on
equality of treatment and opportunity, and they were determined to be
heard.[14-90] Fahy informed the White House that the committee would
review the Army's proposal in an extraordinary meeting. He asked that
the President meanwhile refrain from comment.[14-91]

[Footnote 14-90: Memo, Kenworthy to Cmte, 27 Sep 49,
sub: Army's Reply to Secretary Johnson, and Ltr,
Kenworthy to Joseph Evans, 30 Sep 49, both in Fahy
Papers, Truman Library; Memo, Worthington Thompson
for Leva, 3 Oct 49, sub: Army Policy of Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity, SecDef files; Ltr,
Kenworthy to Nichols, 28 Jul 53, in Nichols
Collection, CMH.]

[Footnote 14-91: Memo for Rcd, probably written by
Philleo Nash, 3 Oct 49, Nash Collection, Truman
Library.]

The committee's stand received support from the black press and
numerous national civil rights organizations, all of which excoriated
the Army's position.[14-92] David K. Niles, the White House adviser on
racial matters, warned President Truman about the rising controversy
and predicted that the committee would again reject the Army's
proposal. He advised the President to tell the press that Johnson's
news release was merely a "progress report," that it was not final,
and that the committee was continuing its investigation.[14-93] The
President did just that, adding: "Eventually we will reach, I (p. 366)
hope, what we contemplated in the beginning. You can't do it all at
once. The progress report was a good report, and it isn't finished
yet."[14-94] And lest his purpose remain unclear, the President
declared that his aim was the racial integration of the Army.

[Footnote 14-92: See Los Angeles _Star Review_,
October 6, 1949; _Afro-American_, October 8, 1949;
Washington _Post_, October 6, 1949; Pittsburgh
_Courier_, Octobers, 1949; Norfolk _Journal and
Guide_, October 15, 1949; New York _Amsterdam
News_, October 15, 1949.]

[Footnote 14-93: Ltr, Niles to President, 5 Oct 49,
Nash Collection, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-94: News Conference, 6 Oct 49, as quoted
in _Public Papers of the President: Harry S.
Truman, 1949_, p. 501.]

The President's statement signaled a victory for the committee; its
extent became apparent only when the Army tried to issue a new
circular, revising its Gillem Board policy along the lines of the
outline plan approved by Johnson on 30 September. During the weeks of
protracted negotiations that followed, the committee clearly remained
in control, its power derived basically from its willingness to have
the differences between the committee and the Army publicized and the
reluctance of the White House to have it so. The attitudes toward
publicity were already noticeable when, on 11 October, Fahy suggested
to Truman some possible solutions to the impasse between the committee
and the Army. The Secretary of Defense could issue a supplementary
statement on the Army's assignment policy, the committee could release
its recommendations to the press, or the Army and the committee could
resume discussions.[14-95]

[Footnote 14-95: Memo, Fahy for President, 11 Oct 49,
FC file.]

President Truman ordered his military aide to read the committee's 11
October suggestion and "then take [it] up with Johnson."[14-96] As a
result the Secretary of Defense retired from the controversy.
Reminding Gray through intermediaries that he had approved the Army's
plan in outline form, Johnson declared that it was "inappropriate" for
him to approve the plan's publication as an Army circular as the Army
had requested.[14-97] About the same time, Niles informed the Army
that any revision of Circular 124 would have to be submitted to the
White House before publication, and he candidly admitted that
presidential approval would depend on the views of the Fahy
Committee.[14-98] Meanwhile, his assistant, Philleo Nash, predicting
that the committee would win both the assignment and quota arguments,
persuaded Fahy to postpone any public statement until after the Army's
revised circular had been reviewed by the committee.[14-99]

[Footnote 14-96: Penciled Note, signed HST, on Memo,
Niles for President, Secretary's File (PSF), Truman
Library.]

[Footnote 14-97: Memo, Maj Gen Levin C. Allen, Exec
Secy, SecDef, for SA, 14 Oct 49; Memo, Vice Adm
John McCrea, Dir of Staff, PPB, for Allen, 25 Oct
49; both in CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 14-98: Memo for Rcd, Karl Bendetsen, Spec
Consultant to SA, 28 Nov 49, SA files; Ltr,
Kenworthy to Fahy, 22 Nov 49, and Memo, Kenworthy
for Fahy Cmte, 29 Oct 49, sub: Background to
Proposed Letter to Gray; both in Fahy Papers,
Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-99: Ltr, Fahy to Cmte, 17 Nov 49, Fahy
Papers, Truman Library.]

Chairman Fahy was fully aware of the leverage these actions gave his
committee, although he and his associates now had few illusions about
the speedy end to the contest. "I know from the best authority within
P&A," Kenworthy warned the committee, that the obstructionists in Army
Personnel hoped to see the committee submit final recommendations--"what
its recommendations are they don't much care"--and then disband. Until
the committee disbanded, its opponents would try to block any real
change in Army policy.[14-100] Kenworthy offered in evidence the
current controversy over the Army's instructions to its field
commanders. These instructions, a copy of the outline plan (p. 367)
approved by Secretary Johnson, had been sent to the commanders by The
Adjutant General on 1 October as "additional policies" pending a
revision of Circular 124.[14-101] Included in the message, of course,
was Gray's order to open all military occupational specialties to
Negroes; but when some commanders, on the basis of their
interpretation of the message, began integrating black specialists in
white units, officials in the Personnel and Administration and the
Organization and Training Divisions dispatched a second message on 27
October specifically forbidding such action "except on Department of
Army orders."[14-102] Negroes would continue to be authorized for
assignment to black units, the message explained, and to "Negro spaces
in T/D [overhead] units." In effect, the Army staff was ordering
commanders to interpret the secretary's plan in its narrowest sense,
blocking any possibility of broadening the range of black assignments.

[Footnote 14-100: Memo, Kenworthy for Cmte, 29 Oct 49,
sub: Background to Proposed Letter to Gray, Fahy
Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-101: Msg, TAG to Chief, AFF, et al., WCL
45586, 011900Z Oct 49, copy in AG 220.3.]

[Footnote 14-102: Memo, D/PA for TAG, 25 Oct 49, sub:
Assignment of Negro Enlisted Personnel, with
attached Memo for Rcd, Col John H. Riepe, Chief,
Manpower Control Gp, D/PA; Memo, Deputy Dir, PA,
for Gen Brooks (Dir of PA), 3 Nov 49, same sub;
Msg, TAG to Chief, AFF, et al., WCL 20682, 27 Oct
49. All in CSGPA 291.2 (25 Oct 49).]

Kenworthy was able to turn this incident to the committee's advantage.
He made a practice of never locking his Pentagon office door nor his
desk drawer. He knew that Negroes, both civilian and military, worked
in the message centers, and he suspected that if any hanky-panky was
afoot they would discover it and he would be anonymously apprised of
it. A few days after the dispatch of the second message, Kenworthy
opened his desk drawer to find a copy. For the first and only time, he
later explained, he broke his self-imposed rule of relying on
negotiations between the military and the committee and its staff _in
camera_. He laid both messages before a long-time friend of his, the
editor of the Washington _Post_'s editorial page.[14-103] Thus
delivered to the press, the second message brought on another round of
accusations, corrections, and headlines to the effect that "The Brass
Gives Gray the Run-Around." Kenworthy was able to denounce the
incident as a "step backward" that even violated the Gillem Board
policy by allocating "Negro spaces" in overhead units. The Army
staff's second message nullified the committee's recommendations since
they depended ultimately on the unlimited assignment of black
specialists. The message demonstrated very well, Kenworthy told the
committee, that careful supervision of the Army's racial policy would
be necessary.[14-104] Some newspapers were less charitable. The
Pittsburgh _Courier_ charged that the colonel blamed for the release
of the second message had been made the "goat" in a case that involved
far more senior officials, and the Washington _Post_ claimed that the
message "vitiates" even the limited improvements outlined in the
Army's plan as approved by Secretary Johnson. The paper called on
Secretary Gray to assert himself in the case.[14-105]

[Footnote 14-103: Memo, Kenworthy for Chief of
Military History, 13 Oct 76, CMH.]

[Footnote 14-104: Idem for Cmte, 29 Oct 49, sub:
Instructions to Commanding Generals on New Army
Policy, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-105: Lem Graves, Jr. (Washington
correspondent of the Pittsburgh _Courier_), "A
Colonel Takes the Rap," Pittsburgh _Courier_,
October 29, 1949; Washington _Post_, November 3,
1949.]

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