Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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On the basis of evidence submitted by his long-standing study group,
General Edwards concluded that current Air Force policy for the use of
black manpower was "wasteful, deleterious to military effectiveness
and lacking in wartime application." The policy of the Navy was
superior, he told the Chief of Staff and the secretary, with respect
to military effectiveness, economy, and morale, especially when the
needs of full mobilization were considered. The Air Force would (p. 340)
profit by adopting a policy similar to that of the Navy, and he
proposed a program, to be "vigorously implemented and monitored," that
would inactivate the all-black fighter wing and transfer qualified
black servicemen from that wing as well as from all the major commands
to white units. One exception would be that those black specialists,
whose work was essential to the continued operation of their units,
would stay in their black units. Some black units would be retained to
provide for individuals ineligible for transfer to white units or for
discharge.

[Illustration: SECRETARY SYMINGTON.]

The new program would abolish the 10 percent quota and develop
recruiting methods to enable the Air Force to secure only the "best
qualified" enlistees of both races. Men chronically ineligible for
advancement, both black and white, would be eliminated. If too many
Negroes enlisted despite these measures, Edwards explained that an
"administratively determined ceiling of Negro intake" could be
established, but the Air Force had no intention of establishing a
minimum for black enlistees. As the Director of Personnel Planning put
it, a racial floor was just as much a quota as a racial ceiling and
had the same effect of denying opportunity to some while providing
special consideration for others.[13-86]

[Footnote 13-86: Memo, Dir, Personnel Planning USAF,
for the Fahy Cmte, 15 Jan 49, sub: Air Force
Policies Regarding Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]

The manpower experts had decided that the social complications of such
a policy would be negligible--"more imaginary than real." Edwards
referred to the Navy's experience with limited integration, which, he
judged, had relieved rather than multiplied social tensions between
the races. Nevertheless he and his staff proposed "as a conservative
but progressive step" toward the integration of living quarters that
the Air Force arrange for separate sleeping quarters for blacks and
whites. The so-called "barracks problem" was the principal point of
discussion within the Air staff, Edwards admitted, and "perhaps the
most critical point of the entire policy." He predicted that the trend
toward more privacy in barracks, especially the separate cubicles
provided in construction plans for new barracks, would help solve
whatever problems might arise.[13-87]

[Footnote 13-87: Summary Sheet DCS/P, USAF, for CS,
USAF, and SecAF, 29 Dec 48, sub: Air Force Policies
on Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]

While the Chief of Staff, General Vandenberg, initialed the program
without comment, Assistant Secretary Zuckert was enthusiastic. As
Zuckert explained to Symington, the program was predicated on free
competition for all Air Force jobs, and he believed that it would also
eliminate social discrimination by giving black officers and men (p. 341)
all the privileges of Air Force social facilities. Although he
admitted that in the matter of living arrangements the plan "only goes
part way," he too was confident that time and changes in barracks
construction would eliminate any problems.[13-88]

[Footnote 13-88: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 5 Jan 49,
SecAF files.]

Symington was already familiar with most of Edwards's conclusions, for
a summary had been sent him by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff on 22
December "for background."[13-89] When he received Zuckert's comments he
acted quickly. The next day he let the Secretary of Defense know what
the Air Force was doing. "We propose," he told Forrestal, "to adopt a
policy of integration." But he qualified that statement along the
lines suggested by the Air staff: "Although there will still be units
manned entirely by Negroes, all Negroes will not necessarily be
assigned to these units. Qualified Negro personnel will be assigned to
any duties in any Air Force activity strictly on the basis of the
qualifications of the individual and the needs of the Air Force."[13-90]
Symington tied the new program to military efficiency, explaining to
Forrestal that efficient use of black servicemen was one of the
essentials of economic and effective air power. In this vein he
summarized the program and listed what he considered its advantages
for the Air Force.

[Footnote 13-89: Memo, Maj Gen William F. McKee for
Symington, 22 Dec 48, sub: Mr. Royall's Negro
Experiment, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 13-90: Memo, SecAF for Forrestal, 6 Jan 49,
Negro Affairs, 1949, SecAF files.]

The proposal forwarded to the Secretary of Defense in January 1949
committed the Air Force to a limited integration policy frankly
imitative of the Navy's. A major improvement over the Air Force's
current practices, the plan still fell considerably short of the
long-range goals enunciated in the Gillem Board Report, to say nothing
of the implications of the President's equal opportunity order.
Although it is impossible to say exactly why Symington decided to
settle for less than full integration, there are several explanations
worth considering.

In the first place the program sent to Forrestal may well not have
reflected the exact views of the Air Force secretary, nor conveyed all
that his principal manpower assistant intended. Actually, the concern
expressed by Air Force officials for military efficiency and by civil
rights leaders for equal opportunity always centered specifically on
the problems of the black tactical air unit and related specialist
billets at Lockbourne Air Force Base. In fact, the need to solve the
pressing administrative problems of Colonel Davis's command provoked
the Air staff study that eventually evolved into the integration
program. The program itself focused on this command and provided for
the integrated assignment of its members throughout the Air Force.
Other black enlisted men, certainly those serving as laborers in the F
Squadrons, scattered worldwide, did not pose a comparable manpower
problem. They were ignored on the theory that abolition of the quota,
along with the application of more stringent recruitment procedures,
would in time rid the services of its unskilled and unneeded men.

It can be argued that the purpose of the limited integration proposal
was not so much to devise a new policy as to minimize the impact of
change on congressional opponents. Edwards certainly hoped that his
plan would placate senior commanders and staff officers who (p. 342)
opposed integration or feared the social upheaval they assumed would
follow the abolition of all black units. This explanation would
account for the cautious approach to racial mixing in the proposal,
the elaborate administrative safeguards against social confrontation,
and the promised reduction in the number of black airmen. Some of
those pressing for the new program certainly considered the retention
of segregated units a stopgap measure designed to prevent a too
precipitous reorganization of the service. As Lt. Col. Jack Marr, a
member of Edwards's staff and author of the staff's integration study,
explained to the Fahy Committee, "we are trying to do our best not to
tear the Air Force all apart and try to reorganize it overnight."[13-91]
Marr predicted that as those eligible for reassignment were
transferred out of black units, the units themselves, bereft of
essential personnel, would become inoperative and disappear one by
one.

[Footnote 13-91: Testimony of Lt Col Jack F. Marr
Before President's Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 13
Jan 49, afternoon session, p 46.]

In the end it must be admitted that race relations possess an inner
dynamic, and it is impossible to relate the integration of the Air
Force to any isolated decision by a secretary or proposal by a group
from his military staff. The decision to integrate was the result of
several disparate forces--the political interests of the
administration, the manpower needs of the Air Force, the aspirations
of its black minority, and perhaps more than all the rest, the
acceptance by its airmen of a different social system. Together, these
factors would make successive steps to full integration impossible to
resist. Integration, then, was an evolutionary process, and
Symington's acceptance of a limited integration plan was only one step
in a continuing process that stretched from the Air staff's study of
black manpower in 1948 to the disappearance of the last black unit two
years later.

CHAPTER 14 (p. 343)

The Fahy Committee Versus the Department of Defense

Given James Forrestal's sympathy for integration, considerable
cooperation could be expected between members of his department and
the Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services, better known as the Fahy Committee. In the wake of the
committee's establishment, Forrestal proposed that the service
secretaries assign an assistant secretary to coordinate his
department's dealings with the group and a ranking black officer from
each service be assigned to advise the assistant secretaries.[14-1] His
own office promised to supply the committee with vital documentation,
and his manpower experts offered to testify. The service secretaries
agreed to follow suit.

[Footnote 14-1: Memo, SecDef for SA et al., 21 Oct 48,
copy in Fahy Committee file, CMH [hereafter cited
as FC file]. The Center of Military History has
retained an extensive collection of significant
primary materials pertaining to the Fahy Committee
and its dealings with the Department of Defense.
While most of the original documents are in the
Charles Fahy Papers and the Papers of the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services at the Harry S.
Truman Library or in the National Archives, this
study will cite the CMH collection when possible.]

Willing to cooperate, Forrestal still wanted to chart his own course.
Both he and his successor, Louis A. Johnson, made it quite clear that
as a senior cabinet officer the Secretary of Defense was accountable
in all matters to the President alone. The Fahy Committee might report
on the department's racial practices and suggest changes, but the
development of policy was his prerogative. Both men dealt directly
with the committee from time to time, but their directives to the
services on the formulation of race policy were developed
independently of the White House group.[14-2] Underscoring this
independent attitude, Marx Leva reminded the service secretaries that
the members of the Personnel Policy Board were to work with the
representatives of their respective staffs on racial matters. They
were not expected "to assist Fahy."[14-3]

[Footnote 14-2: Ltrs, James Forrestal to Fahy, 26 Mar
49, and Louis Johnson to Fahy, 18 Apr 49; both in
FC file. See also Ltr, Thomas R. Reid to R. M.
Dalfiume, 12 Feb 65, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 14-3: Min, Cmte of Four Secretaries Mtg, 26
Oct 48, Office of OSD Historian. The Committee of
the Four Secretaries was an informal body composed
of the Secretary of Defense or his representative
and the secretaries of the three armed services.]

At the same time Secretary of Defense Forrestal was aware that the
interests of a committee enjoying White House support could not be
ignored. His attempt to develop a new racial policy was probably in
part an effort to forestall committee criticism and in part a wish to
draw up a policy that would satisfy the committee without really doing
much to change things. After all, such a departmental attitude toward
committees, both congressional and presidential, was fairly normal.
Faced with the conflicting racial policies of the Air Force and Army,
Forrestal agreed to let the services present their separate (p. 344)
programs to the Fahy Committee, but he wanted to develop a race policy
applicable to all the services.[14-4] Some of his subordinates debated
the wisdom of this decision, arguing that the President had assigned
that task to the Fahy Committee, but they were overruled. Forrestal
ordered the newly created Personnel Policy Board to undertake,
simultaneously with the committee, a study of the department's racial
policy. The board was to concentrate on "breaking down the problem,"
as Forrestal put it, into its component parts and trying to arrive
quietly at areas of agreement on a uniform policy that could be held
in readiness until the Fahy Committee made its report.[14-5]

[Footnote 14-4: Min, War Council Mtg, 12 Jan 49,
Office of OSD Historian; Memo, Secy of War Council
for SA et al., 13 Jan 49, sub: Significant Action
of the Special Meeting of the War Council on 12
January 1949, OSD 291.2. The War Council,
established by Section 210 of the National Security
Act of 1947, consisted of the Secretary of Defense
as chairman with power of decision, the service
secretaries, and the military chiefs of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.]

[Footnote 14-5: Memo, Thomas R. Reid, Chmn, PPB, for
Worthington Thompson, OSD, 15 Feb 49, sub: Meeting
of Committee of Four, 10 A.M. Tuesday--15 February,
FC file.]

The Personnel Policy Board, established by Forrestal to help regulate
the military and civilian policies of his large department, was the
logical place to prepare a departmental racial policy.[14-6] But could a
group basically interservice in nature be expected to develop a
forceful, independent racial policy for all the services along the
lines Forrestal appeared to be following? It seemed unlikely, for at
their first meeting the board members agreed that any policy developed
must be "satisfactory to the three services."[14-7]

[Footnote 14-6: Forrestal signed an interim directive
appointing members of the board on 22 February
1949. Composed of a civilian chairman and an under
secretary or assistant secretary from each service,
the board was to have a staff of personnel experts
under a director, an officer of flag rank,
appointed by the chairman; see NME Press Releases,
28 Dec 48, and 1 Apr 49.]

[Footnote 14-7: Min PPB Mtg, 26 Feb 49, FC file.]

Undeterred by members' calling for more investigation and debate
before the board prepared a common policy, Chairman Thomas R. Reid and
his chief of staff, Army Brig. Gen. Charles T. Lanham, acted.[14-8] On 28
February they drafted a directive for the Secretary of Defense that
would abolish all racial quotas and establish uniform standards of
induction for service which in times of emergency would include
provisions for the apportionment of enlistees both qualitatively and
quantitatively. Moreover, all black enlistees would be given the
opportunity to serve as individuals in integrated units. The services
would be completely integrated by 1 July 1950. To ease the change,
Reid and Lanham would in the interim regulate the number of Negroes in
integrated units, allowing not less than four men and not more than 10
percent in a company-size unit. Enlisted men could choose to serve
under officers of their own race.[14-9]

[Footnote 14-8: Memo, Col J. F. Cassidy, PPB, for Dir,
PPB Staff, 25 Feb 49, sub: Policies of the Three
Departments With Reference to Negro Personnel, FC
file.]

[Footnote 14-9: PPB, Draft (Reid and Lanham), Proposed
Directive for the Armed Forces for the Period 1
July 1949 to 1 July 1950, 28 Feb 49, FC file.]

Favorably received in the secretary's office, the proposed directive
came too late for speedy enactment. On 3 March Forrestal resigned, and
although Leva hoped the directive could be issued before Forrestal's
actual departure, "in view of his long-standing interest in this
field," Forrestal was obviously reluctant to commit his successor (p. 345)
to so drastic a course.[14-10] With a final bow to his belief in
service autonomy, Forrestal asked Reid and Lanham to submit their
proposal to the service secretaries for review.[14-11] The secretaries
approved the idea of a unified policy in principle, but each had very
definite and individual views on what that policy should contain and
how it should be carried out. Denied firm direction from the ailing
Forrestal, Reid and Lanham could do little against service opposition.
Their proposal was quietly tabled while the board continued its search
for an acceptable unified policy.

[Footnote 14-10: Note, Leva thru Ohly to Buck Lanham,
attached to Draft of Proposed Directive cited in n.
9.]

[Footnote 14-11: Memo, Chmn, PPB, for John Ohly,
Assistant to SecDef, 15 Mar 49; Revised Min, PPB
Mtg, 18 Mar 49; both in FC file.]

Perhaps it was just as well, for the Reid-Lanham draft had serious
defects. It failed to address the problems of qualitative imbalance in
the peacetime services, probably in deference to Forrestal's recent
rejection of the Army's call for a fair distribution of high-scoring
enlistees. While the proposal encouraged special training for Negroes,
it also limited their assignment to a strict 10 percent quota in any
unit. The result would have been an administrative nightmare, with
trained men in excess of the 10 percent quota assigned to other,
nonspecialty duties. As one manpower expert later admitted, "you ran
the real chance of haying black engineers and the like pushing
wheelbarrows."[14-12]

[Footnote 14-12: Interv, author with Roy K. Davenport,
7 Oct 71, CMH.]

The service objections to a carefully spelled out policy were in
themselves quite convincing to Lanham and Reid. Reid agreed with
Eugene Zuckert, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, that "probably
the most logical and soundest approach" was for each service to
prepare a policy statement and explain how it was being carried out.
The board could then prepare a general policy based on these
statements, and, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, send
it to the Fahy Committee in time for its report to the President.[14-13]
But if Zuckert's scheme was logical and sound, it also managed to
reduce the secretary's status to final endorsement officer. Such a
role never appealed to James Forrestal, and would be even less
acceptable to the politically energetic Louis Johnson, who succeeded
Forrestal as Secretary of Defense on 28 March 1949.

[Footnote 14-13: Memo for Files, Clarence H. Osthagen,
Assistant to SecAF, 31 Mar 49, sub: Conference With
Thomas Reid, FC file.]

Reid appreciated this distinction, and while he was willing to abandon
the idea of a policy directive spelling out matters of personnel
administration, he was determined that there be a general policy
statement on the subject and that it originate not with the services
but with the Secretary of Defense, who would then review individual
service plans for implementing his directive.[14-14] Reid set the board's
staff to this task, but it took several draftings, each stronger and
more specific than the last, before a directive acceptable to Reid and
Lanham was devised.[14-15] Approved by the full board on 5 April 1949 and
signed by Secretary Johnson the next day, the directive reiterated the
President's executive order, adding that all persons would be considered
on the basis of individual merit and ability and must qualify (p. 346)
according to the prescribed standards for enlistment, promotion,
assignment, and school attendance. All persons would be accorded equal
opportunity for appointment, advancement, professional improvement,
and retention, and although some segregated units would be retained,
"qualified" Negroes would be assigned without regard to race. The
secretary ordered the services to reexamine their policies and submit
detailed plans for carrying out this directive.[14-16]

[Footnote 14-14: Memo, Thomas Reid for Asst SecNav, 1
Apr 49, sub: Statement on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-15: PPB, Draft Memo, SecDef for Svc Secys
(prepared by Col J. F. Cassidy for Reid), 31 Mar
49; PPB, Proposed Policy for the National Military
Establishment, 4 Apr 49; both in FC file.]

[Footnote 14-16: Memo, SecDef for SA et al., 6 Apr 49,
sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Services; Min, PPB Mtg, 5 Apr 49; both in FC
file.]

Although responsible for preparing the secretary's directive, Reid and
Lanham had second thoughts about it. They were concerned lest the
services treat it as an endorsement of their current policies. Reid
pointedly explained to their representatives on the Personnel Policy
Board that the service statements due by 1 May should not merely
reiterate present practices, but should represent a "sincere effort"
by the departments to move toward greater racial equality.[14-17] Service
responses, he warned, would be scrutinized to determine "their
adequacy in the light of the intent of the Secretary's policy." Reid
later admitted to Secretary Johnson that the directive was so broadly
formed that it "permits almost any practice under it."[14-18] He, Lanham,
and others agreed that since its contents were bound to reach the
press anyway, the policy should be publicized in a way that played
down generalizations and emphasized the responsibilities it imposed
for new directions. Johnson agreed, and the announcement of his
directive, emphasizing the importance of new service programs and
setting a deadline for their submission, was widely circulated.[14-19]

[Footnote 14-17: Min, PPB Mtg, 8 Apr 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-18: Memo, Reid for SecDef, 14 Apr 49,
sub: The President's Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, FC
file.]

[Footnote 14-19: Min, PPB Mtg, 5 May 49; NME Press
Release 3-49A, 20 Apr 49; both in FC file.]

The directive reflected Louis Johnson's personality, ambition, and
administrative strategy. If many of his associates questioned his
personal commitment to the principle of integration, or indeed even
his private feeling about President Truman's order, all recognized his
political ambition and penchant for vigorous and direct action.[14-20]
The secretary would recognize the political implications of the
executive order just as he would want to exercise personal control
over integration, an issue fraught with political uncertainties that
an independent presidential committee would only multiply. A dramatic
public statement might well serve Johnson's needs. By creating at
least the illusion of forward motion in the field of race relations, a
directive issued by the Secretary of Defense might neutralize the Fahy
Committee as an independent force, protecting the services from
outside interference while enhancing Johnson's position in the White
House and with the press. A "blustering bully," one of Fahy's
assistants later called Johnson, whose directive was designed, he
charged, to put the Fahy Committee out of business.[14-21]

[Footnote 14-20: This conclusion is based on
Interviews, author with Charles Fahy, 8 Feb 68,
James C. Evans, 6 Apr 69, and Brig Gen Charles T.
Lanham, 10 Jan 71. It is also based on letters to
author from John Ohly, 9 Jan 71, and Thomas Reid,
15 Jan 71. All in CMH.]